Strategic Petroleum Reserve: Improving the Cost-Effectiveness of
Filling the Reserve (24-APR-08, GAO-08-726T).
The Strategic Petroleum Reserve (SPR) was created in 1975 to help
protect the U.S. economy from oil supply disruptions and
currently holds about 700 million barrels of crude oil. The
Energy Policy Act of 2005 directed the Department of Energy (DOE)
to increase the SPR storage capacity from 727 million barrels to
1 billion barrels, which it plans to accomplish by 2018. Since
1999, oil for the SPR has generally been obtained through the
royalty-in-kind program, whereby the government receives oil
instead of cash for payment of royalties on leases of federal
property. The Department of Interior's Minerals Management
Service (MMS) collects the royalty oil and transfers it to DOE,
which then trades it for oil suitable for the SPR. As DOE begins
to expand the SPR, past experiences can help inform future
efforts to fill the reserve in the most cost-effective manner. In
that context, GAO's testimony today will focus on: (1) factors
GAO recommends DOE consider when filling the SPR, and (2) the
cost-effectiveness of using oil received through the
royalty-in-kind program to fill the SPR. To address these issues,
GAO relied on its 2006 report on the SPR, as well as its ongoing
review of the royalty-in-kind program, where GAO interviewed
officials at both DOE and MMS, and reviewed DOE's SPR policies
and procedures. DOE provided comments on a draft of this
testimony, which we incorporated where appropriate.
-------------------------Indexing Terms-------------------------
REPORTNUM: GAO-08-726T
ACCNO: A81872
TITLE: Strategic Petroleum Reserve: Improving the
Cost-Effectiveness of Filling the Reserve
DATE: 04/24/2008
SUBJECT: Bid evaluation
Cost analysis
Cost effectiveness analysis
Crude oil
Energy consumption
Energy costs
Energy demand
Energy management
Energy planning
Energy shortages
Energy supplies
Evaluation methods
International organizations
International relations
Oil importing
Oil resources
Petroleum industry
Petroleum refining facilities
Procurement evaluation
Program evaluation
Royalty payments
Supply and demand
Strategic Petroleum Reserve
******************************************************************
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GAO-08-726T
* [1]In summary
* [2]DOE Could Improve the Cost-Effectiveness of Filling the SPR
* [3]Purchasing Oil to Fill the SPR May Be More Cost-Effective Th
* [4]Conclusions
* [5]GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
* [6]GAO's Mission
* [7]Obtaining Copies of GAO Reports and Testimony
* [8]Order by Mail or Phone
* [9]To Report Fraud, Waste, and Abuse in Federal Programs
* [10]Congressional Relations
* [11]Public Affairs
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Testimony:
Before the Select Committee on Energy Independence and Global Warming,
House of Representatives:
United States Government Accountability Office:
GAO:
For Release on Delivery:
Expected at 10:00 a.m. EDT:
Thursday, April 24, 2008:
Strategic Petroleum Reserve:
Improving the Cost-Effectiveness of Filling the Reserve:
Statement of Frank Rusco:
Acting Director:
Natural Resources and Environment:
GAO-08-726T:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-08-726T, a testimony before the Select Committee on
Energy Independence and Global Warming, House of Representatives.
Why GAO Did This Study:
The Strategic Petroleum Reserve (SPR) was created in 1975 to help
protect the U.S. economy from oil supply disruptions and currently
holds about 700 million barrels of crude oil. The Energy Policy Act of
2005 directed the Department of Energy (DOE) to increase the SPR
storage capacity from 727 million barrels to 1 billion barrels, which
it plans to accomplish by 2018. Since 1999, oil for the SPR has
generally been obtained through the royalty-in-kind program, whereby
the government receives oil instead of cash for payment of royalties on
leases of federal property. The Department of Interior�s Minerals
Management Service (MMS) collects the royalty oil and transfers it to
DOE, which then trades it for oil suitable for the SPR.
As DOE begins to expand the SPR, past experiences can help inform
future efforts to fill the reserve in the most cost-effective manner.
