DOD Systems Modernization: Maintaining Effective Communication Is
Needed to Help Ensure the Army's Successful Deployment of the
Defense Integrated Military Human Resources System (08-SEP-08,
GAO-08-927R).
The Department of Defense (DOD) has had long-standing, serious
problems with its numerous military component-unique personnel
and pay systems, including accurately paying its military
personnel on time and monitoring and tracking them to, from, and
within their duty stations. For example, in the early 1990s, Army
Reserve and National Guard troops received inaccurate or late pay
and benefits after serving in Operations Desert Shield and Desert
Storm. We previously reported that the lack of integration among
DOD's multiple military personnel and pay systems, among other
things, caused these and similar errors. To address these and
other problems, in February 1998, DOD initiated a program to
design and implement the Defense Integrated Military Human
Resources System (DIMHRS). DIMHRS is intended to provide a joint,
integrated, standardized personnel and pay system for all
military components (including active and reserve components). In
November 2004, DOD accepted the design of the first phase of
DIMHRS for personnel and pay functions and then proceeded with
development of the system. Meanwhile, as we reported in 2006,
some Army Reserve and National Guard troops continued to receive
inaccurate pay resulting in part from a lack of integration in
Army personnel and pay systems. Furthermore, personnel and pay
problems have been exacerbated by the hundreds of thousands of
military personnel deployed to Iraq and Afghanistan, whose
families depend on receiving accurate and timely pay, in addition
to DOD's need to track military personnel in and out of theater.
DOD is concurrently working with the Army, Air Force, and Navy,
but the Army is to be the first to deploy DIMHRS. Therefore, we
focused our review on DOD's plans to deliver the system to the
Army for deployment. DOD has planned five DIMHRS deployment dates
for the Army with the most recent one scheduled in March 2009.
Four of the deployment dates were postponed--April 2006, April
2008, July 2008, and October 2008. As of April 2008, DOD moved
the October date to March 2009. DIMHRS uses software referred to
as a commercial-off-the-shelf product. According to DIMHRS
program officials, including the Deputy Director of the Business
Transformation Agency, the product will address all military
component requirements. In February 2005, we reported that
because DOD was not managing the DIMHRS program effectively,
including its requirements, it was at increased risk of not
delivering promised system capabilities and benefits on time.
Since our 2005 report, we have monitored DOD's progress in
managing the DIMHRS program under the authority of the
Comptroller General to conduct evaluations on his own initiative.
Specifically for this report, our objective was to determine to
what extent DOD has effectively communicated the DIMHRS's
capabilities to the Army in order for the Army to prepare for
deployment of the system in March 2009.
-------------------------Indexing Terms-------------------------
REPORTNUM: GAO-08-927R
ACCNO: A84045
TITLE: DOD Systems Modernization: Maintaining Effective
Communication Is Needed to Help Ensure the Army's Successful
Deployment of the Defense Integrated Military Human Resources
System
DATE: 09/08/2008
SUBJECT: Accountability
Defense capabilities
Internal controls
Military communication
Military pay
Military personnel
Military systems analysis
Pay
Payroll systems
Program evaluation
Program management
Reporting requirements
Standards
Systems conversions
Systems design
Systems evaluation
Systems integration
Systems integrity
Military forces
Defense Integrated Military Human
Resources System
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GAO-08-927R
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GAO-08-927R:
September 8, 2008:
The Honorable Robert M. Gates:
The Secretary of Defense:
Subject: DOD Systems Modernization: Maintaining Effective Communication
Is Needed to Help Ensure the Army's Successful Deployment of the
Defense Integrated Military Human Resources System:
Dear Mr. Secretary:
The Department of Defense (DOD) has had long-standing, serious problems
with its numerous military component-unique personnel and pay systems,
including accurately paying its military personnel on time and
monitoring and tracking them to, from, and within their duty stations.
For example, in the early 1990s, Army Reserve and National Guard troops
received inaccurate or late pay and benefits after serving in
Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm.[Footnote 1] We previously
reported that the lack of integration among DOD's multiple military
personnel and pay systems, among other things, caused these and similar
errors.[Footnote 2] To address these and other problems, in February
1998, DOD initiated a program to design and implement the Defense
Integrated Military Human Resources System (DIMHRS). DIMHRS is intended
to provide a joint, integrated, standardized personnel and pay system
for all military components (including active and reserve components).
