Military Readiness: Joint Policy Needed to Better Manage the
Training and Use of Certain Forces to Meet Operational Demands
(30-MAY-08, GAO-08-670).
Military operations in support of the Global War on Terrorism,
particularly those in Iraq and Afghanistan, have challenged the
Department of Defense's (DOD) ability to provide needed ground
forces. Section 354 of the Fiscal Year 2008 National Defense
Authorization Act directed GAO to report on a number of military
readiness issues. In this report, GAO addresses (1) the extent to
which DOD's use of nonstandard forces to meet ground force
requirements has impacted the force and (2) the extent to which
DOD has faced challenges in managing the training and use of
these forces, and taken steps to address any challenges. To
address these objectives, GAO analyzed DOD policies, guidance,
and data and interviewed department, joint, combatant command,
and service officials as well as trainers and over 300 deploying,
deployed, and redeploying servicemembers.
-------------------------Indexing Terms-------------------------
REPORTNUM: GAO-08-670
ACCNO: A82224
TITLE: Military Readiness: Joint Policy Needed to Better Manage
the Training and Use of Certain Forces to Meet Operational
Demands
DATE: 05/30/2008
SUBJECT: Combat readiness
Defense capabilities
Defense contingency planning
Defense operations
Force planning
Military forces
Military officers
Military operations
Military personnel
Military personnel deployment
Military training
Mission essential operations
National defense operations
Standards
Strategic forces
Strategic planning
Training utilization
program goals or objectives
Afghanistan
Global War on Terrorism
Iraq
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GAO-08-670
This is the accessible text file for GAO report number GAO-08-670
entitled 'Military Readiness: Joint Policy Needed to Better Manage the
Training and Use of Certain Forces to Meet Operational Demands' which
was released on May 30, 2008.
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Report to the Committee on Armed Services, U.S. Senate and the
Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives:
United States Government Accountability Office:
GAO:
May 2008:
Military Readiness:
Joint Policy Needed to Better Manage the Training and Use of Certain
Forces to Meet Operational Demands:
GAO-08-670:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-08-670, a report to the Committee on Armed Services,
U.S. Senate, and the Committee on Armed Services, House of
Representatives.
Why GAO Did This Study:
Military operations in support of the Global War on Terrorism,
particularly those in Iraq and Afghanistan, have challenged the
Department of Defense�s (DOD) ability to provide needed ground forces.
Section 354 of the Fiscal Year 2008 National Defense Authorization Act
directed GAO to report on a number of military readiness issues. In
this report, GAO addresses (1) the extent to which DOD�s use of
nonstandard forces to meet ground force requirements has impacted the
force and (2) the extent to which DOD has faced challenges in managing
the training and use of these forces, and taken steps to address any
challenges. To address these objectives, GAO analyzed DOD policies,
guidance, and data and interviewed department, joint, combatant
command, and service officials as well as trainers and over 300
deploying, deployed, and redeploying servicemembers.
What GAO Found:
The use of nonstandard forces�individuals in certain temporary
positions, and units with missions that require the unit personnel to
learn new skills or operate in different environments�has helped DOD
fulfill U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) requirements that the Army
otherwise would not have been able to fill, but these efforts have also
caused challenges across the force. For certain Navy and Air Force
occupational specialties, these nonstandard force deployments have
challenged the services� abilities to (1) balance the amount of time
their forces are deployed with the amount of time they spend at home,
and (2) meet other standard mission requirements. Some of the
communities that have been most affected by nonstandard force
deployments include the engineering, security force, and explosive
ordnance disposal communities. In addition, the services have been
challenged by emerging requirements for capabilities which do not exist
in any of the services� standard forces, such as the transition teams
that train local forces in Iraq and Afghanistan. These requirements are
particularly taxing because the teams are composed primarily of
officers and senior noncommissioned officers. Because standard forces
do not exist to meet these leadership requirements, the services are
forced to take leaders from other commands, which must then perform
their missions without a full complement of leaders.
The steps that DOD has taken to increase coordination between the
services and CENTCOM have helped DOD manage challenges related to
nonstandard forces, but additional steps are needed to ensure
consistency in training and using these forces. Nonstandard forces face
more complex relationships than standard forces, making coordination of
their training and use more challenging. Specifically, their training
requirements are established by both the services and theater
commanders and training may be conducted by trainers from another
service. In addition, while deployed, these forces often report to
commanders from two different services. Furthermore, authorities
concerning the training and use of forces do not specifically address
the training and use of nonstandard forces. DOD has taken significant
steps to coordinate the training of its nonstandard forces through
regular conferences at which CENTCOM and service officials develop
detailed training plans for some nonstandard forces. However, the
training of individual augmentees has not been fully coordinated. As a
result, individuals who perform the same types of tasks may receive
different levels of training. Also, the services waive training
requirements without consistently coordinating with CENTCOM, so CENTCOM
lacks full visibility over the extent to which all of its forces have
met requirements. To increase support and oversight of the use of
nonstandard forces in theater, the services have taken steps to improve
coordination, which have reduced instances where nonstandard forces�
missions, tasks, or organization are modified. However, the services do
not have full visibility over their nonstandard forces and view the
authority of ground force commanders differently, which has sometimes
led to differences in their use of nonstandard forces.
What GAO Recommends:
To better manage the training and use of nonstandard forces, GAO
recommends that DOD develop and issue a policy, which clarifies:
responsibilities for the training of all nonstandard forces, including
individual augmentees; training waiver responsibilities and procedures;
and the nature and extent of ground force commanders� authorities to
direct the use of nonstandard forces. DOD concurred with this
recommendation and stated it has work underway to review existing
policy and to ensure necessary guidance is in place.
To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-08-670]. For more
information, contact Sharon L. Pickup at (202) 512-9619 or
[email protected].
[End of section]
Contents:
Letter:
Results in Brief:
Background:
The Use of Nonstandard Forces Has Helped DOD to Meet CENTCOM
Requirements but Has Also Created New Challenges:
Increased Coordination Has Helped DOD Address Some Challenges Related
to the Training and Use of Nonstandard Forces, but Other Challenges
Still Remain:
Conclusions:
Recommendation for Executive Action:
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology:
Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Defense:
Appendix III: Military Command and Control Relationships:
Appendix IV: Training Requirements for Nonstandard Forces Deploying to
U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM):
Appendix V: Servicemembers' Perceptions of Preparation for Nonstandard
Force Deployments:
Appendix VI: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
Related GAO Products:
Abbreviations:
CENTCOM: U.S. Central Command:
DOD: Department of Defense:
EOD: explosive ordnance disposal:
HMMWV: High-Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle:
NDAA: National Defense Authorization Act:
OSD: Office of the Secretary of Defense:
SEAL: Sea, Air, Land:
[End of section]
United States Government Accountability Office:
Washington, DC 20548:
May 30, 2008:
The Honorable Carl Levin:
Chairman:
The Honorable John McCain:
Ranking Member:
Committee on Armed Services:
United States Senate:
The Honorable Ike Skelton:
Chairman:
The Honorable Duncan L. Hunter:
Ranking Member:
Committee on Armed Services:
House of Representatives:
Since 2001, over a million U.S. Army and Marine Corps servicemembers
have been deployed abroad for military operations in support of the
Global War on Terrorism, and the demands of current operations,
particularly in Iraq and Afghanistan, have challenged the ability of
the Army and Marine Corps to provide needed ground forces. In response
to the high demand for ground forces and the high operations tempos of
Army and Marine Corps forces, the Department of Defense (DOD) has taken
steps to broaden the pool from which it can draw forces. Specifically,
DOD has helped to mitigate the demands on the Army by deploying
personnel from the Navy and the Air Force, and it has deployed
personnel from all four services to meet emerging demands for leaders.
In this report, we distinguish between "standard forces" and
"nonstandard forces." Standard forces perform their core missions
within service deployment constructs, such as Army brigades or Marine
Corps regiments. Nonstandard forces refer to a broad range of forces
that are currently being used to augment DOD's standard forces and meet
ongoing demands, primarily in the U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) area
of operations. Specifically, we use the term nonstandard forces to
include four different groups of forces that DOD has categorized as
follows:
* Joint sourced forces--units from one service that are deployed to
perform their core missions in place of units from another service; for
example, Navy or Air Force medical units deployed to fill requirements
for Army medical units.
* In-lieu-of forces--units trained and deployed to execute missions
outside of their core competencies; for example, Army artillery units
that are trained and then deployed to fill requirements for military
police units.
