

WISCONSIN.

E. F. Butler to be postmaster at Mosinee, Wis., in place of W. N. Daniels, resigned.

WYOMING.

Thomas W. Keenan to be postmaster at Pinebluff, Wyo., in place of Charles W. Johnson. Incumbent's commission expires March 3, 1915.

W. M. Wolfard to be postmaster at Encampment, Wyo., in place of Henry D. Ashley, resigned.

CONFIRMATIONS.

Executive nominations confirmed by the Senate January 30 (legislative day of January 26), 1915.

UNITED STATES ATTORNEY.

James A. Smiser to be United States attorney for the district of Alaska, division No. 1.

PROMOTIONS IN THE REVENUE-CUTTER SERVICE.

Third Lieut. Russell Lord Lucas to be second lieutenant.
Third Lieut. Wilmer Hake Eberly to be second lieutenant.
Second Lieut. Howard Eugene Rideout to be first lieutenant.
Second Lieut. Frank Lynn Austin to be first lieutenant.

POSTMASTERS.

ALABAMA.

C. L. Cleveland, Centerville.

CALIFORNIA.

Fred M. Kelly, Needles.

COLORADO.

Robert E. Norvell, Hayden.
Sarah J. O'Connell, Georgetown.

DELAWARE.

Edwin V. Ocheltree, Greenwood.
J. Frank Starling, Dover.

FLORIDA.

Thomas E. Blackburn, Bowling Green.

GEORGIA.

Albert S. J. McRae, McRae.

IDAHO.

Emily B. Davis, Milner.

INDIANA.

Theodore Hoss, Fowler.
J. Bruce Pessell, Butler.
Lewis Phillippe, Bicknell.
Henry E. Snyder, Atlanta.
Charles Van Arsdall, Hymera.

KANSAS.

Carl E. Hallberg, Courtland.
Virginia H. Kinyon, Fall River.
W. E. Mattison, Mount Hope.
Frank E. Munger, Atwood.
Thomas Pore, Cedar Vale.
Ferdinand Scharping, Hillsboro.

IOWA.

Cary C. Beggs, Moulton.
Charles A. Britch, Ida Grove.
Peter J. Cool, Baxter.
Madge Fell, Fremont.
Carl L. Little, Ames.
William F. Oehmke, Larchwood.
Max Mayer, Iowa City.
Frank B. Wilson, Greenfield.

KENTUCKY.

C. E. Beeler, Calhoun.
L. T. Doty, Owenton.
B. M. Powell, Corydon.

MASSACHUSETTS.

Bernard Campbell, Millville.
Marianna J. Cooke, Millford.
John T. Dolan, Avon.
Nathaniel A. Eldridge, Chatham.
Thomas F. Hederman, Webster.
James T. Hennessy, Wareham.
William B. Mahoney, Westfield.

NEW JERSEY.

Richard J. Fox, Grantwood.
Isaac Klein, Salem.
Charles C. Stewart, Mays Landing.

OREGON.

W. R. Cook, Madras.
Gaphart D. Ebner, Mount Angel.
Mary E. Fitzpatrick, Beaverton.
J. J. Gaither, Toledo.
Charles O. Henry, Athena.
Mary T. Mangold, Gervais.
George C. Mason, Jefferson.
Lovie R. Watt, Amity.
W. C. Wilson, Joseph.

PENNSYLVANIA.

Joseph P. McMahon, Susquehanna.
Joseph A. Shoff, Madera.
William W. Van Eman, Grove City.

SOUTH CAROLINA.

Dana T. Crosland, Bennettsville.
G. B. Stackhouse, Mullins.

TEXAS.

Horace C. Blalock, Marshall.
Robert G. Bransom, Burleson.
Joe H. Campbell, Matador.
Hugo J. Letzerich, Harlingen.
Joseph W. Singleton, Waxahachie.

UTAH.

T. L. Sullivan, Eureka.

VERMONT.

David P. MacKenzie, Island Pond.

VIRGINIA.

William A. Byerly, Bridgewater.
Crandal Mackey, jr., Rosslyn.

WASHINGTON.

Calvin W. Stewart, Tacoma.

WEST VIRGINIA.

Fred S. Hathaway, Grantsville.

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES.

FRIDAY, January 29, 1915.

The House met at 11 o'clock a. m.

The Chaplain, Rev. Henry N. Couden, D. D., offered the following prayer:

We bless Thee, Almighty God, our heavenly Father, for the degree of civilization which, under Thy providence, as a people we are permitted to enjoy, but we realize that with every advance toward a higher order come new and complicated problems which must be solved; but, as our fathers met the problems of their day and solved them, help us, we beseech Thee, with patriotic fervor and a high conception of statesmanship to meet the questions of our day and adjust ourselves to the new conditions in accordance with Thy will. In the name of Jesus Christ our Lord. Amen.

The Journal of the proceedings of yesterday was read and approved.

EXTENSION OF REMARKS.

Mr. BARTLETT. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent to extend my remarks upon the amendment that I offered on yesterday to the appropriation bill, on page 72, line 2.

The SPEAKER. The gentleman from Georgia [Mr. BARTLETT] asks unanimous consent to extend his remarks in the Record on the amendment which he offered to the bill yesterday, as designated. Is there objection?

There was no objection.

Mr. HAY. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent to extend my remarks on the subject of the Army.

The SPEAKER. The gentleman from Virginia [Mr. HAY] asks unanimous consent to extend his remarks on the subject of the Army. Is there objection?

There was no objection.

Mr. TOWNER. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent to extend my remarks in the Record by printing a short speech delivered night before last by Congressman SLOAN, of Nebraska, on William McKinley. I think it is appropriate on the anniversary of his birth to publish it.

The SPEAKER. The gentleman from Iowa [Mr. TOWNER] asks unanimous consent to extend his remarks by printing a short speech by the gentleman from Nebraska [Mr. SLOAN] on William McKinley. Is there objection?

There was no objection.

Mr. TREADWAY. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent to extend my remarks in reference to the navigation of the Connecticut River.

The SPEAKER. The gentleman from Massachusetts asks unanimous consent to extend his remarks in the RECORD in reference to the navigation of the Connecticut River. Is there objection?

There was no objection.

NAVAL APPROPRIATION BILL.

Mr. PADGETT. Mr. Speaker, I move that the House resolve itself into Committee of the Whole House on the state of the Union for the consideration of the bill H. R. 20975, the naval appropriation bill; and, pending that, I wish to make a statement and to ask if an agreement can be reached relative to the time. In discussing the matter with my colleagues on the committee it was the idea that we should conclude general debate with the adjournment of the House to-day. I wanted to ask unanimous consent that the House sit until 6 o'clock this evening and then recess until 8, and then sit until 11 o'clock to-night for general debate only upon the bill, and that on the adjournment to-night the general debate be closed.

The SPEAKER. The gentleman from Tennessee [Mr. PADGETT] moves that the House resolve itself into Committee of the Whole House on the state of the Union to consider House bill 20975, the Naval appropriation bill, and, pending that, he asks that at 6 o'clock the House stand in recess until 8 o'clock and have a session running not past 11 o'clock, and that when the House adjourns to-day the general debate on the Naval appropriation bill shall be considered as finished.

Mr. BUTLER. Mr. Speaker, reserving the right to object, I would like to ask the chairman of the committee whether he has determined that this general debate shall be finished to-day?

Mr. PADGETT. That is the idea; to close it with adjournment to-night.

Mr. BUTLER. Since I had my conversation with the chairman several members of the committee, some upon that side of the House and some upon this side, have requested me, if possible, to secure them some time. Now, they can not all be heard if we adjourn to-night at 11 o'clock. I have no disposition at all to delay this debate, for I have nothing myself to say, but I would like very much if these gentlemen having views to express could have the opportunity to express them. The gentleman from Texas [Mr. SLAYDEN], for example, one of the long-time Members, desires to say something on this bill. I think the opportunity should be given him. But if it is proposed to limit the general debate, I do not see how I can find time for him, much to my regret. I concede that the chairman of the committee has much to do with the fixing of the time. I only tell him what I have learned to be the wish of some of the Members of the House.

Mr. PADGETT. I will state to the gentleman that several Members spoke to me with reference to the time, and among them the gentleman from Texas [Mr. SLAYDEN], who spoke some days ago. I said to all of them that I would be glad to do the best I could, but that I could not make any promise as to a definite time with anyone else. The requests that have been made upon me, so far as the time I would control, is more than consumed by requests from the members of the committee.

Mr. BUTLER. Will the gentleman tell me what his ideas are as to the division of time?

Mr. PADGETT. If we carry out the program until 11 o'clock, that would give 10 hours for debate.

Mr. MANN. About nine.

Mr. BUTLER. About nine hours.

Mr. PADGETT. Between 9 and 10 hours.

Mr. MANN. Why not run right along; what is the object of taking a recess from 6 until 8?

Mr. PADGETT. I am perfectly willing to eliminate the recess.

Mr. MANN. We did that the other day, and had a satisfactory audience all the time.

Mr. PADGETT. I will modify my request, Mr. Speaker, and eliminate the recess from 6 to 8.

Mr. BUTLER. That will give us 11 hours' debate.

Mr. MANN. We always lose some of the time.

Mr. BUTLER. Now, will the chairman give me his idea as to the division of time?

Mr. PADGETT. There has been nothing said about that as yet, because I wanted to see if we could agree on the general time. In discussing the matter with the gentleman from Pennsylvania [Mr. BUTLER] and the gentleman from Massachusetts [Mr. ROBERTS] on that side of the House, and with the gentleman from Missouri [Mr. HENSLEY], representing certain members on the committee in sympathy with his views, it

was suggested that Mr. HENSLEY should control four hours of the time and that the remainder of the time be divided between the gentleman from Pennsylvania [Mr. BUTLER] and myself, each of us to yield one-half hour to the gentleman from California [Mr. STEPHENS], a member of the committee, and, as I understood it, we would yield one hour to the gentleman from Massachusetts [Mr. GARDNER].

Mr. BUTLER. Is the gentleman from Tennessee willing to yield one-half hour to the gentleman from Massachusetts?

Mr. PADGETT. Yes; and the remainder would be divided equally among us for distribution.

Mr. MANN. I would like to make this suggestion: That the gentleman ask unanimous consent that general debate be closed at the adjournment of the session to-day, without fixing the time, with the understanding that we shall run along and that the bill shall not be read under the five-minute rule to-day.

Mr. SLAYDEN. Mr. Speaker, I want to submit a suggestion in connection with this debate. There is not a bill, in all probability, which will come before this House which provokes greater interest or about which gentlemen more earnestly desire to express themselves in real pertinent debate than this naval bill. I can see no impropriety whatever in confining general debate to the bill itself. In the present state of business in the Congress—the advanced situation in the House and the absolutely unadvanced situation in another body—I can see no reason why there should not be a reasonable extension of time in this House for debate. I can not see why, if there is to be a limit, debate should not run until 11 o'clock to-night and the House begin at 10 o'clock to-morrow and close general debate, unless some reason should develop here why it should not be done at 10 o'clock to-morrow. That would be an extension of an hour suggested by the gentleman, and I submit a request for unanimous consent that that shall be done and that I shall be allowed one hour. I hope that no gentleman will think that I am indulging in vanity in submitting this request. I rarely trespass on the House for prolonged discussion on any question. I do not think in the whole course of my career when an appropriation bill was up that I have asked that I should be given an hour's time, but this time, because I really want to say something about the bill and some features of it, I am going to submit the request that the time be extended beyond that suggested by the committee by two hours.

The SPEAKER. What is the gentleman's request?

Mr. SLAYDEN. That debate run until 11 o'clock to-night, and then begin at 10 o'clock to-morrow morning and general debate run until 12 o'clock noon.

The SPEAKER. Does the gentleman from Tennessee accept that as an amendment to his request?

Mr. PADGETT. I want to suggest another matter. If the House runs continuously until 11 o'clock with the recess eliminated, I will agree to yield to the gentleman from Texas half an hour, and the gentleman from Missouri [Mr. HENSLEY] will yield him half an hour, and thus take care of the gentleman from Texas out of the additional two hours that we get by eliminating the recess.

The SPEAKER. The Chair will state the request of the gentleman from Tennessee. The gentleman from Tennessee asks unanimous consent that debate run until 11 o'clock to-night; that he control one-half of the time and that the gentleman from Pennsylvania [Mr. BUTLER] control one-half, minus four hours that is controlled by the gentleman from Missouri [Mr. HENSLEY]; that the gentleman from Tennessee and the gentleman from Pennsylvania agree to yield one-half hour to the gentleman from California [Mr. STEPHENS]; that the gentleman from Tennessee and the gentleman from Pennsylvania agree to yield one-half hour each to the gentleman from Massachusetts [Mr. GARDNER] and the gentleman from Tennessee, and the gentleman from Missouri agree to yield 30 minutes each to the gentleman from Texas [Mr. SLAYDEN].

Mr. SLAYDEN. Mr. Speaker, I submitted a request for unanimous consent to let debate go on until noon to-morrow and begin one hour earlier. I think that request is reasonable.

The SPEAKER. The trouble is that the gentleman from Tennessee submitted a unanimous consent first.

Mr. SLAYDEN. I will wait, then, until his request is objected to.

The SPEAKER. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Tennessee?

Mr. SLAYDEN. I object.

Mr. BUTLER. The gentleman will have the hour that he requested, and I hope he will not object.

Mr. SLAYDEN. I want to say in reply, Mr. Speaker, that I spoke to the gentleman from Tennessee six weeks ago for time, and he advised me a few minutes ago that I could not get any.

Mr. PADGETT. I told the gentleman that I would do the best I could, but the members of the committee had called for all the time that I had.

Mr. MANN. Mr. Speaker, we have extended the time for the gentleman from Texas, and I hope the gentleman will not object. It is rather inconvenient to meet at 10 o'clock in the morning.

Mr. SLAYDEN. Mr. Speaker, let me understand, please, whether the gentleman from Tennessee has made any modification whatever of his request, and what it is?

The SPEAKER. The Chair will again state the request of the gentleman from Tennessee. Gentlemen will have to give close heed or they will not understand it, it is so long.

Mr. SLAYDEN. I beg the Speaker's pardon. My attention was distracted for the moment by a Member who spoke to me.

The SPEAKER. The gentleman from Tennessee asks unanimous consent that the general debate on this naval appropriation bill run until 11 o'clock to-night—

Mr. MANN. Until the House adjourns to-night.

The SPEAKER. Until the House adjourns to-night, and that the gentleman from Tennessee [Mr. PADGETT] control half the time and the gentleman from Pennsylvania [Mr. BUTLER] the other half, minus 4 hours to be assigned to the gentleman from Missouri [Mr. HENSLEY], and that the gentleman from Tennessee [Mr. PADGETT] and the gentleman from Pennsylvania [Mr. BUTLER] each agree to give 30 minutes to the gentleman from California [Mr. STEPHENS] and 30 minutes to the gentleman from Massachusetts [Mr. GARDNER], and that the gentleman from Tennessee [Mr. PADGETT] yields 30 minutes to the gentleman from Texas [Mr. SLAYDEN] and the gentleman from Missouri [Mr. HENSLEY] yields 30 minutes to the gentleman from Texas [Mr. SLAYDEN], and that the general debate close when the House adjourns to-night.

Mr. SLAYDEN. Mr. Speaker, I withdraw my objection.

Mr. HENSLEY. I desire to inquire whether or not at any time—say, for instance, when three or four hours have been consumed—if those gathered here should conclude that they wanted to adjourn, that would cut off the general debate entirely?

Mr. MANN. It undoubtedly would; but I take it that the House will not be so discourteous.

Mr. BUTLER. We will endeavor to see that it does not adjourn.

Mr. HENSLEY. Very well.

The SPEAKER. The gentleman from Texas withdraws his objection.

Mr. HAMLIN. Mr. Speaker, reserving the right to object, I did not understand that the request submitted by the gentleman from Tennessee confined the general debate to this bill.

Mr. BUTLER. It did not.

Mr. HAMLIN. I think it ought to be so confined.

Mr. MANN. I think it probably will be, because you can not get time in any other way.

Mr. HAMLIN. I think it ought to be confined, and I think the unanimous-consent agreement ought to include that.

The SPEAKER. Does the gentleman from Tennessee include that in his request?

Mr. PADGETT. No; I do not care to complicate the request in that way.

Mr. ROBERTS of Massachusetts. I want to know if it is distinctly understood that there is to be no reading of the bill under the five-minute rule to-day?

Mr. MANN. That is not a part of the request, but that was the gentleman's statement.

Mr. ROBERTS of Massachusetts. I understand it; but the Chair did not put it.

Mr. MANN. The gentleman's statement is sufficient. It does not need to be a part of the request.

Mr. WITHERSPOON. Reserving the right to object, I do not like that part of the agreement at all which confines the time controlled by the gentleman from Missouri [Mr. HENSLEY] to four hours, and I want to submit to the gentleman from Tennessee that that is not a fair division of time. This method of taking six hours of the time and dividing it up between the gentleman from Tennessee [Mr. PADGETT], who favors the bill, and the gentleman from Pennsylvania [Mr. BUTLER], who favors the bill, and the gentleman from California [Mr. STEPHENS], who also favors the bill, giving those who favor the bill six hours and those who oppose it four hours, is an unfair division of the time.

Mr. MANN. I should like to say to the gentleman from Mississippi that we do not consider that that side of the House is entitled to control time both in favor of and opposed to the

bill. We do not figure on the time granted to the gentleman from Pennsylvania [Mr. BUTLER] as all in favor of the bill.

Mr. BUTLER. I do not think that all the gentlemen who have spoken to me are in favor of the bill.

Mr. MANN. We do not intend to be compelled to go over to that side of the House to ask anybody for time.

Mr. BUTLER. Let me say to my friend from Mississippi that I imagine some of the gentlemen who have asked me for time are opposed to this bill. I have not asked them whether they favor or oppose the bill. They want to speak on it, and I shall apportion the time as gentlemen have applied to me, without asking them whether they are for the bill or against it.

Mr. WITHERSPOON. Let me get through. I am not through yet. I desire to make a few further remarks. In addition to that the Naval Affairs Committee have gone into a very exhaustive examination of the questions which this House is to consider, and I think there are about 1,200 or 1,300 pages of printed testimony taken. A great many new, and in my opinion very important, facts have been developed, and it is absolutely necessary that this House should be put in possession of those facts if they are to vote according to the facts of the case, and it is an utter impossibility for the testimony, which I think shows that this bill ought to be materially amended, to be presented in four hours. Now, it is not going to hurry things along very much to cut down the debate an hour or two. We will not lose much in furthering the business of the session to extend the debate an hour or two. That does not make any material difference, and I think it is perfectly reasonable for those of us who oppose this bill to ask that we be given five hours instead of four, and I appeal to the gentleman from Tennessee to agree that Mr. HENSLEY may control five hours of the time.

Mr. PADGETT. I will state to the gentleman that the universal practice up until last year has been that the time has been divided between the two parties of the House. Out of courtesy to the gentleman, last year I departed from that practice and asked that the gentleman should control a certain portion of the time, and this year I have done the same thing; and, discussing the matter with the gentleman from Missouri [Mr. HENSLEY], the four-hour agreement we reached was satisfactory. I can not modify my agreement.

The SPEAKER. Is there objection?

Mr. FOWLER. Mr. Speaker—

The SPEAKER. For what purpose does the gentleman from Illinois rise?

Mr. FOWLER. To reserve the right to object, in order that I may get some information. I desire to ask the chairman of the committee if any portion of the time for general debate has been awarded to anyone who is in favor of making some provision in this bill for high-explosive shells?

Mr. PADGETT. There is a provision in the bill for armor and armament, and it embraces all kinds of shells and is not limited to any kind.

Mr. FOWLER. Mr. Speaker, I do not desire to delay the House a moment, but I desire to have an opportunity to present the question of high-explosive shells when we reach that part of the bill. I ask that there might be embodied in this request 20 minutes, and that I may have the right to devote that time to this question.

Mr. PADGETT. I think the gentleman can be cared for under the ordinary rules of the House under the five-minute debate. I do not wish to embarrass the general debate in any way with an agreement in reference to the five-minute rule.

Mr. MADDEN. I presume it is the intention of the committee to be rather liberal under the five-minute rule.

Mr. PADGETT. I think the gentleman will bear me witness we have always been.

The SPEAKER. Is there objection?

Mr. BARKLEY. Mr. Speaker, reserving the right to object, I do not desire to delay the consideration of this bill, but I have been attempting for several days to get at least 15 minutes in which to discuss this measure. The chairman of the committee has informed me that the committee has taken up all of its time practically which has been promised to others, so the chances are I can not get that 15 minutes from him. Of course, I realize that whatever I may say upon this bill may not be very important to this House, but there are some opinions on naval matters which I would like to have an opportunity of expressing, and if I can not obtain the 15 minutes during the general debate I shall ask unanimous consent during the consideration of the bill under the five-minute rule to speak at some proper place.

The SPEAKER. Is there objection?

Mr. GARDNER. Mr. Speaker, I understand the gentleman from Kentucky is opposed to the bill. I am willing to yield the gentleman a quarter of an hour of my time. An hour is more than I shall probably consume.

Mr. BARKLEY. I am very much obliged to the gentleman.

The SPEAKER. Is there objection? [After a pause.] The Chair hears none. [Applause.]

Mr. RAKER. Mr. Speaker—

The SPEAKER. For what purpose does the gentleman rise?

Mr. RAKER. Before the House goes into the Committee of the Whole House on the state of the Union I want to submit a unanimous-consent request.

Mr. MANN. Not now.

Mr. RAKER. It is only to correct the Record.

The SPEAKER. The motion of the gentleman from Tennessee is pending. Unless he would agree to withhold it—

Mr. RAKER. It is to correct the Record.

Mr. MADDEN. I object.

The SPEAKER. The gentleman from Illinois objects, and the question is on going into the Committee of the Whole House on the state of the Union.

The question was taken, and the motion was agreed to.

Accordingly the House resolved itself into the Committee of the Whole House on the state of the Union for the consideration of the bill H. R. 20975, the naval appropriation bill, with Mr. HAY in the chair.

The CHAIRMAN. The House is in the Committee of the Whole House on the state of the Union for the consideration of the bill H. R. 20975, which the Clerk will report.

The Clerk read as follows:

A bill (H. R. 20975) making appropriations for the naval service for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1916, and for other purposes.

Mr. PADGETT. Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent that the first reading of the bill be dispensed with.

The CHAIRMAN. Is there objection? [After a pause.] The Chair hears none.

Mr. PADGETT. Mr. Chairman, as the Members of the House are well aware, my voice is in very bad shape owing to a continued attack of laryngitis, and I regret that it encumbers very much my ability to speak. I shall not devote a great deal of time to a discussion of this matter, but will be pleased to answer as best I can any questions that any Members may desire to ask. I wish to say, however, Mr. Chairman, that during the consideration of the bill under the five-minute rule I hope to be able to give to the committee information upon any item in the bill as we may have it under consideration at the time, and for that reason I shall not at attempt at this time to make any extended remarks. I have filed with the bill a very extensive report, going into great detail of explanation of the various items in the bill. Last year the bill as it became a law carried \$144,492,453.53. The bill this year as reported and now pending before the committee carries \$148,589,786.88, an increase of \$3,721,070.27, and I may add, as the committee is well aware, last year we sold the two old battleships, the *Idaho* and the *Mississippi*, for \$12,535,275.96, and in lieu of the two which were sold we authorized the construction of a third dreadnaught, and in this bill the sum of \$5,727,410 is included for the construction of this additional ship, and it is embraced in the total of the \$148,000,000 that I mentioned. In other words, if you credit the Navy with the sale of the ships in the amount of \$12,535,000, which went into the Treasury last year, and deduct \$4,635,000 that was taken out of that sum for the construction of the additional ship last year, and the \$5,727,410 embraced in the bill this year for the construction upon that additional ship, it leaves an amount in this bill of \$142,833,376.88. The bill recommends the construction of 2 battleships, 6 torpedo-boat destroyers, 1 large seagoing submarine, 16 smaller submarines but of good radius of action, 1 transport, 1 hospital ship, and 1 fuel ship. The total cost of the new construction authorized is \$53,168,828, and on the first year's construction, because these appropriations are not all made at the time of authorization, but only an amount sufficient to carry on the work during the year, there is appropriated the sum of \$22,903,998.