In November 2004, DOD accepted the design of the first phase of DIMHRS
for personnel and pay functions and then proceeded with development of
the system. Meanwhile, as we reported in 2006,[Footnote 3] some Army
Reserve and National Guard troops continued to receive inaccurate pay
resulting in part from a lack of integration in Army personnel and pay
systems. Furthermore, personnel and pay problems have been exacerbated
by the hundreds of thousands of military personnel deployed to Iraq and
Afghanistan, whose families depend on receiving accurate and timely
pay, in addition to DOD's need to track military personnel in and out
of theater. DOD is concurrently working with the Army, Air Force, and
Navy, but the Army is to be the first to deploy DIMHRS. Therefore, we
focused our review on DOD's plans to deliver the system to the Army for
deployment. DOD has planned five DIMHRS deployment dates for the Army
with the most recent one scheduled in March 2009. Four of the
deployment dates were postponed--April 2006, April 2008, July 2008, and
October 2008. As of April 2008, DOD moved the October date to March
2009. The other services are to follow the Army's deployment, but their
dates remain undetermined as of June 2008. In addition, DOD estimates
the cost for DIMHRS through fiscal year 2009 to be approximately $1
billion.[Footnote 4]
DIMHRS uses software referred to as a commercial-off-the-shelf product.
According to DIMHRS program officials, including the Deputy Director of
the Business Transformation Agency, the product will address all
military component requirements. The DIMHRS program office works with
the components to make changes to their related business processes and
adopt the commercial-off-the-shelf capabilities and processes as long
as the changes do not result in inefficiencies or adversely affect
mission or servicemembers and their families.
In February 2005, we reported that because DOD was not managing the
DIMHRS program effectively, including its requirements, it was at
increased risk of not delivering promised system capabilities and
benefits on time.[Footnote 5] In that report, we noted that the
shortcomings in DOD's efforts to effectively manage DIMHRS requirements
were attributed to a number of causes, including DOD's long-standing
cultural resistance to departmentwide solutions. These shortcomings
left DOD without adequate assurance that the requirements would
accurately reflect the end users', including the Army's, needs. Since
our 2005 report, we have monitored DOD's progress in managing the
DIMHRS program under the authority of the Comptroller General to
conduct evaluations on his own initiative. Specifically for this
report, our objective was to determine to what extent DOD has
effectively communicated the DIMHRS's capabilities to the Army in order
for the Army to prepare for deployment of the system in March 2009.
To conduct our work, we reviewed and analyzed relevant documents, such
as the system requirements documents,[Footnote 6] the Army feasibility
assessment of DIMHRS and requirements review, schedule, acquisition
strategy, minutes from governance meetings, program status reports, and
prior GAO reports. To augment our review of these documents, we
interviewed officials from DOD's Business Transformation Agency, which
is responsible for, among other things, leading and coordinating
business transformation efforts, such as the DIMHRS program, across the
department; the Enterprise Program Management Office-DIMHRS (called the
DIMHRS program office in this report), which is responsible for, among
other things, acquiring and implementing DIMHRS; and the Office of
Personnel and Readiness Information Management, which, among other
things, provides functional oversight for Human Resources Management
and ensures that all requirements are consistent with the enterprise
requirements. We also interviewed DIMHRS program officials from the
Defense Finance and Accounting Service and the Department of the Army.
We conducted this performance audit from January 2007 to July 2008 in
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those
standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain
sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our
findings and conclusions based on our audit objective. We believe that
the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and
conclusions based on our audit objective.
