Energy and Science Reports and Testimony: 1992 (Other Written Prod.,
04/93, GAO/RCED-93-131).
Included among the leading energy and science issues today are the
continuing U.S. dependence on imported oil, the staggering costs to
clean up the nuclear weapons complex, and the expectations for science
and technology to improve U.S. competitiveness abroad. This document
contains summaries of GAO reports and testimony issued during 1992 on
energy and science topics. Order forms are included to obtain documents
of interest.
--------------------------- Indexing Terms -----------------------------
REPORTNUM: RCED-93-131
TITLE: Energy and Science Reports and Testimony: 1992
DATE: 04/01/93
SUBJECT: Environmental monitoring
Energy research
Research and development
Energy demand
Contract monitoring
Financial management
Nuclear weapons plant safety
Scientific research
Technology transfer
Government publications
IDENTIFIER: Bibliographies
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Cover
================================================================ COVER
Resources, Community, and Economic Development Division
April 1993
ENERGY AND SCIENCE REPORTS AND
TESTIMONY: 1992
GAO/RCED-93-131
Energy and Science Products
Abbreviations
=============================================================== ABBREV
BCLLWC -
CNG -
DOD -
DOE -
DOT -
EG&G -
FERC -
GAO -
HHS -
IRM -
NASA -
NSF -
NRC -
OMB -
R&D -
SBIR -
SEC -
SEMATECH -
TVA -
UEC -
FOREWORD
============================================================ Chapter 0
Energy and science concerns remain at the forefront of significant
national issues. The continuing dependence on imported oil, the
staggering costs that will be required to clean up the nuclear
weapons complex, and the expectations for science and technology to
improve the nation's ability to compete globally are among the energy
and science concerns that are intertwined with current efforts to
address the federal budget deficit and improve the nation's economy.
Because of this, energy and science will play key roles in public
policy decisions for the foreseeable future.
During 1992, the U.S. General Accounting Office (GAO) issued reports
related to these and other energy and science issues. Highlights of
GAO's work include:
Science and Technology. Widespread overcharges for indirect costs
(or overhead) were being incurred on federally funded research
at universities. As a result, federal actions must be taken to
limit overhead costs and simplify the overall reimbursement
system. (See p. 50.)
Managing the Department of Energy (DOE). DOE does not have an
effective system to ensure that uncosted (unspent) obligations
are analyzed as part of its budget formulation process. DOE
ended fiscal year 1991 with about $9.7 billion in uncosted
obligations--a 45-percent increase since fiscal year 1989--but
does not know the extent that these funds may be used to reduce
future appropriation requests. (See p. 35.)
Energy Supply and Demand. Six policy options could be pursued to
reduce gasoline consumption and air pollution. However, relying
on just one option could be difficult and costly; consequently,
a strategy incorporating the best designs of each policy option
is preferable. (See p. 22.)
Nuclear Waste. A program to build facilities to dispose of
high-level wastes stored in tanks at the Savannah River Plant in
South Carolina is now 5 years behind schedule and expected to
cost $4 billion. Moreover, DOE needs to assess and compare
alternative technologies to determine if it should accelerate
efforts to replace existing technology. (See p. 9.)
This annual index includes information on these and other GAO
documents directly related to energy and science that were issued
between January and December 1992. This index should be useful for
general information and research purposes and for understanding the
energy and science issues that GAO is addressing.
Questions can be directed to me at the U.S. General Accounting
Office, Room 1842, 441 G Street, N.W., Washington, D.C., (202)
512-3841. Readers interested in ordering documents or in requesting
bibliographic searches on a specific topic should call the Document
Handling and Information Service, (202) 512-6000, or fax a request to
(301) 258-4066. Forms are included in the back of the index to
facilitate document orders.
Victor S. Rezendes
Director, Energy and Science Issues
Resources, Community, and
Economic Development Division
ENERGY AND THE ENVIRONMENT
============================================================ Chapter 1
ENERGY AND THE ENVIRONMENT
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 1:1
Nebraska Low-Level Waste
GAO/RCED-93-47R, 10/14/1992
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO provided information on the
site selection for a low-level radioactive waste facility in
Nebraska, focusing on the Boyd County Low-Level Waste Monitoring
Committee's (BCLLWC): (1) reservations about the proposed site in
the county; (2) concern about the facility licensing proceeding and
any plans to store mixed and decommissioned wastes at the site; and
(3) concern that the site might receive wastes from other states.
GAO found that: (1) although they did not find the site unsuitable,
two BCLLWC geology consultants reported that groundwater could become
contaminated and be discharged into a nearby creek, and therefore the
site would not meet regulatory requirements; (2) the site developer
did not include mixed wastes and decommissioned wastes in its
application for state licensing but would request such permission
later; (3) BCLLWC believed the plans for mixed and decommissioned
wastes should have been raised at the licensing proceeding; and (4)
the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) alone could grant emergency
access to the Nebraska facility if the denial of access would pose a
public health threat, but NRC said that applicants first had to
exhaust all other alternatives, and it did not anticipate any such
situation arising.
Nuclear Waste: New York's Adherence to Site Selection Procedures is
Unclear
GAO/RCED-92-172, 8/11/1992
A New York commission charged with choosing a site for a low-level
radioactive waste facility announced in September 1989 that it
planned limited investigations at five potential sites. Four of the
sites were chosen as a result of a statewide screening process, while
the fifth site had been offered to the commission by an owner. The
counties where the sites are located have raised objections to the
site-selection process. GAO concludes that the commission's
consideration of the offered site was inconsistent with some of its
procedures and may not have followed others.
Nuclear Health and Safety: Mortality Study of Atmospheric Nuclear
Test Participants is Flawed
GAO/RCED-92-182, 8/10/1992
A 1979 report from the Centers for Disease Control suggested that the
incidence of leukemia among servicemen who had participated in
atmospheric nuclear tests in the 1950s may have been seriously
underestimated. In response, the Defense Nuclear Agency commissioned
the National Academy of Sciences to study how low-level radiation
affected participants in other atmospheric tests. The Academy's 1985
report concluded that the death rate from cancer in the five tests
reviewed was generally less than that which would be expected in the
general population. New information developed by the Defense Nuclear
Agency in 1989, however, raised doubts about the validity of the
Academy study. GAO provides information on the actions or omissions
by the federal government in connection with the 1985 National
Academy of Sciences report. GAO discusses (1) the accuracy of the
data supplied to the Academy, (2) when and how inaccuracies in the
data were discovered, (3) when and how the inaccuracies occurred, and
(4) what actions have been taken to correct the data and update the
1985 mortality study.
Environmental Technology: Comments on S. 2632, the National
Environmental Technologies Agency Act
GAO/T-RCED-92-81, 7/21/1992
Testimony presented by Victor S. Rezendes, Director, Energy and
Science Issues, before the Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs.
Innovative technologies are needed to clean up the environment and
protect it in the future. The combined public and private cleanup
effort in the United States alone may cost more than half a trillion
dollars during the next 30 years, while the recent summit in Rio de
Janeiro underscores the growing global dimensions of the
environmental problem. Proposed legislation before the Congress--S.
2632--would create an agency to promote the development and
commercial application of environmentally safe technologies and to
improve the nation's competitiveness in meeting world demand for such
technologies. Although the bill highlights the need for innovative
environmental technologies, it also raises fundamental questions that
the Congress may want to consider before committing considerable
federal investment in a new agency. For example, what are the
research and development needs? What are the needs for transfer of
technology? What are the regulatory barriers to more widespread use?
In any case, GAO believes that some of the bill's provisions could be
clarified to avoid potential problems and help ensure success.
Finally, the Congress may want to examine the roles of existing
government organizations and how they should be integrated to promote
the development and deployment of innovative environmental
technologies.
Hydroelectric Dams: Proposed Legislation to Restore Elwha River
Ecosystem and Fisheries
GAO/T-RCED-92-80, 7/9/1992
Testimony presented by Keith O. Fultz, Director, Planning and
Reporting, before the Energy and Power Subcommittee, House Committee
on Energy and Commerce; Water, Power and Offshore Energy Resources
Subcommittee, House Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs; and
Fisheries, Wildlife Conservation and the Environment Subcommittee,
House Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries. GAO discussed the
Elwha River Ecosystem and Fisheries Restoration Act, focusing on:
(1) the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission's (FERC) authority to
license dams on the Elwha River; (2) the Department of the Interior's
position on removal of the dams to restore fisheries; and (3) who
should pay the costs if the dams are removed. GAO noted that: (1)
the Glines Canyon Dam is within the boundaries of a national park,
where FERC does not have the authority to license dams; (2) Interior,
FERC, and the National Marine Fisheries Service believe that removing
both dams offers the best prospects for restoring the Elwha River
fisheries and their surrounding ecosystem; and (3) the cost of
removing the dams should be allocated among parties in proportion to
the benefits they have received from the dams or will receive from
the restoration of the river.
Nuclear Waste: Improvements Needed in Monitoring Contaminants in
Hanford Soils
GAO/RCED-92-149, 7/6/1992
Since so much of the radioactive and hazardous waste stored at the
Department of Energy's Hanford site either has been buried or has
leaked from underground storage tanks, monitoring is vital to detect
whether contaminants are seeping toward groundwater. GAO has
discovered, however, that programs to spot contamination in the
vadose zone--the unsaturated soil layer above the groundwater
level--have received scant funding, are operating with out-of-date
and uncalibrated equipment, and are not comprehensive enough to
assess the migration of contaminants. The several different programs
and organizations now spending vadose zone funds are often unaware of
each other's activities and tend not to share data, personnel, or
knowledge. Furthermore, DOE has no plan for improving its vadose
zone activities. Vadose zone technology could help DOE save money by
reducing the need for doing laboratory analyses and drilling wells.
Nuclear Waste: Defense Waste Processing Facility--Cost, Schedule,
and Technical Issues
GAO/RCED-92-183, 6/17/1992
Since the early 1980s, the Department of Energy has been planning or
building facilities to treat and dispose of 34 million gallons of
high-level radioactive waste stored in underground tanks at the
Savannah River Site in South Carolina. The program has experienced
cost increases and is now expected to cost nearly $4 billion and run
about 5 years behind schedule. Further cost increases and schedule
delays are possible because of technical issues and other
uncertainties. Much of the cost increases and schedule slippages
resulted from ineffective program management. In addition, because
of the way in which DOE reported funding and budget information about
the program in the past, the Congress did not have a clear picture of
the cost increases and schedule slippages. DOE has taken steps to
correct these problems. Two key pretreatment processes continue to
be plagued by technical problems. At the same time, an alternative
pretreatment method with lower operating costs has become available,
raising questions about which pretreatment technology can come online
quickest and offer environmental, safety, performance, and cost
advantages. GAO recommends that DOE assess and compare the existing
and alternative pretreatment technologies to see whether DOE should
accelerate its planned efforts to replace the existing technology.