* Ad-hoc forces--temporary units formed by consolidating individuals
and equipment from various commands or services and then training these
personnel to meet mission requirements; for example, the transition
teams that are currently training Iraqi and Afghan forces.
* Individual augmentees--individuals deployed for temporary positions
that augment staff operations during contingencies; for example,
individuals deployed to fill temporary positions in the Multinational
Force-Iraq joint headquarters.
The National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2008
[Footnote 1] modified the Comptroller General's requirements for
reporting on the readiness of Army and Marine Corps ground forces
outlined in the John Warner National Defense Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 2007.[Footnote 2] In response to these requirements, we are
issuing a series of products on readiness issues; a list is included at
the end of this report. This report addresses DOD's efforts to mitigate
the impact of high operational tempos specifically, assessing (1) the
extent to which DOD's use of nonstandard forces to meet ground force
requirements has impacted the force, and (2) the extent to which DOD
has faced challenges in managing the training and use of these forces,
and taken steps to address any challenges.
To assess the extent to which DOD's use of nonstandard forces has
impacted the force, we analyzed documents provided by the Office of the
Secretary of Defense (OSD), the Joint Staff, U.S. Joint Forces Command,
and the services, and we discussed the impacts of using nonstandard
forces with officials from these organizations and with individual
servicemembers. To assess the extent to which DOD has faced challenges
in managing the training and use of these forces, and taken steps to
address any challenges, we reviewed and analyzed portions of the United
States Code that deal with service and combatant command
responsibilities for preparing their forces, as well as OSD, Joint
Staff, combatant command, and service policies and guidance. We also
interviewed department, joint, combatant command, and service officials
as well as trainers and individual servicemembers. Specifically, we
traveled to the CENTCOM area of operations in November 2007 and
conducted group discussions with over 300 servicemembers who had
deployed to CENTCOM for nonstandard force missions. Each servicemember
also completed a questionnaire at the end of the discussion group
sessions. Most of these personnel were Air Force servicemembers who
were completing their deployments and in the process of redeploying
from Iraq to the United States through Kuwait, but we also interviewed
redeploying Navy and Army personnel. Many of the servicemembers we met
with had performed engineering, detainee operations, or convoy
missions, which are among the largest nonstandard missions in Iraq. We
also interviewed officials from the commands that oversee the
deployment of nonstandard forces in the CENTCOM area of operations as
well as officials responsible for the oversight of personnel from
specific specialties, such as explosive ordnance disposal. Additional
information about our scope and methodology can be found in appendix I.
We conducted this performance audit from July 2007 through April 2008,
in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain
sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that
the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and
conclusions based on our audit objectives.
Results in Brief:
DOD has used Navy and Air Force personnel to fill some CENTCOM force
requirements that would otherwise have exceeded the Army's capacity to
supply personnel and it has also deployed individuals to meet new
demands for leaders, but these efforts have created other challenges
for the services. By deploying nonstandard forces in addition to its
standard forces, DOD has spread the CENTCOM requirements for ongoing
operations across a wider portion of the force, but available data
indicate that nonstandard forces represent a small portion of the total
deployed force. While deployments of Navy and Air Force nonstandard
forces have helped to mitigate the high demands for Army forces, some
requirements, such as those for explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) and
medical personnel, can be met only by a small number of highly skilled
individuals from among the services. Other requirements, such as those
for military police, have been met with a larger group of nonstandard
forces. Although the use of nonstandard forces has helped DOD fill
CENTCOM requirements that the Army otherwise would not have been able
to fill, it has also challenged the Navy's and the Air Force's
abilities to balance the amount of time their forces are deployed with
the amount of time they spend at home, as well as their abilities to
meet other mission requirements. Despite these challenges, the Navy and
the Air Force have stated that they can sustain the current level of
nonstandard force contributions in support of ongoing operations, but
not without causing strain on the force. In addition, over the course
of ongoing operations, requirements have emerged for new capabilities
that do not reside in any of the services' force structures.
Requirements for individual augmentees and the transition teams that
train local forces in Iraq and Afghanistan are the most common examples
of these emerging requirements. Both sets of requirements are focused
on leaders--primarily officers and middle-to senior-grade
noncommissioned officers. This demand for leaders has created
challenges for the services because the leaders are generally pulled
from other units or commands, which are left to perform their missions
without their full complement of leaders. The demand also increases
deployment rates for the individual leaders who fill the positions.
The steps that DOD has taken to increase coordination between the
services and CENTCOM--or its ground force commanders--have helped DOD
manage challenges related to nonstandard forces, but additional steps
are needed to ensure consistency in the training and use of these
forces. Nonstandard forces face more complex relationships than
standard forces, making coordination of their training and use more
challenging. Specifically, their training requirements are established
by both the services and commanders in theater and much of their
training may be conducted by trainers from another service. In
addition, while they are deployed, these forces often report to
commanders from two different services. Furthermore, joint doctrine
concerning the training and use of forces does not specifically address
the training and use of nonstandard forces, with their complex training
and command relationships. DOD has taken significant steps to
coordinate the training of its nonstandard forces through regular
conferences at which CENTCOM, U.S. Joint Forces Command, and service
officials develop detailed training plans for some nonstandard forces.
However, the training of individual augmentees has not been fully
coordinated; as a result, individuals who perform the same types of
tasks in theater may receive different levels of training. Also, the
services waive some training requirements without consistently
coordinating with CENTCOM, so CENTCOM lacks full visibility over the
extent to which all of its assigned forces have met its training
requirements. To increase support and oversight of the use of
nonstandard forces in theater, the services since 2004 have taken steps
to improve coordination with the ground force commanders who provide
the day-to-day taskings for these forces. Air Force commanders said
that the increased coordination with ground force commanders has
reduced the number of instances in which ground force commanders have
modified the missions, tasks, or organization of Air Force nonstandard
forces, and the Navy's similar coordination efforts have allowed it to
more easily limit the extent to which its nonstandard forces perform
tasks for which they have not been fully trained and equipped. Despite
these coordination efforts, we noted that the Navy and the Air Force do
not always have full visibility over commanders' use of nonstandard
forces in theater, and have differing views on the authority of ground
force commanders, which has sometimes led to differences in the use of
nonstandard forces.
To better manage the training and use of nonstandard forces, we are
recommending that the Secretary of Defense direct the Office of the
Secretary of Defense (Personnel and Readiness), in consultation with
the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, to develop and issue a
policy to guide the training and use of nonstandard forces. At a
minimum, the policy should clarify: responsibilities for the training
of all nonstandard forces, including individual augmentees; training
waiver responsibilities and procedures; and the nature and extent of
ground force commanders' authorities to direct the use of nonstandard
forces. In its comments on a draft of this report, DOD concurred with
our recommendation and stated it has work underway to review existing
policy and ensure that guidance is in place for effective training and
equipping of nonstandard forces and individual augmentees. In addition,
DOD provided technical comments, which we have incorporated in the
report as appropriate. DOD's comments are reprinted in their entirety
in appendix II.
Background:
Military Roles and Responsibilities:
The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is the top military advisor
to the Secretary of Defense and the President and has many
responsibilities, which include the development of a number of
overarching military plans and policies. The Chairman has set forth
doctrine that addresses command relationships and authorities,
principles for command and control, guidance for organizing joint
forces and other selected joint activities in Joint Publication 1,
Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States, and provides
further detail on such issues as they relate to joint land operations
in Joint Publication 3-31, Command and Control for Joint Land
Operations.[Footnote 3]
The U.S. military's global presence is organized into a series of
geographic combatant commands. The commander of each combatant command
has authority over assigned U.S. military forces operating within that
command's area of operations and is directly responsible for planning
and conducting the operations that achieve national, alliance, or
coalition strategic objectives based on directives that flow from the
President and the Secretary of Defense. Combatant commanders may
exercise this authority through subordinate joint force commanders. The
commander of U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) has authority to direct all
aspects of military operations in the command's area of responsibility.