Summary:
DOD has taken some recent steps to improve communications with the Army
about DIMHRS's capabilities in an effort to better prepare the Army for
deployment of the system in March 2009. However, Army officials still
have some concerns about the extent to which Army requirements are
being incorporated into DIMHRS. In addition, DOD has not established a
clear, well-defined process for maintaining effective communications to
better prepare the Army to deploy DIMHRS. Effective communication is a
key federal internal control standard that calls for communications to
constantly flow down, across, and up the organization to help it
achieve all of its objectives.[Footnote 7] Such communication would
improve the Army's understanding of what the system will deliver thus
enabling the Army to better design and implement effective business
processes to work with DIMHRS. The Army has had problems receiving
assurance from DOD about the extent to which its requirements would be
included in DIMHRS. For example, in September 2007, when the Army
compared versions 3.0 and 3.1 of the system requirements document, it
noted that DOD's DIMHRS program office had not effectively communicated
with the Army the rationale or negotiated the acceptance of the Army's
requirements that were dropped, changed, or both, which were agreed
upon in version 3.0. During the Army's review of version 3.1, it
identified and submitted 717 issues for DOD to resolve. Furthermore,
when communicating changes for version 3.1, the format made it
difficult for the Army to perform its comparative analysis. Army
officials said that when the DIMHRS program office does not effectively
communicate to them the differences between its requirements and the
system, they have difficulty conducting a gap analysis between the
system's planned capabilities and their own requirements. The gap
analysis forms the basis upon which the Army can determine whether it
needs to develop or adjust its business processes prior to deploying
DIMHRS.
DOD recently took steps to improve its communications with the Army
about DIMHRS's capabilities and its impact on Army requirements. For
example, in May 2008, the DIMHRS program office began to meet with Army
officials to discuss the development of a formal process of delivering
and adjudicating the documented updates to the design; this includes
the differences between the Army's requirements--documented need of
what a particular product or service should be or do--and the DIMHRS's
requirements, which are documented in the system requirements document.
According to Army officials, with respect to version 3.2, they
identified 311 issues with 98 issues remaining in July 2008, which the
DIMHRS program office is working to resolve. Additionally, in April
2008, the DIMHRS program office shared more detailed information about
DIMHRS's capabilities through activities, such as demonstrations of the
system capabilities. Moreover, the Deputy Director of the Business
Transformation Agency stated that moving the deployment date to March
2009 allowed the DIMHRS program office and the Army the time to
communicate about DIMHRS's capabilities. Although these steps have been
taken, DOD has not developed and documented a clearly defined process
for maintaining effective communications of the differences between
DIMHRS's capabilities and Army requirements. Without a clearly defined
process for maintaining effective communications, the Army may not be
effectively prepared to deploy the system when scheduled, and DOD may
deliver a system that will require extensive and expensive investments.
Therefore, we recommend that you direct the Deputy Secretary of Defense
to develop a clearly defined process for maintaining effective
communications of the differences between DIMHRS's capabilities and
Army requirements to help ensure that the Army will have adequate time
to prepare for deployment of the system. In commenting on a draft of
this report, the department concurred with this recommendation. The
department's comments are discussed in detail in a later section of
this report. DOD's written comments are reprinted in enclosure I.
Background:
Following reports of pay issues, in late 1995, the Under Secretary of
Defense for Acquisition and Technology established a Defense Science
Board Task Force on Military Personnel Information Management to advise
the Secretary of Defense on the best strategy to support military
personnel and pay functions. In its August 1996 report, the task force
concluded that "the present situation, in which the Services develop
and maintain multiple Service-unique military personnel and pay
systems, has led to significant functional shortcomings (particularly
in the joint arena) and excessive costs for system development and
maintenance for the Department of Defense." The task force recommended
that DOD "move to a single, all-Service and all-component, fully
integrated personnel and pay system, with common core software."
In response to the task force's recommendation, DOD initiated the
DIMHRS program in February 1998. DIMHRS will be Web based and uses a
commercial-off-the-shelf product. DIMHRS is intended to be a joint,
integrated, standardized personnel and pay system for all components of
the military services, including active and reserve components.
According to DOD, the program will provide improved processes and
deliver timely and accurate pay and benefits to all servicemembers and
their families, anytime and anywhere. Specifically, DIMHRS is intended
to provide (1) accurate and timely personnel data, (2) standard data
for comparison across the services and other components, (3) tracking
information on reservists for both pay and service credit, (4) tracking
information on military personnel in and out of theater, and (5)
integrated personnel and pay functions.