Nuclear Waste: Status of Actions to Improve DOE User-Fee Assessments
GAO/RCED-92-165, 6/10/1992
The Department of Energy is required to build a deep underground
repository for the safe, permanent disposal of nuclear waste from
government and the private sector. According to DOE estimates, the
program could cost as much as $34 billion if two repositories are
built. In a June 1990 report (GAO/RCED-90-65), GAO noted that DOE's
methods for estimating program costs and revenues and for assessing
fees did not adequately take into account uncertainties like
inflation that are inherent in such a long-term program. GAO
discusses DOE's periodic assessment of whether the fees charged to
utilities running nuclear power plants are adequate to cover the
costs of the civilian nuclear waste disposal program. GAO also
discusses the need to disclose in the fund's financial statements the
possibility that a portion of the one-time user fees due from
utilities may be uncollectible because of the uncertain condition of
some utilities.
Nuclear Waste: DOE's Repository Site Investigations, a Long and
Difficult Task
GAO/RCED-92-73, 5/27/1992
More than 20,000 metric tons of highly radioactive wastes are stored
at more than 70 sites across the country. Because these wastes will
remain dangerous for thousands of years, the Department of Energy is
seeking to develop an underground repository for safe, permanent
disposal of this material. Under 1987 legislation, DOE must consider
Yucca Mountain, Nevada, as the sole potential repository site. This
report focuses on (1) DOE's efforts to investigate Yucca Mountain
since 1988; (2) DOE's efforts to ensure the early identification,
primarily through surface-based tests, of any conditions that could
disqualify the site; and (3) the effects of delays in DOE's obtaining
environmental permits from the state of Nevada.
Nuclear Health and Safety: More Can Be Done to Better Control
Environmental Restoration Costs
GAO/RCED-92-71, 4/20/1992
For more than 40 years, the nuclear weapons complex run by the
Department of Energy has been disposing of hazardous and radioactive
waste at sites across the country. DOE estimated in 1988 that its
environmental restoration effort, a process to clean up these sites
and meet federal and state standards, could cost as much as $64
billion. Although data are unavailable to determine aggregate cost
growth associated with DOE's environmental restoration program,
indications are that costs are soaring. In response to these
increases, DOE began reviewing the causes of cost growth in 1990 to
determine whether the cost escalation could be minimized. DOE,
concluding that some cost growth has been unnecessary and should be
better controlled, has begun (1) conducting program cost reviews, (2)
developing procedures that require preparing documentation to support
cost estimates, and (3) instituting cost-estimating review
procedures. GAO questions the direction and pace of DOE's actions.
Specifically, DOE still lacks some basic management tools, such as
baselines for individual projects and an information system for
monitoring cost growth, to properly understand and analyze
environmental restoration cost growth. While these tools would not
in themselves stem the program's cost growth, they would help DOE
better identify and understand the reasons behind the cost increases,
allowing DOE management to deal with the problem.
Cleanup Technology: Better Management for DOE's Technology
Development Program
GAO/RCED-92-145, 4/10/1992
The Department of Energy has implemented its technology development
program for environmental cleanup and has funded major research and
development projects. The program's funding for fiscal year 1992 is
about $303 million, and DOE is requesting about $315 million for
fiscal year 1993. The agency has not, however, developed measurable
performance goals, overall cost estimates and schedules, and key
decision points for evaluating program projects. Without these basic
management tools, DOE will have a hard time determining what its
objectives are, how best to achieve them, and when it has achieved
them. Moreover, the Congress will have difficulty determining what
investments the program is making and what funding is needed.
DOE's Clean Coal Technology Program
GAO/RCED-92-143R, 4/3/1992
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO commented on the Department
of Energy's response to a previous GAO report on improvements needed
in the DOE Clean Coal Technology Program. GAO noted that: (1) DOE
believes that the GAO report does not portray the larger picture of
the program's successes and that the Clean Coal Technology Program is
achieving significant successes and (2) of the five GAO
recommendations included in the report, DOE disagrees with one,
agrees with or is taking action on two others, and believes its
current procedures are sufficient to meet the intent of the remaining
two.
Connecticut Low-Level Waste
GAO/RCED-92-137R, 3/17/1992
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO provided information on
states' efforts to implement the Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy
Amendments Act of 1985, focusing on Connecticut's program for
developing a disposal facility for commercial low-level radioactive
waste. GAO noted that: (1) 13 states, including 8 states that are
members of state compacts, plan to develop new disposal facilities;
(2) only California, a member of a 4-state compact, may have a
facility operational by the January 1, 1993, deadline, and the other
planned facilities could be completed between 1993 and 1999; and (3)
Connecticut's facility development schedule is unknown, since it
suspended site-specific testing after determining that its
site-screening contractor made some errors in its technical
investigation of three candidate sites.
Nuclear Waste: Development of Casks for Transporting Spent Fuel
Needs Modification.
GAO/RCED-92-56, 3/13/1992
So that it can start removing radioactive wastes from the nation's
nuclear plants in 1998, the Department of Energy is developing two
kinds of high-capacity casks for shipping spent fuel by truck or by
rail and barge. The pace and direction of DOE's cask development
program are based on the agency's conviction that a storage facility
can be developed in time to receive and store the spent fuel by 1998.
GAO doubts that DOE will have a facility up and running by then.
Despite grant applications from possible host jurisdictions, the
likelihood that a volunteer site will be found remains uncertain.
This situation affords DOE an opportunity over the next several years
to reevaluate the course and direction of the cask development
program while conserving funds until there is a clear need to produce
casks. With more time available, DOE can address whether possible
technical and operational concerns might affect cask designs.
Cleanup Technology: DOE's Management of Environmental Cleanup
Technology
GAO/T-RCED-92-29, 2/26/1992
Testimony presented by Victor S. Rezendes, Director, Energy and
Science Issues, before the Environment Subcommittee, House Committee
on Science, Space, and Technology.
To clean up its nuclear weapons complex in a cost-effective way, the
Department of Energy believes that it needs improved cleanup
technologies. As a result, it has begun a technology development
program and has started funding eight integrated cleanup research and
development projects. The number of these demonstration projects is
expected to change as DOE reassesses its program strategy.
Nonetheless, DOE's focus to date has been on setting up the program,
not on its future management. GAO testified that DOE needs to
develop key management tools fundamental to the program's
effectiveness. These tools include measurable performance goals,
overall project cost estimates and schedules, and major decision
points. Without them, DOE will have problems in measuring the
technology development program's progress, informing the Congress
about the investments being made and funding required, and weeding
out poorly performing projects that are no longer beneficial.
Nuclear Waste: DOE Assistance in Funding Route Improvements to Waste
Isolation Plant
GAO/RCED-92-65FS, 1/14/1992
Located near Carlsbad, New Mexico, the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant is
intended to be an underground repository for the permanent disposal
of transuranic waste--material contaminated with radioactive elements
that have atomic numbers greater than uranium. The Department of
Energy produces this waste at various facilities in its nuclear
weapons complex. This fact sheet provides information on DOE's
fulfillment agreements with New Mexico to assist the state in
obtaining federal funds to improve roads in connection with the
plant.
Nuclear Waste: Weak DOE Contract Management Invited TRUPACT-II
Setbacks
GAO/RCED-92-26, 1/14/1992
The Department of Energy spent about $3 million to buy 24 defective
shipping containers intended to transport transuranic waste to
storage sites in New Mexico. The containers were built under a
subcontract with Westinghouse, DOE's managing contractor for the
Waste Isolation Pilot Plant. While smoothing welded surfaces on the
containers, the contractors ground the walls too thin to meet the
Nuclear Regulatory Commission's approved design. NRC later rejected
the thin-walled containers. Concerned that the contractor might
declare bankruptcy and jeopardize the opening of the plant, DOE
allowed Westinghouse to enter into an agreement with the contractor
to build 15 NRC-approved containers and purchase the defective ones.
This report details several ineffective contracting practices that
led to DOE's purchase of the defective containers. Ineffective
oversight by Westinghouse and DOE exacerbated the situation.
Historically, DOE has given its contractors wide latitude but has
done little oversight. Although DOE is trying to improve its
contract-management approach, instituting effective, lasting changes
will be difficult.
Nuclear Health and Safety: Radiation Events at DOE's Idaho National
Engineering Laboratory
GAO/RCED-92-64FS, 1/13/1992
The Idaho National Engineering Laboratory, established in 1949, is an
engineering facility whose primary function is to build, test, and
operate nuclear reactors and support facilities. During the 1950s
and 1960s, the Laboratory released radioactive materials into the
atmosphere on several occasions. This fact sheet provides
information on nuclear events at the Laboratory through the 1980s and
on the extent to which the Department of Energy considered such
events in determining the award fee paid to the Laboratory
contractor. GAO focused on (1) airborne radiation release that may
have exposed the public to radiation levels greater than the current
public exposure standards and (2) events that resulted in one or more
workers receiving an exposure exceeding the current annual standards
for protecting workers from radiation.
Nuclear Waste: Slow Progress Developing Low-Level Radioactive Waste
Disposal Facilities
GAO/RCED-92-61, 1/10/1992
Each year, nuclear power plants, businesses, hospitals, and
universities generate more than 1 million cubic feet of hardware,
rags, paper, liquid waste, and protective clothing that have been
contaminated with radioactivity. While most of this waste has been
disposed of in facilities in Nevada, South Carolina, and Washington
State, recent legislation made the states responsible--either
individually or through groups of states called compacts--for
developing new disposal facilities. This report discusses (1) the
states' progress and problems in meeting facility development
milestones in the law, (2) federal and state efforts to resolve
issues related to mixed waste (low-level waste that also contains
hazardous chemicals) and waste with very low levels of radioactivity,
and (3) the Department of Energy's progress in discharging the
federal government's responsibility under the law to manage the most
hazardous low-level waste.
ENERGY RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT
============================================================ Chapter 2
ENERGY RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 2:1
Federal Research: Foreign Contributions to the Superconducting Super
Collider
GAO/RCED-93-75, 12/30/1992
The Department of Energy may have a hard time getting the foreign
contributions needed to meet its $1.7 billion goal for the
Superconducting Super Collider. As of the end of fiscal year 1992,
DOE had received about $15 million in foreign contributions
consisting of pledges and contributions of labor and materials from
India, Russia, and China. This amount is close to the $20 million
DOE estimated that it would receive by the end of fiscal year 1992.