In that context, GAO�s testimony today will focus on: (1) factors GAO
recommends DOE consider when filling the SPR, and (2) the cost-
effectiveness of using oil received through the royalty-in-kind program
to fill the SPR.
To address these issues, GAO relied on its 2006 report on the SPR, as
well as its ongoing review of the royalty-in-kind program, where GAO
interviewed officials at both DOE and MMS, and reviewed DOE�s SPR
policies and procedures. DOE provided comments on a draft of this
testimony, which we incorporated where appropriate.
What GAO Found:
To decrease the cost of filling the reserve and improve its efficiency,
GAO recommended in previous work that DOE should include at least 10
percent heavy crude oils in the SPR. If DOE bought 100 million barrels
of heavy crude oil during its expansion of the SPR it could save over
$1 billion in nominal terms, assuming a price differential of $12
between the price of light crude oil and the lower price of heavy crude
oil, the average differential over the last five years. Having heavy
crude oil in the SPR would also make the SPR more compatible with many
U.S. refineries, helping these refineries run more efficiently in the
event that a supply disruption triggers use of the SPR. DOE indicated
that, due to the planned SPR expansion, determinations of the amount of
heavy oil to include in the SPR should wait until it prepares a new
study of U.S. Gulf Coast refining requirements. In addition, we
recommended that DOE consider acquiring a steady dollar value�rather
than a steady volume�of oil over time when filling the SPR. This
�dollar-cost-averaging� approach would allow DOE to acquire more oil
when prices are low and less when prices are high. GAO found that if
DOE had used this purchasing approach between October 2001 through
August 2005, it could have saved approximately $590 million, or over 10
percent, in fill costs. GAO�s simulations indicate that DOE could save
money using this approach for future SPR fills, regardless of whether
oil prices are trending up or down as long as there is price
volatility. GAO also recommends that DOE consider giving companies
participating in the royalty-in-kind program additional flexibility to
defer oil deliveries in exchange for providing additional barrels of
oil. DOE has granted limited deferrals in the past, and expanding their
use could further decrease SPR fill costs. While DOE indicated that its
November 2006 rule on SPR acquisition procedures addressed our
recommendations, this rule does not specifically address how to
implement a dollar-cost-averaging strategy.
Purchasing oil to fill the SPR�as DOE did until 1994�is likely to be
more cost-effective than exchanging oil from the royalty-in-kind
program for other oil to fill the SPR. The latter method adds
administrative complexity to the task of filling the SPR, increasing
the potential for waste and inefficiency. A January 2008 DOE Inspector
General report found that DOE is unable to ensure that it receives all
of the royalty oil that MMS provides. In addition, we found that DOE�s
method for evaluating bids has been more robust for cash purchases than
royalty-in-kind exchanges, increasing the likelihood that cash
purchases are more cost-effective. For example, in April 2007, DOE
solicited two different types of bids�one to purchase oil for the SPR
in cash and one to exchange royalty oil for other oil to fill the SPR.
DOE rejected offers to purchase oil when the spot price was about $69
per barrel, yet in the same month, DOE exchanged royalty-in-kind oil
for other oil to put in the SPR at about the same price. Because the
government would have otherwise sold this royalty-in-kind oil, DOE
committed the government to pay, through foregone revenues to the U.S.
Treasury, roughly the same price per barrel that DOE concluded was too
high to purchase directly.
To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-08-726T]. For more
information, contact Frank Rusco at (202) 512-3841 or [email protected].