The acquisition of DIMHRS was interrupted from July 2005 through
December 2005 in order to assess its feasibility. In 2005, DOD had
planned for the Army to deploy DIMHRS in the third quarter of fiscal
year 2006 and the other services to deploy it in the fourth quarter of
fiscal year 2007. The department had estimated that the program would
cost $601 million from inception through fiscal year 2009. However, due
to concerns raised by the military services, in July 2005, the Deputy
Secretary of Defense directed a strategic pause whereby the military
services discontinued developmental activities for DIMHRS in order to
determine the continued viability of the DIMHRS program. According to
DIMHRS officials--including the Director of Human Capital Management
Integration, Office of the Under Secretary of the Army--the Army, the
Air Force, and the Navy completed their feasibility assessments of
DIMHRS using the Army's configured solution as the baseline. Based on
the results of the Army's assessment completed in October 2005, the
Deputy Secretary of Defense in December 2005 directed Army program
officials to proceed with the acquisition of DIMHRS as the first
military service to implement the program.
Initially, DOD planned to acquire and deploy DIMHRS in three
functionality-based phases: (1) military personnel and payroll, (2)
military manpower, and (3) military training. However, after the
strategic pause, DOD planned to acquire and deploy DIMHRS in one phase,
which would include functionality for military personnel and payroll.
DOD officials stated that this functionality would also include
essential manpower and training requirements.
In addition, during the Army's feasibility assessment of DIMHRS, the
Army identified business processes that needed to be integrated with,
or adapted to, the capabilities of DIMHRS. In order to define, revise,
and validate the designs of these business processes, the Army entered
the design, development, and analysis phase--intended to collect the
complete set of personnel and pay requirements necessary for the Army
to deploy DIMHRS. This phase was part of the Army Requirements Review-
-intended to ensure that the DIMHRS design adequately covers the Army's
requirements. During the design, development, and analysis phase, Army
focus groups reviewed current Army business processes to identify the
requirements that would be used to define the revised business
processes as part of DIMHRS. Specifically, the Army analyzed 129
business processes and documented gaps between Army personnel and pay
processes and the DIMHRS application. The Army DIMHRS program office
delivered the Army documentation that was captured during the design,
development, and analysis phase incrementally to the developer/
integrator contractor of DIMHRS for consideration. The contractor
redeveloped the Army's detailed business processes into designs for
each individual business process. These designs were sent to the Army
for review. The Army DIMHRS program office has accepted the design
packages documenting the incorporation of baseline Army requirements
into DIMHRS. According to DOD, a key product was developed during the
design, development, and analysis process�the system requirements
document. This document is broken down into individual business
processes that must be in place within DIMHRS for the system to meet
the requirements specified in the DIMHRS Operational Requirements
Document.[Footnote 8]
In February 2005,[Footnote 9]we reported that DOD faced significant
management challenges with DIMHRS, a major system acquisition program
that is expected to lead to major changes in the processing of military
personnel and pay. Until these challenges were addressed, the system
was at increased risk of not providing expected capabilities and
benefits on time and within budget. We made several recommendations
aimed at improving the department's oversight of the program with which
DOD generally agreed, and DOD stated that it was already performing
some of the best practices contained in our recommendations. Since our
2005 report, we testified in November 2006 that, among other things, in
response to our recommendation to establish an integrated governance
structure, DOD had established a steering committee that includes
representatives from the services.[Footnote 10]
Figure 1 depicts a chronology of events for the DIMHRS program.
Figure 1: Chronology of Key Events for the DIMHRS Program:
[See PDF for image]
This figure illustrates the chronology of key events for the DIMHRS
Program, as follows:
Date: February 1998;
Event: DOD initiated the DIMHRS program.
Date: October 2003;
Event: The DIMHRS program office approved version 1.0 of the system
requirements document[A].
Date: March 2004;
Event: DOD established a baseline version of detailed requirements and
provided it to the developer/integrator contractor.
Date: July 2005-December 2005;
Event: Deputy Secretary of Defense directed a strategic pause whereby
the military services discontinued developmental activities for DIMHRS
in order to determine the continued viability of the DIMHRS program.
Date: December 2005;
Event: Deputy Secretary of Defense issued a memorandum stating "DIMHRS
appears to be a viable solution to the department's personnel and pay
problems;" the strategic pause ended and program resumed.