The Superconducting Super Collider funding profile, however, calls
for DOE to obtain an additional $1.1 billion in foreign contributions
through fiscal year 1996. Although most of this money will have to
come from Japan, Japanese officials have said that they are still
studying the merits of the project and have yet to decide whether to
contribute. If the foreign contributions do not materialize, the tab
for U.S. taxpayers will increase regardless of whether the Congress
decides to make up for the funding shortfall or let the project's
schedule slip. According to DOE, a 1-year slippage in the project's
overall completion schedule would boost costs by about $400
million--or roughly $1 million a day.
Nuclear Science: Status of DOE's Self-Supporting Isotope Program
GAO/T-RCED-92-88, 8/12/1992
Testimony presented by Victor S. Rezendes, Director, Energy and
Science Issues, before the Environment, Energy and Natural Resources
Subcommittee, House Committee on Government Operations.
Isotopes have important applications in medicine, industry, and
scientific research. Although the Department of Energy's program to
produce and distribute isotopes is relatively small, it is an
important domestic source of this material. GAO testified that DOE
faces significant obstacles in trying to run the program on a
self-supporting basis. Because DOE has been unable to recoup program
costs through isotope sales, its original $16 million operating fund
has been depleted, and the agency is borrowing money to keep the
program solvent. High, uncontrollable operating costs; lack of
capital funding; and foreign competition--much of it subsidized--have
been the main barriers to the program's self-sufficiency. DOE has
hired a consulting firm to help redesign the program. DOE and the
firm will then seek ways to finance DOE's newly defined role in the
isotope field. But continued government funding is likely to be
needed to keep the program afloat. GAO testified that had DOE
completed such a study before reorganizing its isotope program in
1989, many of these problems could have been avoided.
Federal Research: Implementation of the Super Collider's Cost and
Schedule Control System
GAO/RCED-92-242, 7/21/1992
The Superconducting Super Collider project, estimated to cost $8.25
billion and to be completed over a 10-year period ending in 1999, is
designed to produce intense proton collisions, thereby providing
insights into the fundamental components of matter. In April 1992
testimony (GAO/T-RCED-92-48), GAO indicated that the Department of
Energy lacked an integrated system for monitoring cost and schedule
performance. DOE argued that GAO's testimony relied on 1990 audit
work and did not accurately reflect present conditions. This report
provides information on (1) the time frame and the basis of GAO's
data that supported the April 1992 testimony and (2) the status of
both GAO's review and DOE's system for managing the Superconducting
Super Collider's cost and schedule.
Nuclear Science: Monitoring Improved, but More Planning Needed for
DOE Test and Research Reactors
GAO/RCED-92-123, 7/15/1992
As its stock of nondefense nuclear reactors dwindles due to lower
demand and higher operating costs, the Department of Energy must
decide which reactors to shut down and which to maintain or replace.
In DOE's view, the small number of remaining reactors and their
specialized functions makes unnecessary formal long-range planning
that would compare the capabilities, ages, and conditions of the
reactors. Yet GAO believes that, given the ages of the test and
research reactors and the deterioration taking place, it is not
premature to plan for the timely retirement or replacement of these
reactors. The absence of such planning could lead to safety
problems, diminished reactor performance, increased costs to maintain
existing safety levels, and gaps in service to experimenters using
the equipment. Safety, or at least the identification of safety
problems, has improved at DOE's nondefense test and research
facilities. DOE now has an inventory of identified problems at these
facilities that will take years to correct. Ensuring safer
operations, however, demands continued identification and correction
of problems.
Nuclear Science: Consideration of Accelerator Production of Tritium
Requires R&D
GAO/RCED-92-154, 6/15/1992
Tritium, a crucial material used in nuclear weapons, gradually decays
and must be continually replaced. The Department of Energy is
responsible for producing tritium and has traditionally generated it
at its nuclear reactors. The reactors are getting old, however, and
it is unclear how much longer they will last. An
alternative--producing tritium with a particle accelerator--was first
proposed in 1989 by scientists at Los Alamos and Brookhaven National
Laboratories. DOE has devoted scant funds to test the concept,
however, and the full extent of the accelerator's abilities remains
unknown. DOE declined to pursue this idea because it doubted that
enough time existed to develop the concept, given the immaturity of
the technology and the urgency with which DOE believed new tritium
production capacity would be needed. Reductions in the nuclear
weapons stockpile have eliminated the need for an urgent schedule and
have given DOE more time to study the accelerator. To sufficiently
develop the technology for an accelerator so that it can be compared
with reactors for tritium production would require a research and
development program.
Nuclear Science: DOE's Self-Supporting Isotope Program Is
Experiencing Problems
GAO/RCED-92-122FS, 6/3/1992
Production and distribution of isotopes, which have medical,
industrial, and scientific applications, has been a long-standing
mission of the Department of Energy. DOE now generates less than 5
percent of all worldwide isotope sales. DOE is having problems
running its isotope sales program on a self-supporting basis, and,
since 1990, program operating costs have exceeded revenues. Foreign
competition and high operating costs have been the main factors
discouraging the program's self-sufficiency. U.S. isotope users are
concerned that DOE's commitment to operating the program on a
self-sufficient basis may limit the domestic availability of some
isotopes if DOE cannot produce them cost-effectively.
Energy R&D: DOE's Prioritization and Budgeting Process for Renewable
Energy Research
GAO/RCED-92-155, 4/29/1992
This report examines how the Department of Energy plans and budgets
research and development projects for renewable energy technologies.
Such technologies include electricity generation from solar, wind,
and geothermal energy sources. GAO discusses how DOE (1) determines
the annual budget for energy technologies, including renewal, fossil,
and nuclear energy, and the role played in this process by the Office
of Management and Budget; (2) allocates research and development
funds among renewable energy technologies; and (3) ensures that
specific congressional directives for research and development
projects for renewable energy technology are followed.
Energy R&D: DOE's Prioritization and Budgeting Process for Renewable
Energy Research
GAO/T-RCED-92-57, 4/30/1992
Testimony presented by Victor S. Rezendes, Director, Energy and
Science Issues, before the Investigations and Oversight Subcommittee,
House Committee on Science, Space, and Technology.
See abstract for GAO/RCED-92-155, 4/29/1992
Federal Research: Concerns About the Superconducting Super Collider
GAO/T-RCED-92-48, 4/9/1992
Testimony presented by Victor S. Rezendes, Director, Energy and
Science Issues, before the Investigations and Oversight Subcommittee,
House Committee on Science, Space, and Technology.
So far, the Congress has provided about $1.3 billion toward
construction of the Superconducting Super Collider and is now
considering the President's request for another $650 million for
fiscal year 1993. GAO testified that several factors could delay the
project, increase its cost to the U.S. government, or reduce
potential benefits. GAO believes that, as the investment increases
and construction advances, it is more likely that project funding
will continue even if costs increase and other countries do not help
pay for it. Accordingly, correcting the problems cited by GAO and
obtaining firm funding commitments from other nations are necessary
to protect the U.S. investment in the project. Continuation of
federal funding could also be made contingent on the Department of
Energy putting in place an integrated cost and schedule system,
assessing the impact on the domestic economy of using foreign
subcontractors, and obtaining firm commitments for contributions for
other nations by a certain date.
Nuclear Science: Fast Flux Test Facility on Standby, Awaiting DOE
Decision on Future Missions
GAO/RCED-92-121FS, 4/9/1992
The Fast Flux Test Facility, located at the Hanford Reservation in
Washington State, is the Department of Energy's newest and largest
test and research reactor facility. In operation since 1982, the
facility is designed primarily to test how well materials and
components proposed for use in advanced reactors work in an operating
test reactor. This fact sheet explores the rationale for DOE's 1990
decision to shut down the facility as well as DOE's response to
proposals to keep the facility operating.
The SP-100 Nuclear Reactor Program: Should It Be Continued?
GAO/T-NSIAD-92-15, 3/12/1992
Testimony presented by Mark E. Gebicke, Director, NASA Issues,
before the Investigations and Oversight Subcommittee, House Committee
on Science, Space, and Technology.
The SP-100 Space Nuclear Reactor Program was created to develop
technology for space reactor power systems used in future NASA and
Defense Department space missions. The program has been struggling,
and the government is at a point at which it must decide whether to
continue it. GAO's testimony discusses (1) the program's past and
projected costs, (2) missions identified by potential users of the
technology, (3) recent events that raise questions about the
program's continued viability, and (4) possible options for the
program's future.
ENERGY SUPPLY AND DEMAND
============================================================ Chapter 3
ENERGY SUPPLY AND DEMAND
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 3:1
Nuclear Safety: Concerns About the Nuclear Power Reactors in Cuba
GAO/RCED-92-262, 9/24/1992
If Cuba obtains the help needed to complete construction of its two
Soviet-designed nuclear power reactors, the United States will need
assurances that they are built and will be operated in a way that
does not pose a risk to the United States in the event of an
accidental release of radioactive material. Although work has halted
on the two reactors, the first unit is believed to be virtually
finished while the second is between 20 and 30 percent complete. The
main reactor components have not yet been installed, and the nuclear
fuel has not been delivered. Concerns about the reactors center on
the questionable quality of the construction, limited regulatory
oversight, inadequate training for operators, lax safety standards,
and the absence of a Cuban industrial infrastructure to support the
reactors' operation and maintenance. Concerns also exist that the
upper portion of the containment dome was designed to withstand
pressures of only 7 pounds per square inch. Because Russia demands
hard currency as payment for--and Cuba now lacks the money to
buy--equipment needed for the reactors, when the reactors will start
up is unclear. Continued monitoring of Cuba's progress toward
completing the reactors is warranted.
Electricity Regulation: Electric Consumers Protection Act's Effects
on Licensing Hydroelectric Dams
GAO/RCED-92-246, 9/18/1992
The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission faces a major challenge. By
the end of 1993, the long-term operating licenses for more than 15
percent of the nation's nonfederal hydroelectric power projects will
expire. In relicensing these projects, FERC must balance electricity
needs with environmental and other considerations, as spelled out in
the 1986 Electric Consumers Protection Act. This report: (1)
reviews the effects of that legislation on FERC's licensing process
for and decisions about hydroelectric power projects, (2) provides
information on FERC's use of temporary licenses for projects seeking
relicensing, and (3) identifies FERC's requirements for ensuring
public safety at hydroelectric projects.