Joint force commanders under CENTCOM are responsible for conducting
region-specific operations, such as Operations Iraqi Freedom in Iraq
and Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan. For example, in Iraq, the
commander of Multinational Force-Iraq--a CENTCOM joint force commander-
-provides direction to the commander of Multinational Corps-Iraq, who
in turn directs the joint force commanders responsible for particular
regions within Iraq. Regional commanders in Iraq control the brigade-
sized units operating in their areas. Army brigade combat teams or
Marine Corps regimental combat teams are led by experienced officers
who generally have broad responsibilities for conducting missions with
their assigned forces. When these ground force commanders are directing
standard forces from their own services, they are responsible not only
for directing the day-to-day movements of these forces, but also for
organizing them and determining the scope of their missions within the
parameters set by higher command authority. When ground force
commanders control forces from more than one service, joint doctrine
requires that they synchronize the unique capabilities and limitations
of each force in order to achieve unity of effort.[Footnote 4]
Combatant commanders and service secretaries have responsibilities
related to ensuring the preparedness of forces that are assigned to the
combatant commands. Under Title 10 of the U.S. Code,[Footnote 5] the
commander of a combatant command is directly responsible for the
preparedness of the command to carry out assigned missions and each
service secretary is responsible for training and carrying out the
functions of the service so as to fulfill the current and future
operational requirements of the combatant commands. For example, when
the Army provides standard forces to a combatant command such as
CENTCOM, it takes steps to ensure that these forces meet Army training
requirements and certifies that these requirements have been completed
before deploying its servicemembers. In addition, these forces
generally are commanded in theater by a subordinate commander from
their own service. Because section 164 of Title 10 of the United States
Code also gives combatant commanders wide-reaching authority over their
assigned forces--including the authority to coordinate joint training-
-CENTCOM and its ground component command have issued lists of required
training tasks that apply to forces deploying to the CENTCOM area of
operations. Coordination of service and combatant commander
responsibilities and training requirements is generally straightforward
and simple when it involves standard forces because standard forces are
normally trained by their parent service and then directed in theater
by commanders from the same service, who organize them, determine the
scope of their missions, and direct their the day- to-day movements.
Meeting Requirements with Nonstandard Forces:
Combatant commands like CENTCOM state their need for forces using
various requirements documents, such as Requests for Forces and Joint
Manning Documents. The joint and service force providers are
responsible for identifying forces available to meet these combatant
command requirements. The force providers have used two types of forces
to meet CENTCOM requirements--standard forces and nonstandard forces.
Standard forces perform their core missions within service deployment
constructs.[Footnote 6] Ongoing operations in Iraq and Afghanistan have
required large numbers of ground forces, including requirements for
certain combat support and combat service support skills. Engineering,
explosive ordnance disposal (EOD), and detainee operations personnel
have been in particularly high demand. As the Army and Marine Corps
standard forces that were filling these CENTCOM requirements began to
approach or exceed DOD's deployment rotation goals, DOD looked to
nonstandard forces as a way to help meet the large CENTCOM
requirements. DOD has relied on the following nonstandard forces.
* Joint sourced forces: These are forces from one service deployed to
perform their core missions in place of units from another service. An
example would be a Navy Mobile Construction Battalion filling an Army
combat heavy engineer requirement.
* In-lieu-of forces: These are forces trained and deployed to execute
missions outside of their core competencies. An example would be taking
an existing Army artillery battalion, providing it with training and
equipment, and deploying it to fill a transportation or military police
requirement.
* Ad-hoc forces: These are temporary forces formed by consolidating
individuals and equipment from various commands or services and then
training the personnel to meet mission requirements. The most common ad-
hoc units are the transition teams that are training Iraqi and Afghan
forces.
* Individual augmentees: These are individuals deployed for temporary
positions that augment staff operations during contingencies. An
example would be individuals deployed to fill temporary positions in
the Multinational Force-Iraq joint headquarters.
We have previously testified that in order to meet the challenges of
ongoing operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, DOD has taken steps to
increase the availability of personnel for deploying units.[Footnote 7]
However, in the process, the services have been unable to meet DOD's
deployed/at home ratio goals, for some personnel. DOD's goal is for
active component personnel to be at home twice as long as they are
deployed. However, many forces, especially those in high demand, are
experiencing deployed/at home ratios of 1:2 or less. These goals have
been especially challenging for the Army, which has successively
increased the length of its Iraq deployments--from 6 to 12 and
eventually to 15 months. For reserve component personnel, DOD has set a
goal to limit involuntary mobilizations to 12 months, with 5 years
between involuntary mobilizations. However, when he issued these goals
in a January 2007 memorandum,[Footnote 8] the Secretary of Defense
noted that in the short term, DOD will not be able to meet the goals.
The Use of Nonstandard Forces Has Helped DOD to Meet CENTCOM
Requirements but Has Also Created New Challenges:
While DOD's limited use of nonstandard forces has spread large CENTCOM
requirements across a wider portion of the force, the use of
nonstandard forces has not alleviated the high pace of operations among
Army forces and it has created several new challenges for the services.
Specifically, it has exacerbated the high pace of operations for
selected Navy and Air Force occupational specialties. In addition,
nonstandard force requirements for individual leaders have created
challenges for the services because the leaders are generally pulled
from other units or commands, which are left to perform their missions
without their full complement of leaders. The demands also increase
deployment rates for the individual leaders who fill the positions.
Use of Nonstandard Forces Spreads Requirements Across More of the
Force, but Available Data Indicate That Nonstandard Forces Represent a
Small Portion of the Deployed Force:
By deploying nonstandard forces in addition to its standard forces, DOD
has spread the CENTCOM requirements for ongoing operations across a
wider portion of the force, but available data indicate that
nonstandard forces represent a small portion of the deployed force.
Navy and Air Force officials provided us with historical data which
indicate that the use of their nonstandard forces has been increasing
since 2004. The figures show that the two services together deployed at
least 17,000 nonstandard forces between mid-2006 and early 2008--a
relatively small number compared to an average deployed force of about
180,000 in Iraq and Afghanistan during a similar time period.[Footnote
9] According to Army, Marine Corps, and U.S. Joint Forces Command
officials, Army and Marine Corps nonstandard forces also constitute a
relatively small portion of the deployed force. However, unclassified
figures on the number of deployed Army and Marine Corps nonstandard
forces are not available.
DOD Has Used Nonstandard Forces to Meet CENTCOM's Large Requirements:
DOD's use of nonstandard forces has helped to increase the supply of
certain forces, but the Army has continued to deploy its forces at
higher than desired rates due to imbalances that still exist between
the available supply and current demand for forces. DOD's rotation goal
calls for active component forces to spend at least twice as much time
at home as deployed. Therefore, if the services are to meet this goal,
the supply of deployable personnel must be at least three times the
demand for those particular personnel--one person would be deployed and
two would be at home. Because nonstandard forces make up a relatively
small portion of the deployed force, the deployments of nonstandard
forces have generally had a limited impact on the supply of forces
relative to the demand for those forces. As a result, officials
reported that the Army has continued to deploy its personnel at rates
in excess of DOD's deployment goals.
Two factors can affect the supply of personnel, including nonstandard
forces, which are available to meet CENTCOM's large demands. The demand
for some occupational specialties--such as medical or EOD personnel--
can only be met by a small, highly skilled group of personnel who
generally have undergone extensive individual or unit training to
prepare them for their missions. For example, CENTCOM has increasing
demands for EOD personnel to locate, identify, and dispose of various
forms of explosive ordnance, but the services have limited numbers of
EOD personnel who have completed the training necessary to perform
these tasks. The Navy has about 2,200 deployable EOD personnel.
[Footnote 10] These individuals are required to complete 54 weeks of
training, which includes parachuting and diving, in addition to basic
EOD training. Similarly, the Air Force has only about 1,000 qualified
EOD personnel. Deployments of personnel from these relatively small
Navy and Air Force EOD communities have helped DOD fulfill CENTCOM
requirements that the Army otherwise would have been unable to fill.
However, due to the CENTCOM demands for EOD personnel, Army EOD
personnel will continue to face deployments at a pace above DOD's 1:2
deployed/at home goal, typically deploying for 15 months and returning
home for only 12 months.
The different service approaches for filling requirements can also
affect the supply of personnel, including nonstandard forces, which are
available to meet CENTCOM's large demands. For example, the Army and
the Navy approaches for fulfilling CENTCOM's military police
requirements have increased the supply of available personnel more than
the Air Force approach for meeting these requirements.[Footnote 11]
Since the early phases of operations in Iraq, the Army increased the
supply of personnel it had available to meet military police
requirements by retraining units which were not in high demand, such as
artillery and quartermaster units, and then deploying them in addition
to its military police units. The Navy has also increased the supply of
personnel available to meet these requirements by drawing personnel
both from its Master-at-Arms specialty, which most closely resembles
the Army's military police occupation, and from a broad range of
specialties that were not police-related. The Navy adopted this
approach because all of its nonstandard forces undergo mission-specific
training prior to deploying. The Air Force approach did less to
increase the supply of available personnel because it fulfilled these
requirements exclusively with personnel from its relatively small
security force occupational specialty. Because the Air Force used only
a small portion of its force to meet these requirements, it did little
to address the imbalance between CENTCOM's large demand for military
police forces and the available supply of forces. As a result, not only
are Army forces continuing to deploy at higher than desired rates, but
the Air Force's security personnel are also deploying at high rates.