Date: February 2006;
Event: The DIMHRS program approves version 2.01 of the system
requirements document.
Date: September 2006;
Event: Army completed its requirements review.
Date: July 2007;
Event: The DIMHRS program office approved version 3.0 of the system
requirements document.
Date: August 2007;
Event: The DIMHRS program office conditionally approved version 3.1 of
the system requirements document.
Date: April 2008;
Event: Deputy Secretary of Defense directed the Army's deployment date
to change from October 2008 to March 2009.
[A] The system requirements document is broken down into individual
business processes that must be in place within DIMHRS for the system
to meet the requirements specified in the DIMHRS Operational
Requirements Document.
[End of figure]
DOD Has Recently Taken Some Steps to Share DIMHRS Capabilities with the
Army but Has Not Established a Clearly Defined Process for Maintaining
Effective Communications:
DOD does not have a clearly defined process to routinely communicate
with the Army about the extent to which the Army's requirements--
documented need of what a particular product or service should be or
do--will be incorporated into DIMHRS, although DOD has improved some
aspects of its communications recently. Effective communication is a
key federal internal control standard that calls for communications to
constantly flow down, across, and up the organization to help it
achieve all of its objectives.[Footnote 11] Standards encourage
maintaining effective communication throughout an organization. DOD's
Enterprise Program Management Office for DIMHRS, also known as the
DIMHRS program office,[Footnote 12] developed the DIMHRS project
management plan, which states that the DIMHRS Program Manager is
responsible for ensuring required liaison activities are accomplished
with stakeholders. This could include ensuring that the DIMHRS program
office effectively communicates the system capabilities of DIMHRS with
the Army. Such communication would facilitate the Army's understanding
of what the system will deliver thus enabling the Army to better design
and implement effective business processes to work with DIMHRS.
The Army has had problems receiving assurance from DOD about the extent
to which its requirements would be included in DIMHRS. DOD has
submitted versions 3.0, 3.1, and 3.2 of the system requirements
document (e.g., the document that captures the business processes that
must be in place within DIMHRS for the system to meet requirements
specified in the DIMHRS Operational Requirements Document) to the Army
for review. For example, in September 2007, when the Army compared
versions 3.0 and 3.1 of the system requirements document, it noted that
the DIMHRS program office had not effectively communicated with the
Army the rationale or negotiated acceptance of the Army's requirements
that were dropped, changed, or both and were agreed upon in version
3.0. During the Army's review of version 3.1, it identified 717 issues
and submitted them to the DIMHRS program office to be resolved.
According to the Army, a few of the issues it identified in September
2007 remain unresolved in version 3.1 as of July 2008.
In addition, when the DIMHRS program office communicated changes in
DIMHRS requirements in version 3.1 to the Army, the Army had difficulty
tracking those changes between versions 3.0 and 3.1 because the
information was provided in a format that made it difficult for the
Army to extract the information needed to perform its comparative
analysis. DOD's developer/integrator contractor that manages the system
requirements and changes between the various versions of the system
requirements document uses a requirements management tool, which
facilitates its ability to track changes between the various versions
of the system requirements document as the system requirements are
changed over time. However, when the DIMHRS program office provided the
information derived from this tool to the Army, the Army received the
information in a format that made it difficult for the Army to extract
the information it needed to compare changes to its requirements. The
Army tracked thousands of requirements manually between versions 3.0
and 3.1 of the system requirements document. Army officials said that
this effort took time and may not have been accurate or comprehensive.
Subsequently, the DIMHRS program office sent a summary of the changes
to the Army; however, by the time the Army received the summary of
changes, it had already completed its comparative analysis of them.
Army officials said that if the DIMHRS program office had provided
timely access to the summary of changes, they could have performed the
analysis with 100 percent certainty. According to Army officials, when
the DIMHRS program office does not enable the Army to understand the
differences between the Army's requirements and the system, the Army
has difficulty conducting a gap analysis--determining the difference
between what is needed and what is available--between the system's
planned capabilities and its requirements. The Army relies on this gap
analysis to form the basis upon which it can determine whether it needs
to develop or adjust its business processes prior to deploying DIMHRS.