Energy Policy: Options to Reduce Environmental and Other Costs of
Gasoline Consumption
GAO/RCED-92-260, 9/17/1992
GAO evaluated six policy options--a higher gas tax, a tax on tail
pipe emissions, subsidies for alternative fuels, higher fuel economy
standards for new vehicles, surcharges for cars that are less fuel
efficient and pollute more, and financial rewards for people who
voluntarily scrap older vehicles--to determine their effect on the
economy, the environment, traffic congestion, and other issues.
These policy options can be modified or combined to more effectively
reduce gasoline consumption and air pollution from cars and light
trucks and to meet other important policy objectives. Options that
send consumers clear market signals, such as higher gasoline or tail
pipe taxes, could help ensure that the costs of gasoline use in these
vehicles are visible and fully considered by consumers when they buy,
maintain, drive, and trade in vehicles. These options could also
increase the demand for more fuel-efficient and alternatively fueled
vehicles. Relying on just one option to meet multiple and sometimes
conflicting policy objectives, however, could be difficult and
costly. This, in turn, could reduce the chance that any policies
will be adopted. An eclectic strategy incorporating the best designs
of individual policy options seems desirable.
Energy Policy: Options to Reduce Environmental and Other Costs of
Gasoline Consumption
GAO/T-RCED-92-94, 9/17/1992
Testimony presented by Victor S. Rezendes, Director, Energy and
Science Issues, before the Environment Subcommittee, House Committee
on Science, Space, and Technology.
See abstract for GAO/RCED-92-260, 9/17/92
East European Energy: Romania's Energy Needs Persist
GAO/NSIAD-92-257, 8/4/1992
Modernization of Romania's energy sector and increased production are
crucial if that country is to achieve market reforms and reinvigorate
its economy. Because the changing energy economies of Romania and
other East European countries may open up new markets for Western
energy technologies, this report provides information on (1) trends
and problems linked to Romania's energy production and imports, (2)
Romania's energy needs and the steps being taken or planned to
address them, (3) factors that discourage U.S. trade with and
investment in Romania's energy sector, and (4) U.S. government and
international efforts to develop Romania's energy sector.
Alternative Fuels
GAO/RCED-92-240R, 7/24/1992
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO provided information on:
(1) tunnel restrictions for gaseous-fueled vehicles in Baltimore,
Boston, and New York; (2) the implications of Department of
Transportation (DOT) regulations requiring recertification of
compressed natural gas (CNG) cylinders; and (3) the consistency of
provisions for alternative-fuel tax benefits in recently proposed
legislation. GAO noted that: (1) regulatory agencies in Baltimore,
Boston, and New York have recently supported relaxing their
regulations that block access for gaseous-fueled vehicles and have
been working with the CNG and liquified petroleum gas industries to
resolve potential safety issues associated with gaseous fuels; (2)
DOT requires CNG cylinder recertification only for those vehicles
involved in commerce, but some state and local governments require
all CNG vehicle users to maintain DOT certification; and (3)
inconsistencies among the proposed legislation's provisions for tax
deductions could result in some acceptable fuels' not receiving tax
benefits.
Gasohol: Federal Agencies' Use of Gasohol
GAO/T-RCED-92-73, 6/24/1992
Testimony presented by Victor S. Rezendes, Director, Energy and
Science Issues, before the Investigations Subcommittee, House
Committee on Armed Services.
This testimony examines federal agencies' use of gasohol--gasoline
containing 10 percent ethanol. Bulk purchases of gasohol for use in
federal motor vehicles have been limited, and the extent to which
gasohol has been used by federal credit card purchasers of motor fuel
is unknown. Eliminating or tightening exemptions from requirements
for the use of gasohol and promoting its use among credit card users
may increase demand. The Department of Defense (DOD) has advertised
in trade publications its need for more suppliers, generating
increased supplier inquiries about future federal contracts. Yet
questions remain about the ability of DOD and industry to meet
increased demand, particularly given the current limited availability
of gasohol, pending environmental regulation that may spur ethanol
demand, and the expense of gasohol when handling and other costs are
factored in.
Energy Conservation: Efforts Promoting More Efficient Electricity
Use
GAO/T-RCED-92-74, 6/23/1992
Testimony presented by James E. Wells, Jr., Associate Director,
Energy and Science Issues, before the Environment, Energy and Natural
Resources Subcommittee, House Committee on Government Operations.
Utility-sponsored "demand-side management" programs encourage
consumers to use less energy by better insulating their homes and
businesses and by replacing appliances with more efficient models.
This testimony discusses (1) the likelihood that such programs will
result in energy conservation; (2) impediments that must be overcome;
and (3) Department of Energy efforts to promote demand-side
management and integrated resource planning, including efforts
identified in DOE's National Energy Strategy.
Uranium Enrichment: Unresolved Trade Issues Leave Uncertain Future
for U.S. Uranium Industry
GAO/RCED-92-194, 6/19/1992
Total U.S. imports of Soviet-produced natural and enriched uranium
were 17 times greater in 1991 than they were 5 years earlier.
Department of Energy uranium enrichment officials and U.S. miners
view these imports as a threat to the domestic uranium market, and in
November 1991, the miners filed an antidumping petition against
Soviet importers. This report discusses (1) the increasing volume of
natural and enriched uranium imported into the United States from the
Soviet Union; (2) the ongoing antidumping case initiated by U.S.
uranium miners; (3) other factors that will play a large role in
determining the future of the domestic uranium market--namely, the
breakup of the Soviet Union and the commercial use of highly enriched
uranium originally produced for nuclear weapons; and (4) DOE's
uranium inventories.
South American Oil: Marginal Producers Not a Likely Source for
Increased U.S. Imports
GAO/NSIAD-92-227, 6/16/1992
GAO reviewed the petroleum industries of the following eight South
American countries that produce petroleum but are not major
exporters: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador,
Peru, and Trinidad and Tobago. This report discusses (1) the amount
of crude oil the United States imports from the eight countries, (2)
expected crude oil production for these countries through the year
2010, and (3) investment reforms that these countries have recently
made in their petroleum industries. In general, although the United
States imports some oil from these countries, as a group, the eight
countries are currently net oil importers because combined domestic
oil consumption exceeds oil production. Furthermore, the net oil
imports are expected to continue to increase through the year 2010,
making it unlikely that the United States will obtain increased oil
shipments from these countries.
Alternative Fuels: Experiences of Brazil, Canada, and New Zealand in
Using Alternative Motor Fuels
GAO/RCED-92-119, 5/7/1992
The oil crisis of the 1970s spurred the governments of Brazil,
Canada, and New Zealand to seek domestic alternatives for their motor
fuels. Each government was the catalyst for action on alternative
fuels, and this leadership proved crucial in removing economic and
technological barriers and persuading industry and consumers that
alternative fuels were important. Participation by the fuel,
automotive, and utility industries was vital in attracting and
retaining consumers for alternative fuels and vehicles in each
country. Finally, consumer acceptance was essential to the use of
alternative fuels in these countries, and incentives such as reduced
taxes or subsidies helped boost consumer use of alternative fuels.
These countries' experiences, however, show that introducing and
sustaining the use of alternative fuels is neither a quick nor an
easy undertaking. For example, consistent long-term government
commitment was sometimes hard to maintain because of resource
limitations and other reasons. In some cases, failure to maintain
this commitment undercut sustained use of alternative fuels.
Furthermore, alternative fuel initiatives struggled when industry was
not actively involved in vehicle development, fueling system
construction, and marketing.
Electricity Supply: Efforts Under Way to Improve Federal Electrical
Disruption Preparedness
GAO/RCED-92-125, 4/20/1992
This report examines the federal government's plans and policies for
meeting major disruptions in the supply of energy, such as those
caused by severe weather or sabotage. GAO discusses (1) to what
extent the Department of Energy includes other federal, state, local,
and utility organizations in its preparedness planning; (2) how
sufficient the statutory authorities available to federal agencies
are for responding to major electrical disruptions; and (3) whether
emergency plans incorporate restoration priorities and measures to
help ensure adequate supplies of electrical equipment.
Energy Conservation: DOE's Efforts to Promote Energy Conservation
and Efficiency
GAO/RCED-92-103, 4/16/1992
The Department of Energy is responsible for spearheading federal
efforts to encourage energy conservation. This report focuses on DOE
programs promoting electricity and overall energy efficiency. GAO
examines (1) the scope of DOE's energy conservation and efficiency
programs, including its Integrated Resource Planning Program; (2) the
way in which policy options identified in the National Energy
Strategy promote conservation and efficiency, as well as increased
energy supplies; and (3) the extent to which DOE evaluates program
results and considers evaluation results when planning and budgeting
for these programs. GAO also discusses the role of the Federal
Energy Regulatory Commission, which regulates most wholesale
electricity transactions, in promoting energy conservation and
efficiency.
Electricity Supply: Regulating Utility Holding Companies in a
Changing Electric Industry
GAO/RCED-92-98, 4/9/1992
How adequately are consumers and investors protected in the electric
utility industry? This report looks at (1) recent changes within the
electric utility industry that involve utility holding companies; (2)
the effect of these changes on the Securities and Exchange
Commission's (SEC) administration of the Public Utility Holding
Company Act of 1935; and (3) the relationship between SEC, the
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, and state regulators in
protecting consumer and investor interests in the changing industry.
Mexican Oil: Issues Affecting Potential U.S. Trade and Investment
GAO/NSIAD-92-169, 3/18/1992
This report deals with issues affecting potential future U.S. trade
with and investment in Mexico's petroleum industry. GAO discusses
(1) recent trends in Mexican oil production and exports and the main
factors affecting Mexico's ability to meet current production and
export goals, (2) the views of U.S. oil-producing and oil service
contracting companies on principal barriers to and possible benefits
of U.S. trade with and investment in Mexico's oil industry and the
response of Mexican officials, and (3) U.S. government efforts to
help Mexico's petroleum sector.
Natural Gas: Factors Affecting Approval Times for Construction of
Natural Gas Pipelines
GAO/RCED-92-100, 2/26/1992
During the period of GAO's review, the median processing time for the
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission to approve applications to build
natural gas pipelines was about 1 year, but some approvals took much
longer. FERC has tried to shorten the time it takes pipeline
companies to receive approval to start construction, and the Congress
is considering several bills aimed at speeding or eliminating the
need for FERC approval. Nevertheless, FERC could further improve its
timeliness and performance in processing applications by better
informing and training its staff and others on policy changes,
negotiating generic agreements with other federal agencies on their
environmental reviews of pipeline applications, and strengthening its
management information system.