[End of section]
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee:
We are pleased to be here today to participate in the Committee's
hearing on the Strategic Petroleum Reserve (SPR). Congress authorized
the SPR in 1975 to protect the nation from oil supply disruptions
following the Arab oil embargo of 1973 and 1974 that led to sharp
increases in oil prices. The federal government owns the SPR, and the
Department of Energy (DOE) operates it. The SPR currently has the
capacity to store up to 727 million barrels of crude oil in salt
caverns in Texas and Louisiana. As of April 21, 2008, current inventory
of the SPR stood at 701.3 million barrels of oil, which is roughly
equivalent to 58 days of net oil imports. DOE made direct purchases of
crude oil until 1994, when purchases were suspended due to the federal
budget deficit, and in fiscal years 1996 and 1997 approximately 28
million barrels of oil were sold to reduce the deficit. Since DOE
resumed filling the SPR in 1999, it has obtained oil from the
Department of the Interior's Minerals Management Service (MMS) "royalty-
in-kind" program. Through this program, the MMS receives oil instead of
cash for payments of royalties from companies that lease federal
property for oil and gas development. MMS contracts for some of this
royalty oil to be delivered to designated oil terminal locations or
"market centers" where DOE takes possession. Because the royalty oil
often does not meet SPR quality specifications, and because the market
centers can be distant from SPR storage sites, DOE generally awards
contracts to exchange royalty oil at the market center for SPR-quality
oil delivered to SPR facilities. Obtaining oil for the SPR through the
royalty-in-kind program avoids the need for Congress to make outlays to
finance oil purchases, but the foregone revenues associated with using
royalty-in-kind oil to trade for SPR oil imply an equivalent loss of
revenue because MMS would otherwise sell the oil and deposit the
revenues with the U.S. Treasury. Interior estimates that the forgone
revenue attributable to using the royalty-in-kind program to fill the
SPR were $4.6 billion from fiscal year 2000 through fiscal year 2007.
The Energy Policy Act of 2005 directed DOE to increase the SPR storage
capacity to 1 billion barrels and to fill it "as expeditiously as
practicable without incurring excessive cost or appreciably affecting
the price of petroleum products to consumers."[Footnote 1] It required
DOE to select sites to expand the SPR's storage capacity within 1 year
of enactment, by August 2006. On February 14, 2007, Secretary of Energy
William Bodman designated three sites for the expansion, including a
160 million barrel facility in Richton, Mississippi, an 80 million
barrel expansion of a facility in Big Hill, Texas, and a 33 million
barrel expansion of a facility in Bayou Choctaw, Louisiana. In its June
2007 SPR plan, DOE anticipated these expansions would begin in fiscal
year 2008 and be complete in 2018.[Footnote 2],[Footnote 3] DOE also
indicated that it would prefer to continue using the royalty-in-kind
program to fill the additional storage capacity. DOE estimates the
capital cost for the SPR expansion at approximately $3.67 billion, and
estimates the cost of operating and maintaining the expanded portion of
the SPR at $35 to $40 million per year.
As DOE begins to expand the SPR, past experiences may help inform
future efforts to fill the SPR in the most cost-effective manner. In
that context, our testimony today will focus on: (1) factors we
recommend DOE consider when filling the SPR, and (2) the cost-
effectiveness of using oil received through the royalty-in-kind program
to fill the SPR.
To address these issues, we are summarizing work from our August 2006
report on the SPR and our ongoing review of the royalty-in-kind
program.[Footnote 4] For our August 2006 report, we contracted with the
National Academy of Sciences to convene a group of 13 industry,
academic, governmental, and nongovernmental experts to collect opinions
on the impacts of past SPR fill and use and on recommendations for the
future. We also reviewed records and reports from DOE and the
International Energy Agency. In addition, for our ongoing review of the
royalty-in-kind program for this committee and others, we identified
and reviewed applicable laws and documentation on DOE policies and
procedures for evaluating SPR purchase and exchange bids, and
interviewed officials at both Interior and DOE. We have also drawn upon
previous GAO reports on the royalty-in-kind program.[Footnote 5] We
conducted our work on this testimony from January to April 2008 in
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those
standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain
sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that
the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and
conclusions based on our audit objectives.
In summary:
* To fill the SPR in a more cost-effective manner, we recommended in
previous work that DOE include in the SPR at least 10 percent heavy
crude oils, which are more compatible with many U.S. refiners and
generally cheaper to acquire than the lighter oils that comprise the
SPR's volume. DOE indicated that, due to the planned SPR expansion,
such determinations should wait until it prepares a new study of U.S.