Nonstandard Force Deployments Increase Challenges for Some Portions of
the Navy and the Air Force:
Nonstandard force deployments have made it more difficult for the Air
Force and the Navy to limit the high pace of operations in some
occupational communities and they have created new challenges as the
services have fewer personnel available to fulfill the standard
missions of these communities. For example, the impact of nonstandard
force deployments on the Air Force's security forces has been
significant. These forces had a high tempo of operations before they
began deploying for nonstandard force missions, and about half of the
Air Force's 8,000 security forces who deployed in 2007 served as
nonstandard forces. The length of these nonstandard force deployments
varied between 6 and 12 months, but these forces generally had a 1:1
deployed/at home ratio, far below the DOD 1:2 goal. In addition,
predeployment training requirements and standard mission requirements
add significantly to the pace of operations for these security forces
during their time at home. During our interviews with security force
personnel who were redeploying from Iraq, many noted that they had been
deployed to Iraq more than once and several servicemembers expressed
the opinion that, given the full range of their responsibilities, they
would be lucky to be home for 8 months of the year between deployments.
Because Navy and Air Force personnel in some specialties, such as
engineering, were experiencing high tempos even before they began
deploying for nonstandard force missions, the services are finding it
more difficult to limit the high tempo of operations for personnel in
these occupational specialties. To help address these challenges, the
services are expanding some of these stressed career fields. For
example, the Navy is adding a mobile construction battalion to its
force and the Air Force is adding heavy engineering personnel.[Footnote
12] Air Force officials have also reported that nonstandard EOD
deployments were intensifying already high personnel tempos for these
forces and Navy data show that EOD personnel are away from their home
stations for more than half the time that they are between nonstandard
CENTCOM deployments.
The nonstandard force deployments of some occupational communities have
also presented the services with additional challenges as fewer
personnel are available to fulfill the standard missions of these
communities. For example, the nonstandard force deployments of Navy and
Air Force EOD personnel result in fewer personnel being available for
standard EOD missions. As part of their standard mission, Navy EOD
forces support U.S. Special Operations Command units, including Navy
Sea, Air, Land (SEAL) units and Army Special Forces. They can also be
called upon to counter weapons of mass destruction, clear harbors and
waterways, and perform underwater repairs and salvage. Air Force
officials have reported that nonstandard EOD deployments affect the
service's ability to provide EOD teams in support of homeland missions
such as deployments for major political events. The deployments of
nonstandard Air Force security forces also result in fewer personnel
being available for traditional mission requirements, such as ensuring
the safety, security, reliability, and availability of nuclear weapons;
providing flight line security; and providing home station security at
Air Force bases.
Despite the challenges that they face as a result of nonstandard force
deployments, Navy and Air Force officials have stated that the services
will be able to sustain their current levels of nonstandard force
deployments to meet CENTCOM requirements. However, they report that
these deployments will cause strain on the force because many of the
CENTCOM requirements are concentrated in specific occupational
specialties.
CENTCOM's Demand for Leaders Has Created Challenges for Service
Commands, Units, and Individuals:
CENTCOM's extensive nonstandard force requirements for officers and
middle-to senior-grade noncommissioned officers have challenged the
commands or units responsible for fulfilling these requirements as well
as the individual leaders who have deployed to fill the positions. Over
the course of ongoing operations, requirements have emerged for new
capabilities that do not reside in any of the services' force
structures. Requirements for individual augmentees and the transition
teams that train local forces in Iraq and Afghanistan are the most
common examples of these emerging requirements. CENTCOM has thousands
of positions for these nonstandard force leaders. These positions are
being filled with personnel from all four services, but because the
services do not have permanent transition team units or pools of
available individuals, they generally transfer leaders from other
commands or units to fill these positions. Personnel from service
headquarter organizations are deploying to fill many of these
leadership positions, but operational units are also being tasked by
the services to give up some of their leaders. Officials reported that
because the units and commands that deploy their key leaders generally
do not receive replacement personnel, they face challenges as they are
left to perform their own missions without their full complement of
leaders. Both service and CENTCOM officials reported that the
organizations which are giving up personnel face a difficult choice in
deciding which of their leaders to keep and which of their leaders to
deploy. The Navy recently began taking steps to relieve its commanders
of having to make these difficult decisions. Under a new policy, the
Navy will fill most individual augmentee positions with servicemembers
who are between assignments, rather than pulling servicemembers from
positions within other commands.[Footnote 13] The stated purposes of
this policy include providing stability for sailors and their families
and improving manning stability at the unit level. As such, it
mitigates the impact of individual augmentee deployments on Navy
commands that were previously required to deploy some of their leaders.
CENTCOM's large demand for leaders has also created challenges for some
of the leaders who have deployed to fill these CENTCOM requirements.
Because transition teams are generally comprised of officers and middle-
and senior-grade noncommissioned officers, and individual augmentees
tend to come from similar leadership ranks, not from the large pool of
junior enlisted personnel, leaders who are deploying to fill CENTCOM's
nonstandard leadership positions may experience a high tempo of
operations. Many of these leaders are being taken from commands when
they are in the "at home" portion of their deployment cycles. As a
result, they may be deployed in excess of DOD's 1:2 deployed/at home
goal for active forces, or DOD's 1:5 goal for reserve component forces.
Even the leaders who are deploying from defense agencies or
headquarters organizations may have just left an operational unit,
where they had recently deployed.
Increased Coordination Has Helped DOD Address Some Challenges Related
to the Training and Use of Nonstandard Forces, but Other Challenges
Still Remain:
The steps that DOD has taken to increase coordination between the
services and CENTCOM--or its ground force commanders--have helped DOD
manage several challenges related to the training and use of its
nonstandard forces, but other challenges still remain. Nonstandard
forces face more complex training and command relationships than
standard forces. Their training requirements are established by both
the services and commanders in theater and much of their training may
be conducted by trainers from another service. In addition, while they
are deployed, these forces often report to commanders from two
different services. DOD has taken significant steps to coordinate the
training of its nonstandard forces through regular conferences at which
CENTCOM, U.S. Joint Forces Command, and service officials develop
detailed training plans for some nonstandard forces. However, the
training of individual augmentees has not been fully coordinated; as a
result, individuals who perform the same types of tasks in theater may
receive different levels of training. Furthermore, the services waive
some training requirements without consistently coordinating with
CENTCOM, so CENTCOM lacks full visibility over the extent to which all
of its assigned forces have met its training requirements. However,
since 2004, the services have taken steps to increase oversight of
nonstandard forces in theater, and enhanced coordination with the
ground force commanders who provide the day-to-day taskings for these
forces. Despite these coordination efforts, we noted that the Navy and
the Air Force do not always have full visibility over commanders' use
of nonstandard forces in theater, and have differing views on the
authority of ground force commanders, which has sometimes led to
differences in the use of nonstandard forces.
DOD Faces Challenges in Managing Training and Use of Nonstandard Forces
Due to Complex Command Relationships and Other Factors:
DOD faces challenges in coordinating the training and use of
nonstandard forces that it does not typically face with its standard
forces because of differences in the provision of training and more
complex command relationships. While standard forces may have one or
more chains of command, standard forces are generally trained by their
parent service to requirements set by that service and then directed in
theater by commanders from the same service, who organize them,
determine the scope of their missions, and direct their day-to-day
movements. As a result, the coordination of the training and use of
standard forces is generally straightforward.
In contrast, many nonstandard forces undergo training provided by
another service and face more complicated command relationships, making
coordination of their training and use more challenging. For example,
because the Navy and the Air Force are unable to provide most of the
ground combat skills training that their nonstandard forces require,
the Army has agreed to provide ground combat skills training at Army
locations such as Camp Shelby, Fort Bliss, and Fort Dix. The Army also
provides Navy and Air Force nonstandard forces specialized training at
Army Training and Doctrine Command locations. For example, it provides
a military police investigator course at Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri.
While some nonstandard forces are trained by their own services and
report only to commanders from that same service, many nonstandard
forces are trained by a different service and then report in theater to
commanders from more than one service. For example, "in-lieu-of" Army
artillery units may be trained by the Army to perform military police
functions and then deployed to theater, where they would typically
report to an Army commander who would determine their organization, the
scope of their missions, and their day-to-day tasks. Other nonstandard
forces, such as Navy forces performing detainee operations or Air Force
units performing convoy missions, have more complicated relationships.