International Energy Agency: Response to the Oil Supply Disruption
Caused by the Persian Gulf Crisis
GAO/NSIAD-92-93, 1/21/1992
The rapid increase in worldwide oil prices after Iraq's invasion of
Kuwait in 1990 focused renewed attention on how the use of emergency
oil stocks held by members of the International Energy Agency can
mitigate the effects of an oil supply disruption. This report
reviews (1) the International Energy Agency's decision on whether to
draw down emergency oil stocks in response to the disruption in oil
supplies following the Iraqi invasion, (2) the U.S. policy on
restraining oil demand, (3) the U.S. position on domestic sharing of
oil supplies in an emergency and oil companies' views on that
position, and (4) the extent of Department of Energy efforts to
educate the American people about U.S. participation in the
International Energy Agency.
Electricity Supply: Potential Effects of Amending the Public Utility
Holding Company Act
GAO/RCED-92-52, 1/7/1992
Seeking to reap the potential benefits of greater competition,
proposals to exempt some electric generators from the ownership
restrictions of the Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935 could
alter the structure of the nation's $170 billion electric utility
industry. This report evaluates how the proposals might affect (1)
the reliability and cost of the U.S. electricity supply and (2)
state and federal regulation of electric utilities.
MANAGING THE DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY
============================================================ Chapter 4
MANAGING THE DEPARTMENT OF
ENERGY
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 4:1
Federal Contracting: Cost-effective Contract Management Requires
Sustained Commitment
GAO/T-RCED-93-2, 12/3/1992
Testimony presented by J. Dexter Peach, Assistant Comptroller
General, before the Oversight and Investigations Subcommittee, House
Committee on Energy and Commerce.
Loose administration of government contracts has resulted in
contractors getting bonuses for mediocre performance and billing
agencies for millions of dollars in unallowable or questionable
costs, such as employee parties, tickets to sporting events, and
liquor. Civilian agencies now spend about $55 billion per year on
contracts. Although contractors can play a key role in delivering
needed services, once contracts are awarded federal agencies often
give short shrift to overseeing the quality and cost of completed
work. More thorough and timely contract auditing could help minimize
the government's vulnerability to waste, fraud, and abuse.
Currently, a significant backlog exists of audits of costs incurred
by contractors. Civilian agencies could also beef up their audit
effectiveness by clarifying which agency has responsibility for
contractor audits, clearly spelling out unallowable and questionable
costs, and making clear the government's position on the use of
contractor discounts. At the core of contracting problems, GAO has
discovered a lack of senior management attention to agency
contracting. In some cases, senior officials have remained ignorant
of waste and abuse because agencies have no way of flagging
contracting problems. In other instances, senior officials have
neither made managers accountable for effective contract
administration nor committed themselves to correcting contracting
problems that have surfaced.
TVA Bond Sales
GAO/RCED-93-43R, 10/23/1992
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO provided information on the
extent to which minority and regional bond underwriters that
participated in the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) bond sales were
actually located in the TVA service delivery area. GAO noted that:
(1) the number of underwriting firms considered in the TVA region
differed depending on the definition used; (2) between October 1989
and July 1992, TVA conducted seven bond sales totalling $12.8
billion; (3) underwriters located in the seven-state region, but not
in the TVA service area, were responsible for 7.6 percent of sales,
and underwriters located within the TVA service area were responsible
for 4.6 percent; (4) four of seven bond sales included the
participation of a single minority firm that was responsible for
sales ranging from $5 million to $20 million; (5) another regional
minority firm was responsible for $5 million in a January 1992 bond
sale, $9 million in a November 1989 bond sale, and $10 million in an
October 1989 bond sale; and (6) neither of the two minority firms
were located in the area actually served by TVA.
Department of Energy: Project Management at the Rocky Flats Plant
Needs Improvement
GAO/RCED-93-32, 10/16/1992
Various studies of the Department of Energy's Rocky Flats Plant in
Colorado have highlighted numerous management weaknesses that have
affected some projects at the plant. GAO identified two ongoing
projects--the supercompactor and upgrades to the plant's low-level
waste transfer system--that have experienced massive cost growth
during the past 4 years. In both cases, project managers did not
properly oversee the early stages of the projects' development. Both
the plant contractor and DOE have taken steps to address some of
these weaknesses, but GAO is concerned that these actions may not be
comprehensive enough to resolve all the problems. Although the plant
contractor has developed corrective action plans and has made
progress implementing them, the plans were based only on the
contractor's business management review study and may not include
some urgently needed corrective actions. DOE officials have said
that they have addressed the problems cited in previous management
studies but have not yet developed a comprehensive corrective action
plan with detailed tasks and completion milestone dates. DOE
officials believe that such a plan is necessary and have designated
someone to draft one. The agency, however, still needs to define the
plan's scope and set a date when the plan should be finished.
Department of Energy: Better Information Resources Management Needed
to Accomplish Missions
GAO/IMTEC-92-53, 9/29/1992
Although the Department of Energy relies heavily on information in
dealing with everything from massive environmental damage to unsafe
nuclear weapons facilities, staff throughout the agency are not
always receiving the information they need. This situation could
increase the likelihood that the public will be unnecessarily exposed
to dangerous contaminants; the safety and health of workers will not
be adequately protected; outdated weapons components will continue to
be manufactured and discarded; and facilities, secrets, and employees
will not be adequately protected from threats. In addition, DOE is
wasting money developing and running information systems that overlap
or duplicate existing systems. These problems exist because DOE has
not (1) implemented a strategic information resources management
(IRM) planning process that focuses information resource investments
on achieving strategic mission objectives and (2) exercised adequate
management control to ensure that IRM activities are conducted in
accordance with the law. Underlying DOE's ineffective IRM planning
and management control is a lack of top management attention to
managing information.
UEC Net Present Value
GAO/RCED-92-294R, 9/23/1992
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO provided information on cash
flow projections for the proposed Uranium Enrichment Corporation
(UEC), as envisioned by proposed legislation. GAO noted that: (1)
it adjusted Department of Energy estimates for revenue and expenses
associated with uranium enrichment operations from 1993 through 2011
to project the present value of UEC net operating income to be about
$5.2 billion; (2) any estimate of earnings from uranium enrichment
operations is subject to major uncertainties because of the inherent
difficulty of determining the amount and selling price of enrichment
services; and (3) it computed the net present value of UEC payments
to the Treasury for loans, royalties, leases, and dividends to be
about $3.2 billion, but that projection is also subject to major
uncertainties.
UEC Cash Flow Projection
GAO/RCED-92-292R, 9/17/1992
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO evaluated a consultant's
cash flow projections for the Uranium Enrichment Corporation that
would be created by proposed legislation. GAO noted that the
projections: (1) incorporate several assumptions that would not
apply to the corporation, as envisioned by the proposed legislation,
and (2) use revenue and cost figures that do not reflect recent
program changes. GAO also noted that its revised projection: (1)
uses more recent Department of Energy revenue and cost estimates; (2)
makes adjustments to reflect recent changes in the proposed
legislation; and (3) shows that, from 1993 through 2005, the
corporation will return to the government revenues totalling about
$3.8 billion.
Department of Energy: Status of Reporting Compliance for DOE's Major
System Acquisitions
GAO/RCED-92-204FS, 8/24/1992
This fact sheet provides information on the Department of Energy's
compliance with documentation and reporting requirements for its
Major System Acquisitions, which are defined as projects critical to
fulfilling an agency's mission. GAO looks at whether certain key
documents for each Major System Acquisition have been approved by
senior DOE management. These documents include a mission needs
statement, a project plan, and an independent cost estimate.
Approval of these documents is required before or at the start of a
project, which begins upon the completion of the conceptual design.
DOE Management: Impediments to Environmental Restoration Management
Contracting
GAO/RCED-92-244, 8/14/1992
The Department of Energy's proposed new contracting approach for
cleaning up contaminated nuclear weapons sites would rely on
environmental restoration management contractors, who would assume
sole responsibility for handling the cleanup effort. Although DOE
has set several important goals for this contracting effort,
constraints such as the lack of qualified cleanup personnel would
make it hard to achieve them. GAO believes that evaluation should be
a major component in the implementation of the 5-year pilot tests at
DOE sites in Fernald, Ohio, and Hanford, Washington. DOE has not,
however, established final criteria for measuring the concept's
success, identified the information needed to evaluate the concept,
or established a timetable for conducting the evaluation. In
addition, DOE has not yet hired all the staff needed to oversee the
pilot tests or developed plans to train current staff in their new
oversight duties.
Energy Management: Entertainment Costs Under DOE's Uranium
Enrichment Production Contract
GAO/RCED-92-230FS, 7/30/1992
As part of a contract to produce enriched uranium at government-owned
facilities in Paducah, Kentucky, and Portsmouth, Ohio, Martin
Marietta Energy Systems was allowed to bill the government for more
than half a million dollars in entertainment and liquor costs. The
final tab included golf outings, musical performances, receptions,
tours, and a charter boat ride. These parties were thrown for
utility executives who are either current or potential customers for
the government's enriched uranium. GAO questions the legality of
spending federal dollars on alcohol and the presence of bureaucrats
and contractor employees at such social gatherings. GAO is waiting
to hear from the Department of Energy's Office of General Counsel as
to why these costs were allowed.
Nuclear Waste: Questionable Uses of Program Funds at Lawrence
Livermore Laboratory
GAO/RCED-92-157, 5/28/1992
Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory spent the bulk of its $32.5
million in nuclear waste program funding on scientific and technical
work. About $1.5 million of this money, however, went for apparently
unrelated research that the Department of Energy authorized even
though such funds may be used only for purposes spelled out in the
Nuclear Waste Act. DOE, in allowing at least two of its other
laboratories to use nuclear waste funds for independent research, did
not ensure that the laboratories limited the use of these funds to
activities covered by the act. While Livermore's yearly spending on
scientific and technical work has fallen by about 60 percent since
1989, the expense of managing this declining work load is expected to
decrease only by about 17 percent. Livermore officials attribute the
relatively small decline in management costs to the need to meet
basic regulatory and project control requirements. DOE has not
determined if more efficient ways exist to manage the limited work
assigned to Livermore, such as transferring this work to another
project contractor. Finally, Livermore awarded all of its project
subcontracts on a noncompetitive basis without adequate
justification, bringing into question whether the contracts were
reasonably priced or other qualified contractors were fairly
considered. Livermore is now instituting new procurement policies
and procedures that may correct this procurement weakness.