Gulf Coast heavy sour crude refining requirements. In addition, we
recommended that DOE consider acquiring a steady dollar value of oil
over time and allowing oil companies more flexibility to defer delivery
of royalty-in-kind exchanges to the SPR when prices are likely to
decline in return for additional deliveries in the future. In updating
us on the status of this recommendation, DOE indicated that its
November 8, 2006, rule on SPR acquisition procedures addressed our
recommendations; however, this rule does not specifically address both
how to implement a dollar-cost-averaging strategy and how to provide
industry with more deferral flexibility. In subsequent comment, DOE
noted that the November 8, 2006, acquisition procedures do not address
dollar-cost-averaging, but they do address flexibility of purchasing
and scheduling in volatile markets.
* Filling the SPR with oil purchased in cash is likely to be more cost-
effective than filling the SPR through the royalty-in-kind program for
several reasons. For example, the royalty-in-kind program adds a layer
of administrative complexity to the task of filling the SPR, increasing
the potential for waste or inefficiency. Moreover, DOE has evaluated
the cost of cash purchases more thoroughly than exchanges, increasing
the likelihood that cash purchases are more cost-effective. For
example, in May 2007, DOE rejected cash purchases for the SPR,
concluding that the current price of about $69 per barrel was unusually
high. However, in the same month, DOE entered into contracts to
exchange royalty oil, effectively committing the government to pay--
through foregone revenues to the U.S. Treasury--about the same price
for oil that it concluded was too high to purchase directly. In
November, DOE entered into another exchange contract when oil was about
$96 per barrel.
DOE Could Improve the Cost-Effectiveness of Filling the SPR:
To decrease the cost of filling the SPR and improve its efficiency, we
have recommended in our previous work that DOE: (1) include at least 10
percent heavy crude oil in the SPR, (2) consider acquiring a steady
dollar value of oil, and (3) consider allowing oil companies additional
flexibility to defer deliveries in exchange for delivering additional
barrels of oil at a later date. The current composition of the SPR is
entirely of medium to light grades of oil.[Footnote 6],[Footnote 7]
Including heavier oil in the SPR could significantly reduce fill costs
because heavier oil is generally less expensive than lighter grades. We
recommended in our August 2006 report that DOE, at a minimum, implement
its own recommendation made in a 2005 study to have at least 10 percent
heavy oil in the SPR.[Footnote 8] In addition, we found that DOE may
have underestimated how much heavy oil should be in the SPR to minimize
oil acquisition costs. Therefore, we further recommended that DOE
examine the maximum amount of heavy oil that should be held in the SPR.
To illustrate the potential magnitude of savings from including heavy
crude oil in the SPR, we have done some simple calculations. If DOE
included 10 percent heavy oil in the SPR as it expands to 1 billion
barrels, that would require DOE to add 100 million barrels of heavy
oil, or about one-third of the total new fill. From 2003 through 2007,
Maya--a common heavy crude oil--has traded for about $12 less per
barrel on average than West Texas Intermediate--a common light crude
oil. If this price difference were to persist over the duration of the
new fill period, DOE would save about $1.2 billion in nominal terms by
filling the SPR with 100 million barrels of heavy oil.[Footnote 9] The
savings could be even larger if DOE included more than 10 percent
heavier oils in the SPR. Alternatively, DOE could add heavy oil to the
SPR by exchanging the light oil in one or more of the caverns for
heavier oil. DOE has the legal authority to exchange one type of oil
for another and has done so before. For example, in 1998, DOE exchanged
11 million barrels of heavy crude oil stored in the Bryan Mound site
for 8.5 million barrels of other higher value light crude oil.