Mr. STAFFORD. Will the gentleman yield?

Mr. PADGETT. I will.

Mr. STAFFORD. It might be very interesting to the committee if the chairman can give the information as to what amount of money is being expended each year, or for the last year, the present year, and the future year in actual naval construction on new projects.

Mr. PADGETT. Well, I will see if I have that here, and I will try to get it for the gentleman.

The amount recommended in this bill to carry on the new construction heretofore authorized is \$23,805,803, and the

amount necessary to carry on the construction herein recommended is \$22,903,998. You will find that in the third paragraph of the second page of the report. I do not have before me the cost of new construction that was recommended last year, but if I remember correctly it was something about \$43,000,000 or \$44,000,000. It will appear in the report filed with the bill last year.

Mr. STAFFORD. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. PADGETT. Yes, sir.

Mr. STAFFORD. So, according to the statement just made, if all the money appropriated in this bill for the next fiscal year be realized there will be at least \$45,700,000 that will be expended?

Mr. PADGETT. It is about that sum. The total is \$46,109,801. That appears in the same paragraph of the report that I referred to, just a line or two below.

Now I call attention to the fact that of the annual appropriations made in the bill for the last fiscal year there is \$1,800,000 of unobligated balances, and of these unobligated balances we have made available \$800,000 on account of the construction of submarines, and we have reappropriated \$1,000,000 for aeronautics, in its broadest and widest terms, embracing dirigibles and aeroplanes, and so forth.

Mr. GOULDEN. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield right there?

Mr. PADGETT. Yes.

Mr. STAFFORD. The gentleman has just stated that a million dollars for aeronautics is not only for aeroplanes but also for dirigibles.

Mr. PADGETT. Balloons, also.

Mr. STAFFORD. It was stated in the consideration of the Army appropriation bill that one of these dirigibles costs as high as a million dollars, so that there would not be any money for aeroplanes left. All would be used for dirigibles.

Mr. PADGETT. The cost of some, I understand, amounts to only \$89,000.

Mr. ROBERTS of Massachusetts. I understand the small ones cost only \$2,000.

Mr. STAFFORD. The Zeppelins, it was stated during the consideration of the Army appropriation bill, cost as much as \$1,000,000.

Mr. PADGETT. On page 286 of the hearings you will find an itemized statement in which it appears that one dirigible, under Steam Engineering, is estimated at \$60,000; under Construction and Repair, \$112,000; under Ordnance, \$2,000; and under the Bureau of Navigation, \$600, so that it would be about \$174,600.

Mr. GARDNER. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. PADGETT. Yes.

Mr. GARDNER. I think perhaps the confusion arises from the fact that it was testified before the Committee on Military Affairs by Gen. Scriven that a Zeppelin would cost a million dollars. I understand that the proposed dirigible is one of the other types instead of a Zeppelin. It is one of the smaller types.

Mr. PADGETT. Yes; it is not of the larger and more expensive type.

Mr. GOULDEN. Mr. Chairman, it was on that very subject that I wanted to ask the chairman of the committee a question. If I understood the matter properly, as to the development of aviation for naval purposes. What is the total amount recommended in this bill of unobligated balances and new appropriations? What is the exact amount available for 1915-16?

Mr. PADGETT. I will say to the gentleman that heretofore Congress has been appropriating for aviation under lump-sum appropriations, carried under the Bureaus of Steam Engineering and Construction and Repair, just an indefinite amount of a lump-sum appropriation, given to those bureaus for general work. The committee thought it wise to segregate aeronautics and to make it separate and apart by itself, feeling that it had reached a stage of development where it was deserving of separation and emphasis; so that we put it in a clause by itself, under the office of the Secretary of the Navy, with authority for him to distribute the total appropriation to the various bureaus as might be needed. And we have, as I stated a moment ago, made available for that purpose the sum of \$1,000,000. I understand that last year we expended something over \$200,000 for aeronautics.

Mr. GOULDEN. The chairman realizes how important this item is?

Mr. PADGETT. Yes; and the present year something like \$300,000 will be expended. We have made available a million dollars for the coming fiscal year.

Mr. GOULDEN. I notice that the department asked for \$1,187,600.

Mr. PADGETT. That was not the department. That was Capt. Bristol, the officer in the department who has charge of that particular service, and he stated that he could use \$1,187,000. I will also call your attention to the fact that Capt. Bristol stated that he had an unexpended balance at the present time of \$350,000, or about that amount, and we have added a million dollars, so that from now until the close of the fiscal year 1916, which would be a year from next July, we will have \$1,350,000 which would be available for that purpose.

Mr. GOULDEN. I am sure none of us anticipate a war; we all hope there will be none, anyway; but I am quite confident that this is a very important branch of both the Army and the Navy, and I think it should be developed as rapidly as possible. I have no doubt that the Naval Committee has taken the matter under full advisement, and that this embodies the wisdom of the members.

Mr. PADGETT. For certain purposes we regard it as a very valuable aid for service in the Navy, and we have taken an advanced step.

Mr. GOULDEN. I am glad to hear it. I want to ask another question, if I may. I see you have provided for 17 submarine torpedo boats, 1 of the seagoing type. Will the gentleman kindly tell us the difference in the cost between the latter—the seagoing type—and the former?

Mr. PADGETT. Yes. The bill stipulates the limit of cost of the seagoing type. It is a large boat, from a thousand to twelve hundred tons displacement, and the limit of cost is fixed at \$1,400,000. The other boats will be about 500 or 600 tons displacement, and the limit of cost is fixed at \$550,000 each, or a difference of \$850,000 in limit of cost.

Mr. GOULDEN. This is quite an item, and it has developed that the best use that they can be put to is in connection with the defenses of the harbors and the coast.

Mr. PADGETT. The submarine is a boat and an implement of war that is developing very rapidly. The boat that was considered and developed last year is not the boat that is in mind to-day. Last year, as I stated, the Congress authorized the construction of a seagoing vessel, jumping at one stroke from a boat of about 600 tons displacement to about 1,200 tons displacement. That is largely experimental. And the experts of the department, from their study of the matter, from the investigations that they have made, and from the drawings, feel that they have worked out the solution of the question, but there is nothing that succeeds like success itself.

Mr. GOULDEN. I am delighted to hear the gentleman say that, and sincerely hope that the genius of our naval experts may be rewarded. Can the gentleman tell us without much trouble the exact amount appropriated for submarine torpedo boats—that is, approximately—in this bill?

Mr. PADGETT. Yes. The total cost would be 16 at \$550,000 each, and 1 at \$1,400,000.

Mr. GOULDEN. That answers my question satisfactorily.

Mr. PADGETT. Now, then, for this purpose we have recommended for the first year \$3,405,000, and in addition we have reappropriated \$800,000, making \$4,205,000 that has been appropriated for the first year's construction. It takes about 30 months to build a submarine, but on account of the difficulties we have experienced with contractors they have taken a much longer time. This is a machine of very delicate construction, very complicated machinery and mechanism, and there are many difficulties that have to be encountered and overcome. Our experience has been with the contractors, and there are only two in this country—the Electric Boat Co. and the Lake Boat Co.—that undertake to build these submarines—

Mr. GOULDEN. The gentleman, I am sure, realizes how important this is to the great city and its magnificent harbor which I have the honor to represent in part here, and therefore these questions are asked. I wanted full information with the desire that it go into the RECORD, and I thank the gentleman for his courteous and instructive replies. I feel that the immense commerce of New York demands from the National Government the greatest protection possible.

Mr. GARDNER. Mr. Chairman, I understood the gentleman to say that in this bill a million dollars is appropriated for aeronautics, and in addition \$300,000 is available from unobligated balances?

Mr. PADGETT. For the last fiscal year.

Mr. GARDNER. Does that make \$1,300,000 in all?

Mr. PADGETT. Yes, sir.

Mr. GARDNER. Now, I did not understand the chairman's report in that way. If you will turn to page 287 of the hearings, the hearings of Capt. Bristol, at the bottom of the page, you will find that he says there is only about \$350,000 now available for expenditure.

Mr. PADGETT. I understand that. Now, then, we have made available \$1,000,000 for the next fiscal year, and as I stated a moment ago, from the present time until the close of the fiscal year, June 30, 1916, there will be a total available of \$1,350,000.

Mr. GARDNER. But the gentleman's report and the gentleman's bill say that the million dollars is appropriated out of the total unobligated balances.

Mr. PADGETT. Annual balances—June, 1914. These are unexpended balances of the fiscal year 1915. The unappropriated balances that we have made available are for the fiscal year that is past—1914.

Mr. GARDNER. That is satisfactory. Only I wanted to have a definite understanding, because it was not clear to me from the report. Is the gentleman ready to have me ask one or two questions which I have on my mind?

Mr. PADGETT. Yes, sir.

Mr. ROBERTS of Massachusetts. Will the gentleman yield for just a moment before we leave this subject of aeronautics?

Mr. GARDNER. Yes, sir.

Mr. ROBERTS of Massachusetts. I understand the chairman of the committee to say that for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1915, there will be \$350,000 available for aeronautics?

Mr. PADGETT. No; he says he has at the present time \$350,000 available for use during the remainder of this fiscal year.

Mr. ROBERTS of Massachusetts. Capt. Bristol means by that that \$350,000 of the lump sum for Steam Engineering and Construction and Repair have been allotted for aeronautics. I want to call the attention of the chairman of the committee to this condition of affairs which may develop at the end of this fiscal year, as it did at the end of last fiscal year. At the end of last fiscal year—June 30, 1914—we had unobligated balances of about \$2,000,000, so we were informed by the Secretary of the Navy. Those unobligated balances were largely in Steam Engineering and Construction and Repair; the two items up to the present time carrying the money for aeronautics. If the same condition holds for this year, there will be something like \$2,000,000 on June 30, 1915, of those appropriations unobligated which can be used, if the Secretary so wishes, for aeronautics during this year. Now, it is wholly up to the department whether the \$350,000 that has been allotted for aeronautics is the limit of the amount that shall be spent for the fiscal year.

Mr. PADGETT. The Secretary stated in that connection that if he had more money available he could not spend it at the present time, because he can not get machines abroad, and there is no one in this country prepared to manufacture them at the present time.

Mr. ROBERTS of Massachusetts. Now, if the chairman will pardon me just a moment, reference has been made to the item and the statement of Capt. Bristol, showing the probable expenditure of the \$1,000,000 which we have appropriated, and reference to that shows that a considerable proportion, running, if my memory serves, into \$100,000 or \$200,000, will be needed to handle aeronautics, in the way of sheds and stations and other accessories that are needed for air craft. If the money is available and can be used out of this year's appropriation, those accessories can be provided this year; and when the \$1,000,000 appropriation takes effect it is probable that that can all be spent for air craft, and none of it be needed for the accessories.

Mr. GARDNER. Will the gentleman turn to page 39 of his report?

Mr. PADGETT. Yes.

Mr. GARDNER. The gentleman will find that there are 21 first-line battleships included in the table on that page.

Mr. PADGETT. Yes.

Mr. GARDNER. I take it that that table comes from the new Navy Yearbook. At all events, it corresponds with the Navy Yearbook table.

Mr. PADGETT. Yes; it is taken from that.

Mr. GARDNER. Is it not true that the *Arizona*, *California*, *Idaho*, *Mississippi*, *Nevada*, *Oklahoma*, and *Pennsylvania* have never as yet been completed?

Mr. PADGETT. I think that is correct.

Mr. GARDNER. That is correct.

Mr. PADGETT. Yes.

Mr. GARDNER. That brings the number down to 14. Now, is it not also true that the *Kansas*, *Minnesota*, *New Hampshire*, and *Vermont* belong to the second line?

Mr. PADGETT. Last year in the Navy Yearbook they were placed in the first-line battleships. It was only last year that the Navy Yearbook had a heading, "First-line battleships." Prior to that time they used the designation "First-class bat-

battleships." I have looked back a number of years, and I find that the ships the gentleman mentions have been classified all the while under "First-class battleships." In the last year's Navy Yearbook they were put down under "First-line battleships," and this year they are put down under "First-line battleships."

Mr. GARDNER. Mr. Chairman, I hold in my hand a publication of the Navy Department called Ships' Data, United States Naval Vessels, bearing date January 1, 1914. I hold in the other hand Navy and Marine Corps List and Directory, dated January 1, 1915, and in both these publications I find that the *Kansas*, *Minnesota*, *New Hampshire*, and *Vermont* have all four been relegated to the second line.

Mr. PADGETT. I think you will notice on the same page of your Ships' Data a note in which they say that by virtue of an order made, I believe, in 1912—

Mr. GARDNER. I have the Secretary's letter here about it.

Mr. PADGETT. The Secretary made an order for classification that ships more than 10 years old should be put in the second line, and ships under 10 years old should be classed in the first line, and that publication is in accord with that order of the Secretary.

Mr. GARDNER. I have his letter.

Mr. PADGETT. I will say also, for the benefit of those who may not have investigated, that the book we referred to a moment ago as the Navy Yearbook is a publication gotten out by the clerk of the Committee on Naval Affairs of the Senate, and is not published by the Navy Department.

Mr. GARDNER. I am not blaming the department or even the committee, but I want to bring out the fact that that is a mistake in the committee's report.

Mr. PADGETT. I just wanted to call attention to the fact that it depends on which classification you adopt. Let me explain this. There is another regulation that has fixed the active fleet at 21 ships, and when they speak of the 21 in the first line they are taking the 21 that constitute the active fleet—the first line of resistance. In other words, there are 4 squadrons, with 4 ships in each squadron, and 1 extra one with each squadron, and a flagship, making 21 ships, 4 to a squadron, and allowing 1 extra one to be ready to go in its alternate time to the navy yards for docking and repairs, so as to have 4 in each squadron available.

Mr. GARDNER. The gentleman is merely confusing the question again. I want to get it clear that the Navy Department classification leaves only 10 ships in the first line.

Mr. PADGETT. According to that classification, under 10 years of age.

Mr. GARDNER. According to the classification of the Navy Department.

Mr. PADGETT. Under 10 years of age; that is correct.

Mr. GARDNER. Now I will read what the Secretary of the Navy said in a letter to me three days ago, if I may.

Mr. PADGETT. Certainly.

Mr. GARDNER. This is the Secretary's letter:

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
Washington, January 26, 1915.

HON. A. P. GARDNER, M. C.,
House of Representatives.

MY DEAR MR. GARDNER: Receipt is acknowledged of your letter of January 25, 1915, pointing out certain discrepancies between Senate Document No. 637, Sixty-third Congress, third session (Navy Yearbook), and the Navy and Marine Corps List and Directory, January 1, 1915.

On October 22, 1912, the department issued the following general order: "The age of vessels in the Navy shall be computed from the date of the act of Congress authorizing their construction." On November 9, 1912, the department approved the classification submitted by the Bureau of Construction and Repair, in which battleships were transferred from the first to the second line when they were 10 years old.

The list of battleships contained in the Ships' Data book and Navy and Marine Corps List and Directory are therefore correct.

Senate Document No. 637 is a Senate publication over which this department has no cognizance. The list contained on page 842 has been carried along from year to year and evidently has not been compared recently with the Ship's Data Book. The *South Carolina* and *Michigan* will be transferred to the second line on March 3, 1915.

Sincerely,

JOSEPHUS DANIELS,
Secretary of the Navy.

This statement about the *South Carolina* and the *Michigan* means that on March 3, 1915, instead of having 10 ships in the first line of battleships there will be only 8.

Mr. PADGETT. That is correct as to the age of the ships. The gentleman must bear in mind also that there will be added the new ships as they are authorized to come in, and then he must make this distinction.

Mr. GARDNER. Yes; and it takes about four years from the date of authorization to build a ship.

Mr. PADGETT. No; about three years.

Mr. GARDNER. I think four years from the date of authorization.

Mr. PADGETT. They are building them now in about 30 to 32 months.

Mr. GARDNER. I think the gentleman is mistaken.

Mr. PADGETT. I want to call attention to the fact that the grouping of the 21 ships is the first line of resistance. They are the ones actually in commission and in service, and go into the first line of resistance. The other is a paper tabulation.

Mr. GARDNER. The *Texas* took three years and eight months from the date of authorization to the date of completion. That is the last ship completed. The *New York*, the next most recent dreadnaught, took from the time it was authorized to the date of its first commission three years and nine months to build. It is well to remember, however, that, owing to the Mexican situation, she was put into commission before she was complete. The gentleman is giving the figures of the date of the laying of the keel to the first commission, and is not counting the time from the date of authorization.

Mr. PADGETT. Then they are usually three or four months in preparing plans; but that varies, however.

Mr. OLDFIELD. Will the gentleman yield?

Mr. PADGETT. Certainly.

Mr. OLDFIELD. I notice in the report that the Navy Department asked for 8 submarines and you give them 17.

Mr. PADGETT. The Secretary of the Navy asked for 8 because he thought it was sufficient. The majority of the membership of the committee thought we ought to have more, and so voted, and 17 represent the action of the committee.

Mr. OLDFIELD. Nine more than the Secretary asked for. How does the \$148,000,000 appropriated by this bill compare with the amount asked for by the Secretary of the Navy and the Naval Board?

Mr. PADGETT. You must separate the Secretary and the General Board.

Mr. KELLEY of Michigan. Will the gentleman from Tennessee permit me to call attention to the fact that the General Board recommended 17 submarines, and the committee followed the recommendation of the General Board instead of the recommendation of the Secretary?

Mr. PADGETT. I think the gentleman from Michigan is not accurate. The General Board recommended 16 coast submarines and 3 seagoing submarines. The building program of the Secretary of the Navy, I will say to the gentleman from Arkansas, as recommended, would have carried about \$44,000,000 to construct it, and when the committee reported it it was \$53,000,000.

Mr. OLDFIELD. Nine million dollars more.

Mr. PADGETT. Yes. The General Board recommended a program that would have carried \$123,224,972.

Mr. OLDFIELD. More than twice as much.

Mr. PADGETT. Three times as much as the Secretary recommended and two and a half times as much as the committee allowed.

Mr. OLDFIELD. Who is at the head of the General Board?

Mr. PADGETT. Admiral Dewey. Now, Mr. Chairman, I desire to reserve the balance of my time and will yield the floor.

Mr. HENSLEY. Mr. Chairman, I want to ask the gentleman from Tennessee a question or two before he yields the floor.

Mr. PADGETT. I will yield?

Mr. HENSLEY. Last year's appropriation bill authorized the building of what is known as a seagoing submarine. This bill provides another seagoing submarine. These seagoing submarines cost something over a million dollars each, do they not?

Mr. PADGETT. The limit of cost is \$1,400,000.

Mr. HENSLEY. Will the chairman give the committee some idea with reference to the practicability of these submarines—whether or not they have been worked out?

Mr. PADGETT. I stated in the early part of my statement that the experts in the department have worked out plans by which they think it will be a success. None has yet been built, and they do not know by actual demonstration; but they have great confidence and a firm belief in the seagoing type of submarines. However, it is a jump from 600 tons to one of 1,200 tons, or an increase of 100 per cent, and the question of its actual success is yet to be worked out; but we believe that it is going to be a success.

Mr. HENSLEY. Another question: Can the chairman tell when the submarine authorized by the last bill will be completed?

Mr. PADGETT. I think the contract calls for 30 months; but I will say to the gentleman that experience in the past has been such that, on account of the delicacy of the work of the submarine, its manifold number of pieces, it may not be completed

in that time. For instance, in the engine of a submarine there are something like a thousand parts; they are reducing it to something like six hundred and some odd different parts, but, as the gentleman can see, it is a very delicate piece of mechanism, and the contractors have not been able to keep up and complete it within the time limit.

Mr. HENSLEY. Is it not a fact that the experts in the department, not knowing whether this character of a submarine would be a success, did not make any request upon the committee for an authorization for another seagoing submarine?

Mr. PADGETT. No; the Secretary asked expressly for one. The General Board recommended three.

Mr. HENSLEY. Of the seagoing type?

Mr. PADGETT. Yes; estimated for it and asked for it.

Mr. SLAYDEN. Will the gentleman permit a question?

Mr. PADGETT. Yes.

Mr. SLAYDEN. I was much interested in the gentleman's statement about what he calls the seagoing submarine, and I received the impression that there is doubt in his mind, and perhaps reflected from the doubt in the minds of these experts, whether or not it is practical.

Mr. PADGETT. No, sir. I stated that the experts have worked out plans, and that they firmly believe that it will be a success.

Mr. SLAYDEN. Jumping from 600 tons to 1,200 tons. Mr. PADGETT. Yes; but as none has been constructed here we will have to wait; but we wait with confidence, in the belief that it will be a success.

Mr. SLAYDEN. Is the gentleman quite certain that none have been constructed?

Mr. PADGETT. Not in this country.

Mr. SLAYDEN. Did the gentleman see an Associated Press dispatch which appeared in a Washington paper last Saturday to the effect that the Germans had just launched a submarine provisioned and equipped for, if it should become necessary, a three months' voyage?

Mr. PADGETT. I saw that.

Mr. SLAYDEN. That looks like it might be a seagoing submarine.

Mr. PADGETT. We have no definite information about it. They state that they have not been able to get definite information from abroad. We get these reports, but the department have worked out their plans and diagrams and specifications, and they believe that it will work to such an extent that they asked for one last year and they ask for another one this year, and the committee believed it by reporting for the one last year and reporting for the one this year.

Now, Mr. Chairman, I will reserve the remainder of my time and yield the floor to the gentleman from Pennsylvania.

Mr. BUTLER. Will the gentleman from Tennessee unite with me now in yielding to the gentleman from California the time we agreed to give him, I to give him one-half an hour and the gentleman one-half an hour?

Mr. PADGETT. Yes; I will yield 30 minutes.

Mr. BUTLER. Then I will yield to the gentleman.

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from California is recognized for one hour.

Mr. STEPHENS of California. Mr. Chairman and gentlemen, I am not for war; I am for peace, everlasting peace. I am for a larger Navy and a larger Army, because I believe that is one of the ways to keep this country at peace. [Applause.] I am not a jingoist in any sense of the word. I am as far from that as any man can possibly be, but I do believe that now is the time to take out more insurance against war.

Mr. McKELLAR. Will the gentleman yield?

Mr. STEPHENS of California. Yes.

Mr. McKELLAR. Did our European friends, who have been building large armies and large navies for the last several years, realize anything on their insurance? Does not the gentleman think the fact that they had large standing armies helped to bring about the war rather than insure them against war?

Mr. STEPHENS of California. No; I do not. I think that each of the nations now at war has postponed war, and is now benefited because of the army and navy each has.

Mr. McKELLAR. Does the gentleman think that any European nation now engaged in war is benefiting itself?

Mr. STEPHENS of California. No; I think war never benefits the people of any country engaged.

Mr. SLAYDEN. Will the gentleman yield?

Mr. STEPHENS of California. I will.

Mr. SLAYDEN. They paid the largest insurance premium of any people of whom we have any record in all history, and yet the conflagration came. Now, does the gentleman think it was a wise investment under the circumstances?