In April 2008, after the program's schedule was revised and approved,
the DIMHRS program office took steps to improve its communications with
the Army about DIMHRS's capabilities and its impact on Army
requirements. Specifically, the Deputy Director of the Business
Transformation Agency stated that moving the deployment date to March
2009 allowed the DIMHRS program office and the Army the time to
communicate about DIMHRS's capabilities and the impact the change in
deployment date has on Army's preparation for deploying DIMHRS,
including the Army's requirements. As part of its communication
efforts, in April 2008, the DIMHRS program office provided the Army
with demonstrations of the system capabilities. These demonstrations
alleviated some of the Army's uncertainty about DIMHRS by giving it
more access to the functionality of DIMHRS through activities such as
"Try DIMHRS" and "See DIMHRS" demonstrations.[Footnote 13] The DIMHRS
Program Manager stated that these activities were not intended to be
comprehensive because DIMHRS was still under development at that point
in time.
In addition, according to Army officials, in May 2008, the DIMHRS
program office began to meet with Army officials to discuss the
development of a formal process of delivering and adjudicating the
documented updates to the design; this included the differences between
the Army's requirements and the DIMHRS's requirements, which are
documented in the system requirements document. In February 2008, when
the DIMHRS program office released version 3.2 of the system
requirements document to the Army, the Army identified 311 issues with
98 issues remaining in July 2008, which the DIMHRS program office is
working to resolve. According to DIMHRS program office officials,
during its review of version 3.2 with the Army, they discussed the fact
that the notification process for changes made to the system
requirements document needed to be improved. The DIMHRS program office
stated that it is modifying the process to ensure that the services
receive formal notification of documented changes whenever the changes
impact system requirements by preparing and sending out a summary of
the changes to the services. Although DOD is working to improve its
communications of DIMHRS's capabilities, it has not developed and
documented a clearly defined process for maintaining effective
communications of the differences between DIMHRS's capabilities and
Army requirements.
According to the DIMHRS program office, the deployment date for DIMHRS
was changed from October 2008 to March 2009 primarily because it had
not conducted adequate testing of the system's performance on payroll
processing. However, the Army raised several concerns, including (1)
whether DOD will effectively communicate changes to system requirements
and provide the Army with information that helps it determine the gaps
between its requirements and DIMHRS's capabilities and (2) the lack of
timely communication of the summary information derived from the
requirements management tool, which would facilitate the Army's ability
to identify changes needed to adapt its business processes and
adequately prepare for DIMHRS. DOD does not have a clearly defined
process that ensures effective communication will be maintained
throughout the process for deploying the system. Having such a process
would help ensure that the Army has a better understanding of the
differences between its requirements and the system. Without addressing
these weaknesses, deployment of DIMHRS may result in a system that will
require extensive and expensive investments.
Conclusions:
DOD planned for the Army to deploy DIMHRS over 2 years ago, and has
postponed deployment four times with deployment now scheduled for March
2009. Although DOD has taken steps to improve its communication of
DIMHRS requirements to the Army, the Army continues to have concerns,
including a lack of (1) assurance that Army requirements are covered in
DIMHRS and (2) timely access to summary information on system
requirements changes. In addition, it is too early to determine if DOD
will continue to communicate with the Army about the differences
between DIMHRS's capabilities and the Army requirements since DOD only
began making improvements in April 2008 and has not established a
clearly defined and documented process for maintaining this
communication. Without effective communication, the Army has difficulty
performing the gap analyses needed to determine which business
processes to develop or adjust as it prepares for deployment of DIMHRS.
If the Army does not have system information in time to adjust its
business processes, the Army may not be prepared to deploy the system
or may deploy it prematurely, which could affect servicemembers' pay.
DOD's efforts to improve its communications with the Army regarding the
DIMHRS program's system capabilities does not include clearly defining
and documenting a process that maintains effective communications of
the differences between DIMHRS's capabilities and Army requirements.
DOD has committed the Army to deploy DIMHRS in March 2009 as a result
of postponing its October 2008 date. However, without DOD establishing
a clearly defined process for maintaining effective, timely
communications, the Army may not be prepared to deploy the system when
scheduled, and DOD may deliver a system that will require extensive and
expensive investments.