Including heavier oil would have the additional benefit of making the
composition of SPR oil more compatible with U.S. refineries. In recent
years, many refiners in the United States have upgraded their
facilities so they can process heavy oil. Our analysis of DOE's Energy
Information Administration (EIA) data shows that, of the approximately
5.6 billion barrels of oil that U.S. refiners accepted in 2006,
approximately 40 percent was heavier than that stored in the
SPR.[Footnote 10] Refineries that process heavy oil cannot operate at
normal capacity if they run lighter oils. For instance, DOE's December
2005 found that the types of oil currently stored in the SPR would not
be fully compatible with 36 of the 74 refineries considered vulnerable
to supply disruptions. DOE estimated that if these 36 refineries had to
use SPR oil, U.S. refining throughput would decrease by 735,000 barrels
per day, or 5 percent, substantially reducing the effectiveness of the
SPR during an oil disruption, especially if the disruption involved
heavy oil. To improve the compatibility of SPR oil with refineries in
the United States, the DOE study concluded that the SPR should contain
about 10 percent heavy oil. However, our August 2006 report found that
DOE may have underestimated how much heavy oil should be in the SPR to
maximize compatibility with refiners. We also found DOE may have
underestimated the potential impact of heavy oil disruptions on
gasoline production. Several refiners who process heavy oil told us
that they would be unable to maintain normal levels of gasoline
production if forced to rely on SPR oil as currently constituted. For
example, an official from one refinery stated that if it exclusively
used SPR oil in its heavy crude unit, it would produce 11 percent less
gasoline and 35 percent less diesel. Representatives from other
refineries told us they might need to shut down portions of their
facilities if they could not obtain heavy oil. For these reasons, we
recommended that DOE conduct a new review of the optimal oil mix in the
SPR and determine the maximum volume of heavy oil that could be
effectively put in the reserve.
In addition, we recommended that DOE consider filling the SPR by
acquiring a steady dollar value of oil over time, rather than a steady
volume of oil over time as has occurred in recent years. This "dollar-
cost-averaging" approach would allow DOE to take advantage of
fluctuations in oil prices and ensure that more oil would be acquired
when prices are low and less when prices are high. In our 2006 report,
we found that if DOE had used this approach from October 2001 through
August 2005, it could have saved approximately $590 million in fill
costs. We also ran simulations to estimate potential future cost
savings from using a dollar-cost-averaging approach over 5 years and
found that DOE could save money regardless of the price of oil as long
as there is price volatility, and that the savings would be generally
greater if oil prices were more volatile.
We also recommended that DOE consider allowing oil companies
participating in the royalty-in-kind program more flexibility to defer
their deliveries to the SPR at times when filling would significantly
tighten the market or when prices are expected to decline.[Footnote 11]
In return for these deferrals, companies would provide additional
barrels of oil when they resumed deliveries. DOE has already approved
some delivery deferrals at companies' requests, such as during the
winter 2002-2003 oil workers' strike in Venezuela. From October 2001
through August 2005, DOE received an additional 4.6 million barrels of
oil for the SPR valued at approximately $110 million as payment for
these delivery deferrals. However, DOE has denied some deferral
requests and experts have noted that there is room to expand the use of
deferrals. Experts noted DOE would need to exercise its authority to
deny deferrals at times when it is in the national interest.
Nonetheless, given that the SPR currently holds roughly 58 days of net
imports, we believe there is sufficient inventory for some flexibility
in allowing deferrals.
In updating us on the status of recommendations we made to DOE in our
August 2006 report, DOE indicated that its November 8, 2006, rule on
SPR acquisition procedures addressed our recommendations on dollar-
cost-averaging and deferrals. However, the new acquisition rule does
not specifically address our recommendations to study both how to
implement a dollar-cost-averaging strategy and how to provide industry
with more deferral flexibility. Unless DOE addresses and adopts these
recommendations, it will not be filling the reserve in the most cost-
effective manner. As to our recommendation on the optimal mix of oil in
the SPR, DOE indicated that, due to the planned SPR expansion, such
determinations should wait until it prepares a new study of U.S. Gulf
Coast heavy sour crude refining requirements. We believe the SPR
expansion offers DOE an ideal opportunity to change the SPR's oil mix
to include heavier oils that are less costly to acquire and better
match U.S. refining capacity. We look forward to DOE completing its new
study of U.S. Gulf Coast heavy crude refining requirements and believe
such a study will find that DOE should include more than 10 percent
heavier oils in the SPR.