While these Navy units typically receive Army training, these Air Force
units receive Air Force training. However, both the Navy and the Air
Force units typically face dual chains of command in theater. They
typically receive their day-to-day taskings from an Army ground force
commander but also report to commanders from their own services, who
are responsible for determining their organization and the scope of
their missions. For more information on command and control
relationships in the CENTCOM area of operations, see appendix III.
Given these complex training and command relationships, roles and
responsibilities must be clearly understood in order for the in-theater
use of nonstandard forces to align with the training of those forces.
However, joint doctrine concerning the training and use of forces--
including command relationships, roles, and responsibilities--was
established before DOD began expanding its use of nonstandard forces in
2004. Moreover, the latest version of the joint doctrine does not
specifically address the training and use of nonstandard forces, with
their complex training and command relationships. Lacking policies that
specifically define roles and responsibilities for nonstandard forces,
the services have increased their coordination to address these complex
training and command relationships. While individual augmentees
typically report to a single commander in theater, these nonstandard
forces may also face challenges because their in-theater commanders may
not be from the individual augmentee's parent service and because the
in-theater commanders may not be from the same service that trained the
individual augmentee.
Commands and Services Have Taken Significant Steps to Coordinate Plans
for Training Some Nonstandard Forces:
CENTCOM and U.S. Joint Forces Command have taken steps to coordinate
efforts to plan for the predeployment training that many nonstandard
forces need, including participating in periodic conferences, referred
to as Joint Sourced Training and Oversight conferences. At these
meetings, officials from the Army, Navy, Marine Corps, Air Force,
CENTCOM, and U.S. Joint Forces Command conduct line-by-line reviews of
Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force nonstandard forces and determine
which training the deploying service will provide and which training
the Army will provide for the other services. To prepare for the Joint
Sourced Training and Oversight conferences, the Air Force and the Navy
take certain steps, including informally consulting with Army
officials, as the following examples illustrate.
* The Air Force holds its own periodic conferences to determine the
specific training needs of its nonstandard forces. During these
conferences, officials from various Air Force training, headquarters,
and theater-level commands and organizations evaluate the list of
CENTCOM-required training tasks and determine what, if any, additional
training nonstandard forces may require. To avoid unwanted duplication
of training, they also determine whether any existing Air Force
training can be used to meet CENTCOM's requirements. Army officials
attend these conferences to coordinate necessary training that the Air
Force is not able to provide. However, CENTCOM headquarters officials
responsible for developing the training requirements generally have not
attended these conferences.
* The Navy also reviews training requirements for its nonstandard
forces and it conducts informal discussions with the Army prior to the
Joint Sourced Training and Oversight conferences. During these
discussions the Navy determines what additional training its
nonstandard forces may require, but it does not attempt to substitute
training that sailors already receive for CENTCOM's required training,
and CENTCOM officials do not generally participate in these
discussions.
As a result of these coordination efforts, officials we interviewed
believe they have been able to gain a good understanding of CENTCOM and
service training requirements for certain nonstandard forces and the
types of training that will be provided to ensure these requirements
are met. See appendix IV for more information on training requirements
and types of training.
Individual Augmentee Training Has Not Been Fully Coordinated:
While the Joint Sourced Training and Oversight conference participants
coordinate training plans for most nonstandard forces, the participants
do not address the training needs for one group of nonstandard forces-
-individual augmentees--during the conferences. Rather, each service
conducts its own program of instruction, which vary in content and
length, and which may involve training from other services. For
example, the Army's specific program of instruction that deploying Army
individual augmentees must attend is 7 days long. These augmentees must
also complete additional Army-specific training, either before or after
they attend the individual augmentee course. The Navy requires its
individual augmentees to attend a 17-day combat training course, run by
the Army at Fort Jackson, South Carolina. Prior to December 2007, Air
Force individual augmentees received no ground combat skills training.
Since then, the Air Force has been sending its individual augmentees
through one of three courses ranging in length from 5 to 10 days, which
are based on internally developed Air Force requirements. In some
cases, individual augmentees from one service have attended a different
service's training course. For example, according to Army training
officials, some Navy personnel--who were not subject to the additional
Army training requirements--attended the Army's individual augmentee
training, rather than the Navy course, because the Army course took
less time to complete than the Navy course. Despite the differences in
individual augmentee training, Army, Navy, and Air Force individual
augmentees often serve side-by-side in theater and are expected to
perform the same types of tasks.
CENTCOM Lacks Full Visibility over Services' Granting of Training
Waivers:
Under Title 10 of the United States Code and joint doctrine, the
combatant commands and the service secretaries have responsibilities
related to ensuring the preparedness of forces that are assigned to the
combatant commands. In exercising these authorities, the services
determine required training for their forces and have also established
procedures for waiving training under certain circumstances. In
addition, CENTCOM has established a list of certain "theater entry
requirements" characterized as training tasks on which it expects
deploying forces to train prior to deployment. See appendix IV for
additional information on training requirements and types of training.
While the services and CENTCOM have coordinated some training plans,
the services have implemented procedures for waiving CENTCOM-required
training without fully coordinating with the CENTCOM headquarters
office responsible for developing the training requirements on either
the development of the waiver procedures or the actual issuing of
waivers. Navy nonstandard forces that have completed Navy combat skills
training more than 90 days prior to their deployment would normally
have to update their training by repeating the course, but they can
waive this requirement if they complete relevant combat skills training
that significantly exceeds what they would receive in the Navy course.
[Footnote 14] The Air Force grants waivers for combat skills training
on a case-by-case basis. The Air Force headquarters operations office
considers approval of combat skills training waivers for Air Force
nonstandard forces if the commander who has day-to-day control over
those forces accepts the risk of lost training and states in writing
that the forces will not conduct missions outside of their operating
bases. According to CENTCOM officials, the services have not
consistently coordinated these waiver policies with CENTCOM. Therefore,
CENTCOM does not have full visibility over the extent to which its
assigned forces have met its established training requirements.
Officials from both the Navy and the Air Force emphasized that they
grant few training waivers, but they said that they do not track all
nonstandard force training waivers.
Services Have Taken Steps to Coordinate More Closely with Ground Force
Commanders, but Have Differing Views about the Ground Force Commanders'
Authority to Use Nonstandard Forces:
Since 2004, the services have expanded their efforts to provide
oversight and support to their nonstandard forces, including
coordinating with ground force commanders to ensure the forces are
being used for missions and tasks for which they were trained.
Specifically, the Navy increased the number of staff and the amount of
resources it dedicates to supporting nonstandard forces in the CENTCOM
theater. The Air Force also expanded its in-theater support of its
nonstandard forces, and in 2007 it redesignated its Expeditionary
Mission Support Groups as Air Expeditionary Groups in order to increase
their level of authority. While the two services have in-theater
support commands at several locations, the commanders and their support
personnel are regularly in the field interacting with ground force
commanders and nonstandard forces. Air Force and Navy officials from
the in-theater commands said that expanding their support has led to
increased coordination with ground force commanders. According to Air
Force commanders, this coordination has reduced the number of instances
in which ground force commanders have modified the missions, tasks, or
organization of their nonstandard forces after they arrive in theater.
Similarly, the Navy has enhanced its ability to coordinate the
successful resolution of cases in which ground force commanders may
require Navy nonstandard forces to perform tasks for which they have
not been fully trained and equipped.
Despite these coordination efforts, we noted that the Navy and the Air
Force do not always have full visibility over commanders' use of
nonstandard forces in theater, and have differing views on the
authority of ground force commanders, which has sometimes led to
differences in the use of nonstandard forces. Because the services do
not always have representatives from the supporting commands collocated
with all of their nonstandard forces, they are not able to coordinate
with ground force commanders concerning all changes to organization,
mission, or tasks. For example, the service commands do not have
visibility over their nonstandard force members who volunteer for
additional tasks for which they may not be properly prepared. Navy
officials estimate that there may be six cases per month in which
volunteers from their nonstandard forces perform tasks for which they
have not been fully trained. Because servicemembers do so without the
knowledge of their Navy chain of command, the command officials were
unable to precisely state the extent to which Navy nonstandard forces
volunteered, and they had not directly observed the situations in which
the servicemembers volunteered. Air Force commanders estimated that 95
percent of Air Force nonstandard forces in the CENTCOM area of
operations were performing precisely the tasks for which they were
trained, equipped, and deployed. However, they said a relatively small
number of personnel were performing tasks or missions which differed
from those on CENTCOM's requirements document, and added that in most
cases these new tasks underutilized the skills of the nonstandard
forces.