Recommendation for Executive Action:
To help address the Army's needs and minimize extensive and expensive
fixes to DIMHRS, we recommend that you direct the Deputy Secretary of
Defense to develop and document a clearly defined process for
maintaining effective communications of the differences between
DIMHRS's capabilities and Army requirements to help ensure that the
Army will have adequate time to prepare for deployment of the system.
Agency Comments:
The department concurred with our recommendation that the Deputy
Secretary of Defense develop and document a clearly defined process for
maintaining effective communications of the differences between
DIMHRS's capabilities and Army requirements to help ensure that the
Army will have adequate time to prepare for deployment of the system.
In response to this recommendation, DOD stated in its comments that as
the focus of the DIMHRS program shifts from application development to
deployment, a recently formed Tiger Team--which is composed of
representatives from the Business Transformation Agency, the Army, and
the Defense Finance and Accounting Service--will, among other things,
bolster the department's current communication efforts and assist with
the Army's preparedness for DIMHRS deployment as well as the service
delivery model after deployment. This will further enhance the
department's communication efforts and will encourage the prompt
resolution of issues that emerge due to potential differences between
DIMHRS's capabilities and Army requirements. The process described
above is captured in a draft charter for the Tiger Team that will be
staffed, and the charter will be presented to the Deputy Secretary of
Defense no later than the end of System Acceptance Testing for DIMHRS.
DOD's written comments are reprinted in enclosure I.
We are sending copies of this report to the House and Senate Armed
Services and Appropriations Committees; House Committee on Government
Reform; Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs; the Director, Office
of Management and Budget; and the Secretaries of the Army, Navy, and
Air Force. We will also make copies available to others on request. In
addition, the report will be available at no charge on the GAO Web site
at [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov].
Should you or your staff have any questions on the matters discussed in
this report, please contact me at (202) 512-3604 or [email protected].
Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public
Affairs may be found on the last page of this report. GAO staff who
made key contributions to this report are listed in enclosure II.
Sincerely yours,
Signed by:
Brenda S. Farrell:
Director, Defense Capabilities and Management:
Enclosures - 2:
Enclosure I:
Comments from the Department of Defense:
Office Of The Under Secretary Of Defense:
Acquisition Technology And Logistics:
3000 Defense Pentagon:
Washington, DC 20301-3000:
August 29, 2008:
Ms. Brenda S. Farrell:
Director, Defense Capabilities and Management:
U.S. Government Accountability Office:
441 G Street, N.W.
Washington, DC 20548:
Dear Ms. Farrell:
This is the Department of Defense (DoD) response to the GAO draft
report, GAO-08-927R, "DOD Systems Modernization: Maintaining Effective
Communication Is Needed to Help Ensure the Army's Successful Deployment
of the Defense Integrated Military Human Resources System," dated
August 5, 2008 (GAO Code 350927). Detailed comments on the report
recommendations are enclosed.
The Department concurs with GAO's recommendation. Maintaining effective
communications with the Army and other Components is important to the
successful deployment of the Defense Integrated Military Human Resource
System (DIMHRS) and in ensuring that there is adequate time for the
Services to prepare for deployment. The Department has taken action to
realign the governance structure and processes as the focus of the
program shills from program development to system deployment, which
will bolster communications efforts with the Army going forward and
will encourage the prompt resolution of emerging issues.
Sincerely,
Signed by:
Paul A. Brinkley:
Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Business Transformation):
Enclosure: As stated:
GAO Draft Report Dated August 5, 2008:
GAO-08-927R (GAO Code 350927):
"DOD Systems Modernization: Maintaining Effective Communication Is
Needed To Help Ensure The Army's Successful Deployment Of The Defense
Integrated Military Human Resources System"
Department Of Defense Comments To The GAO Recommendation
Recommendation 1: The GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense
direct the Deputy Secretary of Defense to develop and document a
clearly defined process for maintaining effective communications of the
differences between Defense Integrated Military Human Resources
System's capabilities and Army requirements to help ensure that the
Army will have adequate time to prepare for deployment of the system.