Mr. STEPHENS of California. I will answer the gentleman's question as I go along in my remarks.

Mr. McKELLAR. Before the gentleman proceeds will he answer this question?

Mr. STEPHENS of California. Yes.

Mr. McKELLAR. If a large standing army and a very large navy is an insurance against war, to what size does the gentleman think Germany ought to have built her army and navy, and to what size does the gentleman think Great Britain ought to have built her army and navy in order to have had effective insurance against this great war that is now being fought?

Mr. STEPHENS of California. I will say to the gentleman I am not and do not pretend to be a naval or an army expert, but a business man, with what I think is ordinary business sense, and it is because I believe it is a good business proposition, as well as one that will preserve the young men of this Nation, and perhaps save our women from the awful heart-breakings and sufferings and aftermath of war, that I advocate a larger Navy and a larger Army at this time.

Mr. HOWARD. Does not the gentleman think he will see a disarmament of all the nations before ever seeing an agreement among the militarists and jingoists as to the size of army and navy which a nation ought to build?

Mr. STEPHENS of California. Well, I am not acquainted with very many jingoists, and I can not answer for them, but at this time I feel that we are not assured of anything at the close of this war unless it is that human nature will still be human nature.

I would insure this Nation against war, for I want no more war-bereaved mothers, widows, and children, and no more war-maimed and suffering men in these United States. I shall dwell on two points only at this time. Is the United States justified in making adequate naval defense, and is the Pacific coast fairly or even proportionately defended?

Mr. Speaker, we insure our personal property against burglary and our windowpanes against breakage; we build cyclone cellars to which we run when storms approach; we insure our homes and our business buildings against damage or destruction by fire; we go to great expense in all our cities and towns to provide fire engines and men to run them, so that we may be ready to fight fire when it comes. No city is so foolish as to wait until fire breaks out before contracting for fire-fighting apparatus. No insurance against loss by fire could be had for Chicago, San Francisco, or Baltimore after their destructive fires had commenced. Insurance must be taken out and fire-fighting apparatus be ready before the city begins to burn if it is to do any good; and trained fire fighters are more effective than the old-time volunteers.

We gather together a police force, large or small, according to the size of the community, and thereafter, night and day, it patrols the streets to prevent crime and arrest it. We do not wait until the riot call is sounded to organize and drill our bluecoats. Neither fire companies nor insurance prevent conflagrations, but they hold them within bounds and afford first aid to the injured. Policemen do not stop all crime, but they are a constant deterrent and a ready arm of the law in an emergency.

Mr. HENSLEY. Will the gentleman yield?

Mr. STEPHENS of California. Certainly.

Mr. HENSLEY. The statement the gentleman just made—that any community needs to organize a crew or fighting force to go out and cope with fire and that sort of thing—let me ask the gentleman whether or not now the great forces in Europe, by the tremendous effort they are putting forth, are trying to prevent the fire or are they not destroying property and life with no sort of regard to bringing about a cessation of hostilities?

Mr. STEPHENS of California. Of course the war in Europe can not now be prevented. One side or the other must be conquered, just as in a great conflagration we must put out the fire or be burned up. There never was a war without loss of life, and I think that previous preparation—preparation for defense—not only postpones and may prevent war but will well serve our Nation in time of war.

Every banker keeps cash in reserve and money on call that he may withstand future financial storms. Indeed, every man of sound mind and commendable habits is strengthening himself morally, physically, and financially against the possible troubles of to-morrow.

Every careful man of family insures his life and often strains to the utmost to meet insurance premiums in order to save his wife and children from a fight for existence after he is gone. Every mother with children is saving something for the rainy day that may come by and by.

If, as communities and individuals, we are so constantly and persistently, so commendably and praiseworthy, engaged in preparing against trouble, why should we not, as a Nation, insure ourselves against war by preparing our Navy to meet those who may attack us, and our Army and our fortifications to repel all who may invade? Is it wrong for husband and father to carry insurance? Indeed, is it not desirable and advisable to burden ourselves to-day that wives and children may not go hungry to-morrow?

God knows I never want another war, either at home or abroad. I pray for peace. "Peace on earth, good will toward men," means as much to me as to any other man who was taught at his mother's knee to pray for peace everlasting. If the rest of the world is armed, if every other nation in our class is possessed of a navy and an army that she thinks superior to ours, are we not more likely to be nationally imposed upon than if we are unquestionably the stronger?

It is my guess that Great Britain will never again attack us, nor will she ever seriously participate in any war made upon us. In the interest, therefore, of world-wide peace, in the interest of peace between this Nation and every other, the United States of America should be prepared to defend herself from an attack by any other nation and be fairly prepared to repel Great Britain. To be thus prepared we must have more battleships and battle cruisers, air craft and submarines, destroyers and auxiliaries—not in numberless array, but within reason.

Shall we as a nation spend millions of dollars as a warning to the world and a defense against all comers, or shall we wait until the attack is made and then sacrifice our bravest and best, our own and our mothers' sons, in awful war? Shall we delay and pay for our tardiness in the suffering and privation of our soldiers and sailors? Shall we wait until the storm breaks, and then have our women and children miserable and hungry because we would not see? Shall we spend money now or men and money hereafter? Shall we pay out millions of money to avoid war or shall we wait and spend the life blood of hundreds of thousands of our sons and billions of our money in war?

We must do one or the other. With all my strength I favor reasonable preparation now. We should husband the Nation's resources. We should not appropriate hundreds of millions additional until we know what defenses we ought to have. But we can double the number of submarines now built, building, and authorized, and help, not hinder, any proper program. We can add a few battle cruisers to our fleet and not go contrary to the lessons taught by the war in Europe.

The United States needs a council of defense made up of men who know and are not afraid to recommend that which would render this country reasonably safe from attack. And then, my fellow Congressmen, we should vote the money to carry out that program, regardless of whether or not it helps trade in our respective communities.

Again let me say I am not for war. I am unequivocally for peace. I would go the limit to avoid war. If my shoe should be stepped on, I would be sure my toe was hurt before I would enter the international prize ring. The United States ought not and must not again engage in civil or foreign war, and one of the best ways to insure against it is to reasonably prepare our Army, Navy, and fortifications for the defense of our shores.

Mr. HENSLEY. Will the gentleman yield right there?
Mr. STEPHENS of California. If the gentleman will not take too long, I do not want to take time from my colleagues.

Mr. HENSLEY. The gentleman from California says he is for peace, and I am confident from my relations with him that he sincerely takes that position and believes in what he is saying here now, but I desire to ask him this question, whether or not if this country had a navy even twice as large as the present Navy he does not believe that there would be the same insistence upon the part of those who are asking for further increases to-day?

Mr. STEPHENS of California. First, I want to thank the gentleman for his good opinion. I have an equal respect for him. And next, I want to say, in answer to his question, that I do not believe the demand will increase with the years. What the Navy wants, and above all what the people want, is adequate defense and nothing more.

We have two great ocean fronts and a fleet large enough to fairly protect but one. The Pacific coast has more miles of territory touching the 3-mile limit than has the Atlantic coast, but it has no dreadnaught to help protect it. There are 29 battleships on the Atlantic coast and only 1 on the Pacific. That one is the *Oregon*, almost 20 years old and ordinarily in reserve, but now in commission and on her way to meet the President at Colon.

I am not one of those who think war imminent or likely at any very early day, and yet I must ask you who read the news

of the world to answer one question: If war should come to-morrow, in which direction would you look to see the flash of the guns? Do you not think the Pacific coast ought to be fairly well protected? Do you not think we ought to have a fleet there equal to the one on the Atlantic? Now, that the Panama Canal is open, do you not think the only fleet we have should be on the Pacific coast at least a part of the time?

Secretary of the Navy Daniels has said the fleet should not be divided. Well, then, why not keep it in the Pacific most of the time? It is no farther from the Pacific to the Atlantic than from the Atlantic to the Pacific coast. It will not take a battle fleet a day longer to go from San Francisco to New York than it will to sail from New York to San Francisco.

The following figures demonstrate clearly the difference in naval protection afforded the Atlantic and Pacific coasts:

Battleships.

ATLANTIC COAST.
ACTIVE FIRST LINE.

Name	Tons.	Guns.						Under 4-inch.
		14-inch.	13-inch.	12-inch.	8-inch.	7-inch.	6-inch.	
New York.....	27,000	10						4
Arkansas.....	26,000			12				4
Delaware.....	20,000			10				4
North Dakota.....	20,000			10				4
Texas.....	27,000	10						4
Wyoming.....	26,000			10				4
Utah.....	21,825			10				4
Florida.....	21,825			10				4
Michigan.....	16,000			8				26
South Carolina.....	16,000			8				26

PACIFIC COAST.
ACTIVE FIRST LINE.

None.

ATLANTIC COAST.
ACTIVE SECOND LINE.

Kansas.....	16,000			4	8	12		22
Virginia.....	14,948			4	8		12	26
Georgia.....	14,948			4	8		12	16
Nebraska.....	14,948			4	8		12	16
New Jersey.....	14,948			4	8		12	15
Connecticut.....	16,000			12	8	12		22
Louisiana.....	16,000			4	8	12		22
Minnesota.....	16,000			4	8	12		22
New Hampshire.....	16,000			4	8	12		22
Vermont.....	16,000			4	8	12		22
Rhode Island.....	14,948			4			16	16

PACIFIC COAST.
ACTIVE SECOND LINE.

	Tons.	Guns.
Oregon.....	10,288	4 13-inch. 8 8-inch. 16 under 4-inch.

IN RESERVE.
SECOND LINE.

Name	Tons.	Guns.						Under 4-inch.
		14-inch.	13-inch.	12-inch.	8-inch.	7-inch.	6-inch.	
Alabama.....	11,552		4				14	8
Illinois.....	11,552		4				14	8
Kearsarge.....	11,520		4		4			4
Kentucky.....	11,520		4		4			4
Missouri.....	12,500			4			16	10
Ohio.....	12,500			4			16	10
Wisconsin.....	11,552		4				14	8
Maine.....	12,500			4			16	10

PACIFIC COAST.
IN RESERVE—SECOND LINE.

None.

Monitors.
ATLANTIC COAST.

	Tons.	Over 4-inch.	Under 4-inch.
Amphitrite.....	3,990	6	2
Tallahassee.....	3,225	6	2

PACIFIC COAST.

None.

Cruisers.
ATLANTIC COAST.

	Tons.	Over 4-inch.	Under 4-inch.
Washington.....	14,500	20	26
North Carolina.....	14,500	20	26
Tennessee.....	14,500	20	26
Brooklyn.....	9,215	20	12
Des Moines (3).....	3,200	10	8
Tacoma (3).....	3,200	10	8
Birmingham (3).....	3,750	2	8
Salem (3).....	3,750	2	8
Olympia (2).....	5,865	14	4
Montgomery (3).....	2,072	7	2
Chester (3).....	3,750	2	8

PACIFIC COAST.

San Diego.....	13,680	18	22
Maryland.....	13,680	18	22
South Dakota.....	13,680	18	22
Chattanooga (3).....	3,200	10	8
Cleveland (3).....	3,200	10	8
New Orleans (3).....	3,200	10	8
Denver (3).....	3,200	10	8
Raleigh (3).....	2,072	11	6
St. Louis (3).....	9,700	14	22
Marblehead (3).....	2,072	8	4

ATLANTIC COAST.
IN RESERVE.

Chicago (2).....	4,500	14	
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PACIFIC COAST.

Colorado.....	13,680	18	22
Pittsburgh.....	13,680	18	22
West Virginia.....	13,680	18	22
Albany (3).....	9,700	14	22
Milwaukee (1).....	9,700	14	22
Charleston (1).....	9,700	14	22

Gunboats.
ATLANTIC COAST.

	Tons.	Over 4-inch.	Under 4-inch.
Nashville.....	1,371	8	6
Machias.....	1,177	8	4
Marietta.....	990	6	6
Petrel.....	890	4	4
Sacramento.....	1,425	3	2
Wheeling.....	990	6	6
Castine.....	1,177	2	2
Paducah.....	1,085	6	6
Mayflower.....	1,085	6	6
Dubuque.....	1,085	6	6
Dolphin.....	1,486	6	6

PACIFIC COAST.

Annapolis.....	1,010		10
Yorktown.....	1,710	6	8
Vicksburg.....	1,010	6	6

Destroyers.
ATLANTIC COAST.

In commission.....	21
In reserve.....	13
Total.....	34
Tender Dixie (guns).....	12 4-inch.
Tender Panther (guns).....	2 4-inch.

PACIFIC COAST.

In commission.....	5
In reserve.....	4
Total.....	9

- Submarines.**
ATLANTIC COAST.
- 5 Cs.
 - 3 Ds.
 - 2 Es.
 - 2 Gs.
 - 4 Ks.
 - 1 G reserve.
 - Prairie (mother ship) 12 4-inch.
- PACIFIC COAST.
- 3 Hs.
 - 4 Ks.
 - 4 Fs (Honolulu).
 - 2 As reserve.

Résumé.
ATLANTIC COAST.

Battleships 23, 487,586 tons, 20 14-inch guns, 20 13-inch guns, 142 12-inch guns, 88 8-inch guns, 72 7-inch guns, 154 6-inch guns, 367 guns under 4 inches.

PACIFIC COAST.

Battleships 1, 10,288 tons, 4 13-inch guns, 8 8-inch guns, 16 guns under 4 inches.

ATLANTIC COAST.

	Number.	Tons.
Monitors.....	2	7,215
Cruisers.....	12	82,802
Gunboats.....	11	13,200
Destroyers.....	34	
Submarines.....	17	

PACIFIC COAST.

	None.	
Monitors.....	16	130,000
Cruisers.....	3	3,730
Gunboats.....	9	
Destroyers.....	19	
Submarines.....		

¹ Four at Honolulu.

There are 29 battleships on the Atlantic and 1 on the Pacific coast. There are 34 torpedo boat destroyers on the Atlantic and 9 on the Pacific. There are 17 submarines on the Atlantic and 5 on the Pacific coast and 4 at Honolulu. There are 12 cruisers on the Atlantic and 16 on the Pacific, and not a gun of the 16 larger than 8-inch. Mr. Speaker and gentlemen, do you think that a fair division of naval protection, even in time of peace? If the fleet is to remain the larger part of the year on the Atlantic coast, do you not think 50 submarines should be stationed along our Pacific shores? [Applause.]

Mr. GOULDEN. I want to ask the gentleman how many harbors you have that could be attacked by a foreign fleet from any point on the Pacific coast?

Mr. STEPHENS of California. We have a dozen, in round numbers.

Mr. GOULDEN. I did not think you had more than four or five.

Mr. STEPHENS of California. We have four or five large harbors; but there are many smaller harbors, with cities of three to fifteen thousand near by.

Mr. GOULDEN. But not of sufficient depth of water to enable large battleships to enter or approach near enough to do any harm.

Mr. STEPHENS of California. I think they could easily reach the wharves in these smaller harbors. There is depth of water sufficient in many to admit any ordinary battleship. They now take in merchant ships that draw from 20 to 25 feet of water.

Mr. GOULDEN. If the gentleman will permit, I am in sympathy with him and think the Pacific coast ought to be protected; but if the gentleman will pardon an observation, some years ago when the difficulty with the school board was had in San Francisco I heard it said by the President of the United States that war was imminent, and that we were on the very verge of it with one of the oriental powers. Happily the difficulty was amicably adjusted and war averted.

Mr. STEPHENS of California. Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. BUTLER. Mr. Chairman, I yield 15 minutes to the gentleman from Illinois [Mr. BRITEN].

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from Illinois is recognized for 15 minutes.

Mr. BRITEN. Mr. Chairman, it is not my intention to talk for or against the naval appropriation bill as a whole, as it has been presented to the House, because I am thoroughly satisfied with it at present. I do desire, however, to call the attention of the House to a new paragraph on page 27 which has for its effect the elimination of the Board of Selection for Retirement, which I am told, though new legislation, will be provided for in a rule that will be presented to the House tomorrow, making this paragraph not subject to a point of order. The "plucking board"—as this board is commonly known—in the past has performed a valuable service toward the efficiency of the Navy. We all agree on that. We also must agree that the value of the "plucking board" to-day is nil. But it is in effect, and "pluckings" will continue until this House takes some action toward removing that board, which was created some 16 years ago.

Naval experts who have appeared before our committee time and again have insisted that the pluckings from year to year as they occur now do not tend to increase the efficiency of the Navy, but rather to decrease the efficiency, with the result that some 15 able-bodied, highly efficient officers, some of whom have survived 15 different sets of "pluckers," are put on the retired list every year when they are practically at the zenith of their ability; when they are enjoying the best part of their life and giving to the service the best that is in them. Then we pluck them—put them on the retired list; practically pension them—in order to make room for the promotion of an ensign or a lieutenant of junior grade.

Mr. McKELLAR. Will the gentleman yield?

Mr. BRITTEN. Yes.

Mr. McKELLAR. At what average time of life are these men plucked? Have you any figures on that?

Mr. BRITTEN. They are plucked at all ages.

Mr. McKELLAR. But what is about the average time?

Mr. BRITTEN. I do not quite understand the gentleman's question.

Mr. McKELLAR. I mean this, how many years have they to serve on an average when they are plucked?

Mr. BRITTEN. That depends on the rank of the officer plucked.

Mr. McKELLAR. I understand that entirely; but my idea was, have any statistics been prepared showing the average time when these gentlemen who have already been plucked have the right to serve?

Mr. BRITTEN. They may not have served a year and then be plucked, and on the other hand they may have served 15 or 20 years before being selected for retirement.

Mr. McKELLAR. I want to say to the gentleman that I am heartily in sympathy with his view about it.

Mr. COOPER. Will the gentleman yield?

Mr. BRITTEN. Yes.

Mr. COOPER. It is entirely left to the discretion of the board as to whom shall be plucked?

Mr. BRITTEN. That is left entirely to the discretion of the board. No public hearings are had; nothing is given to the public as to why an officer is plucked; there is nothing reviewable. The plucking board meets and acts, not upon the service record of the officer, not upon any merit that is shown to exist in the Navy Department applying to that particular officer, but upon the general impression that prevails in the Navy regarding the officer plucked.

Mr. McKELLAR. Does the board report its findings; and if so, to whom?

Mr. BRITTEN. To the Secretary of the Navy, who in turn reports to the President of the United States, and the officer is retired from the service.

Mr. McKELLAR. Is a record kept of the findings of the board, an examination on which it acts, and is that record sent to the Secretary and then to the President?

Mr. BRITTEN. There is no record kept, the names of the unfortunate officers merely being submitted for immediate retirement to the Secretary of the Navy.

Mr. CALLAWAY. How is this board appointed?

Mr. BRITTEN. By the Secretary of the Navy. It is composed of five rear admirals.

Mr. CALLAWAY. Are they on the retired list or on the active list?

Mr. BRITTEN. They are on the active list.

Mr. GREENE of Vermont. This plucking board starts with the idea that somebody must be plucked, whether they deserve to be plucked or not?

Mr. BRITTEN. Yes.

Mr. PADGETT. The law provides that they must pluck so many captains, commanders, and lieutenants. If there is no plucking, there can be no promotion.

Mr. BRITTEN. Did the chairman of the committee say that if there was no plucking there would be no promotion?

Mr. PADGETT. Practically none.

Mr. BRITTEN. I dislike to take exception to that statement. The law provides that as soon as a sufficient number of retirements in the natural way does not occur during a year to provide for the proper flow of promotions, then the plucking board must retire the required number, not to exceed 15.

Mr. McKENZIE. At what age are the officers of the Navy retired by law, 62 or 64?

Mr. BRITTEN. Sixty-four years.

Mr. McKELLAR. Will the gentleman yield?

Mr. BRITTEN. Yes.

Mr. McKELLAR. In the opinion of the gentleman, is it requisite in order to get an efficient Navy to arrange such a system as to get a proper flow of promotions or to get service?

Mr. BRITTEN. A proper flow of promotions and retirements will be established through a new personnel bill now in the hands of our committee.

Mr. GOULDEN. Will the gentleman yield? Does the gentleman know that the Secretary of the Navy approves of the findings of this so-called plucking board?

Mr. BRITTEN. Always; he must.

Mr. BUTLER. The Secretary and the President both.

Mr. BRITTEN. According to law, he can not do otherwise. We must change the law.

Mr. BUTLER. Oh, that part of it; yes.

Mr. BRITTEN. It was a good law in its effect when passed, but it has now outlived its usefulness.

Mr. GREENE of Vermont. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman permit this suggestion?

Mr. BRITTEN. Yes.

Mr. GREENE of Vermont. Is not the operation of the law to-day based upon just as substantial a philosophy as that delineated in the comic opera of "The Mikado," in the words of Koko:

As some day it may happen that a victim must be found,
I've got a little list; I've got a little list?

[Laughter.]

Mr. BRITTEN. Yes. "I'll prepare a little list" is more apropos.

Mr. STEPHENS of California. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. BRITTEN. Yes.

Mr. STEPHENS of California. Is it not true that the plucking board is not accountable to anybody for its verdicts, and does not have to give an account to anybody for the reasons of them?

Mr. BRITTEN. Yes. It has been said by one of the members of the plucking board this year that it tended rather to decrease the efficiency of the Navy than to increase it; but he added, "The law provided that we must meet and select a number of officers for retirement, and we did it." Their efficiency or value to the service was not considered.

Mr. COOPER. Would it not be better if a discretion were lodged in the plucking board, so that they would not be required to pluck an arbitrary number, but if they saw officers who ought to be plucked, they could retire them?

Mr. BRITTEN. Yes. That is being considered in the preparation of a new personnel act now pending before our committee. The bill will provide for reasonable promotion, and such officers as may be selected for retirement will be placed in a reserve list and used in some other branch of the department—in the Life-Saving Service or in the Revenue-Cutter Service or in the departmental service—where their activities through life have disqualified them to still serve the Government in a most satisfactory manner.

Mr. GREEN of Iowa. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. BRITTEN. Yes; I yield.

Mr. GREEN of Iowa. I understand the gentleman to say that the law was a good one at the time it was passed?

Mr. BRITTEN. Yes. That was 16 years ago.

Mr. GREEN of Iowa. Will the gentleman explain why it is not a good one at the present time?

Mr. BRITTEN. It is because in those days our Navy did not compare with our Navy of to-day. During the first few years after the passage of this law anybody could pick out 5 or 10 or 15 captains whose service did not do the Navy any good. But to-day they pluck men who a year ago may have included the chief of staff of the Atlantic Fleet. One officer plucked last year was the naval representative at the Army War College, whose duty in effect was to tell the Army officers what the Navy would do under certain conditions in time of war, to decide on strategical developments and tactical movements and all sorts of complicated questions which might arise during the war; and the officer who was designated by the Secretary of the Navy less than two years ago to act in that important position at the Army War College was last year plucked, notwithstanding the fact that Admiral Dewey had just sent a request to the department asking that that particular officer should be assigned to the Navy General Board for the year 1914, and he would have been in that service when retired had not the difficulty with Mexico intervened.

Mr. KELLEY of Michigan. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. BRITTEN. Yes.

Mr. KELLEY of Michigan. Is it not also true that a former superintendent of the Naval Academy, a comparatively young man, was plucked last year?

Mr. BRITTEN. Yes; that is true; a man in the height of his ability, practically a young man in the service, was plucked, as was said, because of his social position, not because of his service record. I refer to Capt. Gibbons, one of the greatest captains in the American Navy up to the time he was plucked.

Mr. BUTLER. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. BRITTEN. Yes.

Mr. BUTLER. Was it not plainly stated that he was plucked because he had not gone to sea enough?