DOE Management: Better Planning Needed to Correct Records Management
Problems
GAO/RCED-92-88, 5/8/1992
This report examines how the Department of Energy responded to a 1988
National Archives and Records Administration evaluation of DOE's
record management program, which involves some of the most important
and extensive scientific information in existence. That evaluation
cited major problems affecting every phase of record management--from
creation and maintenance through disposal. GAO looks at (1) the
potential impact of these deficiencies on DOE operations, (2) how DOE
has responded to the evaluation, and (3) additional actions DOE
should take to improve its responsiveness to the recommendations.
Energy Management: Vulnerability of DOE's Contracting to Waste,
Fraud, Abuse, and Mismanagement
GAO/RCED-92-101, 4/10/1992
The Department of Energy spends about 90 percent of its budget--more
than $17 billion in fiscal year 1990--on contractors, primarily those
managing nuclear weapons facilities. Persistent weaknesses in DOE's
oversight and management of contractors have led GAO to designate DOE
contracting as 1 of 16 government programs at high risk for waste,
fraud, abuse, and mismanagement. This vulnerability arises mainly
from DOE's long-standing management approach of indemnifying nearly
all contractor costs and not exercising adequate oversight over
contractor operations and activities. This report discusses in
detail (1) problems resulting from DOE's approach to contracting and
(2) DOE's recent efforts to address these problems.
Energy Management: Systematic Analysis of DOE's Uncosted Obligations
Is Needed
GAO/T-RCED-92-41, 3/24/1992
Testimony presented by Victor S. Rezendes, Director, Energy and
Science Issues, before the Investigations and Oversight Subcommittee,
House Committee on Science, Space, and Technology.
GAO testified on how the Department of Energy analyzes uncosted
obligations when formulating its budget requests. Generally,
uncosted obligations are obligations that DOE has made to contractors
for goods and services that have not yet been provided and for which
no costs have been incurred. Thus, costs relating to the obligations
will be incurred in the future. GAO discusses (1) the size of DOE's
growing uncosted obligations, (2) their significance in the budget
formulation process, (3) why the uncosted balances exist, and (4)
DOE's analysis of uncosted obligations for its fiscal year 1993
budget request.
Nuclear Health and Safety: Increased Rating Results in Award Fee to
Rocky Flats Contractor
GAO/RCED-92-162, 3/24/1992
In 1989 GAO pointed out problems in the Department of Energy's award
fee process and recommended that DOE restructure it to reduce the
level of discretion exercised in making a final determination.
Although DOE tried to improve the process, the final outcome of the
first award fee determination for EG&G--the contractor now running
the Rocky Flats Plant in Colorado--indicates that some of the same
problems persist. Despite findings of significant deficiencies and
marginal environmental, safety, and health performance, the
contractor's overall performance was deemed "good" and slightly more
than $1.7 million was awarded. This increase was possible through
discretion exercised by the fee determination official with the
concurrence of DOE's Defense Programs Office, suggesting that the
process remains subjective. Furthermore, the fee was awarded without
clearly showing that at least 51 percent of the fee was based on
environmental, safety, and health performance--a DOE requirement.
Energy Management: Better Federal Oversight of Territories' Oil
Overcharge Funds Needed
GAO/RCED-92-24, 2/21/1992
About $68 million from two oil overcharge cases was made available to
five U.S. territories--American Samoa, Guam, the Mariana Islands,
Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands. In response to congressional
concerns about whether these funds have been spent appropriately,
this report examines (1) the amount of funds the territories have
spent and whether this amount has been accurately reported to the
Congress and (2) whether the Departments of Energy and Health and
Human Services have adequate monitoring procedures and have taken
steps to ensure that the territories' use of oil overcharge funds is
in accordance with legal requirements.
Tennessee Valley Authority: Issues Surrounding Decision to Contract
Out Construction Activities
GAO/RCED-92-105, 1/31/1992
The Tennessee Valley Authority has traditionally used its own
employees to do most of its engineering, construction, and
modification work. In a significant departure from its long-standing
reliance on an in-house construction work force, TVA announced a new
policy in May 1991 to contract out all construction and major
modification work. Concerns were raised that this decision could
mean that thousands of TVA employees would lose their jobs. This
report examines the (1) basis for TVA's decision to contract out
construction and major modification work; (2) rationale for certain
procedures TVA has followed in complying with the Government in the
Sunshine Act; (3) effect of the decision on TVA employees, including
the number and type of employees affected; and (4) effect of the
decision on TVA operations.
PRODUCING NUCLEAR WEAPONS SAFELY
============================================================ Chapter 5
PRODUCING NUCLEAR WEAPONS
SAFELY
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 5:1
Nuclear Weapons Complex: Weaknesses in DOE's Nonnuclear
Consolidation Plan
GAO/RCED-93-56, 11/19/1992
The end of the cold war and expected reductions in the nation's
nuclear weapons arsenal has prompted the Department of Energy to
study ways to consolidate the agency's nuclear weapons complex. The
agency's first choice is to centralize most of its nonnuclear
operations, which produce nonnuclear components for weapons, in
Kansas City, Missouri. A number of other nonnuclear activities would
move to other DOE facilities or be privatized. GAO is concerned
because the costs associated with this plan are uncertain and the
technical risks of consolidation have not been thoroughly explored.
DOE recognizes some of these weaknesses and is looking into other
options, such as moving specific operations to the national
laboratories. It is also doing more detailed cost estimates on other
options. Some weaknesses, however, continue to receive little
attention. Further analysis of additional policy options and
technical risks is needed to assure the Congress and the public that
all reasonable options have been explored and that DOE's approach
will minimize risks. Moreover, a specific size for the complex has
yet to be decided. GAO believes that the selection of the complex's
size and capabilities sets a critical baseline for consolidation
planning. Once parameters are placed on the future production
capability of the complex, consolidation planning to establish that
capability can go forward.
Nuclear Security: Improving Correction of Security Deficiencies at
DOE's Weapons Facilities
GAO/RCED-93-10, 11/16/1992
Although it is critical that the nation's stock of nuclear materials
be properly secured and safeguarded, routine Department of Energy
security inspections in 1989 and 1990 uncovered more than 2,100
security deficiencies at 39 of its contractor-run weapons facilities.
This report reviews attempts by DOE operating contractors to correct
security deficiencies and examines how DOE supervises such contractor
efforts. GAO evaluated 20 security deficiency cases at four nuclear
weapons facilities and found that contractors are not adequately
conducting four of the eight procedures considered necessary to
ensure proper correction of deficiencies. The contractors cannot
always prove that they have done three critical analyses--root cause,
risk assessment, and cost-benefit--and do not always adequately
verify that corrective actions are appropriate, effective, and
complete. At the same time, DOE oversight has been hampered by
computer system incompatibility. DOE reviews of contractors'
corrective action plans are sometimes untimely, and DOE cannot always
show that it has validated contractors' corrective actions.
Nuclear Security: Safeguards and Security Planning at DOE Facilities
Incomplete
GAO/RCED-93-14, 10/30/1992
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO evaluated the Department of
Energy's planning process for safeguards and security at numerous
sensitive facilities and sites, focusing on: (1) the extent to which
DOE has completed safeguards and security plans for sensitive
facilities; (2) the extent to which DOE has completed such plans for
the areas, or sites, surrounding these facilities; and (3) recently
proposed modifications to the DOE safeguards and security planning
process. GAO found that: (1) as of September 1992, DOE had not
completed safeguards and security plans for 15 of its 27 sensitive
facilities; (2) DOE may not complete many of the unfinished sensitive
facility plans for some time because field offices have not completed
vulnerability assessments for 8 of the 15 facilities; (3) reasons
cited for slow progress in completing plans include lack of field
office and headquarters staff to adequately support the planning
effort and evolving program guidance throughout the planning process;
(4) more than three-fourths of the safeguards and security plans for
the sites surrounding the sensitive facilities were not complete as
of September 1992; and (5) modifications to streamline and improve
the DOE safeguards and security planning process include combining
sensitive facility and site plans into one overall summary document,
issuing a guide to facilitate the preparation of the document, and
reorganizing the program offices to better monitor field offices'
compliance with safeguards and security requirements.
Nuclear Weapons Complex: Issues Surrounding Consolidating Los Alamos
and Lawrence Livermore National Laboratories
GAO/T-RCED-92-98, 9/24/1992
Testimony presented by Victor S. Rezendes, Director, Energy and
Science Issues, before the House Committee on Science, Space, and
Technology.
This testimony focuses on the Department of Energy's nuclear weapons
laboratories. GAO discusses three main issues: (1) the research,
development, and testing capabilities of the Los Alamos and Lawrence
Livermore National Laboratories; (2) recent trends in staffing and
funding at DOE's weapons laboratories; and (3) the options identified
by the laboratories and DOE for consolidating the Los Alamos and
Livermore research, development, and testing programs.
Nuclear Materials: Removing Plutonium Residues From Rocky Flats Will
Be Difficult and Costly
GAO/RCED-92-219, 9/4/1992
The Department of Energy's Rocky Flats Plant, near Denver, Colorado,
processed plutonium for nuclear weapons for nearly 40 years.
Plutonium residues, a by-product of this activity, have been
accumulating at the plant, and DOE now faces removing this material.
The plant's latest inventory records for lean residues (materials
with relatively low amounts of plutonium) show that 97,000 kilograms
of solid residues and 14,000 liters of liquid residues--together
containing about 2,900 kilograms of plutonium--are stored at the
plant. To clean up Rocky Flats, DOE will have to remove these
residues, a difficult task because the residues contain combustible
materials and other characteristics that preclude shipping. DOE has
not yet decided how it will eliminate the residue backlog at Rocky
Flats. The agency is considering three basic
alternatives--processing the residues to separate out the plutonium,
shipping them to other facilities for processing, or disposing of
them as wastes.
Nuclear Materials: Plutonium Processing in the Nuclear Weapons
Complex
GAO/RCED-92-109FS, 8/20/1992
This fact sheet describes the methods and facilities that the
Department of Energy uses to process plutonium for use in nuclear
weapons. Plutonium is not found in nature and has to be artificially
produced. DOE no longer manufactures new plutonium, however.
Instead, DOE processes and recycles the plutonium from retired
nuclear weapons and the plutonium that remains as scrap or residue
from plutonium processing. In summary, DOE recovers plutonium in two
main ways--aqueous and pyrochemical--at four processing sites. Due
to environmental and safety concerns and cuts in the numbers of
nuclear weapons, only the Los Alamos processing facility is now up
and running.