DOD Response: Concur. The Department concurs that maintaining effective
communications with the Services is important to the successful
deployment of the Defense Integrated Military Human Resources System
(DIMHRS) program and in ensuring there is adequate time for the
Services to prepare for deployment. To that end, the Enterprise Program
Management Office and the Services have worked closely together
throughout the program's development. As development of the program was
completed, the DIMHRS functionality that had come on-line was
demonstrated to the Army through a "See/Try DIMHRS" program. In turn,
the Army has a robust internal communication and change management
program in place to ensure that they have adequate time to prepare for
DIMHRS deployment. Additionally, as the focus of the program shifts
from application development to deployment, a recently-formed "Tiger
Team" will bolster the Department's current communications efforts and
assist with the Army's preparedness for DIMHRS Go-Live as well as the
service delivery model after Go-Live. The Tiger Team, which is composed
of representatives from the Business Transformation Agency (BTA), Army,
and the Defense Finance and Accounting Service (DFAS), will examine
operational readiness from a holistic business point of view,
incorporating elements of people, process, and technology for the Hire-
to-Retire end-to-end business process. This will further enhance the
Department's communication efforts and will encourage the prompt
resolution of issues that emerge due to potential differences between
DIMHRS' capabilities and Army requirements. The Tiger Team will report
to a Senior Executive Level Governance Board, which will expedite
resolution of issues, direct resources towards resolution of gaps that
the team identifies, and will closely monitor Army's deployment
readiness as the DIMHRS Go-Live date approaches. The process described
above is captured in a draft Charter that will be staffed and presented
to the Deputy Secretary of Defense no later than the end of System
Acceptance Testing for DIMHRS.
[End of section]
Enclosure II:
GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
GAO Contact:
Brenda S. Farrell, (202) 512-3604 or [email protected]:
Acknowledgments:
In addition to the individual named above, Grace Coleman, Karen N.
Harms, Susannah Hawthorne, LaToya King, Rebecca Shea, Matthew Spiers,
Robin Wagner, Jose Watkins, and Angela Watson made key contributions to
this report.
[End of section]
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[End of section]
Footnotes:
[1] For the purposes of this report, Army refers to active Army.
[2] GAO, Financial Management: Defense's System for Army Military
Payroll Is Unreliable, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-
bin/getrpt?GAO/AIMD-93-32] (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 30, 1993).
[3] GAO, Military Pay: Inadequate Controls for Stopping Overpayments of
Hostile Fire and Hardship Duty Pay to Over 200 Sick or Injured Army
National Guard and Army Reserve Soldiers Assigned to Fort Bragg,
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-384R] (Washington,
D.C.: Apr. 27, 2006).
[4] According to DOD, as of March 31, 2008, it had spent approximately
$766 million on the program, and it estimates spending an additional
$286 million through fiscal year 2009. It does not include costs
incurred by the Air Force from October 2007 through March 2008, the
Marine Corps from fiscal year 2007 through March 2008, and the Navy
since program inception.
[5] GAO, DOD Systems Modernization: Management of Integrated Military
Human Capital Program Needs Additional Improvements, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-05-189] (Washington, D.C.: Feb.
11, 2005).
[6] The system requirements document, also known as the system
subsystem specification document, is broken down into individual
business processes that must be in place within DIMHRS.
[7] GAO, Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government,
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO/AIMD-00-21.3.1]
(Washington, D.C. November 1999).
[8] The Operational Requirements Document is a tool used by managers
responsible for defining system capabilities needed to satisfy the
mission needs of DIMHRS. This document is intended to guide the scope
of the DIMHRS program.
[9] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-05-189].
[10] GAO, Defense Business Transformation: A Comprehensive Plan,
Integrated Efforts, and Sustained Leadership Are Needed to Assure
Success, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-229T]
(Washington, D.C.: Nov.16, 2006).
[11] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO/AIMD-00-21.3.1].
[12] The DIMHRS program office is responsible for, among other things,
acquiring and implementing DIMHRS.
[13] The DIMHRS program office developed (1) an instructor-led lab
called "Try DIMHRS" that allows Army personnel to practice hands-on
navigation through DIMHRS to conduct routine Army human resources
functions and (2) a weekly event using Defense Connect Online
technology called "See DIMHRS" that allows personnel to view Army human
resources instructor-led scenarios with explanations over the Web.
[End of section]
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