Mr. BRITTEN. Yes; that was one of the attributed causes.

Mr. BUTLER. Capt. Gibbons was eliminated from the service because he had not spent his time at sea, but had been too long on the land. That was the reason assigned.

Mr. BRITTEN. That was the reason assigned for his plucking, and directly thereafter another officer who had been on the high seas a greater length of time than the admirals who plucked him was retired from the service because he had an untidy ship that was 16 or 18 years old, and his great sea service and material additions to the development of the Navy entirely ignored.

Mr. HENSLEY. Mr. Chairman, will my colleague yield?

Mr. BRITTEN. Certainly.

Mr. HENSLEY. I ask the gentleman if it is not true that notwithstanding the gentlemen who compose the plucking board decided that Capt. Gibbons had not had sufficient sea service, the fact that he did not have sufficient service was because he was detained as Superintendent of the Naval Academy over his own protest, when he was insisting all the time on more sea service, and those in authority would not give it to him?

Mr. BRITTEN. Yes. The records all indicate that fact.

Mr. HENSLEY. His record was marked "excellent" throughout?

Mr. BRITTEN. Yes.

Mr. GREEN of Iowa. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield further?

Mr. BRITTEN. Yes.

Mr. GREEN of Iowa. Does not the gentleman think we ought to have some method of getting rid of the least efficient officers of our Navy?

Mr. BRITTEN. Yes; and we are going to accomplish that in a personnel act that is now pending before our committee.

Mr. GREEN of Iowa. Why not wait, then, for the introduction of that act instead of doing it now?

Mr. BRITTEN. Delay at this time will cause the assembling of another plucking board on June 1, and 15 officers who are to-day looked upon as valued protectors of our great country will be relegated to the scrap heap as the result of this unnecessary and now infamous law.

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from Illinois has expired.

Mr. BRITTEN. Mr. Chairman, I ask that the gentleman controlling the time on our side [Mr. BUTLER] give me some more time.

Mr. BUTLER. I greatly regret, Mr. Chairman, that I have no time at my disposal.

Mr. STEPHENS of California. I will be glad, Mr. Chairman, to yield to the gentleman five minutes of my time.

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from California [Mr. STEPHENS] yields to the gentleman from Illinois [Mr. BRITTEN] five minutes. The gentleman from Illinois is recognized for five minutes.

Mr. BUTLER. Then, Mr. Chairman, I will yield to the gentleman five minutes which would otherwise have gone to the gentleman from Michigan [Mr. KELLEY].

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from Illinois is recognized for 10 minutes.

Mr. BRITTEN. Mr. Chairman, I understand I got five minutes from my colleague [Mr. BUTLER], five minutes from the gentleman from California [Mr. STEPHENS], and five minutes from the gentleman from Michigan [Mr. KELLEY], making 15 minutes in all.

Mr. BUTLER. Yes; Mr. KELLEY gives the gentleman five minutes. I was offering the gentleman Mr. KELLEY's time. [Laughter.]

Mr. BRITTEN. Then I am recognized for but 10 minutes, Mr. Chairman?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Mr. BRITTEN. When Admiral Knight appeared before our committee as a member of the plucking board for 1914, he said in substance that the officers were not plucked on account

of their service records, which appeared in the files of the Navy Department, but rather were plucked on the general impression respecting them that prevailed throughout the Navy.

Now, if an officer is a good fellow and a sociable character naturally he will not be plucked, if Admiral Knight's statement is true, but if he is inclined to be a little gruff, if he insists on strict discipline on board ship, he is the man who will be plucked. And in this instance, the case of Capt. Hill, he was plucked last year. I maintain that without exception he was one of the greatest, if not the greatest, captain of the United States Navy up to the time he was plucked, and I am going to tell you gentlemen just a few of the material developments he has added to our great Navy, which is going ahead in leaps and bounds.

In 1912 Capt. Hill was the Chief of Staff under the Commander in Chief of the Atlantic Squadron, Admiral Osterhaus. The rank of Chief of Staff is looked upon generally as the greatest compliment that can be paid a naval officer, except to make him Commander in Chief of the Atlantic Fleet, which assignment, of course, comes through the Secretary of the Navy. The duties of the Chief of Staff are voluminous, and in substance comprise the entire management of the fleet, as well as being the principal adviser of the Commander in Chief, in all tactical and strategical movements, both in mimic and actual warfare. He does practically everything under the Commander in Chief, the latter being a sort of managerial officer. Capt. Hill was a naval adviser at the Army War College, as I explained a few moments ago, at the time he was retired. He was a member of the Navy General Board for 1907-8, and had been requested for 1914, by Admiral Dewey. Among all the captains in the Navy Admiral Dewey had requested Capt. Hill. He was a staff officer and a director of the Naval War College in 1910-1911, and the hearings before our committee developed the fact that while there he and two other officers changed the entire system of instruction, followed along the line of some of the German and English systems, and that system is to-day in effect at the Navy War College.

During the War with Spain he served on the battleship *Iowa* under Fighting Bob Evans, and Admiral Evans, in a special report to the department, highly commended this young officer for his coolness while in action at one of the rapid-fire guns.

In 1903—and here is where the shoe pinches—this young officer stepped on the toes of the Board of Construction, who had decided to eliminate from battleships the great torpedo of to-day. Hill made a single-handed fight, as admitted by Admiral Knight before our committee, and was entirely responsible in preventing the taking of torpedoes from the battleships, as had then been ordered by the Board of Construction; and, after a fight of six months and treading on the toes of his superiors all that time, the torpedo tubes and torpedoes were ordered replaced on battleships, and they are there to-day, and you and I know their great value.

Mr. SMITH of Texas. Will the gentleman yield?

Mr. BRITTEN. I have very little time left.

Mr. SMITH of Texas. I should just like to ask the age of Capt. Hill when he was retired?

Mr. BRITTEN. About 52, I believe.

Mr. BUTLER. He is older than that—56 or 58.

Mr. BRITTEN. I am informed that he is 56 or 58. My impression was that he was 52 or 54.

Mr. GREEN of Iowa. Does the gentleman know of an instance where a torpedo that struck anything has ever been fired by a battleship?

Mr. BRITTEN. Yes; many instances.

Mr. GREEN of Iowa. When and where?

Mr. BRITTEN. The war between Russia and Japan was decided by a torpedo attack.

Mr. GREEN of Iowa. Not fired by a battleship, but by a torpedo-boat destroyer.

Mr. BRITTEN. It was a torpedo, nevertheless, was it not?

Mr. GREEN of Iowa. Yes; but the torpedo tubes on battleships are simply useless.

Mr. BRITTEN. I must decline to yield further, and certainly do not regard the gentleman from Iowa as a torpedo expert.

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman declines to yield further. Mr. BRITTEN. Some years ago, when Capt. Hill was assigned to a battleship as assistant in command, he incorporated what is now known as the Ship's Organization Book, which is now a part of the equipment of every battleship. This ship's organization book will tell a new man on a ship just where to find any location and any article he desires on board that ship, the location of the lifeboats, the fire appliances, and other mechanisms that go toward the making of a battleship. This book is Capt. Hill's own idea.

Then, later on, Capt. Hill suggested to the Board of Construction and had revised practically the entire system of construction of battleship turrets and the raising of the armor belt on battleships, which at that time was too low and appeared to be erroneous. He was the originator in this country of the Council of National Defense. Now, I ask you, gentlemen, in God's name, whom is the plucking board going to pluck this year, who last year was superior to Capt. Hill and Capt. Gibbons? Still, the law provides that they must pluck five captains, and these five captains who are to be plucked this year were 12 short months ago superior to Capt. Hill and Capt. Gibbons, two of the greatest captains we had in the Navy. Unless a special rule is brought in here to-morrow to make this paragraph not subject to a point of order, some gentleman on the floor of the House, who probably is not in the room at the present time will make a point of order and it will be stricken from the bill, and the plucking board will meet again on June 1, and five captains who 12 months ago were apparently superior in efficiency and in every way, according to this last plucking board, to Capt. Hill and Gibbons, will be plucked in order to provide a sufficient flow of promotion for some ensign or some youth who now is a lieutenant, junior grade.

Mr. HENSLEY. Will the gentleman yield?

Mr. BRITTEN. I yield to the gentleman from Missouri.

Mr. HENSLEY. I should like to ask the gentleman from Illinois whether or not there is anything pointed out by Admiral Knight, appearing against Capt. Hill in his service record?

Mr. BRITTEN. Capt. Hill's record was perfect in every detail with the exception of an untidy ship, the *Marietta*, which was given him by his superior officers as a sort of unsatisfactory assignment because he had stepped on their toes. Instead of giving him the ship to which he was entitled at that time they put him on this old tub, the *Marietta*, 15 years old.

Mr. HENSLEY. Has the gentleman in mind any officer whose service was such that he anticipated the action of the plucking board and packed his things to get out of the Navy?

Mr. BRITTEN. It is said that one officer—and I thank the gentleman for the suggestion—thought that he would be retired by the plucking board, and he was so convinced of it that he had his trunk packed and ready to catch a certain steamer in the Orient as soon as he got the wireless telling him that he was plucked. He was dumbfounded to think that men like Hill and Gibbons should be plucked and he left in the service.

Mr. BUTLER. They had overlooked him.

Mr. BRITTEN. Yes; they had overlooked him. I will say that Capt. Hill had more sea service than the most of the admirals who plucked him.

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman has expired.

Mr. BRITTEN. Will the gentleman yield me two minutes more?

Mr. HENSLEY. I will yield the gentleman two minutes.

Mr. McKELLAR. I want to ask the gentleman a question.

Mr. BRITTEN. What is it?

Mr. McKELLAR. We educate these boys at the Naval Academy at an average cost of \$20,000, and then this board plucks them out. Is that correct?

Mr. BRITTEN. That is correct.

Mr. McKELLAR. Without regard to efficiency, but simply to afford easy promotion?

Mr. BRITTEN. That is correct. Now, gentlemen, at the proper time, on reaching page 34, it is my intention to offer an amendment applying to aviation, which you all realize is probably the most important branch of our naval service. Aviation and submarines are at least the most important new branch. The bill provides that the ranking officer in aviation can not be above the rank of lieutenant commander. Now, it develops that we have in the great aviation corps one lieutenant commander. Previous to the war England had 37 commanders and a great number of lieutenant commanders, and this number has been greatly augmented since the war. This one lieutenant commander, who is supposed to be attached to the Pensacola aviation base, will be promoted to the rank of commander in a few months, and then our great Aviation Corps, combining with it the great technicalities that go with that branch of the service, with its great dangers that go with the service, for which we are appropriating a hundred million dollars, will be under the direction and supervision of what is called, in the parlance of the street, a "kid," a young lieutenant. I think the bill is entirely in error, and my amendment will endeavor to cure it.

The officer who commands a dirigible or a squadron of aeroplanes will perform duties that in responsibility, cost of the material under his charge, and importance in naval operations are certainly commensurate with command rank.

It is most important from the standpoint of harmonious co-ordination of the air fleet and the main body to employ a rea-

sonable number of officers in air duty that have the wide general service experience and mature judgment that can be gained only after sufficient experience in all the grades below commander.

The recommendation from the Navy Department, as prepared by Capt. Bristol, the director of aeronautics, included commanders. Unless commanders are included, it is not reasonable to expect them to volunteer for a duty which precludes them from taking out life insurance and which is most hazardous.

There are now 6 naval officers and 1 marine officer who hold the Navy Department's air pilot's certificate. They are 1 lieutenant commander, 2 lieutenants, 2 lieutenants (junior grade), 1 ensign, 1 first lieutenant, Marine Corps.

The first of these is due for promotion to commander about July 1 next, graduated from the Naval Academy 1896. The next senior graduated from the Naval Academy 1905, 9 years later, and will not be a commander in the ordinary course of events for about 10 years.

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman has expired.

Mr. BRITTEN. I ask unanimous consent to extend my remarks in the Record.

The CHAIRMAN (Mr. CRISP). The gentleman from Illinois asks unanimous consent to extend his remarks in the Record. Is there objection?

There was no objection.

Mr. HENSLEY. Mr. Chairman, I yield one hour to the gentleman from Mississippi [Mr. WITHERSPOON].

Mr. WITHERSPOON. Mr. Chairman, I had supposed until I listened to the speech of my friend from California [Mr. STEPHENS] that we had made at least one step in the progress toward truth in this naval business. I was astounded when I heard him say that he still believes in the old doctrine that preparedness for war preserves peace. That is not true in any department of life.

Men always do the things that they prepare themselves to do. If you want to practice law, you go to a law school and get a legal education. You get some law books and rent an office and make preparations; but, according to my friend from California, if you do not want to practice law the way to do it is to make all these preparations. If you want to be a doctor, you get a thorough knowledge of the science of medicine and make all your preparations to practice medicine, and then you will not do it.

In regard to war, if you do not want to indulge in all the barbarities and savagery of the war, the way to keep from doing it is to prepare yourself well to do it.

Mr. J. R. KNOWLAND. Will the gentleman yield?

Mr. WITHERSPOON. Yes; but I have not much time.

Mr. J. R. KNOWLAND. China was unprepared for war, and suffered severe devastation in consequence.

Mr. WITHERSPOON. Since China has had no preparation at all she has been at absolute peace, and the same is true of all other nations in the world that are not prepared.

Mr. J. R. KNOWLAND. Is it not true—

Mr. WITHERSPOON. The gentleman has asked me a question, and I am answering it. The gentleman should not ask a question of me unless he wants it answered.

Mr. FARR. Will the gentleman yield?

Mr. WITHERSPOON. No; I am answering the question of the gentleman from California. How can I yield when I am answering his question?

Every nation in the world except one or two that has prepared itself to go to war is now at war. They have done the very thing they prepared themselves to do.

Are you opposed to sneaking under the water to some innocent battleship while the sailors are all asleep, like those on the battleship *Maine*, and blow the bottom out of it and murder these innocent men? Are you opposed to doing that? Then, the way to keep from doing it is to prepare yourselves with mines and submarines. Are you opposed to going through the heavens in the midnight air with a lot of bombs around you and flying over some house where an innocent mother and little babe are asleep and dropping the bomb down on them and murdering them in their sleep? Are you opposed to that? Then, if you do not want to do it, the way to keep from doing it is to prepare yourselves with a thousand flying machines and bombs in them and then you will not do it. [Laughter.] That will keep you from doing it, according to the idiotic argument that preparedness for war preserves peace. The fact is that when men are in favor of a wrong there is absolutely no suggestion, no proposition, too idiotic for them to believe.

The question in this bill is whether or not we need to build any more ships in order to adequately prepare ourselves for defense; whether or not we are already prepared, without building any more ships, to defend ourselves against any attacks that may be made upon us. That is the question. No intelli-

gent conception of that question can be made without considering the relative power of our preparation with those of foreign Governments. Now, it is not necessary to compare our Navy with the navies of all foreign Governments, because when we compare them with the greatest and that comparison shows we need no more ships, it follows inevitably that we do not need them as to the others. Take, for instance, the German Navy. They have 10 more battleships than France; they have 21 more battleships than Japan; they have 22 more battleships than Italy; they have 26 more battleships, I believe, than Russia; and, consequently, if we do not need any more battleships to enable us to resist the naval power of Germany, we do not need any at all.

Now, I want to call the attention of the committee to some facts developed in the hearings before the committee in preparing this bill, which to my mind are absolutely overwhelming in the establishment of the proposition that we have all the warships that we need. In order to appreciate the force of these facts, I want to remind you of how the matter stood a year ago, and first I call attention to the number of ships. Germany a year ago had 39 battleships, and we had the same number. Now we have 40 battleships, and Germany, according to the Navy Yearbook just published, also has 40; but that Navy Yearbook, which always credits Germany with more than she has and puts us with less than we have, is not corroborated in that respect by the British Navy Annual, which all naval officers say is the highest authority on naval matters. That book, just published for the year 1914, gives a full list of German ships built, building, and authorized, and it puts down the number at 39. The last battleship on the list in the Navy Yearbook of 1914 is not found in the list as put down in the British Navy Annual. In regard to the number of ships we should have, the General Board has been recommending for years that we ought to have 48 battleships, or, in other words, 8 more than we have now. They say that they base that recommendation upon the building programs of other nations. Their argument is, we ought to have 48 battleships because Germany and other nations have a program of building so many. That basis of recommending has no foundation in fact. A year ago the last dreadnaught completed by Germany was the *Koenig Albert*, and you can take the Navy Yearbook for 1914, just published, which I have here before me, and look at the list and you will find that the last completed battleship of Germany is the same one, the *Koenig Albert*, and within the last year Germany has not added a single ship to her navy, and according to the British Annual she has not authorized any other battleships than those that were building a year ago. Not only that, but Germany has never expressed any intention or purpose of having anything like 48 battleships. The number of battleships in Germany is determined just like they are determined in this country—by law—and the laws of Germany tell us how many they propose to have.

In 1900 Germany passed her first law for the construction of battleships, and she at that time fixed the number of battleships that should constitute her navy at 38. Six years afterwards, in 1906, that law was amended, by which Germany determined that her fleet should be composed of 40 battleships, and that stood as the expressed intention of the German Government for six years longer, until 1912, when her law was amended the last time, and when she provided that 41 battleships should be the full number of her fleet. That is the German law, and the German Government has no more power to increase her battleships beyond that limit fixed by German law than the executive department of our Government has to increase them without the authority of Congress. So that, as Germany does not propose at any time to have but 41 battleships, and we have 40 already, I say that the recommendation for 48 battleships, based on what other nations propose to do, falls to the ground. Not only that, not only has there never been any German proposition to increase the number of battleships in a way as to justify the increases which we are proposing, but at this time Germany's kindly neighbors are very rapidly decreasing her fleet. She has lost in the last five months 45 of her war vessels. In that loss is 1 battle cruiser, 5 armored cruisers, about 23 scout cruisers or protected cruisers, as they are called, 9 destroyers, 3 submarines, and a number of auxiliary vessels. So if a justification for a large increase in our Navy that is proposed is to rest for a basis upon the proposition that Germany has increased her navy, then I say that the argument falls to the ground, in the face of the fact that within five months she has been decreased 45 vessels. I want to call attention also to the fact that a year ago I demonstrated to the House that according to every test known to naval experts our Navy was already far superior to the German Navy. One of the tests, and the one which Admiral Vreeland told us was the most accurate test, was a comparison of the muzzle energy of the guns in the

armored vessels of the two Navies. I showed you by data taken from the authorities that at that time the muzzle energy of all the guns on our armored vessels was 444,110 foot-tons greater than the muzzle energy of all the guns in the armored vessels of the German Navy.

Now I want to call attention to a change that has occurred in the last year in that regard. Instead of our Navy having a superiority of 444,110 foot-tons in muzzle energy you will find this to be the fact, that within the last year we have added three great dreadnaughts to our Navy, each being armed with twelve 14-inch guns. The muzzle energy of these 36 guns is 2,374,732 foot-tons, and during the last year we have sold two of our battleships, the *Idaho* and the *Mississippi*, and the muzzle energy of the guns of those two ships was 351,590 foot-tons. Deducting that from the increase of the three last authorized ships, we have an increase in the muzzle energy of the guns on our armored vessels of 2,023,142 foot-tons.

Adding that to the 444,110 foot-tons that we were superior to Germany a year ago it makes our armored vessels now superior to those of the German Navy by 2,264,252 foot-tons. But that is not all. The muzzle energy of the battle cruiser and the four armored cruisers that Germany has lost in this war amounts to 1,037,170 foot-tons, while ours has increased nearly two and one-half million foot-tons. Germany's Navy has decreased over 1,000,000 foot-tons. So that now the muzzle energy of the guns on our armored vessels instead of exceeding that of the German Navy, as it did a year ago by 444,110 foot-tons, now exceeds them 3,504,422 foot-tons. There is the statement of the condition between the two navies, which, according to test, Navy experts tell us is the most accurate criterion to make a comparison and determine the superiority.

Another test of great value, though not as certain as this one, is the weight of the metal in a broadside from all the guns in the Navy. Now, I showed you a year ago that a broadside from all the guns on the armored vessels of the American Navy was 45,954 pounds greater than the weight of the metal in a broadside from guns on the armored vessels of the German Navy. I want to call your attention to the change that has occurred according to that test. The three dreadnaughts that we have added to our Navy within the last year, having thirty-six 14-inch guns, with shells actually weighing 1,400 pounds apiece, increases the broadside in our Navy 50,400 pounds, and deducting from that the weight of the metal in the broadside in the *Idaho* and *Mississippi*, which we have sold, leaves an increase in our Navy of 36,740 pounds. Adding that to the superiority that existed a year ago, we have this result, that the weight of the metal in a broadside from all the guns in the armored vessels of the American Navy now exceeds the weight of the metal in a broadside from the armored vessels of the German Navy instead of 45,954 pounds, as it did a year ago, 82,694 pounds. If figures, argument, and reason can satisfy any human mind, I submit that this ought to be satisfactory to you.

But there is one particular in which the evidence is now much stronger than it was a year ago. At that time we had to rely solely upon arguments and reason. We had very little support in the testimony of experts. It is true that we had the testimony of Admiral Vreeland, who, with a great deal of reluctance, contrary to his own wishes, finally was constrained to admit that the facts show that the American Navy is superior to the German Navy. And that is all we had at that time. Now, I want to call your attention to the fact that three members of the General Board and the commander in chief of the Atlantic Fleet have been before the Naval Affairs Committee in the hearing just closed, and every one of them testified that the American Navy is superior to that of Germany. In other words, I claim that the admissions of experts now unite with facts and arguments and reason to establish the proposition that we already have a Navy so big that it is not necessary to increase it in order to be able to resist the German Navy, and, of course, to resist those which are much smaller.

The General Board, in its report to the Secretary of the Navy, makes an assertion like this: It says the want of any definite naval policy has resulted in an inferiority of the American Navy, and that that inferiority, unless it is removed, will involve us in war. That is substantially the statement of the General Board. That is the statement, however, that was made in an office, was a statement made by men who could not be cross-examined, but when three of those men who made that report came before the committee and were confronted with the facts of the case, they united in testifying that our Navy is not only not inferior but is superior to every navy in the world except England's.

Admiral Badger, the ex-commander in chief of the Atlantic Fleet, now a member of the General Board, was the first mem-

ber who testified on this subject. He was asked to take the last two of the American battleships and German battleships and compare them. He was asked this question:

It is a fact that the last two battleships in the German Navy are armed each with eight 15-inch guns and the last two in the American Navy are armed with twelve 14-inch guns; now state which are the superior ships.

He did not hesitate a minute to testify that the American ships are superior to the German ships. He was also asked to compare the next three ships of the American Navy, also armed with twelve 14-inch guns, with the corresponding three ships in the German Navy, armed with ten 12-inch guns, and, of course, he could not hesitate and did not hesitate to say that ours are superior. In that way he was taken from one end of the list to the other, and with ship after ship he was asked to compare it with those of the German Navy, and he testified that ship for ship we had the superior Navy. That is the testimony of Admiral Badger.