Divergent interpretations of assigned roles and responsibilities have
also posed challenges as commanders have sought to use their
nonstandard forces. For example, the services maintain that there are
limitations on the ground force commanders' authority to modify the
organization, missions, or tasks of deployed nonstandard forces.
Specifically, the Air Force interprets CENTCOM's requirements documents
strictly, and its Air Expeditionary Group commanders work with ground
force commanders to try to prevent Air Force nonstandard forces from
performing any missions or tasks that are not identified in CENTCOM's
requirements documents. The Air Expeditionary Group commanders also
seek to prevent CENTCOM or the ground force commanders from moving
forces to locations that are not outlined in the original requirements.
Air Force officials cite joint doctrine as justification for the Air
Expeditionary Group commanders' ability to impose such limitations on
ground force commanders. Conversely, CENTCOM officials told us they
believe the ground force commanders' authority enables these commanders
to move forces wherever they are needed. Many of the groups of
redeploying airmen with whom we spoke felt that their Air Force chain
of command was too involved in their daily activities; they stated that
they could have performed their missions more effectively had they been
allowed to work exclusively with their ground force commanders. Others
were glad that their Air Force chain of command had intervened when the
ground force commander had tried to adjust their missions. For more
information on servicemembers' views on their nonstandard force
deployments, see appendix V.
The Navy's interpretation of CENTCOM's requirements documents and joint
doctrine is less strict than the Air Force's interpretation. Like the
Air Expeditionary Groups, Navy officials coordinate with ground force
commanders whenever that is possible. However, Navy commanders allow
their nonstandard forces to perform additional tasks if (1) the ground
force commander deems these additional tasks necessary to accomplish
the mission and (2) the additional tasks do not put sailors at risk by
requiring them to do something for which they are not trained and
equipped. Based on these criteria, Navy officials told us that it is
not unusual for their nonstandard forces to receive a change of mission
or mission location. When we spoke to naval officers who had served in
individual augmentee billets in Iraq and Afghanistan, they noted that
their tasks were commonly modified or expanded, but they also said that
the training they had received at the Navy's individual augmentee
course had made them capable of performing all of their assigned tasks.
In general, most of the nonstandard force servicemembers who reported
that their tasks had changed while deployed indicated that the
adjustments, such as moving units to different locations or performing
additional duties, were minor. Although most of these tasks were
performed in Iraq or Afghanistan, they did not necessarily expose the
nonstandard forces to any additional danger. For example, a reserve
intelligence officer told us that she was performing comptroller
functions. In addition, leaders from one of the U.S. Naval Forces
Central Command task groups that support Navy nonstandard forces said
that some petty officers were performing support functions, which were
appropriate leadership duties for their rank, but which were not in
line with the petty officers' occupational specialties or predeployment
training. Running dining halls was one specific example.
Conclusions:
To meet CENTCOM's requirements for servicemembers in certain high-
demand specialties, the Navy and the Air Force have deployed
nonstandard forces in place of Army personnel. Although the number of
deployed nonstandard forces is small when compared with the total
number of forces deployed to the CENTCOM area of operations, many
nonstandard forces, like standard ground forces, have made repeated
deployments and have had limited time at home between deployments.
However, complex training and command relationships have presented
nonstandard forces with challenges that standard forces do not
typically face. Because existing authorities do not specifically
outline roles and responsibilities for the training and use of
nonstandard forces, CENTCOM and the services have sought to coordinate
their efforts to ensure that nonstandard forces are properly trained
and used in theater. While this coordination has increased
significantly since 2004, DOD cannot currently ensure that all of its
nonstandard forces are being used consistent with the tasks,
conditions, and standards for which they have been trained because (1)
CENTCOM does not have full visibility over training waivers, (2)
individual augmentee training has not been coordinated, (3) service in-
theater commands do not always have command personnel present with all
their nonstandard forces, and (4) in some cases, even when coordination
has occurred, divergent interpretations of existing authorities cause
the services and CENTCOM or its ground force commanders to come to
different conclusions concerning missions that should be assigned to
nonstandard forces in theater. Until DOD issues policy guidance that
clarifies (1) the roles and responsibilities for preparing and training
nonstandard forces, including waiver responsibilities and procedures,
and (2) the nature and extent of ground force commanders' authorities
to direct the use of these forces, DOD will continue to face challenges
regardless of its level of coordination.
Recommendation for Executive Action:
To enhance the management of DOD's nonstandard forces, we recommend
that the Secretary of Defense direct the Office of the Secretary of
Defense (Personnel and Readiness) in conjunction with the Chairman of
the Joint Chiefs of Staff to develop and issue a policy to guide the
training and use of nonstandard forces. At a minimum, the policy should
clarify:
* responsibilities for the predeployment training of all nonstandard
forces, including individual augmentees;
* training waiver responsibilities and procedures, and;
* the nature and extent of ground force commanders' authorities to
direct the use of nonstandard forces.
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
The Acting Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Readiness) provided
written comments on a draft of this report. The department concurred
with the recommendation, and stated it has work underway to review
existing policy and ensure the necessary guidance is in place for
effective training and equipping of nonstandard forces and individual
augmentees. In addition, DOD provided technical comments, which we have
incorporated in the report as appropriate. The department's comments
are reprinted in their entirety in appendix II.
We are sending copies of this report to other appropriate congressional
committees and the Secretary of Defense. We will make copies available
to others upon request. In addition, this report will be available at
no charge on the GAO Web site at [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov].
Should you or your staff have any questions concerning this report,
please contact me at (202) 512-9619 or [email protected]. Contact points
for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be
found on the last page of this report. Key contributors to this report
are listed in appendix VI.
Signed by:
Sharon L. Pickup, Director:
Defense Capabilities and Management:
[End of section]
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology:
To assess the extent to which DOD's use of nonstandard forces to meet
ground force requirements has impacted the force, we interviewed
officials from the entities involved in the oversight, management, and
use of nonstandard forces, including the Office of the Secretary of
Defense (OSD), the Joint Chiefs of Staff Directorates for Manpower and
Personnel and Operations, U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM), U.S. Joint
Forces Command, and the service headquarters and service force
providers. We discussed our methodology for identifying and defining
nonstandard forces with CENTCOM, the service headquarters, and the
service force providers. We then obtained data from the services on the
extent to which they have relied on nonstandard forces in support of
ongoing operations as well as data on the use of nonstandard forces
from the Joint Chiefs of Staff and U.S. Joint Forces Command. Using
these data, we determined as a baseline the extent to which the
services rely on these forces to meet operational requirements and the
resultant effect on operational tempo. Because nonstandard force
definitions have differed over time and across the services, we were
not able to assess the reliability of these data. We discussed the
implications of the use of nonstandard forces on the overall force,
obtaining testimonial evidence from officials (1) responsible for the
management and oversight of these forces, and (2) using these forces,
including, but not limited to, officials from CENTCOM; the service
component commands--U.S. Air Forces Central, U.S. Naval Forces Central
Command, and Army Central Command; service headquarters, and service
force providers. We obtained and reviewed documentation on the impact
that the use of nonstandard forces has had on the services, in general,
and on particular career fields within the services, such as security
forces, engineering, and explosive ordnance disposal. In addition, we
analyzed transcripts of congressional testimony presented by DOD
officials on the reliance on nonstandard forces in support of ongoing
operations.
To assess the extent to which DOD has faced challenges in managing the
training and use of nonstandard forces, and taken steps to address any
challenges, we reviewed and analyzed relevant sections of Title 10 of
the United States Code as well as DOD, Joint Staff, combatant command,
and service policies and requirements. In particular, we reviewed the
principles and concepts for joint operations as outlined in Joint
Publication 1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States, to
include roles and responsibilities established under existing command
and control relationships. We also collected and examined theater
training requirements that have been established for deploying
nonstandard forces, including the CENTCOM-issued, theater-specific
training requirements and the tasks required by the Coalition Forces
Land Component Command. We discussed the intent of these training
requirements and the steps by which individuals and units can meet
these requirements with officials from CENTCOM and the Coalition Forces
Land Component Command and the Camp Buehring Udairi Range Complex in
Kuwait. To determine the extent to which the services and joint
community have processes in place to prepare and deploy nonstandard
forces and how these processes address and allow the waiving of theater
training requirements for nonstandard forces, we interviewed officials
from the OSD, U.S. Joint Forces Command, CENTCOM, and service
headquarters. In addition, we spoke with officials from the Navy's
Fleet Forces Command, Navy Expeditionary Combat Command, U.S. Army
Forces Command, First U.S. Army, Third U.S. Army, Second Air Force, and
Ninth Air Force. We met with officials at the Army Continental United
States Replacement Center and conducted meetings and observed training
at the Navy Individual Augmentee Combat Training, the Air Force Basic
Combat Convoy Course, and the Common Battlefield Airman Training-Bridge
course. We also observed several relevant conferences, including the
Second Air Force-hosted Training and Equipment Review Boards in
September 2007 and January 2008, and the Joint Sourced Training and
Oversight conference hosted by U.S. Joint Forces Command in April 2008.