Purchasing Oil to Fill the SPR May Be More Cost-Effective Than Current
Royalty-in-Kind Program:
There are several reasons that purchasing oil--as DOE did until 1994--
may be more cost-effective than filling the SPR using the current
royalty-in-kind program. For instance, there may be fewer bidders for
the royalty oil under the current exchange system than a direct cash
purchase system, which in turn may limit competition and the exchange
deals that DOE can negotiate. In the exchange process, a single company
must be able to and interested in both accepting oil at the designated
market centers and delivering other oil with specific characteristics
to the SPR. This may limit the number of companies interested in
bidding on exchange contracts. In contrast, if DOE purchased oil, many
additional companies may be interested in selling their oil, increasing
competition and lowering prices.[Footnote 12] In 2007, the then Deputy
Assistant Secretary for Petroleum Reserves, who directed activities of
the SPR, told us that he agrees with this reasoning. The inherent
limits of exchanging versus direct purchases are compounded by the fact
that DOE and Interior have not systematically analyzed where to send
royalty oil in a way that maximizes the value of the exchanges. The
value of exchanges is a function of both the costs to deliver oil to
market centers and the deals that DOE can negotiate at particular
market centers. The informal process that Interior and DOE currently
use to identify market centers does not systematically analyze the
tradeoffs between these two factors to identify market centers that
optimize net value to the government.
In addition, royalty-in-kind exchanges add a layer of administrative
complexity to the task of filling the SPR, increasing the potential for
waste or inefficiency. In a January 2008 report, the DOE Inspector
General concluded that DOE does not have an effective control system
over receipts of royalty oil from Interior at the market centers.
[Footnote 13] Specifically, the Inspector General found that DOE did
not have adequate controls to ensure that the volumes of oil that
contractors reported to have received from Interior at the market
centers matched scheduled deliveries. As a result, DOE did not have
assurance that it received all of the oil that Interior shipped,
raising concerns that DOE may not have received its full entitled
deliveries to the SPR. If DOE purchased all of its oil, it would no
longer need to exchange oil at designated market centers and would not
need to coordinate with Interior. Moreover, rather than diverting a
fraction of the oil collected through the royalty-in-kind program to
fill the SPR, Interior could sell that fraction in competitive sales,
as it currently does for the other oil it receives through the royalty-
in-kind program. A senior Interior official said that selling the
royalty oil would be simpler for Interior to administer than the
current exchanges.
Further, DOE's method for evaluating bids is more robust for cash
purchases than royalty-in-kind exchanges, increasing the likelihood
that cash purchases are more cost-effective. In November 2006, DOE
issued a final rule that describes how DOE will evaluate offers when it
is purchasing oil and when it is exchanging royalty oil for other oil
for the SPR.[Footnote 14] This rule provides DOE with considerable
flexibility in the degree of analysis it can conduct when evaluating
offers, and, in practice, DOE's method for evaluating bids for cash
purchases has been more robust than it has for exchanges. For example,
in April 2007, DOE solicited two different types of bids--one to
purchase oil for the SPR in cash and one to exchange royalty oil for
other oil to fill the SPR.[Footnote 15] In deciding whether to purchase
oil, DOE evaluated the bids it received in the context of overall
market trends. It concluded that the offers it received from sellers
were priced too high, in part because the price of oil was generally
high and because the prices of the specific type of oil DOE sought to
purchase were unusually high relative to other oil types. As a result,
DOE rejected offers to purchase oil when the spot price for Light
Louisiana Sweet (LLS)--a commonly used benchmark for Gulf Coast oil--
was about $69 per barrel and decided to delay purchasing any oil until
at least the end of the summer driving season.[Footnote 16] In
contrast, DOE's method for evaluating bids for exchanging royalty oil
focused on whether the oil DOE would receive would be at least the same
value as the oil it would exchange. It did not include an analysis of
whether overall market conditions indicated that it would be more
profitable for the federal government to stop or delay exchanges and
have Interior sell the royalty oil for cash instead. In this case, in
the same month, DOE entered into royalty oil exchange contracts when
the spot price of LLS was about $67 a barrel, effectively committing
the government to pay--through foregone revenues to the U.S. Treasury-
-roughly the same price for oil that DOE concluded was too high to
purchase. Moreover, in November, it awarded additional exchange
contracts when the spot price of LLS had reached $96 a barrel.[Footnote
17]
It should also be noted that the current exchange method is less
transparent than direct purchases because the primarily cash-based
federal budget does not account for noncash transactions. Interior
estimates that the royalty-in-kind program cost the federal government
in total foregone revenue $4.6 billion from fiscal year 2000 through
fiscal year 2007. This foregone revenue was not reflected in the
federal budget since no federal cash flows were involved. Congressional
budget decisionmakers therefore have not had the opportunity to
consider whether the value of the transferred oil could be reallocated
to other competing resource needs.