Then Admiral Fletcher came before us, and he was asked these same questions substantially, and he was then asked particularly about every nation in the world. He was asked the question if he thought our Navy was superior to the German Navy, and said that in tonnage and armament it had better ships and was superior. Then he was asked the question, "Do you think in a war between Germany and the United States we could successfully resist the German Navy?" He said, "Yes." "Do you think we could successfully resist the French Navy?" He said, "Yes." "Do you think we could successfully resist the Japanese Navy?" He replied, "Yes." "Do you think there is a navy on earth we could not successfully resist with the ships we already have?" And he said, "None but England." "But, Admiral," he was asked, "we have been told by one of the experts of the Navy that if we had war with England that, on account of her relations with her neighbors, she could not possibly send more than 50 per cent of her fleet against us. Now, if that be true, if she could not send half of them against us, do you think we would be able to resist her?" "Well," he said, "that would be a close question;" and he declined to answer it. That was the testimony of Admiral Fletcher, the commander in chief of the Atlantic Fleet. A year ago Secretary Daniels spent two days and a half before the Committee on Naval Affairs trying to uphold the contention that the German Navy was superior to ours, and every suggestion and argument that he could make was put in that hearing to show that our Navy was inferior to the German Navy. While he was testifying his aid for operations, Capt. Winterhalter, sat beside him and aided him and made suggestions to him about how to answer questions, and I thought that Capt. Winterhalter was clearly on the other side, and I think all the members of the Naval Affairs Committee thought the same thing. I believe still that he was on the other side a year ago. But in the present hearings just closed this great mistake was made. One of them, who wanted to prove, I think, that we ought to have about 40 more battleships, put Capt. Winterhalter on the stand by whom to prove it, and he told him about our immense coast line and how many ships it would take to defend that. He told about the \$64,000,000,000 of property that he said was lying right on the water's edge close enough for hostile ships to destroy. "Now," he said, "Capt. Winterhalter, in view of these facts do you think it good policy to let the Navy sink to a third or fourth grade naval power?" Capt. Winterhalter, to the astonishment of the whole committee, made this reply. He said, "Well, I want just as many battleships as you will give me." He said, "I would like to have the biggest Navy in the world, but there is Judge Witherspoon, he has already proved that our Navy is superior to the German Navy, and I agree with him on it." [Applause.]

That is what the third member of the General Board says. Nobody asked him whether I had proved anything or not. Nobody said anything to him about that. But evidently since we went into the facts and discussed them, the fact that our Navy is superior to the German Navy had been weighing on his mind and heart, so that he wanted to give expression to it, and he just did. [Applause.]

Mr. KELLEY of Michigan. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. WITHERSPOON. Certainly.

Mr. KELLEY of Michigan. Does the gentleman also recall the statement of Admiral Fletcher when I asked him in the committee as to the relative strength of our Navy and the German Navy, and he also said that our Navy was the equal or the superior of the German Navy?

Mr. WITHERSPOON. Oh, I recall that Admiral Fletcher said at first that our Navy is as good as any in the world except England's, and then later on he qualified that a little and said that our Navy is as good, if not better. He amended his statement, just as we sometimes amend our statements in the House,

by putting in the words "if not better." But when he got through testifying the facts he did not say that ours was as good; he did not say that ours was as good, if not better, but he admitted that we have a Navy that is superior to Germany's. [Applause.]

That is the way with every naval officer that has ever come before that committee when you confronted him with the facts. His very self-respect will force him to admit it.

But the remarkable thing that I have to submit to you is the statement of the Secretary of the Navy himself. A year ago the Secretary of the Navy sat in that committee for two days and a half defending the proposition that the German Navy is superior to ours. This year he came before the committee and he used this expression: "We have a powerful Navy." He said: "It is the most powerful Navy in the world except England's, and possibly Germany's." In the estimation of the Secretary of the Navy that German naval superiority which was clear and certain and fixed, that superiority of the German Navy over ours has now dwindled down to a bare possibility. [Applause.] The fact is the Secretary has always told us that he has to rely upon his experts for these matters in the Navy. That is what he has said a dozen times in the committee. Now, all his experts, including Capt. Winterhalter, have deserted him, and he is coming to the truth. [Applause.]

So much for that. There is one old fallacy that I want to call to your attention. For years and years and years in these debates we have seen Members who advocate the building of more battleships parading here a big map of pasteboard, with the figures of the American Navy on it—that is, the figures with reference to tonnage. The thing does not show that there is a single gun in any navy in the world. It leaves out everything that is important, and tries to show the superiority of other navies to ours by the matter of tonnage, as if battleships shoot tons instead of projectiles.

Now I want to call your attention to that. Of course you can make a paper map like that and prove that any navy is the smallest navy in the world or that any navy is the largest navy in the world, if you will just confine yourself to the tonnage and leave out enough ships to accomplish the result you aim at, and that is the way this is done.

I want to call your attention to that. Take, for instance, this statement of the German Navy. They say that the battleships of the dreadnaught type already built have a tonnage of 285,770 tons, and those building have a tonnage of 187,164 tons. Then they give the same for ours. They say that we have 8 dreadnaughts built, with a tonnage of 189,650, and 4 building, making 12 in all. The figures are given of 12 of our dreadnaughts. Now, the truth is that we have 17. They have just simply left out 5 of them, and in that way they make the tonnage of the German Navy superior to ours.

Mr. MANN. Mr. Chairman, if it would not interrupt the gentleman, will he yield to me?

Mr. WITHERSPOON. Certainly.

Mr. MANN. I may be misinformed, but so far as I remember we have never yet attempted in the provisions we have made to equal the English Navy.

Mr. WITHERSPOON. In tonnage or in vessels, do you mean?

Mr. MANN. In tonnage, or in any other way, so far as a comparison is concerned; but we have in a way attempted to keep up with the German fleet.

Mr. WITHERSPOON. Yes.

Mr. MANN. As I recall, there has been a dispute as to whether last year we were ahead or a little behind the German fleet. Is there any dispute now, in view of what has taken place during the war and the destruction of some of the German fleet? Is there any dispute now as to whether our Navy exceeds in strength the German Navy?

Mr. WITHERSPOON. I think there is. I think that some of these fellows would dispute it if every battleship in the German Navy were sunk in the ocean. Yes; they will dispute anything. [Laughter.]

Mr. MANN. I was not referring to those. I think possibly the gentleman exaggerates a little bit what he would state. I want to get at the facts.

Mr. WITHERSPOON. Yes.

Mr. MANN. I do not remember how many of the German vessels have been destroyed, but there have been some.

Mr. WITHERSPOON. Yes. They are in the hearings, and they numbered 44 in the hearings; and since the hearings were published the *Bleucher*, the largest armored cruiser Germany had, has been sunk to the bottom of the sea, making 45.

Mr. MANN. Does not that clearly leave at present the American fleet superior to the German fleet?

Mr. WITHERSPOON. Of course it does.

Mr. MANN. Suppose the war lasts a little while longer, with the natural results of the war; can anybody then dispute it?

Mr. WITHERSPOON. Well, I think they will. I think they will dispute it. [Laughter.] But I want to say this to the gentleman from Illinois on that proposition: When Admiral Badger, a member of the General Board, was before us, I said, "Admiral, you base your recommendation on 48 battleships, and you put that on the basis of what these other nations are doing." I said, "Now, if this war continues and Germany loses half of her battleships, will not the basis of your argument be gone?" And he said, "Yes." "Well," I said, "then would you say that we should stop?" And he said, "I should."

That is what Admiral Badger said. But, talking about this tonnage, there are the *Oregon*, the *Massachusetts*, the *Indiana*, three of our old battleships, left out of this table, and there are the three, the *California*, the *Mississippi*, and the *Idaho*, that we authorized a year ago. They are left out, and those make six of our battleships that are left out in making this table showing that the German tonnage is superior to ours.

Well, of course, you can do that. You can leave out enough battleships to show that the tonnage of our fleet is inferior to any fleet in the world, and it does not take any brains to do it, either. [Laughter.] All it requires is a little disregard for the truth. That is all that it requires. [Laughter.]

Not only that, but this table here includes in the tonnage of the German Navy all these vessels of Germany that are now lying at the bottom of the sea. Let me show you. This tonnage table has among the German battle cruisers two completed. One of them is the *Goben*. The *Goben* is the largest and last completed battle cruiser in the German Navy, and it was the one that was caught down there in the Mediterranean at the beginning of the war, and she nearly ran herself to death getting out of the way of the other ships to avoid a fight, and finally got into the Dardanelles with all her boilers burned out, half ruined, and was sold to Turkey. The tonnage of the *Goben* is still included in this table just issued in the Navy Yearbook. Take the *Idaho* and the *Mississippi*, that were sold to Greece long before Germany sold the *Goben* and the *Breslau*, and the tonnage of the *Mississippi* and the *Idaho* is excluded from our Navy, but they put into it the *Goben* and the *Breslau*, two cruisers that Germany had sold to Turkey. That is the kind of juggling with figures that these fellows resort to in order to fool you into voting for more battleships.

Then here are the armored cruisers. They have got down 9 of them. Well, 4 of those are lying at the bottom of the sea—4 of them are destroyed. Yet their tonnage is set out in this table against the tonnage of the American Navy.

Here are 41 cruisers. My recollection is that in the list of 45 ships lost by Germany 23 of them are those cruisers. The tonnage of 23 cruisers lying at the bottom of the sea is put down here in this table, in order to show that in tonnage the German Navy is superior to ours. Then here are all the German torpedo-boat destroyers—130 of them—of which 9 are destroyed; and 27 submarines, of which 3 are destroyed.

I want to show you how that will figure out. This table gives the total tonnage of the German Navy as 1,306,577 tons, and gives ours at \$94,889 tons. Of the German cruisers that are destroyed there were about 12 of which I could not get the tonnage. Leaving them out of the deduction, the tonnage of the vessels that Germany has lost amounts to 112,540 tons, which would reduce the tonnage in the German Navy to 1,094,037 tons.

On the other hand, take the tonnage of the 3 dreadnaughts that we have ordered, that are not included here, and the 3 battleships that are left out, and they amount to 126,864 tons, which gives the total tonnage of our vessels as 1,021,753, instead of \$94,000. That makes the German tonnage about 17,000 tons ahead of us still, but you must remember that in that total there are 12 cruisers that ought to be deducted, and if they were deducted it would show that the tonnage of our vessels is superior to those of the German Navy.

But I want to call your attention especially to one thing, and that is that the tonnage of the German Navy includes 20 battleships of the predreadnaught type. So far as our defense is concerned, they ought to be excluded. You will remember that last year I compared the *Oregon* with every one of those 20 battleships, and showed that in the armor plate, in the armament, in the muzzle energy of the guns, in the weight of the metal of a broadside of those vessels, the *Oregon* was superior to every one of them. Yet the *Oregon* is left out and they are all included. If it is fair to leave out the *Oregon*, *Indiana*, and *Massachusetts*, then in order to determine the greater tonnage you ought to leave out every vessel in the German Navy that is inferior to them. That would be fair.

But what I want to call your attention to especially about these ships is that they ought not to be considered by us at all,

for the reason that it is an impossibility for them ever to cross the ocean. They can not carry coal enough to bring them across the ocean, not one of them. The maximum coal capacity of the first five of those German battleships is 1,050 tons. The maximum coal capacity of the next five is 1,400 tons. The maximum coal capacity of the next five is 1,600 tons, and of the other five is 1,800 tons of coal. You can not get those ships across the ocean with that much coal. They can not carry enough coal to bring them, the largest of them, closer than within 500 miles of our shores, and I do not believe the smallest of them could get halfway across the ocean. How can it be justified that we should build battleships to defend ourselves against such battleships as these, from which there is no possibility of any attack? The truth of the business is that the German Navy was never constructed with any idea of fighting the United States. If it had been the vessels would have been built differently. Take the ships of our Navy, the first five old ships that we have carry 1,475 tons, or 425 tons more than the corresponding ships of the Germans. The others carry 1,450, 3,000, 1,900, 2,300. That is the kind of ships we have, and if Germany had ever built her Navy with any idea of prosecuting a war against the United States she would have built different kinds of ships. She would at least have supplied her ships with enough coal to bring them across the ocean.

And there is another thing that bears out the very same idea. You will recall that I pointed out with great detail a year ago how much superior in size the guns on our ships are to those on the German ships. When we were building 13-inch guns they were building 9.4-inch guns. When we were building 12-inch guns they were building 11. When they built 12-inch guns we were building 14-inch guns. Their guns have always been very much smaller than ours. I asked a very brilliant naval officer to explain why that was, and his explanation was that the German Navy was constructed with a view to having war with its neighbors. He said in that country they nearly always have fogs on the sea and the weather is rarely clear, and necessarily a naval engagement over there would be at very close range, and at very close range those smaller guns are as good as the big ones, but nobody would build a ship to fight in such a country as this and equip that ship with those small guns.

So from this we learn two lessons. The first is that we are in no sort of danger from at least half of the German battleships, and the other is the blessed assurance that in the German mind there has never been any idea of a war with the United States. [Applause.]

Mr. GOULDEN. Will the gentleman yield for a question?

Mr. WITHERSPOON. Yes.

Mr. GOULDEN. The gentleman has said nothing whatever about the relative speed capacity of the German vessels and ours. Does the gentleman attach no importance to that?

Mr. WITHERSPOON. They are just about the same.

Mr. GOULDEN. I wanted to know that, because I imagined we had greater speed capacity in our vessels than they had in the German naval vessels.

Mr. WITHERSPOON. There is very little difference, and I do not think it makes a particle of difference, anyway. If you are going out to fight an enemy, it does not make much difference how soon you get there or how late you get there.

Mr. GOULDEN. Speed is useful to get away sometimes, when you find yourself being beaten.

Mr. WITHERSPOON. So far as getting away is concerned, we do not want to get away. When we get into a fight we are going to whip them before we go.

Mr. GREEN of Iowa. Will the gentleman yield?

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from Mississippi has expired.

Mr. BATHRICK. Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent that the gentleman from Mississippi have 10 minutes more.

Mr. MANN. That is not within the power of the committee.

Mr. HENSLEY. Mr. Chairman, I yield 25 minutes additional time to the gentleman from Mississippi.

Mr. GREEN of Iowa. For information, I want to ask the gentleman a question. I understood the gentleman to say that a large number of the German battleships would not have sufficient steaming radius to come across the ocean.

Mr. WITHERSPOON. I so stated.

Mr. GREEN of Iowa. I did not understand how many in number the gentleman stated.

Mr. WITHERSPOON. Twenty. I heard a naval officer say that on one occasion he saw some German battleships in one of our ports, and when they got ready to go home they had to fill the bunkers full of coal and pile it up on the deck in order to have enough to get back.

Mr. ESCH. Will the gentleman yield?

Mr. WITHERSPOON. Yes.

Mr. ESCH. Germany has already installed some oil-burning machinery on her battleships the same as we have. Could she not install it on the 21 battleships?

Mr. WITHERSPOON. I will say that I do not know whether she could or not. It is very uncertain whether you can change the construction so as to make it suitable for oil. I do not know; I doubt it. According to all authorities she has not done it yet, and that ought to be enough for us.

Mr. POWERS. Will the gentleman yield?

Mr. WITHERSPOON. Certainly.

Mr. POWERS. The gentleman has based his argument on the proposition that our Navy is superior to that of Germany, and that therefore we are in no danger from Germany. It develops that England is a good deal more powerful on the sea, more powerful than we are, and I would like to have the gentleman deal with that.

Mr. WITHERSPOON. The reason I do not want to discuss that is because all the battleship crowd that has been before the committee admit that it is unnecessary to build more ships as far as England is concerned. That never has been a question before the committee, and the gentleman will have to excuse me from going into it because I have not now the time.

Mr. TOWNER. Will the gentleman yield for a question?

Mr. WITHERSPOON. Yes.

Mr. TOWNER. It has been stated, and the gentleman knows, that during the war Germany, as well as England, has been building new battleships to replace those that have been destroyed during the war. Can the gentleman give us information as to what extent they are building to repair their losses?

Mr. WITHERSPOON. I will give you this information, that your information is newspaper talk and does not amount to a hill of beans. [Laughter.] The newspapers are publishing this kind of information to influence Congress to squander the public funds, and that is what they are for. We have examined into that; we have asked the Navy Department about it, and they say they have no information at all.

Mr. TOWNER. That is what I was going to ask the gentleman.

Mr. WITHERSPOON. There is no such information, and it is nothing but idle newspaper talk. It is very much like the newspaper report a year ago that Japan had just decided to build 12 more dreadnaughts, and it turned out that she did not want to build but one, and a mob congregated, and they had to escort the members of Parliament home who voted for one in order to keep them out of the hands of the mob. That is the kind of stuff that some newspapers are trying to stuff the public with.

Mr. TOWNER. With the present resources of the German shipyards, would they be able to replace such as have been destroyed?

Mr. WITHERSPOON. I do not know, because I have never seen them, but I imagine that Germany and England and all those other countries have all they can do right now without attempting to build new ships that will not be completed until after the war is over. It takes three years to build a battleship.

Mr. SLAYDEN. Will the gentleman yield?

Mr. WITHERSPOON. Yes.

Mr. SLAYDEN. The gentleman speaks of the newspapers as a source of information, and that argument is as good on one side as it is on the other. Did not the gentleman see an Associated Press dispatch the other day that England would hasten to complete such dreadnaughts as she had under construction but would lay down no more?

Mr. WITHERSPOON. I did not see it. I think it is reasonable that she would hasten to complete those, but it would be folly to build new ships that they could not possibly complete until the war is over. That is the way it looks to me.

I want to suggest this to you: Suppose that Germany had the same number of battleships that we have—40; concede that. What is the relative strength of the American Navy and the German Navy, supposing that every ship in both navies is equal in power? That is a false supposition, because we have proved by every expert that, ship for ship, our ships are superior to the German; but I am supposing that they are just equal ship for ship, the same number. Then could we defend ourselves against Germany?

A naval officer told me that the Naval War College had worked out the problem as to what disadvantage it is to any country to wage a war against another one 3,000 or 4,000 miles away. Everybody admits that it would be a great disadvantage, and they have worked it out as a naval problem. My information from him is that their decision was that, for instance, if Germany should come over here to attack us it would take 11 of her battleships to equal 10 of ours of the same power and character.

Now there is a reason for that. Where a nation sends its fleet 4,000 miles away to fight that fleet has got to be supplied; and, according to one of the experts before us, if we were carrying on war 4,000 miles distant it would take 200 ships to supply our Navy, and it would require the same to supply the German Navy if they were fighting us.

Then you would have to have a part of your fleet to protect those merchant ships bringing your supplies to you, and every one you take away to defend and protect your transports would weaken you just that much. And, so they say, putting it in figures, that 10 of our battleships of the same power would be equal to 11 of the German battleships. In other words, if we had 40, as we have, Germany would have to have 44 in order to be equal to our 40. That is what they worked out in the board of naval experts, according to my information. If that is true, then with 40 battleships in our Navy and the same number in the German Navy, according to the Navy Yearbook, would not we be able to resist her? Have not we got plenty already?

But what is the value of battleships anyway? What are they worth? Do they fight? Do battleships shoot guns? Do they shoot shells? Do they waste any powder? Why, we have had the greatest war of the world going on now for five months. Most of the battleships of the world are owned by the belligerents, and not one single battleship has fired a gun. What are they worth; what are they made for? Sir Percy Scott and other experts told you long before this war came that the day of the battleship was ended; that the invention of the submarine had destroyed its usefulness and it was no longer of any service. He said that before this war began. The war has continued now for five months and not a battleship has fired a gun. I ask you what are they worth?

Mr. J. R. KNOWLAND. Will the gentleman yield?

Mr. WITHERSPOON. Yes; I yield.

Mr. J. R. KNOWLAND. Is it not true that no battleship has fired a gun because the German battleships are all bottled up?

Mr. WITHERSPOON. That is the gentleman's reason.

Mr. J. R. KNOWLAND. What is the gentleman's reason?

Mr. WITHERSPOON. I will show you that is not the reason of the experts. I will show you that is not the reason given in the testimony. The gentleman says the reason the German battleships have not fired a gun is because they are all bottled up in the Baltic Sea. That is the contention of my friend. Where is the Russian fleet? It is also bottled up in the Baltic Sea. The two fleets are right there side by side. The German fleet is five times as powerful as the Russian fleet. Why does not the German fleet destroy the Russian fleet? Why does not it attack the Russian fleet? Why did not they fire a gun from the battleships at the Russian fleet? Do you know why it is? The experts before the Naval Committee tell us that the reason why the Germans have not attacked and destroyed the Russian fleet in the Baltic Sea is because they know that the mines and the submarines of Russia would destroy them before they got in reach of the battleships.

Mr. FORDNEY. Is that the case with England?

Mr. WITHERSPOON. I am going to get to England; I will get to all of them. Now, they say that the reason the German battleships did not fire their guns at the English ships is because England has got her bottled up. If that were a good reason, then Germany would have fired her guns at the Russians. The reason why England and France do not fire their guns at the German fleet is this: Those two nations together have two and a half times as many battleships as the Germans. They are two and a half times as strong as the German Navy. Why do not England and France send their battleships into the Baltic and destroy the German fleet, as they could do if they could ever get in there? Why do not they do it? I will tell you what the experts say. Admiral Badger and Admiral Fletcher, who we have asked to explain that, both agree that the reason why the French and English do not send their battle fleets into the Baltic in order to destroy the German fleet is because England and France know that the German mines and submarines would sink them all to the bottom of the sea before they could get to the German fleet. [Applause.] That is the testimony before our committee. That is what the nations of the earth believe to-day, and everybody believes it except those who want an excuse for building more battleships here—everybody. I will show that England and Germany both believe it. Just take that fight they had the other day. The Germans sent three of their battle cruisers and one of their armored cruisers out on the North Sea. Did they go alone? No. What did they have with them? Why, the German admiral took with him a whole lot of submarines.

Mr. FORDNEY. How did they get back?

Mr. WITHERSPOON. I will tell you—

Mr. FORDNEY. I am asking for information.

Mr. WITHERSPOON. I am going to tell the whole story. The German admiral carried his fleet of submarines out and strung them out in a line behind him, fixing a place behind which he could run. When he was attacked he made for those submarines and got behind them. Now, what did he have the submarines out there for? What did he want something to get behind for except that he knew the English Navy were afraid of submarines and would not follow him when he got behind them as breastworks? That shows the estimate of the German admiral of how submarines are dreaded by the English. The English admiral had the same estimate, because with a great deal more powerful navy, with five battle cruisers all armored with much larger guns than the Germans had, it was perfectly certain that he could have destroyed all of them, but when he got within shooting distance of these submarines he stopped and went back, and that shows what England thinks about submarines.

Mr. HENSLEY. And that was 70 miles from the coast.

Mr. WITHERSPOON. Seventy miles from Helgoland. [Laughter.] I do not know how far from the coast, but I think Helgoland is 30 or 40 miles the way I saw it. They would not approach within 70 miles of that fortified island of the Germans, because Admiral Beatty says himself that he was scared of submarines.

Mr. BRITTEN. Will my colleague yield?

Mr. WITHERSPOON. Yes.

Mr. BRITTEN. It is reported one of the German cruisers went down. Did it go down from the effect of a submarine or from the effect of the fire of an English gun?

Mr. WITHERSPOON. I do not know; but I know if the submarines got close enough they would have blown their bottoms out.

Mr. BRITTEN. The gentleman is so wise in all other directions I thought he might know about that.

Mr. WITHERSPOON. I do not know anything about that.

Mr. BRITTEN. Is it not a fact that the *Blucher* did go down from the effect of big-gun fire and not from a torpedo?

Mr. WITHERSPOON. I suspect it did, although I do not know. The truth about the submarine is that the submarine is described as a weapon of opportunity. That is the expression of the experts. It can not do anything unless you give it the opportunity; but if you do give it the opportunity, you are going to the bottom of the sea. Great ado is made by my friend from Illinois and all these other advocates of so many battleships, and a great point is made of the fact that so few vessels in this war have been destroyed by submarines. Well, that is true. Submarines do not go way out on the oceans. They are defensive weapons, and the very fact that they have destroyed but few vessels in this war shows what is the consensus of opinion in the minds of all the belligerents. They do not let their vessels get close to them. That is the reason they do not destroy any more. [Applause.]