Nuclear Security: Weak Internal Controls Hamper Oversight of DOE's
Security Program
GAO/RCED-92-146, 6/29/1992
The Department of Energy, overseer of the nation's nuclear weapons
program, runs a broad range of plants and laboratories to carry out
research, development, and production. Given the potentially
devastating consequence of radiological sabotage or terrorism, tight
security is a must at these facilities. Accordingly, DOE spends
nearly $1 billion annually to protect them. GAO reviewed DOE's
practice of granting exceptions to the agency's safeguards and
security orders. Approved exceptions have ranged from exceptions to
administration requirements, involving, for example, the labeling or
marking of classified documents, to more substantive exceptions
involving the inventory or storage of special nuclear materials.
This report (1) cites the number of exceptions that have been
approved, (2) determines whether DOE's written policies and
procedures for reviewing and approving exceptions have been followed,
and (3) describes the kind of internal control system used for
monitoring and following up on individual exceptions.
Nuclear Weapons Complex: Status of Restart Issues at the Rocky Flats
Plant
GAO/RCED-92-176FS, 6/22/1992
GAO reviewed the Department of Energy's efforts to resume plutonium
operations at the Rocky Flats Plant in Colorado. This fact sheet
provides information on (1) the process that is being used at Rocky
Flats to identify and manage environment, safety, and health issues;
(2) the overall status of these issues at Rocky Flats; and (3) the
status of these issues at the buildings where DOE plans to resume
plutonium operations.
Nuclear Weapons Complex: GAO's Views on Reconfiguring the Complex
GAO/T-RCED-92-49, 4/1/1992
Testimony presented by Victor S. Rezendes, Director, Energy and
Science Issues, before the Department of Energy Defense Nuclear
Facilities Panel, House Committee on Armed Services.
In addition to long-standing safety and environmental problems
plaguing the nuclear weapons complex, the Department of Energy faces
a major new challenge--how to reconfigure the weapons complex to meet
the nation's defense needs in the 21st century. Key decisions still
need to be made about the size of the complex; where, if necessary,
to relocate various operations; what technologies to use for new
tritium production; and what to do with excess weapons-grade
material. The choices confronting DOE and the Congress are difficult
given the conflicting demands for limited resources.
Nuclear Weapons Complex: Improving DOE's Management of the
Environmental Cleanup
GAO/T-RCED-92-43, 3/30/1992
Testimony presented by Victor S. Rezendes, Director, Energy and
Science Issues, before the Department of Energy Defense Nuclear
Facilities Panel, House Committee on Armed Services.
Sound, credible management systems are essential to the Department of
Energy's cleanup of the nation's nuclear weapons complex. Addressing
the environmental problems created by nearly half a century of
nuclear weapons production is a herculean task. DOE and the Congress
will need to make hard choices between the weapons complex cleanup
and other national needs. Management systems to set priorities,
estimate project costs, and track programs will be critical to this
decision-making. While DOE is making progress on these systems,
further steps are necessary to improve the prioritization system and
determine how it will be used, refine how DOE estimates costs, and
complete and expand the Progress Tracking System.
Nuclear Weapons Complex: Major Safety, Environmental, and
Reconfiguration Issues Facing DOE
GAO/T-RCED-92-31, 2/25/1992
Testimony presented by J. Dexter Peach, Assistant Comptroller
General, before the Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs.
The Department of Energy faces a monumental task in addressing the
legacy of safety and environmental problems created by almost a half
century of nuclear weapons production and, at the same time,
addressing important issues about the size and structure of the
complex in light of a substantially reduced nuclear weapons arsenal.
The cost will be large and the difficulties immense. This testimony
discusses the (1) progress DOE has made in developing and
implementing a safety policy and culture, (2) major challenges DOE
faces in cleaning up the weapons complex, and (3) key issues DOE
faces in reconfiguring the complex in light of weapons reductions.
SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY
============================================================ Chapter 6
SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 6:1
Federal Research: Assessment of the Financial Audit for SEMATECH's
Activities in 1991
GAO/RCED-93-50, 12/11/1992
GAO found no indication during its review that the opinion of Price
Waterhouse on SEMATECH's 1991 financial statements, its report on
internal control structure, or its report on compliance with laws and
regulations cannot be relied upon. In its report on SEMATECH's 1990
financial statements, GAO recommended that the Pentagon require funds
to be disbursed through a letter of credit instead of being disbursed
in advance through quarterly payments to SEMATECH. The Defense
Department has agreed to modify its procedure in January 1993, when
it revises the grant agreement, by providing advance payments to
SEMATECH on a monthly basis. Five member companies acknowledge
including part of their SEMATECH contributions as overhead costs on
government contracts that they held. Although allowable under
government cost accounting principles, reimbursing members'
contributions through overhead serves indirectly to increase the
government's overall support for SEMATECH. GAO notes, however, that
even if the amounts included as overhead were added to federal and
state government contributions, member companies would still have
paid their required 50 percent of SEMATECH's costs.
Technology Transfer: Barriers Limit Royalty Sharing's Effectiveness
GAO/RCED-93-6, 12/7/1992
Despite the introduction of royalty-sharing programs at government
laboratories, federal scientists' interest in patenting has not
increased. Many scientists said that the small financial rewards,
such as those paid under some royalty-sharing programs, offer little
incentive to patent. For example, 17 of 21 agencies GAO reviewed use
royalty-sharing formulas that often pay an individual only a few
hundred dollars for an invention. GAO also found inadequate
financial controls over payments to inventors. In addition, agency
management is using virtually all of the laboratory's share of
invention income to cover the administrative costs of transferring
federal technology to U.S. companies, meaning that the benefits of
royalty sharing are not visible to other potential inventors.
Federal Research: Lessons Learned From SEMATECH
GAO/RCED-92-283, 9/28/1992
SEMATECH--formed in 1987 to help the United States regain its
leadership role in semiconductor production--has shown that a
government-industry research and development alliance can help
improve a U.S. industry's technological position while protecting
the government's interest that the consortium be managed well.
Whether this feat can be replicated and what conditions would lead to
this result in other cases is uncertain. This report discusses the
specific strengths and weaknesses of SEMATECH and makes suggestions
to the Congress in considering any future support for consortia
intended to improve the competitive position of U.S. manufacturers.
High-Technology Competitiveness: Trends in U.S. and Foreign
Performance
GAO/NSIAD-92-236, 9/16/1992
Debates about U.S. policy on everything from trade to education have
increasingly focused on the ability of American producers to compete
successfully in global markets. High-technology products have
received considerable attention because their strong performance has
been linked to increases in overall economic performance and growth.
This report assesses U.S. competitiveness in high-technology areas,
considering, in particular, trends in U.S. performance over the last
decade and comparisons with Japan. GAO considers several basic
questions. First, what is the significance of high-technology
performance and how well can it be measured? Second, what do
measures of overall U.S. performance in high-technology areas
suggest? And third, for 11 industries--pharmaceuticals, civilian
aircraft, telecommunications equipment, fiber optics, semiconductors,
semiconductor equipment and materials, robotics, flexible
manufacturing systems, supercomputers, advanced materials, and
consumer electronics--what has been the relative performance of U.S.
producers and U.S. research efforts during the past decade?
Federal Research: System for Reimbursing Universities' Indirect
Costs Should Be Reevaluated
GAO/RCED-92-203, 8/26/1992
For every dollar spent on federally funded university research, the
government pays another 50 cents for overhead, or indirect costs.
Because of inadequate federal guidance and oversight and weak
internal controls at the universities, the government has been
charged millions of dollars for unallowable and questionable overhead
costs, including entertainment, foreign travel, and utility bills.
Although the universities and government have sought to address
problems with overhead billing, their actions could escalate indirect
costs even further. For example, the universities will likely try to
bill the government for any costs associated with (1) improving their
accounting systems and internal controls and (2) responding to new
government requirements. In GAO's view, the depth and persistence of
the problems and the upward trend in indirect charges over the years
make this an opportune time to consider basic changes to the
reimbursement system. This report discusses advantages and
disadvantages of several alternative approaches to restructuring the
reimbursement system. GAO believes that regardless of any long-term
solution chosen, it is inefficient to have both the Department of
Health and Human Services (HHS) and the Defense Department running
the program, particularly when they are using fundamentally different
approaches. HHS negotiates indirect cost rates that limit the
federal reimbursement, resulting in an average indirect cost rate of
about 50 percent, whereas DOD provides for full recovery of the
universities' claimed allowable indirect costs, resulting in a cost
rate of 59 percent.
Federal Research: SEMATECH's Technological Progress and Proposed R&D
Program
GAO/RCED-92-223BR, 7/16/1992
SEMATECH--the government-industry research and development consortium
formed in 1987 to help the United States regain world leadership in
semiconductor manufacturing by the end of 1992--appears to be on
schedule for achieving its objective, but the Pentagon plans to phase
out future direct funding for the consortium despite member
companies' support for continued funding. The 1992 goal of producing
state-of-the-art semiconductors using only U.S. equipment will
likely be achieved, although this capability will enable U.S.
industry to only reach parity with--not surpass--the Japanese. U.S.
semiconductor manufacturers and equipment suppliers seem to have
stemmed the decline in their worldwide market share. How much credit
SEMATECH should get for this turnaround is unclear, however. The
Defense Department has proposed phasing out funding earmarked for
SEMATECH at the end of this year. Under the proposal, projects at
SEMATECH and other groups would be funded on a case-by-case basis.
The agency plans to spend $80 million annually on semiconductor
research during the next 5 years. SEMATECH member companies, citing
both national defense and economic benefits, support continued
federal backing for SEMATECH. This report also details SEMATECH's
expenditures during its first 5 years and its proposed budget after
1992.
Grant Management: Benefits and Burdens of Increasing NSF Financial
Reporting Requirements
GAO/RCED-92-201BR, 7/13/1992
The National Science Foundation (NSF), an independent federal agency
established more than 40 years ago to bolster scientific progress in
the United States, funded more than 25,000 active research grants in
1992, mainly at universities. Because of congressional concerns
about NSF's ability to effectively manage its growing volume of
grants--NSF relies heavily on grantee institutions to ensure that
funds are spent in accordance with federal guidelines--this fact
sheet provides information on NSF's financial reporting requirements.
GAO discusses (1) NSF financial reporting requirements, (2) the
extent to which NSF grant funds have been shifted between budget
categories and whether large individual budget shifts were used
appropriately under current NSF guidelines, and (3) the views of NSF
and university officials on increased financial reporting
requirements.
University Research: Controlling Inappropriate Access to Federally
Funded Research Results
GAO/RCED-92-104, 5/4/1992
During the 1980s, the increasing importance of university research to
technological innovation forged new links among industry, academia,
and government. The federal government spent $9.6 billion sponsoring
research at universities in fiscal year 1990, while business outlays
for such research topped $1 billion that year. Closer ties between
universities and the private sector raise concerns, however, about
possible conflicts of interest or other relationships that might give
businesses inappropriate access to and therefore an unfair advantage
in commercializing the results of federally funded research.