At these conferences, we held discussions with officials to fully
understand the issues and challenges associated with the reliance on
nonstandard forces. To determine the procedures in place to oversee the
use of nonstandard forces while deployed, we reviewed joint doctrine
and service policies and spoke with U.S. Air Forces Central officials,
Air Expeditionary Group commanders, U.S. Naval Forces Central Command
officials, U.S. Naval Forces Central Command Combined Task Force
commanders, and CENTCOM officials.
To gain insight on servicemember perspectives on deploying as part of a
nonstandard force, we conducted semi-structured discussion group
sessions with over 300 deploying, deployed, and redeploying enlisted
servicemembers and officers from each service. Specifically, we
traveled to the CENTCOM area of operations in November 2007 to conduct
a majority of these discussion groups. In selecting individuals to
speak with, we asked the service headquarters and CENTCOM service
component commands to identify all servicemembers redeploying within
the time frame of our visit. We then spoke with as many of the
redeployers as were available while in Kuwait, Qatar, and Bahrain. The
basic criterion used in soliciting these individuals was that they were
a servicemember deployed or redeploying as part of a nonstandard force.
Most of the groups of servicemembers with whom we spoke were Air Force
servicemembers in the process of redeploying from Iraq. However, we
also interviewed Army and Navy servicemembers deployed and redeploying,
as available, to gain their perspectives on their deployments. Many of
the servicemembers with whom we spoke had performed engineering,
detainee operations, or convoy missions, which are among the largest
nonstandard missions in Iraq. Topics of discussion during the sessions
included notification, preparation, and training for the nonstandard
deployment, and in-theater performance. Following each discussion
group, we administered a short survey to each participant which
solicited further information on their experience deploying as a
nonstandard force. We collected 303 surveys--254 from Air Force
personnel, 33 from Navy personnel, 12 from Army personnel, and 4
surveys that did not specify the member's service. The surveys covered
39 individual augmentees and 264 nonstandard unit personnel. Upon
return from CENTCOM, we met with an additional 21 Army personnel
redeploying from individual augmentee deployments in Iraq and
Afghanistan at the Army's Continental United States Replacement Center
at Fort Benning. The same process was used for these discussion groups
as those previously discussed. We then met with 43 Navy personnel at
the Navy's Individual Augmentee Combat Training at Fort Jackson and 15
Air Force personnel at the Air Force's Basic Combat Convoy Course at
Camp Bullis deploying as part of a nonstandard force. For the
discussion groups we held with deployers, we administered a discussion
session, but did not follow these sessions with the survey instrument
because the individuals had not yet deployed as part of a nonstandard
force. Comments provided during the discussion groups cannot be
projected across the entire military community because the participants
were not selected using a generalizable sampling methodology. To
validate information we heard in the discussion groups, we interviewed
officials from the Navy and Air Force commands that oversee the
deployment of nonstandard forces in the CENTCOM area of operations,
service headquarters, and CENTCOM. Despite our requests, the Marine
Corps did not make any servicemembers or officials available during our
CENTCOM travel.
We conducted this performance audit from July 2007 through April 2008,
in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain
sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that
the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and
conclusions based on our audit objectives.
[End of section]
Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Defense:
Office Of The Under Secretary Of Defense:
Personnel and Readiness:
4000 Defense Pentagon:
Washington, D.C. 20301-4000:
Ms. Sharon L. Pickup
Director, Defense Capabilities and Management:
U.S. Government Accountability Office:
441 G Street, N.W.
Washington, DC 20548:
Dear Ms. Pickup:
This is the Department of Defense (DOD) response to the GAO draft
report, "Military Readiness: Joint Policy Needed to Better Manage the
Training and Use of Certain Forces to Meet Operational Demands," dated
May 5, 2008 (GAO Code 351060/ GAO-08-670).
DOD appreciates the opportunity to comment on the draft report.
Detailed comment on the GAO recommendation is enclosed.
Sincerely,
Signed by:
Joseph J. Angello, Jr.
Acting Deputy Under Secretary of Defense:
Readiness:
Enclosure: As Stated:
GAO Draft Report -- Dated May 5, 2008:
GAO Code 351060/GAO-08-670:
"Military Readiness: Joint Policy Needed to Better Manage the Training
and Use of Certain Forces to Meet Operational Demands"
Department Of Defense Response To The Recommendation:
Recommendation I: The GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense
direct the Office of the Secretary of Defense for Personnel and
Readiness in conjunction with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
to develop and issue a policy to guide the training and use of non-
standard forces. At a minimum, the policy should clarify:
* responsibilities for the pre-deployment training of all non-standard
forces, including individual augmentees;
* training waiver responsibilities and procedures; and;
* the nature and extent of ground force commanders' authorities to
direct the use of non-standard forces.
DOD Response: Concur. The Department of Defense currently has work
underway to review existing policy and ensure the necessary guidance is
in place for effective training and equipping of non-standard forces
and individual augmentees.
[End of section]
Appendix III: Military Command and Control Relationships:
Joint Publication 1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United
States, describes various authorities relevant to the command and
control of deployed forces. These authorities include operational
control, tactical control, and administrative control. This publication
does not make distinctions between the control of standard forces and
the control of nonstandard forces.
* Operational control refers to the authority to perform those
functions of command over subordinate forces involving organizing and
employing commands and forces, assigning tasks, designating objectives,
and giving authoritative direction necessary to accomplish the mission.
Operational control includes authoritative direction over all aspects
of military operations and joint training necessary to accomplish
missions assigned to the command. The service operational commanders
that we interviewed in theater interpreted operational control as their
authority to organize their assigned forces and adjust the scope of the
missions of these forces. The Navy and the Air Force exercise
operational control over most of their own nonstandard forces in the
CENTCOM area of operations.
* Tactical control is defined as a commander's authority over assigned
or attached forces or commands or military capability made available
for tasking that is limited to the detailed direction and control of
movements or maneuvers within the operational area necessary to
accomplish assigned missions or tasks. Tactical control, like
operational control, can be exercised by commanders at or below the
combatant command level and can be delegated within a command.
Commanders that we interviewed for this engagement interpreted tactical
control as commanders' abilities to provide the day-to-day taskings of
their assigned troops, within established mission guidelines. In the
CENTCOM area of operations, ground force commanders exercise tactical
control over forces under their command, including nonstandard forces.
* Administrative control is the direction or exercise of authority over
subordinate or other organizations with respect to administration and
support including organization of service forces, control of resources
and equipment, personnel management, unit logistics, individual and
unit training, readiness, mobilization, demobilization, discipline, and
other matters not included in the operational missions of the
subordinate or other organizations. This is the authority necessary to
fulfill military department statutory responsibilities for
administration and support. Each of the services exercises
administrative control over its own forces, including nonstandard
forces, in the CENTCOM area of operations.
[End of section]
Appendix IV: Training Requirements for Nonstandard Forces Deploying to
U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM):
Nonstandard forces that deploy to the CENTCOM area of operation are
generally subject to at least three different sets of training
requirements--the combatant commander's training tasks, the coalition
forces land component commander's training tasks, and service training
tasks. CENTCOM has issued requirements for forces deploying to its area
of operations, which include minimum training tasks for both units and
individuals. These requirements establish a baseline of combat skill
proficiency for all forces deploying to the CENTCOM area of operations.