Now, here is the argument I want to impress upon you. If the submarines and mines that have got the Russian fleet hemmed in are sufficient to deter the German fleet, four or five times as big, from attacking it; if the submarines and mines that lie between the German fleet and the English and French fleets, which are two and one-half times as great, are sufficient to deter the fleets of those nations from attacking the Germans; if the submarines were sufficient to stop the English the other day in their pursuit of the German cruisers when it was perfectly apparent they could have destroyed all of them if they had just pursued them; if they would give up that pursuit on account of their fear of submarines; if the submarines have had that effect in Europe, then I appeal to you as men who have some logic in your minds if it is not also a fact that with our 59 submarines to protect us, it would deter any of them coming 4,000 miles to attack us? [Applause.]

Mr. FORDNEY. Will the gentleman yield for a question?

Mr. WITHERSPOON. Yes.

Mr. FORDNEY. Do you recommend that our Navy have submarines and mines and no battleships or cruisers?

Mr. WITHERSPOON. No; I could not recommend that, because we have already 40 battleships.

Mr. FORDNEY. Do you mean to say that if we have no battleships or cruisers—

Mr. WITHERSPOON. There is no question of whether we need 40 battleships or not, because we already have them.

Mr. FORDNEY. Do you recommend that the Navy have the necessary submarines and mines and nothing else competent to protect our Navy?

Mr. WITHERSPOON. Oh, no. If we did not have any battleships at all, then your question would arise. But we have

40, and what is the use of discussing the question whether we will have any or not?

Mr. FORDNEY. The argument has been presented here recently that why we do not want a battleship or a cruiser is that in some eight or ten years it becomes obsolete, and therefore unless we continue replacing ships our Navy will be obsolete in a few years.

Mr. WITHERSPOON. There are some people who, wishing to squander the public funds, assert that ships become obsolete in a few years. But anybody knowing anything about battleships will not say that, because it is not true.

Mr. BRITTEN. Did not my colleague, for whom I have the very highest regard—

Mr. WITHERSPOON. I thank you.

Mr. BRITTEN (continuing). Vote against the increase in the number of submarines?

Mr. WITHERSPOON. Yes, sir; I voted against them.

Mr. BRITTEN. I wanted the House to know of the fact.

Mr. WITHERSPOON. I will tell you why I voted against them. There is just this difference between me and my friend from Illinois. I voted against them because the testimony showed that we did not need any more. He votes for the construction of battleships whether we need them or not. That is the difference. [Applause.]

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman has expired. [Applause.]

Mr. HENSLEY. I yield five minutes more to the gentleman from Mississippi. [Applause.]

Mr. GOULDEN. Will the gentleman yield?

Mr. WITHERSPOON. Excuse me. I was asked one question about submarines, and I want to answer it. I voted against increasing our submarines for several reasons. We have 59 already. There is great difficulty in constructing them. I think the amount of money that it will take to complete the submarines already authorized will be about \$15,000,000; but there are a great many difficulties about it which I can not take time now to explain. It takes a long time, and they hardly ever get them right, and there is the greatest difficulty about ever getting them constructed. They are working to solve these difficulties, and I say, as reasonable men, we ought not to waste any more money on them until they have solved the difficulties and given us some assurance that the money will result in the construction of good ships. That is one reason. Another reason is that the experts tell us that the submarine is a weapon of opportunity, and that 50 will do just as much good as 500. That is the testimony before our committee. You can not find in the hearing a single man that advocates a great number of submarines. Admiral Fletcher says, "I do not advise it; I would have a small increase," but he said a small number is just as good as a big number. Admiral Badger says—

Mr. BRITTEN. Right at that point.

Mr. WITHERSPOON. When I get through with the point. I have started to tell what was said. Do not interrupt me until I get through. He says that 50 will do just as well as 500. He says also that it is a weapon of opportunity. All it depends on is whether they can get close enough to a battleship, and he says that if 50 can not do it 500 can not do it; their value is not increased in proportion to the number like other ships. Admiral Badger was also questioned about that. He said, "Well, we think we ought to have a hundred instead of 64." I asked him if there was any reason by which he could tell why we ought to have 64 or 100, and he said, "No; I just said a hundred, but there is no more reason for having 100 than having 64."

Now, there is another thing about that that I want to call your attention to, a reason why we do not want to have any more. If we should have a war with Germany or with England or with any of these other nations, they could not bring their submarines over here to fight us; and we have already 59. I submit that 59 are enough to fight a nation that could not have any on its side.

Mr. BRITTEN. Right there, on that point, will the gentleman yield?

The CHAIRMAN. Does the gentleman yield?

Mr. WITHERSPOON. Yes; I yield.

Mr. BRITTEN. The gentleman refers to our having 59 submarines. Is it not a fact that we have only 6 modern submarines in commission to-day?

Mr. WITHERSPOON. Oh, no.

Mr. BRITTEN. Yes; it is a fact.

Mr. WITHERSPOON. You asked me a question.

Mr. BRITTEN. How many have we, then?

Mr. WITHERSPOON. Well, sit down, and I will tell you. [Laughter.] You asked a question, and you ought to allow me to answer it.

Mr. BRITTEN. If you answer the question I will sit down.
Mr. WITHERSPOON. Yes, sir. We have 59 submarines. That is the number we have, and the testimony shows that we have that many.

Now I will tell you about these submarines. The commander of the submarine flotilla tells all about them, and he said this, that they could go under their own power from 400 miles to 1,350 miles. That is to say, the smaller ones could go out 200 miles and come back; the others could go out 675 miles and come back again.

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from Mississippi has expired.

Mr. BATHRICK. Mr. Chairman, I have 20 minutes reserved for myself, and I yield 10 minutes of that time to the gentleman from Mississippi [Mr. WITHERSPOON].

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair can not recognize the gentleman from Ohio to control time under the agreement that was made. The Chair will recognize the gentleman from Tennessee [Mr. PADGETT] or the gentleman from Missouri [Mr. HENSLEY] or the gentleman from Pennsylvania [Mr. BUTLER].

Mr. BATHRICK. Then I yield 10 minutes of my time to the gentleman from Missouri, to give to the gentleman from Mississippi.

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from Ohio has no time to yield.

Mr. PADGETT. Mr. Chairman, I may state that I reserved 15 minutes for the gentleman from Ohio [Mr. BATHRICK], and if he desires I will yield 10 minutes of that time to the gentleman from Mississippi. [Applause.]

Mr. WITHERSPOON. I thank the gentlemen.

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from Mississippi is recognized for 10 minutes.

Mr. BARKLEY. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield to me for a question?

Mr. WITHERSPOON. Yes.

Mr. BARKLEY. Has any method been discovered whereby the submarine may be destroyed?

Mr. WITHERSPOON. Well, there was a test made the other day down here of a shell invented by Mr. Isham. I was not present; I was not able to go. But I understand that that test showed that he had invented a shell that would not ricochet and would go under the water when it struck the water, and would explode after it had gone under the water for a certain length of time. Now, if such a shell as that could be fired out of a battleship or a cruiser and should strike near the submarine, it would probably destroy it. But the trouble about that is this: Submarines are things that you can not see. They are the assassins of the sea. They go under the water, and they go up under a battleship and blow the bottom out of it before the battleship knows that it is anywhere near about. Here is the fact about it: The submarine can go under the water with its periscope just out, so that it can see everything itself, and in very smooth water the men on the battleship, if they happen to be looking right toward where it sticks the periscope up, may see it at a distance of 2, 3, or 4 miles. But if the weather is anyways rough and the sea foam is there, they can not see it more than a mile or two, and the submarine therefore has the power to get up close enough to the battleship to destroy it before it can be seen, and therefore the invention of that shell, in my judgment, would have very little effect upon the submarine.

Mr. BARKLEY. How close does the submarine have to get to the battleship before it sends its projectile forth to destroy it?

Mr. WITHERSPOON. That depends on the submarine. The oldest submarine can only shoot its torpedoes a thousand yards, if I remember, but the latest and best improved submarines are supposed to have a range of 4 or 5 miles. It depends on the power of the submarine.

Mr. BRITTEN. How many of those have we in commission, please?

Mr. WITHERSPOON. I do not know how many.

Mr. BRITTEN. Is it not a fact that we have only six of those in commission? I have the Navy Register right here before me.

Mr. WITHERSPOON. Excuse me now. I am going to answer you. You can not ask me a question and when I start to answer it, interrupt me.

Mr. BRITTEN. Pardon me.

Mr. WITHERSPOON. I do pardon you. It does not make any difference whether a thing is in commission or out of commission. If we have the ship we can put it in commission very quickly.

Mr. BRITTEN. Is it just as effective out of commission as it would be in commission?

Mr. WITHERSPOON. It is not out of commission and consequently it does not need to be put into commission.

Mr. DONOVAN. Mr. Chairman, a parliamentary inquiry.

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman will state it.

Mr. DONOVAN. The gentleman from Illinois [Mr. BRITTEN] has no right to interrupt a gentleman on this floor and interject remarks without his consent. It is a gross breach of the rules. The gentleman should address the Chair if he wants to take the floor. [Applause.]

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will be in order.

Mr. KELLEY of Michigan. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

The CHAIRMAN. Does the gentleman from Mississippi yield to the gentleman from Michigan?

Mr. WITHERSPOON. Yes; I yield.

Mr. KELLEY of Michigan. I would like to ask the gentleman just a word about the statement that the enemy could not bring his submarines to this country.

Mr. WITHERSPOON. Yes.

Mr. KELLEY of Michigan. As I remember, we have some 9 or 10 submarines in the Philippines, and my recollection is that those were carried there. What is the gentleman's recollection as to that? If they were carried there, why could not an enemy carry its submarines over here?

Mr. WITHERSPOON. Well, this is the fact about that: I do not think it makes any difference whether these submarines were carried to the Philippines by their own steam or whether they were carried on a battleship. They can go long distances, provided they can stop every 1,300 miles and get new supplies. That is the reason why they can not go any farther. Those submarines, I expect, went to Hawaii and stopped along the route wherever they could get supplies and supplied themselves. That is the way, as I understand that. But all the testimony before us is that neither Germany nor any other nation in the world could bring submarines over here to fight us except England, and she could only do it because she has a base of supplies at Halifax and at Bermuda. You remember that testimony. The others could not do it. That being true, I want to submit this argument: If we were to have a war with Germany, there would be on the German side her 40 battleships, her destroyers, and her cruisers, without any submarines. We would have on our side all of our battleships and cruisers and destroyers and monitors, plus our submarines. And the number of German ships that 59 submarines would destroy in that war would be no unimportant part. So, I think that ought to be considered in determining whether it is necessary to build any more ships in order to defend ourselves against foreign countries.

The whole question seems to me to reduce itself down to this, that we have now in our possession so many ships of all kinds that no nation on earth would dare to attack us, especially when we see that they have no disposition to do it, and it is not to their interest to do it.

A great deal is said against Germany because of her militarism. A great many people criticize that country on that ground. Have we more militarism in us than Germany has? Are we less peaceful than Germany is? If we are not, then we ought to be as good as Germany. Let us adopt the same policy that Germany adopts. Germany states her policy in her laws, and she says in that policy that it is not necessary to build a navy as big as that of any other nation in order to defend herself. She has never tried to build a navy as big as that of England, and she puts it on this ground: She says, "All we propose to do is to build a navy big enough so that any nation that might attack us would know that we would destroy so many of her ships that it would imperil her standing among the other nations as a naval power." That is the policy of Germany, expressed in her statutes. Why can we not be as good as she is? Why must we want the greatest Navy on earth? What is it? Is it barbarism? Is it the savage that is in us, or is it the profits that there are in building battleships? Tell me! [Applause.]

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman has expired.

Mr. BUTLER. I yield 25 minutes to the gentleman from Michigan [Mr. KELLEY].

Mr. KELLEY of Michigan. Mr. Chairman, this debate on the naval bill has been going on now for about four hours, and while I believe in the doctrine of concentration I think, perhaps, there is such a thing as carrying it a little too far; and so, on the general theory that any change is a rest, during the short time that I shall occupy I am going to discuss a matter entirely foreign to the question of the Navy.

Mr. Chairman, in a little more than 30 days the work of the Sixty-third Congress will be a matter of history and one-half of the administration of Woodrow Wilson will be over. Within 18 months from this time, and before the end of the first regular session of the Sixty-fourth Congress, the battle lines of the

next presidential election will be drawn and the people of the country will be getting ready to choose again between the Republican Party and the Democratic Party.

The work of this Congress will necessarily play an important part in the next election. It has been in session almost continuously for two years and has acted upon scores of propositions. The great mass of this legislation, however, will have but little bearing upon the fortunes of either party, because party issues were not raised by its enactment. The fact is, that upon many propositions there is substantial agreement between Republicans and Democrats. Upon many other questions there is disagreement among Republicans and a corresponding disagreement among Democrats, while only upon a very few questions is there drawn a clear-cut line of demarcation between the two parties. But in order for parties to exist there must be at least one well-defined, fundamental, outstanding difference between them. But what fundamental difference is there between the Democratic Party and the Republican Party? I do not desire to discuss psychological differences or differences in habits of thought between Republicans and Democrats. I simply wish to call attention to such practical differences as have been shown by the attitude of the two parties upon public questions in this Congress.

Running down through the middle of the House of Representatives is an aisle separating the Democrats from the Republicans and Progressives. Over on one side of the House, sitting together, are the 127 Republicans and 18 Progressives so thoroughly in accord on most propositions that it has never occurred to anyone that these two parties should be assigned different sections of the House. Over on the other side of the House are the 290 Democrats. (Too many altogether.) Why are these men on one side of the aisle Republicans and these on the other side of the aisle Democrats? Is it a difference in character? No. Is it a difference in patriotism? No. Is it a difference in love or sympathy for mankind? No. Is it a difference in faith in Republican institutions? No. What, then, is the meaning of this middle aisle? What economic, social, or moral question is responsible for its existence?

Let us briefly examine the attitude of Members of this House toward important questions which have been considered here during the past two years with a view of discovering, if we can, at least one sure, unvarying, reliable test of party fealty.

A short time ago the question of woman suffrage was before the House. It aroused Nation-wide interest and was ably debated by Representatives of all parties. It very soon developed, however, that there was a diversity of opinion in both parties upon the subject of woman suffrage. The roll call showed 83 Republicans and 86 Democrats in favor of it, and 34 Republicans and 170 Democrats against it. The question of woman suffrage, therefore, is not a party issue, and is not responsible for the existence of this middle aisle. A person might sit on either side of the aisle and be on either side of the question.

On another occasion recently the question of national prohibition was before the House. The debate very soon disclosed the fact that party lines would not be observed in the consideration of this great moral and economic question. The roll call showed 81 Republicans and 116 Democrats in favor of it, and 46 Republicans and 143 Democrats against it. And so the question of prohibition of the liquor traffic does not explain the existence of this middle aisle.

One of the great questions considered by this Congress is the matter of immigration. During the past few years a million aliens a year have been coming to our shores. Many thoughtful persons of all parties have come to the belief that we should restrict immigration. The Sixty-second Congress passed a bill with this object in view without regard to party lines. That bill was vetoed by a Republican President. This Congress passed a similar bill with a similar object in view. Again party lines were disregarded, and this bill has been vetoed by a Democratic President. And so the question of immigration is explain the existence of this middle aisle.

The doctrine of State rights was at one time regarded as a peculiarly Democratic doctrine. To-day, however, it is just as common to hear this doctrine invoked by Republicans as by Democrats against encroachment by the Federal Government on the rights of the State. And so the doctrine of State rights is in no sense a test of party fealty and is not responsible for this middle aisle.

The principle of Government ownership has had the attention of this Congress. We passed a bill here providing for the Government ownership and operation of a railroad in Alaska. This project had the indorsement of two administrations—one Republican and one Democratic—and party lines were disregarded in the passage of the bill. The President of

the United States is now urging Congress to put the Government into the business of transportation on the high seas, an experiment which would test to the uttermost the principle of Government ownership, even though other serious questions were not involved. When this proposition comes up it is certain that the Democratic Party at least will be divided upon it. And so the principle of Government ownership is not responsible for this middle aisle.

The most spectacular debate which has taken place in the House during the past two years was the debate on the question of free tolls for American ships passing through the Panama Canal. On this proposition the leaders of the Democratic Party were in open disagreement. The Speaker of the House and the leader of the majority held views opposite from those entertained by the President. The roll call showed 26 Republicans and 221 Democrats in favor of the repeal of free tolls, and 110 Republicans and 52 Democrats against it. If this question had been a test of party fealty, 26 Republicans would have had to cross over to the Democratic side and 52 Democrats, including the Speaker and the majority leader, would have had to come over on our side.

On the subject of national defense there is a diversity of opinion in each party. You will find Democrats and Republicans who believe we should have a larger Army and a more powerful Navy. You will find Democrats and Republicans who believe our Army and our Navy are entirely sufficient for our needs. You will find peace-at-any-price Democrats, and I dare say that you will also find peace-at-any-price Republicans. And so the question of national defense is not responsible for this middle aisle.

Mr. POWERS. I suggest to the gentleman that if he is not careful about what he says he is going to get all of us together directly.

Mr. KELLEY of Michigan. There will be enough there. [Laughter.] And so with a single exception I might review the attitude of Members of both parties toward the whole field of legislation, including legislation affecting the currency, conservation, and the trusts, without discovering any one safe or reliable test of party fealty.

What policy or principle of government, then, have we had under consideration here during the past two years big enough, vital enough, and fundamental enough to divide Congress and the country into two great political parties? I will tell you what it is. It is the old familiar doctrine of protection to American industry, a doctrine which in its 50 years of continuous application has lifted our country up out of the industrial lowlands to a commanding position among the nations of the earth.

Go over on the Democratic side and ask any Democrat, no matter what his views may be on other questions, "Are you in favor of the principle of protection?" and his answer will be "No." He will tell you that the Democratic Party is the traditional opponent of protection. He will tell you that Congress has no power to levy a tariff except for revenue. He will tell you that Congress has no power to levy a tariff to equalize wages and conditions here and abroad, or to encourage production or manufacture in the United States.

Go over on the Republican side and ask any Republican, no matter what his views may be on other subjects, "Are you in favor of the principle of protection?" and his answer will be "Yes." He will tell you that he is for protection because it is a matter of civilization and standards of living. He will tell you that we ought to build up here under the American flag a civilization higher than that of any other country in the world, and then we should protect that civilization against all cheaper and inferior civilizations elsewhere throughout the world. [Applause on the Republican side.]

But how can it be said that protection is a matter of civilization? Because, in the last analysis, it is largely a question of wages and conditions of employment. Wages and civilization are bound up together. Tell me the wages and conditions of employment of labor and I can paint in the balance of the picture of a nation's life. If you strike at wages, you strike at the home, and the home is the headwaters of the world's civilization. A reduction in income is always a serious matter for labor. It means less nutritious food and poorer clothing for the family. It means fewer books and less schooling for the children. It means a sacrifice of leisure and recreation. It means more of the grind and drudgery of life. It means smaller savings laid aside for a rainy day against sickness and adversity, which sooner or later are apt to cross the pathway of every human life.

And so any policy which protects the wages and the employment of the people against cheap competition, tending to drag men down to a lower plane of living, becomes vital to our civ-

ilization and is of sufficient importance to the Nation's life to become the chief article of faith in the creed of any political party. [Applause on the Republican side.]

The present leaders of the Democratic Party recognize that protection is the one great policy which divides Republicans from Democrats. Coming into power two years ago, for the first time in 16 years, the tariff was the first thing to claim their attention. The first blow struck by this administration was against protection. The first message of President Wilson to Congress was a plea to uproot the doctrine of protection from our social, industrial, and economic life, and in a few weeks thereafter the views of the President were enacted into law.

Conditions in the country two years ago were most favorable for trying out the theories of the President. The business of the country was never more forehanded than then. Industry was standing firmly and confidently on its feet. Even the prospects of a Democratic administration had lost some of its terrors because the promise had been made that no legitimate industry would be injured. Factories were all running full time. Labor was well employed at wages higher than had ever been paid before in the history of the country. The farmer had a ready market for everything he had to sell at prices higher than he had ever received before in times of peace. The savings banks of the country were full of money laid aside by the people for a rainy day. Our merchants and manufacturers and farmers had gone out beyond the seas in quest of a market for their surplus until our export trade had reached the enormous sum of \$2,500,000,000 per annum, or an increase of \$1,000,000,000 per annum over our exports of only 10 years before. [Applause on the Republican side.] And then, like sensible folks, we did not buy back from the world as much as we sold the world. Our imports during the last year under protection amounted to only \$1,800,000,000, leaving a balance of trade in our favor of approximately \$700,000,000 per annum, or an average of nearly \$60,000,000 per month. And our domestic commerce—the trade among ourselves, grown in volume beyond the power of the human mind to comprehend—reached the staggering total of \$35,000,000,000 per annum. That was the condition in which the Democratic Party found the country only two years ago.

How have we been getting along since that time? The new tariff law went into effect in October, 1913, and continued in uninterrupted operation until the beginning of the war in Europe, August 1, 1914. During those 10 months of its operation there was an increase in imports of more than \$100,000,000 over the corresponding months of the previous year under protection. The American people had to send into foreign countries to pay for goods formerly made at home \$100,000,000 more than during the corresponding 10 months of the year before. Not only did the American people lose this \$100,000,000 on account of increased imports, but they suffered a further loss of approximately \$160,000,000 during the same 10 months on account of a falling off in our exports. By buying more from the outside world and selling less we lost in trade the enormous sum of \$260,000,000 during the first 10 months of the operation of the Underwood tariff law. This readily explains why business began to halt and stagger almost everywhere throughout the country even before the commercial uncertainties incident to the war in Europe were introduced into the situation.

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from Michigan has expired.

Mr. BUTLER. I yield to the gentleman two minutes more.

Mr. KELLEY of Michigan. Since August 1, 1914, the Underwood tariff law has in effect been suspended by stress of war as to certain lines of trade. During the last five months imports have fallen off approximately \$125,000,000 as compared with the corresponding five months of last year. The heaviest falling off was for the month of December last, and amounted to approximately \$70,000,000. During the same five months there was also a falling off of exports, as compared with a year ago, of approximately \$243,000,000. Our exports, however, for the month of December last were practically normal in volume, being slightly in excess of the exports for December of last year and only about \$5,000,000 less than for December, 1912.

This heavy falling off of imports in December, coupled with the return of a normal volume of exports, has undoubtedly benefited many lines of trade in this country during the last few weeks. In a sense war has operated as a tariff to shut out imports, while at the same time war's demands for food and supplies have stimulated our exports. War, however, is a poor substitute for the tariff. Trade contingent upon the duration of a war is most hazardous and uncertain. Business, to be successful, must plan for the future. The manufacturer must be able to make contracts with the jobber for future delivery.

The wholesale house must be able to send out its traveling salesmen to make contracts for delivery many months later. Conditions in trade to-day are uncertain. Business men realize that the falling off of imports during the month of December to the extent of \$70,000,000 was due to the exigencies of war, and that when the war is over the stream of imports is again likely to flow to our shores. Under such circumstances it is but natural that business should go forward, feeling its way with hesitation and doubt. Under such circumstances merchants will contract only for immediate or early delivery and the business world will pursue a hand-to-mouth policy. Business men can not take advantage of present trade opportunities at home or abroad or go forward with confidence planning for the future, because no one can say how long the war in Europe will continue or how soon American business must meet destructive competition again from abroad.

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from Michigan has again expired.

Mr. BUTLER. I will yield to the gentleman from Michigan all the time he wishes, and take my chances on it, and the time may be charged up to me. [Applause on the Republican side.]