Importantly, the royalty-in-kind effort to fill the SPR creates,
essentially, a "blind spot" where neither DOE nor Interior, the two
agencies responsible for running the joint program, systematically
examines whether exchanges of millions of barrels of royalty oil have
been a cost-effective approach to filling the reserve. DOE does conduct
a prospective analysis to estimate whether the value of the oil it will
receive in the exchanges will be at least as valuable as the royalty
oil it will exchange. However, DOE enters into exchange agreements that
can last 6 months, and DOE's initial estimates of the values of the
different oil types may not hold over the duration of the contracts.
DOE has not analyzed any of the completed exchanges to determine
whether those exchanges performed as well as expected. Similarly, when
evaluating the performance of the royalty-in-kind program overall,
Interior does not analyze whether the royalty oil transfers to DOE are
a cost-effective means to fill the reserve.[Footnote 18] The 60.7
million barrels of oil that Interior transferred to DOE from fiscal
year 2004 to 2005 accounted for 58 percent of all the royalty-in-kind
oil that Interior collected during that time. While Interior reports to
Congress each year on the financial performance of its royalty-in-kind
program, these reports have not included a measure of the cost-
effectiveness of using royalty oil to fill the SPR.
Conclusions:
Because the SPR has reached sufficient size to address near-term supply
disruptions, decisions about future fill practices can be made in a
more flexible, cost-effective manner without unduly hurting our ability
to respond to such disruptions. With oil prices recently exceeding $117
a barrel, there should be greater interest in finding ways to reduce
fill costs. If it is to reach its goal of filling the expanded SPR by
2018, DOE will have to, in some combination, purchase or receive
through royalty-in-kind transfers roughly 300 million barrels of oil.
Our work shows that substantial cost savings could be achieved through
increased purchasing of heavy oil, a dollar-cost-averaging purchasing
strategy, more flexibility in the timing of oil purchases and
deliveries, and greater attention paid to the opportunity costs of
filling the SPR with royalty oil. Based on our past estimates of the
cost savings potential of dollar cost averaging and the significantly
lower cost of heavier oils, DOE could save well over 10 percent of the
costs of filling the SPR to the currently authorized level--an amount
that is likely well in excess of $1 billion. During this era of dire
national long-term fiscal challenges, it is all the more important that
DOE make fill decisions in a cost-effective manner.
Mr. Chairman, this concludes my prepared statement. I would be pleased
to respond to any questions that you or other members of the Committee
may have at this time.
GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
For further information about this testimony, please contact me, Frank
Rusco, at 202-512-3841 or [email protected]. Contact points for our
Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on
the last page of this statement. Contributors to this testimony include
Ben Bolitzer, Chase Huntley, Heather Hill, Michael Kendix, Jon
Ludwigson, Tim Minelli, Michelle Munn, Alison O'Neill, G. Greg
Peterson, and Barbara Timmerman.
[End of section]
Footnotes:
[1] Pub. L. No. 109-58 (2005). The Energy Policy and Conservation Act,
Pub. L. No. 94-163 (1975), created the SPR and authorized storage of up
to one billion barrels of petroleum products.