Requiring that investigators and other key personnel disclose outside
interests as part of the grant award process, which both the National
Institutes of Health and the National Science Foundation are
considering, is an essential first step toward improving university
management controls over potential conflicts of interest. But GAO
believes that additional steps are warranted to strengthen these
controls and to address the ability of industrial liaison program
members to get advance access to the results of federally funded
research.
Federal Research: Assessment of the Financial Audit for SEMATECH's
Activities in 1990
GAO/RCED-92-97, 4/9/1992
In this third annual audit of the financial statements of SEMATECH,
Inc., a consortium of U.S. semiconductor manufacturers and the
Defense Department, GAO concludes that Price Waterhouse's opinion on
SEMATECH's 1990 financial statements and its reports on internal
control structure and compliance with laws and regulations should be
reliable. While it has incorporated GAO recommendations in its 1990
financial statements, SEMATECH did not disclose postemployment
payments to its former chief operating officer as GAO had suggested.
An earlier GAO report found that at least two of SEMATECH's member
companies had included part of their SEMATECH contributions for
reimbursement as overhead costs on government contracts they held, a
practice that indirectly boosts the federal government's overall
outlay for SEMATECH's research and development activities. One of
these companies has changed its accounting practices so that its
SEMATECH contributions are now primarily expensed against profits
from its commercial business. SEMATECH retains larger on-hand
balances of government funds than it needs to meet normal operating
expenses, reimbursing interest earned on these cash balances to the
U.S. Treasury. If DOD continues to fund SEMATECH activities or
participate in other joint industry-government consortia, it should
disperse funds through a letter of credit rather than by advance
payments to the consortium.
NSF Review: Review Process for the National Science Foundation's
Science and Engineering Pipeline Study
GAO/T-RCED-92-24, 4/8/1992
Testimony presented by James E. Wells, Jr., Associate Director,
Energy and Science Issues, before the Investigations and Oversight
Subcommittee, House Committee on Science, Space, and Technology.
The National Science Foundation's 1987 study entitled "The Science
and Engineering Pipeline" was approved by several layers of NSF
officials, and the internal review the study received appears to have
followed NSF procedures. Information reported in a September 1991
NSF letter, however, may have given the impression that the study
received more formal external review than was the case. GAO
contacted nine individuals mentioned in the letter and discovered
that eight of them had not provided formal review in the form of
written or oral comments. When GAO brought this matter to the
attention of NSF officials, they said that they used the word
"review" to mean "professional interaction," which includes
discussions within the professional community on concepts and topics
related to the study.
Federal Research: Small Business Innovation Research Program Shows
Success but Can Be Strengthened
GAO/T-RCED-92-45, 3/31/1992
Testimony presented by James E. Wells, Jr., Associate Director,
Energy and Science Issues, before the Innovation, Technology, and
Productivity Subcommittee, Senate Committee on Small Business.
GAO discussed the Small Business Innovation Research Program (SBIR),
focusing on: (1) whether the SBIR Program has met its goals; (2) the
reasons for minority and disadvantaged businesses' low level of Phase
III SBIR Program activity; (3) the level of foreign investment and
attention that SBIR awardees have attracted; and (4) changes that
could improve the program. GAO noted that: (1) the SBIR Program is
showing success in Phase III activity even though many projects have
not had sufficient time to achieve their full commercial potential;
(2) SBIR-funded research and development is moving toward increased
private-sector commercialization, since the majority of sales and
additional developmental funding comes from the private sector; (3)
the quality of SBIR research compared favorably with other federal
research; (4) minority and disadvantaged businesses are achieving a
lower level of activity than other companies in Phase III and lower
sales levels; (5) domestic involvement in SBIR is substantially
higher than foreign involvement; and (6) project sales averages vary
by agency. GAO believes that, to strengthen the program: (1) the
Department of Defense needs to increase private-sector
commercialization without weakening its commitment to meeting its own
mission-related goals; (2) federal officials need to clarify the
contractual procedures for entering into Phase III follow-on
non-SBIR-funded production contracts; and (3) federal officials need
to determine whether the company or the agency should perform
additional post-program work.
Federal Research: Small Business Innovation Research Shows Success
but Can Be Strengthened
GAO/RCED-92-37, 3/30/1992
As a nation competing in a global economy, the United States depends
heavily on research and development. The Small Business Innovation
Research Program was created in 1982 to strengthen the R&D role of
small, innovative companies. Even though many program projects have
not yet had enough time to achieve their full commercial potential,
the program is showing success in Phase III, which involves the use
of nonfederal funds for commercial application of a technology. Most
Phase III activity took place in the private sector, showing a trend
toward one of the program's goals--increasing private-sector
commercialization. Major federal agencies, however, differ in their
responses to this goal, as shown by their wide variation in average
sales per project and the percentage of sales to the private sector.
GAO notes three issues that need to be addressed: (1) the extent of
the Defense Department's commitment to the goal of increasing
private-sector commercialization, (2) inconsistent practices in
requiring competition for projects entering Phase III, and (3) the
need to clarify the circumstances under which an agency may work on
its own or continue working with the company through follow-on
contractors after program funding ends.
Federal Research: Small Business Innovation Research Program Shows
Success But Can Be Strengthened
GAO/T-RCED-92-32, 2/26/1992
Testimony presented by Keith O. Fultz, Director, Planning and
Reporting, before the Technology and Competitiveness Subcommittee,
House Committee on Science, Space, and Technology.
See abstract for GAO/RCED-92-45, 3/31/92
Federally Sponsored Research: Indirect Costs Charged by Selected
Universities
GAO/T-RCED-92-20, 1/29/1992
Testimony presented by J. Dexter Peach, Assistant Comptroller
General, before the Oversight and Investigations Subcommittee, House
Committee on Energy and Commerce.
In testimony last year, GAO discussed how Stanford University charged
excessive indirect research costs, or "overhead" as it is commonly
known, to the federal government. (See GAO/T-RCED-91-18, 3/13/1991).
This testimony focuses on three other institutions: Harvard Medical
School, the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, and the University
of California at Berkeley. GAO found many deficiencies in the cost
allocation methods and charging practices at the three schools. In
some cases, GAO discovered problems that the university, the
university's external auditors, or government agencies had already
reviewed but had not questioned. These problems arose because (1)
certain Office of Management and Budget (OMB) Circular A-21 criteria
were inadequate for determining which types of costs should be
allowed or how costs should be properly allocated among different
university functions; (2) universities generally lacked adequate
systems and internal controls to ensure that only allowable indirect
costs were charged to the government; and (3) lax oversight practices
by federal agencies had resulted in universities claiming excessive
indirect costs. Since the March 1991 hearings, all parties involved
have taken steps to address these problems. However, GAO believes
that this is an opportune time to reexamine the federal government's
approach to reimbursing universities for indirect costs. Both OMB
and the Department of Health and Human Services have already
established task forces on the cost reimbursement system. Several
proposals have been offered, both for simplifying the process and for
reducing overall expenditures for indirect costs through the
application of caps or fixed rates on the various categories of
indirect costs. GAO plans to revisit this issue in an upcoming
report.
SPECIAL PUBLICATIONS
============================================================ Chapter 7
SPECIAL PUBLICATIONS
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 7:1
Energy Issues
GAO/OCG-93-13TR, Dec. 1992
The transition series, a set of 28 reports, summarizes GAO's findings
on major problems confronting federal agencies, as well as economic
and management issues facing the Congress and the incoming
administration. One cluster of transition reports, including those
on the budget deficit and investment, addresses broad policy issues
affecting government as a whole and its relationship to the economy.
Another group of reports addresses issues affecting specific federal
agencies, such as the Defense Department and the Internal Revenue
Service. A third group of reports looks at cross-cutting management
issues--everything from financial management to information
management. GAO highlighted many of these problems in a similar set
of reports issued in 1988. In some instances, progress has been
made; all too often, however, the problems have continued to fester
and grow worse. In general, the state of management in the federal
government is poor. Too many management ideas--and resulting agency
structures and processes--that worked well in the past now hinder the
government from responding quickly and effectively to a world in
tremendous flux. Most agencies have no strategic vision of the
future, lack sound systems to collect and apply financial and program
information to gauge operational success and accountability, and too
often do without people with the skills necessary to accomplish their
missions.
Department of Energy Contract Management
GAO/HR-93-9, Dec. 1992
Many GAO audit reports have spotlighted the effect of management
failures in the federal government--waste, inefficiency, and even
scandal. Political leaders have been forced to spend too much time
reacting to surprises like the Department of Housing and Urban
Development debacle rather than doing the work the agencies were
created to do. GAO began its high-risk program to identify those
high-dollar government programs most vulnerable to fraud, waste,
abuse, and mismanagement. The resulting high-risk series of reports,
which examine the federal government's efforts to identify and
correct problems in 17 especially vulnerable areas, fall into three
main categories: lending and insuring, contracting, and
accountability. Many of the root causes of the problems afflicting
these government programs are traceable to the absence of fundamental
processes and systems. GAO urges that future congressional oversight
focus on the agency reports and audited financial statements required
by the Chief Financial Officers Act, agency management's progress in
correcting material weaknesses in program internal control and
accounting systems, and federal agency efforts to develop and
implement performance standards.
Energy Reports and Testimony: 1991
GAO/RCED-92-120, Mar. 1992
From the Persian Gulf War to the collapse of communism, world events
significantly shaped GAO's work on energy topics in 1991. This
annual index references GAO documents published last year in this
issue area. Summaries of GAO reports and testimony are grouped under
several subject headings. To assist the reader in obtaining
documents, an order form is included.
Meeting the Energy Challenges of the 1990s: Experts Define the Key
Policy Issues
GAO/RCED-91-66, Mar. 1991
The nation's economy, environmental quality, defense, and
international strategy are inextricably linked to energy choices.
Past GAO work has identified five major issue areas associated with
energy policy: energy supply and demand, energy and the environment,
management challenges at the Department of Energy, DOE's nuclear
weapons complex, and energy research and development. In July 1990,
GAO sponsored a conference to examine emerging issues in these five
areas. Representatives from government, industry, research
institutions, and citizens' groups assessed the challenges facing the
federal government, the states, and industry on these topics during
the 1990s. This report is a compendium of the presentations made by
attendees during five panel discussions.
Energy Reports and Testimony: 1990
GAO/RCED-91-84, Jan. 1991
This annual index provides a listing and summary of GAO documents
directly related to energy that were issued between January and
December 1990.
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