Mr. KELLEY of Michigan. If the industries of the United States were to-day protected by a tariff reasonable in its terms and certain in its operation, instead of being forced to rely upon the uncertain, temporary protection of a European war, how quickly would American business men seize upon present opportunities to retake our domestic markets and open up new lines of foreign trade. If business men could be assured at this time that they would not be subjected to ruinous competition from abroad when peace comes again, in my judgment, every wheel of industry in this country would begin to turn, and a new era of prosperity for the American people would be at hand.

I believe that the American people have fully determined to restore the policy of protection. In 1912, for the second time in more than half a century, the party of protection was retired from power. It was not because the American people preferred Democratic policies to Republican policies. It was not because there were more Democrats than Republicans in the country. The trouble in 1912 was that we Republicans tried to elect two Presidents at once. [Laughter.] Some of us voted for President Roosevelt and some of us voted for President Taft, and because we voted for both we elected neither. By dividing our forces in 1912 the policy of protection was temporarily supplanted by a Democratic tariff. Whenever our forces are united the policy of protection can be restored. The result of the last election, in which our party gained 60 seats in this House and nearly won a score of others, is a prophecy that the Republican Party, reunited and carrying the banner of protection as of old, will be speedily returned to power. Fifty years of achievement without a parallel in the history of mankind is our party's guaranty for the future. [Applause on the Republican side.]

In view of all that there is at stake for us and for our children, and for all mankind, to be charged as a party with the destinies of this mighty Republic is a sublime trust. Fully alive to the responsibilities which go with the leadership of a great people, let us upon return to power dedicate anew our party to all the high and holy purposes symbolized by the flag of the Republic itself. But what does our flag stand for? It stands for liberty under the law. There can be no such thing as liberty except through the orderly processes of the law. It stands for the rights of persons and the rights of property; it stands for popular rule, and in this it is our destiny to lead the way. It stands for universal education, because every wise person knows that free schools and free government go up and down in the scale together, and that you can not long continue to have one without the other. It stands for a Christian civilization, the best and the cleanest on the globe. It stands for the home and for all the virtues which thrive and cluster around the hearthstone. Standing for all these things, may the God of our fathers protect it and defend it, and may it ever continue to be the emblem of liberty and the banner of promise for all mankind. [Prolonged applause on the Republican side.]

Mr. BUTLER. Mr. Chairman, how much time did the gentleman from Michigan consume?

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman used 31 minutes.

Mr. HENSLEY. I yield 30 minutes to the gentleman from Texas [Mr. SLAYDEN].

Mr. SLAYDEN. Mr. Chairman, the comprehensive, learned, and well-reasoned address of the gentleman from Mississippi [Mr. WITHERSPOON], who is a member of the Committee on Naval Affairs and evidently a student of the operations of the Navy, and of the construction of the appropriation bills pertaining to it, has left little to be said by one who in the main stands with him as regards this question. I do differ from him—and I do it with a great deal of reluctance, because I have

such a high respect for him as a man and for his learning as a legislator—I do differ from him, however, in some minor details which I will undertake to express to the House. Before he closed his address he was interrupted by some one, I think by the gentleman from California [Mr. J. R. KNOWLAND], with a discussion of the late naval fight in the North Sea.

This gentleman asked some questions about how the German battleships which had been defeated got back to port. Since that question was asked I have had put in my hand a brief editorial which appeared in a New York paper yesterday afternoon, which so clearly and fully answers the gentleman's question and sheds such a light on other phases of this bill that I am going to read it:

Score one more for the submarine. The most interesting passage in Admiral Beatty's report reads thus—

Bear in mind that this is a report of a British admiral who commanded the fleet—

"The presence of the enemy's submarine subsequently necessitated the action being broken off."

The victorious fleet, in a moment of triumph, abandoned the field of battle and discontinued the fight where there was every prospect that it might go on and clinch its victory by absolutely destroying the fleet of the enemy. But what happened?

Thus the English commander records something undreamed of hitherto—that the mere presence of underwater boats compelled the sudden ending of a victorious fleet action by the most powerful battle cruisers yet produced. At the very moment when the complete destruction of his quarry was in sight, Admiral Beatty had to haul off and start for home—not because of the appearance of a great fleet of costly battleships, but because the enemy's submarines were at hand. This is the more remarkable because the British ships had their own destroyers and torpedo boats with them, which are reported to have given perfect protection to the fleet operating off the Belgian coast. More than that, the *Tiger*, like the *Lion*, was going at a terrific speed, making 28 or 29 knots; yet, as in the case of the *Hermes*, which was sunk by a German submarine when running at full speed, ability to go fast was not, in Admiral Beatty's mind, sufficient defense, despite the fact that he had once successfully dodged submarines. All of this must send the submarine's stock way up above par, if it has become so formidable as to be a deciding factor in a fleet action, without having even scored a hit. Plainly the surviving German cruisers owe their safety to-day to their underwater comrades.

Mr. Chairman, my text for the speech which by the courtesy of the committee I am allowed to make will be chiefly on the unparalleled conservatism of the United States Navy. In these days of radicalism and what masquerades as reform, and which, when you strip the mask from it, is socialism pure and simple, we ought, I suppose, to welcome conservatism when we can find it in an important body of men like the naval bureaus. But, Mr. Chairman, there is such a thing as an excess of virtue in some cases. And it is to that particular phase of the United States Navy that I shall address myself.

Mr. Chairman, the citizen of the United States or the mere Member of either House of Congress who has the temerity to hold and express an opinion contrary to that of their masters, the bureaus, on the question of national defense invites and un-faillingly receives contumely. Although he may believe himself to be a patriotic citizen, although he may be endeavoring to the best of his ability to serve his country and the constituency which sent him here, he becomes immediately the target for what are meant to be offensive epithets when he has the audacity to do his own thinking.

I know of no American in public or private life who wants to see his country inadequately defended. I know of none who is willing to take a chance of having his country invaded or overrun by any enemy, even the strongest and most aggressive. But is it not a pity, sir, that in the discussion of this question of the national defense epithets can not be dispensed with and real arguments, dictated by calm judgment and supported by sound reasons, substituted?

To call the man who does not believe that an excessive share of the people's contributions to the Government shall be wasted in the support of a needlessly large army and a huge navy a "little American" is not an argument. It is sound and fury from the foolish or insincere pleading by the representatives of those who grow rich in war traffic. I even refuse to feel insulted when such epithets are hurled at me, as they have been. I merely feel sorry for infatuated jingoes, drunk with the war spirit, who resort to such methods and who really seem to believe that they are reasoning.

In voicing my opposition to some features of the naval bill as reported by the committee I shall try in a courteous way and in perfect sincerity to give reasons for my position.

Let me state that position in a sentence. I believe that the committee has advised the appropriation of too much money for obsolete weapons and too little for the greatest ever devised by the wit of man. Recent and current events sustain that view. Battleships are helpless in the presence of submarines

and in terror if their presence is suspected. They are secure only when locked up in well-protected harbors. That is not merely my opinion; it is the logic of events. The committee and the bureaus seem not to have been impressed by facts of recent occurrence. Why are these two bodies so conservative, so ultra-conservative, one may say?

Lately I have been looking into the history of the United States Navy. My investigation has been altogether too casual and superficial for the importance and interest of the subject. But, casual and superficial as it has been, I have learned, for instance, that the American Navy is probably the most conservative body on our continent. Men of my age are usually conservative, but the Navy excels in that particular virtue, as is clearly shown by some of its own historians. History overflows with evidence that the disinclination to employ newer and improved methods of defense has characterized it for a hundred years. It was daring and brilliant in its achievements during the War of 1812, but immediately thereafter it appears to have become the victim of paralysis, mental and physical, and has not yet entirely recovered.

What can be the reason for this peculiar conduct on the part of a body which contains so many men of daring and talent? The only reason I can think of is bureaucracy, always and everywhere dangerous alike to liberty and progress.

The classic example of a purely bureaucratic government is—or, at least, was until the recent revolution which established a Republic—China. For thousands of years the Government of China was in all of its departments and branches thoroughly bureaucratized. Its civilization was stereotyped, its institutions petrified, and every improvement proposed was stoutly resisted and usually defeated. All the activities of government flowed in bureaucratic channels hoary with age, and to propose an improvement was to incur the penalties of treason.

Prior to her great revolution the institutions of France had broken down. There was no outlet for the aspirations, the energy, and the activities of a highly intellectual people. To propose and advocate any improvement or any change, however slight, in the administration of affairs met as its reception the galley, the Bastille, or the block. In intellectual despair, in wide-wasting economic ruin, the French people rose in revolt against this desperate tyranny, and through seas of blood they struggled to emancipate themselves from the dead past, and in the new world of thought, of action, and government became a great, free, progressive nation and the instructor of the world. The bureaus and special privilege were drowned in an ocean of blood.

It was reasonable to suppose that the United States, a new Nation in a New World, untrammelled by foolish traditions, would in the conduct of its Government have lent an eager ear to the suggestion of needed improvements and would have reformed its processes of administration as exigencies and occasions demanded. Not so, however. They also fell under the spell and influence of the bureaus.

Even Congress, acting presumably on the advice of military bureaus, has not been altogether free from excessive conservatism, for until recently every able-bodied citizen of the United States between the ages of 18 and 45 was enrolled in the militia. After his enrollment, until 1903, it was, if I may go to the statutes for an illustration, expressly required by law that every militiaman should be constantly provided with a good musket or firelock of a bore sufficient for balls of the eighteenth part of a pound, two spare flints, a pouch, and a powder horn. See Federal Statutes, volume 4 page 891, section 1628. These muskets, powder horn, pouches, and so forth, were required by the act of Congress of May 8, 1792, and this act was unchanged until after the Spanish War, and not then until 1903.

However, the most bureaucratic department of our Government is the Navy. During both terms of President Washington's administration there was no Navy Department and no Secretary of the Navy; but during its whole existence since the Navy Department seems to have been controlled and dominated, effectively and absolutely, by bureau and naval officers. During the whole of its existence the bureaucrats in charge have steadily, and generally successfully, resisted all improvements until they were forced to adopt them by an aroused public opinion.

The first great revolution in water transportation was the discovery and invention of steam navigation, and how slow and how reluctant the Navy was to adopt this very evident improvement I will try to show you.

STEAM POWER RELUCTANTLY ACCEPTED.

In 1787 John Fitch launched the first steamboat in the United States and made regular trips on it from Philadelphia

to Trenton, N. J., Wilmington, Del., and other points in neighboring States. In the Library of Congress there are newspaper files that carry advertisements of his boat with a fixed steaming schedule.

Robert Fulton launched the *Clermont* on the Hudson River in 1807. His venture was brilliantly successful, and in our commercial navy steam rapidly superseded oar and sail. Steamboats made regular trips on many of our lakes and rivers immediately after Fulton's successful cruise with the *Clermont*. It was surely to have been expected that as steam was successfully used as a means of navigation in the commercial marine of the Nation our Navy experts would eagerly avail themselves of such an epoch-making invention for the Navy. Five years after Fulton had propelled vessels by steam and steamboats were in constant use on our lakes and rivers, the War of 1812 was declared. But during that entire war until late in 1813 no effort was made by the Navy to use steam as a means of navigation.

In that year Fulton designed the first vessel of war which was to be propelled by steam alone. He laid his plans before President Madison, who eagerly and enthusiastically indorsed them. Subsequently, in March, 1814, they were accepted by Congress. This steam war vessel was immediately built by the direction of Congress. The vessel was given the curious classic name, *Demos-Logos*. It was popularly known, however, by the name of the inventor as the *Fulton*. When the *Fulton* was completed in May, 1815, she was assigned to the command of Capt. David Porter, who had just returned from his unfortunate cruise with the *Essex*. The original plan of the *Fulton* was to rely upon steam alone for propulsion. Its commander, Capt. Porter, however, could not forget his previous training and experience on sailing vessels. True to the traditions of his profession, he had no confidence in steam as a motive power. As soon as he assumed charge he caused two large masts to be erected, and he had the sides of the vessel, ordinarily stop flush at the spar deck, carried up to form-protecting bulwarks for the sailors who might be on deck attending to the sails and rigging that had been added by order of Capt. Porter.

On her trial trip the *Fulton* steamed out from New York Harbor 50 miles and back. No use whatever was made of either oar or sail on the trial trip.

Then and there it was demonstrated to everybody save the Navy experts that steam was a successful means of navigation of boats of any size then known and that it had every advantage over the oar and sail.

Before the *Fulton* was finished her inventor died, and peace was declared between Great Britain and the United States. The head of the Navy at that time, on the advice of his cabinet of bureau officers, did not attempt to utilize this great invention of Fulton's, but ordered her to be laid up as a receiving ship at the Brooklyn Navy Yard, where she remained as such from June, 1815, to March, 1829. She was afterwards blown up and destroyed in an explosion. Thus ended the first steam vessel in the American Navy.

The next steamer to appear in our Navy was the *Seagull*. This vessel was used as a dispatch boat in Porter's mosquito fleet. She was laid up in 1825 at Philadelphia, where she remained until 1840, when she was sold for \$4,750.

Bennett says in his Steam Navy of the United States that after the *Seagull* was laid up there was no mention of steam in the literature of the Navy for 10 years.

From 1825 to 1835 no effort was made to use steam in propelling vessels in the United States Navy. During all these years there were about 700 steam vessels in use in the commercial navy of the United States, owned and conducted by citizens, on the rivers and lakes of the United States, and several coast-wise steamers and steamship lines had been established and were running successfully and prosperously.

It is not desirable to pursue further this sickening history of hidebound inefficiency, blind conservatism, and disastrous incompetency at that period of our naval history. The bureaus were in absolute control. Mr. Bennett, in discussing the failure of the naval officers to avail themselves of Fulton's invention of steam navigation, after lamenting their refusal to utilize it, says that had it been employed it would have changed the naval architecture of the world, and would not only have changed the naval architecture, but would also have changed the methods of naval warfare. He further says:

Steam, instead of being afterwards obliged to fight its way inch by inch and foot by foot, compelled to struggle against every obstacle and every objection which jealousy, conservatism, and ignorance could bar against its progress, slowly and painfully forcing an unwilling and qualified recognition from the very element that should have championed its cause, would have appeared in the arena fully armed and equipped from the brain of its master and would have been hailed not only as an auxiliary but as an all-important arm in naval warfare.

This blind obstinacy and conservatism of the naval officers generally has been graphically summed up and described by Prof. James Russell Soley in an article called "The Union and Confederate Navies, battles, and leaders of the Civil War," pages 611 to 631. He says:

The consciousness of ignorance in some men begets modesty, but it seldom has this effect upon the older members of a military hierarchy. Obedience to the orders of a superior is, of course, the essence of military discipline, without which it could not exist, and rank is the primary source of authority. But a system which combines reliance upon rank as the sole source of authority and reliance upon age as the sole qualification for rank contains essential elements of weakness. Its tendency is to make the seniors grow less capable and more despotic, while the juniors gradually lose all sense of responsibility and all power of initiative, and when they at last reach a position of command their faculties have become paralyzed from long disuse. Especially is this the case in a long period of peace, such as followed the War of 1812, and lasted, with only a brief intermission, until 1861. During this time the Navy was always grasping at the shadow and losing the substance. * * * The fatal defects of the system were not noticed until 1861, when the crisis came and the service was unprepared to meet it; and to this cause was largely due the feebleness of naval operations during the first year of the war.

The next great revolution in naval warfare was the invention of ironclad warships of the *Monitor* and *Merrimac* types. Of course, this invention was frowned upon by the bureau chiefs of the Navy Department. It was a new invention, and the old and venerable cry of "experiment" was urged against their construction, and yet the present dreadnaught is but a modification of the *Monitor*. Long after France and England had constructed and had in commission warships incased in iron armor not a step had been taken by our Navy. As Prof. Soley states:

The advantages of a light armor plating for vessels of war had been demonstrated by the experience of the French floating batteries *Destruction*, *Lave*, and *Tonnante* in the attack on Kinburn in 1855 during the Crimean War. These vessels were protected by 4½-inch plates, and the experiment had been deemed so conclusive that both France and England had already constructed new warships incased in armor. It was to be expected that a navy with a war on its hands would have directed its attention from the first moment when it was convinced of the probability of hostilities to securing some of these formidable vessels; and if a hesitation due to the want of statutory authority had led the department to defer building until after Congress met it would at least by that time have digested its plans so thoroughly that the work could begin at once. Nevertheless, for four months after Mr. Welles entered upon his office no steps were taken, even of the most elementary character, toward procuring ironclads.

When the *Merrimac* steamed out of Norfolk Harbor and destroyed the *Cumberland* and *Congress* and disabled the *Roanoke* wooden navies were made obsolete. Would it be believed that after this conclusive demonstration of the worthlessness of wooden vessels in naval warfare that they were built all during the Civil War under the advice of our naval experts, and that they continued to be built even after the Civil War was ended? Prof. Soley says, on page 615, as cited above:

The vessels purchased by the department during the war amounted to 418, and included every variety of merchantman and river steamer roughly adapted to the navy yard for war service. Three types of wooden vessels were built—14 screw sloops of the *Kearsarge*, *Shenandoah*, and *Ossipee* classes; 23 screw gunboats; and 47 side-wheel steamers, known as "double-enders," for service in narrow channels where they could move ahead or astern without turning.

It seems that the board which was appointed on the 6th of August, 1861, to pass upon the advisability of the United States constructing ironclads in effect damned the project. In their report they said:

Opinions differ amongst naval and scientific men as to the policy of adopting the iron armature for ships of war. For coast and harbor defense they are undoubtedly formidable adjuncts to fortifications on land. As cruising vessels, however, we are skeptical as to their advantages and ultimate adoption. But whilst other nations are endeavoring to perfect them we must not remain idle. * * * We, however, do not hesitate to express the opinion, notwithstanding all we have heard or seen written on the subject, that no ship or floating battery, however heavily she may be plated, can cope successfully with a properly constructed fortification of masonry. The officers on this board were Commodores Smith and Paulding and Commander Davis.

It can almost be said that, without exception, every new and effective invention of a war vessel in the history of the Navy of the United States has been the result of an act of Congress demanding that the "experiment" be tried. Three iron-plated floating batteries had been used by the French in the Crimean War in 1855. A joint resolution of Congress, June 24, 1861, directed the Secretary of the Navy to appoint a board to examine the Stevens ironclad floating battery, ascertain the cost and time necessary for its completion and the expediency thereof. This board was composed of the elite of the old wooden navy. It examined the Stevens battery and did not make a report until the end of the year 1861. This report was, of course, adverse to the completion, and, so far as the Government was concerned, the project was dropped.

Ericsson was reluctantly granted a contract. This contract was very rigid in its terms. It provided that the *Monitor* should be built, and when completed should be tested under the direc-

tion of the Navy authorities, and that 25 per cent was to be withheld from each payment until after the completion and satisfactory trial of the vessel. A clause of the contract provided that in case the vessel did not develop the stipulated speed or failed in other stated requirements the contractors should refund to the United States the full amount of the money paid them. This contract contained another clause which illustrates very strikingly the ingrained habit of naval experts to cling to the dead past. The contract made with Ericsson required him to furnish on the ironclad, as a part of its construction, masts, spars, sails, and rigging of sufficient dimensions to drive the vessel at the rate of 6 knots per hour in a fair breeze or wind.

It may not be generally known that when Mr. Bushnell, a friend of Ericsson's, presented the model of the *Monitor*, which had been prepared by Ericsson, to the board composed of Commodore Smith and Paulding and Commander Davis, they grew merry over it and told him that they would vote for a trial of the design if he could get Commander Davis to vote for it. Commander Davis, when appealed to by Mr. Bushnell, told him to take the little thing home and worship it, as it would not be idolatry, because it was in the image of nothing in the heaven above or the earth beneath or in the waters under the earth. Long after the *Monitor* was under way Ericsson examined the contract and stated that if he had known of its terms he would never have completed it. Had he not done so, the *Merrimac* would have pursued its career unchecked, would have destroyed the blockade of the southern ports, and by the destruction of the wooden navy it is safe to say the Confederate States would have established their independence.

The *Monitor* was built very rapidly after the contract had been signed, but, says Prof. Soley:

It must be remembered that the Navy Department had possessed from the beginning five frigates, sister ships of the *Merrimac*, any one of which could have been armored more efficiently than she was in half the time and with half the money, and without waiting for congressional action. Evidently the department little imagined while it was dallying for six months with the question of ironclads that the first 24 hours of the *Monitor's* career would be so big with fate.

While Ericsson was constructing the *Monitor* he was constantly annoyed by Commodore Joseph Smith, Chief of the Bureau of Yards and Docks, with angry criticisms of details. On September 25, 1861, he wrote Ericsson as follows:

I am in great trouble from what I have recently learned, that the concussion in the turret will be so great that men can not remain in it and work the guns after a few fires with shot. I presume you understand the subject better than I do.

He certainly did.

Again, on October 11:

I understand that computations have been made by expert naval architects of the displacement of your vessel, and the result arrived at is that she will not float with the load you propose to put upon her, and if she would she could not stand upright for want of stability, nor attain a speed of 4 knots.

All the world knows now that she did float.

He wrote on October 15:

I have been urging the Ordnance Department to furnish the guns for your vessel, but the knowing ones say that the guns will never be used on her.

In a heavy sea—

He wrote again, October 17—

one side of the battery will rise out of the water or the sea recede from it, and the wooden vessel underneath will strike the water with such force when it comes down or rolls back as to knock the people on board off their feet.

Admiral Farragut, if I read history correctly, never commanded an ironclad vessel during the Civil War or after it. Like all the old officers of the Navy, he damned ironclads as well as torpedoes. When he captured New Orleans in 1862 he commanded a wooden vessel, which was nearly destroyed by a fire raft. At the battle in Mobile Bay in 1864 his flagship was also a wooden vessel.

Admiral Dupont, after the failure of the attack on Charleston, S. C., in 1863, in his report of his operation expressed a decided opinion that monitors and ironclads as vessels of war were failures. See Bennett, pages 403 to 404. In December, 1863, the admirals of our Navy were called upon officially by Secretary Wells to report their opinions as to the efficiency of ironclads.

In the light of subsequent developments, indeed, it was curious, in view of what had already happened, that high officers of the Navy could have been found to report against the efficiency of ironclad vessels. Let it be remembered that an historic engagement at Hampton Roads in March, 1862, had already been fought. The epochal contest between the *Merrimac* and *Monitor* had been in history nearly 21 months when an official opinion as to the value of ironclads was asked and given, and the report of Rear Admiral Goldsborough, made in 1864, was anything but favorable.

In Bennett's Steam Navy of the United States, from which I have derived much information and from which I have freely quoted, is also found the statement that the naval bureaus were not in sympathy with the efforts to get vessels of great speed. In view of the now generally recognized value of speed in vessels of war the statement of the author taxes one's credulity. But let me quote him again:

The importance of speed as a factor in naval warfare, although demonstrated by many events of the Civil War, was disputed, or at least not admitted, as soon as that war was over, and the element that disparaged the *Wampanoag* type of war vessel by referring to them as "engine carriers" and "runaways" succeeded so well in checking naval development in this direction that it was more than 21 years after the triumph of the *Wampanoag* before her speed was again reached in our Navy, the first vessel to equal it being the steel cruiser *Charleston* on the occasion of her four hours' trial trip in smooth water in September, 1889. The British, more progressive and less hidebound in naval matters than ourselves, arrived at the speed of the *Wampanoag* in their navy in 1879 with the large dispatch vessels *Iris* and *Mercury*.