[2] DOE, Office of Petroleum Reserves, Strategic Petroleum Reserve
Plan: Expansion to One Billion Barrels (Washington, D.C.: June 2007).
[3] In his State of the Union speech on January 23, 2007, President
Bush proposed expanding the SPR further to 1.5 billion barrels.
Secretary of Energy William Bodman indicated that DOE's goal was to
have this expansion completed by 2027.
[4] GAO, Strategic Petroleum Reserve: Available Oil Can Provide
Significant Benefits, but Many Factors Should Influence Future
Decisions about Fill, Use, and Expansion, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-872] (Washington, D.C.:
Aug. 24, 2006).
[5] GAO, Royalties Collection: Ongoing Problems with Interior's Efforts
to Ensure a Fair Return for Taxpayers Require Attention, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-682T] (Washington, D.C.:
Mar. 28, 2007).
GAO, Mineral Revenues: Cost and Revenue Information Needed to Compare
Different Approaches for Collecting Federal Oil and Gas Royalties,
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-04-448]
(Washington, D.C.: Apr. 16, 2004).
GAO, Mineral Revenues: A More Systematic Evaluation of the Royalty-in-
Kind Pilots is Needed, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-03-296] (Washington, D.C.:
Jan. 9, 2003).
[6] For information on the composition of the SPR, see: DOE, Office of
the Assistant Secretary for Fossil Energy, Strategic Petroleum Reserve:
Annual Report for Calendar Year 2006.
[7] The weight of oil is measured by its gravity index. According to
DOE's EIA, light oil is greater than 38 degrees gravity, while
intermediate oils, such as those in the SPR, are 22 to 38 degrees
gravity.
[8] See DOE, Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary for Petroleum
Reserves, Strategic Petroleum Reserve Crude Compatibility Study
(December 2005).
[9] This calculation is intended to illustrate the magnitude of
potential savings, and is not meant to be a projection of actual
savings. The actual price difference between light and heavy oil over
the course of the new fill could be smaller or larger than over the
past 5 years, which would either reduce or increase the savings,
respectively.
[10] According to DOE's EIA, heavy oil has a gravity index of 22
degrees or below. According to EIA 2006 data, about 10 percent of the
oil accepted by U.S. refiners has this gravity index and are considered
heavy oils. An additional 30 percent of oil accepted by U.S. refiners
was 22 to 30 degrees gravity, however, according to DOE, all oils
stored in the SPR range from approximately 30 to 37 degrees gravity.
[11] For example, this situation could occur if futures prices are
lower than current prices. Futures prices of oil reflect the cost of
delivery at a specified place, price, and time in the future.
[12] We note that including heavier oils in addition to lighter oils
would also increase the number of potential suppliers of oil for the
SPR.
[13] DOE Office of Inspector General, Audit Report: Department of
Energy's Receipt of Royalty Oil, DOE/IG-0786 (Washington, D.C.: Jan.
2008).
[14] 10 C.F.R Part 626.
[15] DOE's solicitations to purchase oil were part of a plan to replace
11 million barrels of SPR oil that DOE sold in the fall of 2005 after
Hurricane Katrina disrupted refinery supplies.
[16] The spot price reflects the price for immediate settlement of oil
purchases.
[17] By itself, the spot price does not determine how many barrels of
oil the government will receive through royalty exchanges. Rather, this
is determined by the relative value--the price of the grade of oil that
DOE has to exchange (the oil it receives from Interior) versus the
price of the grade of oil that it wishes to exchange for. This means
that the government could receive the same number of barrels of SPR oil
through its exchanges when spots prices are low or high. However, from
a broader federal perspective, it would be more cost-effective if the
federal government deferred royalty exchanges when oil prices were high
and sold the royalty oil for cash. It could then purchase oil when oil
prices were lower, acquiring more of the desired grade of oil for the
same amount of money.
[18] Interior does, however, have procedures in place to ensure that it
pays a reasonable rate to transport oil from the offshore federal
leases, where the oil is produced, to the market centers where DOE
takes possession of the oil.
[End of section]
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