As such, they contain both individual task requirements and groups of
training tasks that are tailored to distinct mission areas. Required
individual tasks include force protection, law of land warfare, rules
of engagement, language training briefings, weapons qualification and
basic marksmanship, High-Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle (HMMWV)
egress assistance training, first aid, and counter-improvised explosive
device training. The requirements also include unit tasks that are
tailored to 24 distinct missions--including engineering units, military
police companies, area support medical companies, and light-medium
truck companies--and a final set of unit tasks that apply to all the
units which are not included in the 24 distinct missions. The unit
training requirements are organized into categories that include
driver, convoy live-fire, communications, heavy weapons, troop leading
procedures and military decision-making process, and combat lifesaver
training tasks. The amount of training required in each category
depends on the mission individual units will undertake. For example, a
general aviation company requires no communications, heavy weapons, or
combat lifesaver training, whereas the requirements for military police
law and order detachments include tasks in each of these categories.
In addition to the CENTCOM requirements, the Coalition Forces Land
Component Command, the command that directs all land forces on behalf
of CENTCOM, has also developed a list of required training tasks. These
tasks include antifratricide; counter-improvised explosive device level
I awareness; Counter Remote Control Improvised Explosive Device
Electronic Warfare System familiarity; escalation of force; test fire/
confirm zero; and HMMWV egress assistance training. Most servicemembers
who deploy to Iraq conduct training at the Udairi Range complex at Camp
Buehring in Kuwait before they deploy to Iraq. Camp Buehring offers
training on tasks required by the Coalition Forces Land Component
Command. However, personnel can complete at least one of these required
tasks--the HMMWV egress assistance training, which is also included in
the CENTCOM training requirements--in the United States before
deploying to Kuwait. In addition to the training on the Coalition
Forces Land Component Command minimum tasks, Camp Buehring offers units
an opportunity to (1) gain additional practice on tasks they have
already learned, (2) receive updated instruction on the latest tactics,
techniques, and procedures, and (3) complete additional training tasks
that unit or service leaders determine are necessary so that the unit
will be able to accomplish its mission.
In addition to the CENTCOM and Coalition Forces Land Component Command
requirements, deploying nonstandard forces are required to complete
service-specific training requirements. Some of these service-required
tasks overlap with the CENTCOM or Coalition Forces Land Component
Command minimum tasks, but the services also have some unique training
requirements. For example, all Army forces entering the CENTCOM area of
operations must complete biometrics training, a requirement that is not
included in CENTCOM's minimum requirements. Another example of a
service-unique training requirement would be the Air Force requirement
for individual augmentees to receive 23 hours of training on tactical
field operations, such as breaking contact with the enemy and crossing
danger areas.
[End of section]
Appendix V: Servicemembers' Perceptions of Preparation for Nonstandard
Force Deployments:
The groups of redeploying nonstandard forces with whom we spoke
generally felt prepared to perform their assigned tasks while deployed
within the CENTCOM area of operations.[Footnote 15] Many groups of
nonstandard forces with whom we spoke listed combat lifesaver training
as some of the most valuable training conducted in the United States
prior to deployment to theater. In addition, many groups of nonstandard
forces emphasized the importance of training with the outgoing unit
after arrival at their mission location. For example, deploying Air
Force convoy truck drivers complete a series of tasks--preferably
together with the personnel they are replacing--before they assume
their mission. These tasks included riding with outgoing personnel on
"local missions" to deliver supplies to bases in Kuwait. In addition,
personnel with whom we spoke from the Army transportation company said
that senior noncommissioned officers used the opportunity in theater
before beginning the mission to train junior soldiers on specific
tasks, such as heavy weapons firing and training on specific vehicles,
which these junior soldiers may not have had opportunities to practice
operating prior to deployment.
The groups of servicemembers with whom we spoke generally noted that
the training they received to prepare them for their nonstandard force
deployment was not always relevant to their missions or was redundant.
However, unit leaders, trainers, and service officials with whom we
spoke usually had explanations for the redundant training or had taken
steps to improve the training identified through feedback as less
relevant. For example, several senior leaders in the units with whom we
spoke noted that although they had not needed to use their weapons
training during their deployments, they were glad to have completed it
just in case they had needed it. The leader of one large unit also
noted that while the time his personnel spent on their individual
qualifications could have been shortened, the full training time was
necessary to build his leadership team in a unit that was composed of
personnel from numerous different commands.
The largest group of nonstandard forces with whom we spoke--airmen
responsible for trucking goods from Kuwait to Iraq--generally agreed
that their U.S.-based training did not fully reflect the tasks they
were expected to conduct while deployed. Servicemembers noted that they
received a significant amount of training on the use of "gun trucks"
(armored HMMWVs with heavy weapons attached), even though the Army had
taken over the convoy security mission in theater. They also said that
their training time in the U.S. could have been better used to practice
driving tractor trailers, since that is what they actually did in
theater. Officials responsible for training these airmen indicated that
they had received similar feedback, and stated that they were adjusting
the Air Force training course to better reflect actual tasks performed
in theater. Specifically, the course officials had requisitioned the
latest model of Army truck that the Air Force nonstandard forces were
driving in theater and they had tripled the number of miles driven by
the airmen in these vehicles during their predeployment training.
[End of section]
Appendix VI: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
GAO Contact:
Sharon L. Pickup, (202) 512-9619 or [email protected].
Acknowledgments:
In addition to the contact named above, Michael Ferren, Assistant
Director; Burns Chamberlain; Nicole Harms; Joanne Landesman; Amanda
Miller; Jason Pogacnik; and Kristy Williams made major contributions to
this report.
[End of section]
Related GAO Products:
Military Readiness: Impact of Current Operations and Actions Needed to
Rebuild Readiness of U.S. Ground Forces. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-08-497T]. Washington D.C.:
February 14, 2008.
Defense Logistics: Army and Marine Corps Cannot Be Assured That
Equipment Reset Strategies Will Sustain Equipment Availability While
Meeting Ongoing Operational Requirements. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-814]. Washington, D.C.:
September 19, 2007.
Military Personnel: DOD Lacks Reliable Personnel Tempo Data and Needs
Quality Controls to Improve Data Accuracy. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-780]. Washington D.C.: July
17, 2007.
Defense Logistics: Improved Oversight and Increased Coordination Needed
to Ensure Viability of the Army's Prepositioning Strategy. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-144]. Washington D.C.:
February 15, 2007.
Defense Logistics: Preliminary Observations on the Army's
Implementation of Its Equipment Reset Strategies. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-439T]. Washington D.C.:
January 31, 2007.
Securing, Stabilizing, and Rebuilding Iraq: Key Issues for
Congressional Oversight. [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-
bin/getrpt?GAO-07-308SP]. Washington, D.C.: January 9, 2007.
[End of section]
Footnotes:
[1] Pub. L. No. 110-181, �354 (2008).
[2] Pub. L. No. 109-364, �345 (2006).
[3] Joint Publication 1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United
States (May 14, 2007) and Joint Publication 3-31, Command and Control
for Joint Land Operations (Mar. 23, 2004).
[4] Joint Publication 3-31, Command and Control for Joint Land
Operations (Mar. 23, 2004).
[5] See 10 U.S.C. �164 for responsibilities of commanders of combatant
commands, and 10 U.S.C. ��3013, 5013, and 8013 for the responsibilities
of the service secretaries.
[6] The Army typically deploys brigades; the Navy, carrier or
amphibious assault groups; the Air Force, air expeditionary force
wings; and the Marine Corps, regiments or marine expeditionary units.
[7] GAO, Military Readiness: Impact of Current Operations and Actions
Needed to Rebuild Readiness of U.S. Ground Forces. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-08-497T] (Washington D.C.: Feb.
14, 2008).
[8] Secretary of Defense Memorandum, Utilization of the Total Force
(Jan. 19, 2007).
[9] Because the services did not collect data for similar time periods,
we included Navy nonstandard force requirements for fiscal year 2007
and Air Force nonstandard force requirements from March 2006 through
March 2008. We also included individual augmentees deployed as of
August 2007. In addition, the deployed force in Iraq and Afghanistan
represents an average of forces deployed from July 2007 through October
2007.
[10] This number includes sailors from deployable EOD mobile units
only. The Navy also has additional EOD personnel assigned to shore duty
who are not deployable.
[11] These requirements are for detainee operations, law and order, and
base security missions.
[12] These Air Force units are commonly referred to as RED HORSE units
(Rapid Engineers Deployable Heavy Operations Repair Squadron
Engineers).
[13] NAVADMIN 147/07, Global War on Terrorism Support Assignments (June
2007).
[14] NAVADMIN 355/07, Navy Individual Augmentee Combat Skills Training
(Dec. 2007).
[15] We met with nonrepresentative groups, which included more than 300
servicemembers who were redeploying from the CENTCOM area of
operations. Appendix I contains additional details about these
individuals.
[End of section]
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