To show how reluctant the Navy was to surrender the wind as a motive power is shown in an order made as late as June 11, 1869, which directed that "hereafter all vessels of the Navy will be fitted with full sail power. The exceptions to this will be tugs and dispatch vessels not fitted with sails. Commanders of squadrons will direct that constant exercises shall take place with sails and spars." A long list of exercises with sails was prescribed.

However, Mr. Chairman, steam did win in the contest with sails and the picturesque old wooden ship, so hallowed by the memories of Van Tromp, Drake, Nelson, Paul Jones, Decatur, and Perry, surrendered to the ironclad. A thing of beauty and grace was displaced by an ugly mass of iron propelled by steam. About these modern creations McAndrews' Hymn is the only bit of literature I recall, and that, beautiful as it is, hardly fills the void in song and romance made by the disappearance of the full-rigged ship.

To the monitor and fast cruisers that were the early development of the ironclad vessels succeeded the battleship. The battleship was succeeded by the dreadnaught, which, in turn, was followed by the superdreadnaught. This change has tremendously increased the cost of the Navy. To construct a dreadnaught of the *Pennsylvania* type costs \$15,000,000—more often it costs \$16,000,000.

And here I will remark that the clause in every naval act passed in recent years which provides for the construction and fitting out of a superdreadnaught is, in my opinion, purposely misleading. This clause reads: "For hull and machinery, \$6,000,000 or \$7,000,000." Nothing is said in it about the cost of armor and armament, which usually amounts to much more than that of the "hull and machinery." To ascertain the cost of armor and armament of a superdreadnaught one must resort to lump-sum appropriations and dig it out after painful efforts. In popular opinion, it only costs six or seven million dollars to construct and fit out a superdreadnaught, when, in fact, it costs more than twice that sum.

In passing I will say, Mr. Chairman, that this is an evil in the methods of the Committee on Naval Affairs which should be corrected, even if an act of Congress is necessary to secure the reform. That committee should deal frankly with the House and the country.

Mr. PADGETT. Will the gentleman yield?

Mr. SLAYDEN. Yes.

Mr. PADGETT. Every appropriation bill contains the language that the cost, exclusive of armor and armament, is not to exceed, as in the last bill, \$7,800,000 each, as it does expressly call attention to the cost of a vessel.

Mr. HOBSON. Will the gentleman yield?

Mr. SLAYDEN. No; I can not; for my time is short.

Mr. HOBSON. I simply wanted to call the gentleman's attention to one thing.

Mr. SLAYDEN. What is it.

Mr. HOBSON. It is simply in the next paragraph in each bill the gentleman will see that there is an appropriation for armor and armament, and of course that completes the appropriation for the vessel.

Mr. SLAYDEN. But nowhere does the bill say what a superdreadnaught shall cost. It says so much excluding armor and armament, but it does not state it so that the man in the street may know approximately the cost of a battleship.

THE COMING OF THE SUBMARINE.

Following the battleship and, in the opinion of many people, destined to drive it off the seas is the submarine.

It has not only brought terror to the commanders of great battleships but it has also disturbed swivel-chair sailors who sit in administration buildings and see danger ahead for their pet project of majestic and expensive dreadnaughts.

Maybe they do not feel as discouraged as Decatur did when he first appreciated the fact that steam had to be accepted by the Navy, but they are not happy at the outlook.

Capt. Mahan tells a story of Decatur, when he was present at an early experiment in steam navigation.

"Crude as the appliances still were, demonstration was conclusive; and Decatur, whatever his prejudices, was open to conviction. 'Yes,' he said, gloomily, to King, 'it is the end of our business; hereafter any man who can boil a teakettle will be as good as the best of us.'"

In anticipation of this legislation and to develop hostility to the purchase of a reasonable number of submarines, certain naval experts and their journalistic fuglemen have already said that it is to be feared that uninformed Members of Congress, victims of the spectacular work of the submarine, may seek to substitute them for dreadnaughts.

If they are wise that is exactly what Members of Congress will do, and I half suspect that the greatest naval power in the world, measured in terms of dreadnaughts, would agree with them. Everybody will admit, I suppose, that if England had had three submarines in the North Sea on a certain day instead of the three cruisers, *The Hague*, *Cressy*, and *Aboukir*, she would have more live sailors to-day and less humiliation.

The submarine has literally fought its way to recognition. It has won its rank as a fighting machine on its achievements.

The idea of a subsurface boat is not new.

Admiral Melville says that—

A submarine craft was experimented with at Toledo, Spain, nearly 400 years ago, and it is possible that submarine navigation was seriously attempted even earlier.

The French are said to have had one in the last decade of the eighteenth century. It first demonstrated its destructive force during the Civil War, and was the work of the Confederates. The Confederate States had no navy worth mentioning. Its naval officers, in the absence of other employment, designed submarine torpedo boats. In February, 1864, a Confederate "David" approached the sloop-of-war *Housatonic*, lying on the outer blockade of Charleston, and exploded a torpedo under her which sank her. In fact, it may be also said that the development of the torpedo as an engine of destruction in war was the work of the Confederates.

The modern submarine is the invention of J. P. Holland, a civilian and a resident of New Jersey. The present efficiency of submarine craft appears to be the direct result of that invention of Mr. Holland. When he presented it to the Government for inspection and adoption it was sneered at and ridiculed by officers in the Navy. There were a few eminent exceptions, however, for Admiral Hichborn and others immediately saw that a revolution had been made in naval warfare.

On the other hand, Admiral O'Neill and other naval officers are reported to have commented most unfavorably on the submarine as an engine of war. Its terrible effectiveness, so recently and conclusively demonstrated, is a complete answer to such critics.

But American officers have not been the only skeptics. The present high admiral of the German Navy, in March, 1901, pronounced against them, and Carl Busley, a German naval expert, once published a monograph on the subject, in which he poured out unstinted ridicule on the submarine. High Admiral von Tirpitz has changed his mind, and so no doubt has Mr. Busley.

In 1910 Blackwood's Edinburgh Magazine published a contribution from Col. A. Court Repington, a British staff officer, on "The submarine menace." It is usually very dangerous to essay the rôle of prophet, but Col. Repington did so nearly five years ago, and events have justified him. Let me quote him:

I think—

He says—

that the North Sea falls within the category of narrow waters which eventually must, by a process of evolution which is taking place under our eyes—that is to say, by the invention or development of the air-ship, the submarine, the torpedo, and the mine—become practically closed on the outbreak of war, and possibly throughout the war, to the operations of seagoing fleets and cruisers.

Col. Repington was right. The North Sea has been virtually closed to the operations of seagoing fleets. To save her's, Germany keeps them immured within her own harbors. To save her's, after a few disastrous ventures, England keeps them in her own waters.

But hear Col. Repington again:

I think that the great ships to which we devote so much money every year * * * will, within a limited period of time, become useless for most operations of which the North Sea or the channel will be the theater.

Col. Repington, in the same article, spoke of the possibility of a superdreadnaught which costs from two to two and a half

millions sterling, or, say, \$12,500,000, with its load of a thousand men, being sunk by an invisible submarine which costs only \$300,000 to \$400,000. That also has happened.

The author directed attention to the fact that improvements in the controlling mechanism of the torpedo has given it astonishing accuracy, and that it can compete with a gun at the medium fighting range and deliver a far more deadly blow.

But let me give you Col. Repington's own words on another point. I like to quote these military experts because the words of the "uninformed" Member of Congress may have no weight, even when supported by such tragedies as those of the North Sea and the English Channel.

He says:

Combined with the submarine the new torpedo becomes a weapon of deadly menace, while the submarine herself—worst of all for battleship and cruiser—has not yet found her naval destroyer, nor is open, except accidentally and by chance, to any known form of attack by ships in fair and normal fighting circumstances.

I express my own opinion, not Col. Repington's, when I say that sneaking up on the enemy while submerged and invisible is about as fair as any feature of war on land or sea.

Our colonel hardly knew, I fancy, how prophetically he spoke when he said:

I think that Germany realizes the value of the submarine and will soon astonish us by her productive capacity in this type.

Germany has shown marvelous productive capacity, and operative capacity as well.

Again, he says:

It is time for us to recognize that the North Sea in time of war will be, if it is not now, no place for a seagoing fleet. Swarms of submarines and destroyers * * * will infest this sea and the existence of every great ship which ventures into the area controlled by these pests, which are almost unassailable by naval means, will be most precarious.

Now, listen to what he says:

Our great and costly battleships and cruisers must be stowed away safely in some distant, safe, and secluded anchorage. Britannia may rule the waves, but who will rule above and below them?

Our author, who seems to be an unusually clear-headed man and also endowed, as events have proved, with a rare gift of prophecy, says that "battle fleets will have to keep out of harm's way and leave flotillas to carry on the war."

They have tried to keep out of harm's way, but have not been entirely able to do so. The fate of the English men-of-war in the North Sea and the Channel and of the Turkish men-of-war inside the Dardanelles, and protected by many mines, warns the commanders of vessels in a way they can not afford to ignore.

Col. Repington says frankly that nothing the English can do by naval means will prevent German submarines putting to sea when they please. Of course the submarines of other countries, if equally enterprising, can also go to sea when they please.

Mr. Chairman, the submarine has taken the place of the dreadnaught as a sea terror. When a flotilla of submarines is operating, the particular sea in which they operate has no place for great battleships. This, of course, is contested by the great firms which have huge and expensive plants for the building of dreadnaughts. Very naturally they fight the inevitable change, for it means the disappearance or lessening of dividends. But its realization and acceptance means success to the countries that employ the latest and most marvelous development in naval architecture. It has been said—and I think it has been shown that—

The submarine can observe, attack, and sink a dreadnaught while she can neither observe, attack, nor sink, except by accident, the submarine.

I have quoted this frank-speaking Englishman at length. Now, let me return to an American authority, Admiral Melville, who says:

If the boat—

He was speaking of the Holland submarine—

has military or strategic value, we should change our policy of construction. Nothing could justify the building of so many battleships if the submarine possesses even a portion of the advantages that their advocates claim.

Who will now deny that it has military and strategic value?

He further says:

In the indifference of naval officers to this question there is great danger. The boats are either valuable or they are worthless for military purposes. From the time that the Senate and House Naval Committees look with favor upon these boats there will be a decrease in the construction of battleships, and the action of Congress in striking out of the naval appropriation bill of 1901 all authorization for battleships and cruisers can certainly in part be traced to the belief that the submarine possesses many of the qualities claimed by its advocates.

If Admiral Melville had known of the present Naval Committees of the two Houses, he would not have been alarmed, because they are usually the last to get an impression aside from that which is sent to them from the department.

And it may be said in passing that Congress still seems inclined to do its own thinking—sometimes, at least.

Yet Admiral Melville did not send forth his note of warning in vain. From that time down to the present the submarine has been fought by the great majority of the officers of the Navy at every session of Congress. Twenty years ago the *Holland* was denounced as an experiment. Long after the submarine had been successfully demonstrated in our Navy, under the mandatory provisions of Congress and following the success of this American type in foreign navies, our own Navy Department in its annual recommendations gave this type of vessel only perfunctory recognition and grudging recommendation. We find, for instance, in the report of Secretary Moody in 1902 that he asked for two submarines; in his report in 1903 Paul Morton did not ask for any. Secretary Bonaparte, in the first year of his administration asked for two submarines; in the second year, none. Secretary Metcalf asked for four submarines during each year of his term. Secretary Meyer, 1909, did not recommend any; in his second year he recommended two; in his third year he did not ask for any. This will show the Navy Department's attitude toward this epoch-making invention. In other words, had the submarine depended upon departmental recognition we should probably have had at this time—instead of 51 built and building—about 10. To show that our naval officers instinctively fear and distrust the submarine and realize that it means the doom of the battleship, reference may be made to the fact that every time a battleship is torpedoed by a submarine during the present war our naval officers are quick in their endeavor to "save the face" of the dreadnaught, and they invariably put down the catastrophe to a floating mine. After the cable dispatches prove conclusively that the disaster was due to a torpedo fired by a submarine they grudgingly admit the fact, but apologize for the incident by calling it a lucky shot, and persist in their opinion that the submarine is still an "experiment."

In the Navy, now presided over by that rare old salt from Tar River, N. C., Josephus Daniels, the submarine is still denounced as an "experiment." Future historians of our Navy will discover that as late as the year 1914, and in the month of December, the Secretary of the Navy, supported by his aid for matériel, Capt. Winterhalter, and by two of his admirals, denounced submarines as an "experiment." If the horrible war which now devastates the earth has taught one naval lesson, it is that the battleship, the dreadnaught, and the superdreadnaught are the certain and legitimate prey of the submarine.

To decry the submarine as an experiment seems a bit absurd in the light of current events. Are we not justified in declaring that dreadnaughts and superdreadnaughts are experiments? Have they ever been tried out in any war? The British battleships *Bulwark*, the *Audacious*, the *Formidable*, and four large British cruisers—the *Aboukir*, *Cressy*, *Hogue*, and *Hawke*—as a result of submarine attacks now rest on the bottom of the ocean. Only a few days ago we read how a British submarine dived under the mines placed in the Dardanelles and sunk the Turkish battleship *Messudieh*. As a result so far of the experiment of dreadnaughts and superdreadnaughts all of them that have ever been encountered by submarines have been sunk. The events of the past few months demand that on humanitarian grounds, if on no other, the advisability of building great battleships each calling for not less than 1,000 officers and men to operate them should be seriously weighed. Due to the torpedoing by submarines the following is the partial death roll up to date of big ships alone:

	Officers and men.
British battleship <i>Bulwark</i>	700
British battleship <i>Formidable</i>	600
British cruisers <i>Aboukir</i> , <i>Cressy</i> , <i>Hogue</i> , and <i>Hawke</i>	1,653
Total.....	2,953

In December, 1913, Admiral Sir Percy Scott, one of the most famous naval experts of the world, and having specialized with great success in gunnery, wrote a remarkable letter to a friend, which for some reason never saw the light of day until June 14, 1914. In that letter, which I will not stop to read in full, but ask to have published as a part of these remarks, he stated that a battleship's occupation was gone, that the naval warfare of the future would be dominated by aeroplanes and by submarines. Every prediction he made in regard to the submarines has been more than fulfilled, and aeroplanes have proven to be of tremendous importance. Submarines have sunk every battleship that they have attacked. Admiral Scott said, among other things:

If we ever go to war with a country that is within striking distance of submarines, I am of the opinion that that country will at once lock up its dreadnaughts in some safe harbor.

This is precisely what Great Britain has had to do and is now doing with her dreadnaughts in the present war. Sir Percy Scott predicted that in any future war there would be—

no use for battleships, and very little chance of much employment of fast cruisers. The navy will be entirely changed; naval officers will no longer live on the sea, but either above it or under it, and the strain on their system and nerves will be so great that a very lengthy period of service will not be advisable. It will be a navy of youth, for we shall require nothing but boldness and daring.

This great English admiral says that—

the function of a battleship is to attack an enemy's fleet; but there will be no fleet to attack, as it will not be safe for a fleet to put to sea.

This prediction of Sir Percy Scott has been conclusively demonstrated during the present war; and as he further says, referring to maneuvers which he had seen:

This demonstration should have made us realize that, now that submarines have come in, battleships are of no use either for defensive or offensive purposes, and consequently building any more in 1914 will be a misuse of money subscribed by the citizens for the defense of the Empire.

He is a sailor who has spent his life on the sea and achieved great distinction in his profession, and is, of course, better qualified to speak than some uninformed Member of Congress who has the audacity to hold an opinion contrary to great naval experts like the gentlemen from Tennessee, North Carolina, and elsewhere. [Applause.]

Secretary Daniels differs from Sir Percy Scott. He says that—

submarines are an experiment and that our main reliance in the future must be upon battleships and dreadnaughts.

But it should be remembered that Mr. Daniels's experience as a sailor was on Tar River in North Carolina, and his taste naturally inclines him to the larger ship.

Notwithstanding North Carolina differs from Great Britain, I humbly submit that Sir Percy Scott has earned his reputation as a prophet.

The General Board and the Navy League insist that four new battleships should be provided for. It is given out that the program of Secretary Daniels for two will be adopted. What will be thought 10 years hence of the American Congress if it yields to these insensate demands? Advanced Navy leaguists claim that an insufficient number of dreadnaughts is worse than none. I suggest, then, that we take them at their word and do the better thing. In spite of all its activities, with conclusive demonstration of the destructiveness and effectiveness of the submarine staring them in the face, the Navy League, so sensitive in regard to our defenseless condition, has never, so far as I know, once raised its voice in behalf of the construction of submarines. The advocates of battleships are some people, Members of Congress and others, who are victims of an obsession—the Navy League, which wants more money spent and more offices provided, and builders who want more orders with the resultant profits. In our naval policy heretofore, but at a safe distance, we have followed England. Let us follow her now. The British Admiralty, so it is reported, has issued orders that no new battleships are to be constructed. All the shipbuilding plants of England to-day are said to be at work on submarines, and the papers state that an effort was made to have a supplemental number built in this country. Charles M. Schwab, it is authoritatively stated, had a contract to build here 20 submarines for the use of England.

Immediately upon the publication of Sir Percy Scott's letter frugal Holland ceased to build battleships and dreadnaughts. The minister of the Navy of Japan is said to have issued orders that no more battleships shall be built, but that torpedo vessels, submarines, and destroyers are to be provided in lieu of the dreadnaughts, so far as new construction is concerned.

The lessons taught by the present European war appear to be that the torpedo carriers—to wit, the fast destroyers and the invisible submarine, together with the fast scout cruiser—will constitute the efficient naval vessels of the future. It has been stated that England is building a 5,000-ton cruiser of the *Sydney* type, the scout cruiser that sunk the German cruiser *Karlsruhe*; but we do not find our Navy Department making any estimates for valuable vessels of this type. The dreadnaught is sacred. Nothing must interfere with the department securing the maximum number of these expensive luxuries. Cruisers of the type of the *Sydney* and the submersible ships are so far the only vessels that have established great value in the hard tests of battle. Then why should we do that which Sir Percy Scott said nearly a year ago would be a criminal waste of the public funds? Why not, if we must appropriate such large sums as this bill calls for, spend it for vessels that are shown to be worth while instead of in huge and costly ships that have never been really tested in war?

"Oh, but," the supporters of the dreadnaughts will say, "the big battleship can whip anything afloat on the ocean." That

may be true of anything floating on the surface of the ocean; but the danger is from below, and from that direction a greater, and from a mysterious and an unmatched power.

Again, say the big-battleship protagonists, "the submarines are all right for defense, but they have no radius worth considering, and can not go out into the great oceans."

Capt. Otto Wedigen, commanding the *U-9*, went more than 200 miles from his base in or near the Kiel Canal to find and sink the three English cruisers in less than 60 minutes. From a position 12 feet under water and at a distance of, it is safe to say, approximately a mile he launched his first torpedo at the unfortunate English ship, the *Aboukir*. She sunk in a few minutes. The other two boats were quickly dispatched. I do not care to even repeat the story of this horror. I refer to it as proof of my contention that in modern naval warfare, as in the contest between the Philistine and Israelite champions, David is the better man.

Now, a word more as to the radius of these subsurface boats.

More than a year ago I read somewhere that they were being built with power to go nearly a thousand miles out to sea and back again. Very recently I have seen it stated that now the newest, largest, and most powerful submarines are being built with the idea of going 1,250 miles out to sea and back again.

Who is prepared to say what the radius will be in one or two or five years?

Who will be so bold as to fix a limit to the powers of the scientist and engineer?

Is it not easily conceivable that in a short time submarine boats of increased speed and power may cross the Atlantic? I read:

NEW GERMAN SUBMARINE AN INDEPENDENT CRUISER.

LONDON, January 23.

The Daily Mail's Copenhagen correspondent says he learns from Hamburg that one of the new German supermarines has just finished trial runs in the Bay of Helgoland and that she proved well suited for the purpose for which she was constructed.

This giant submarine, the correspondent adds, is of the type that carries supplies for three months, and is not under the necessity of putting into a port or having recourse to the parent ship.

About 12 or 14 years ago I saw my first submarine. I had the privilege of going under the water in it. After the first plunge I got over my timidity, and in subsequent submersions I studied, as well as a nontechnical man can, the boat and its possibilities. I was convinced that it is the most wonderful weapon ever invented, and that on the defensive it could withstand any force sent against it. I did not believe then that it could become the powerful offensive arm into which it has since developed and which in some ways I regret.

I would like to see the weapons of aggression lose their potency and those of a defensive nature increase theirs. It would make for peace. It would thwart the schemes of ambitious monarchs and leave the people freer to develop socially and economically. It is the ideal weapon for a Government like ours which harbors no schemes of conquest.

With an adequate supply of submarines, 30 or 40 of which can be built for the cost of one battleship, the United States could not be successfully attacked by any power or possible combination of powers, and millions a year could be saved to the taxpayers. [Applause.]

Mr. Chairman, I shall print with my speech a few selected clippings from newspapers representing the sentiment of this and other countries. The first of these that I shall print is the celebrated letter of Admiral Sir Percy Scott, in which we find these striking statements:

Now that submarines have come in battleships are of no use, either for defensive or offensive purposes, and consequently building any more in 1914 will be a misuse of money subscribed by the citizens for the defense of the Empire.

Under these circumstances I can see no use for battleships and very little chance of much employment for fast cruisers.

The submarine when in water must be kept away from, not looked for.

What we require is an enormous fleet of submarines, airships, and aeroplanes, and a few fast cruisers, provided we can find a place to keep them in safety during war time.

If we go to war with a country that is in striking distance of submarines, I am of opinion that that country will at once lock up their dreadnaughts in some safe harbor. We shall do the same.

[From the Army and Navy Register.]

THE SUBMARINE MENACE.

The London Times of June 12 published a letter from Sir Percy Scott concerning the "Uselessness of great battleships." The position taken by the distinguished writer is the subject of editorial comment elsewhere in this issue. The letter to the Times is as follows:

TO THE EDITOR OF THE TIMES.

SIR: Although I have retired from His Majesty's navy, many people have written and are still writing to me as to whether we should build small battleships or large. My opinion is that we should not be

building either. My reasons for holding this opinion will be found in a letter I wrote some time ago, and a copy of which I inclose herewith.

I am, yours, truly,

PERCY SCOTT.

52 SOUTH AUDLEY STREET, May 31.

52 SOUTH AUDLEY STREET, GROSVENOR SQUARE W.,

December 15, 1913.

DEAR SIR: In reply to your letter I have seen the correspondence in the press suggesting building smaller battleships and also the arguments as to whether two or four battleships should be laid down in 1914.

If we have battleships, we must have thick armor on them to keep out the enemy's shot, and we must have speed to give a tactical advantage in bringing our fire on the enemy. These are axioms among naval officers. For battleships our nation and all other nations have very properly decided to have big ships, big guns, thick armor, and high speed.

The other question is, Are we in 1914 to build two or four battleships? The little navyites say two in order to save money; the big navyites say four, as they think, save the country. If battleships are of use in saving the country, the little navyites are foolish and unpatriotic. If battleships are of no use, then the big navyites are wrong in putting the country to the expense of building four more; the real question to settle before even talking about building more battleships is, Are they of use or are they not? For some thousands of years armed vessels floating on the surface of the water have been used for attack and defense; these vessels to-day vary in size from a canoe containing one man armed with a spear to a 32,000-ton battleship armed with 15-inch guns, and these craft, whether large or small, all float on the water and are visible. In this island we depend upon our food supply coming from overseas; hence it has been necessary for us to have a large number of armed ships to protect our commerce and to safeguard our food supply. This protecting force or insurance of our country is called the Royal Navy and to-day consists of a large number of ships that swim on the water and can be seen and a few that swim under the water and can not be seen.

The introduction of the vessels that swim under water has, in my opinion, entirely done away with the utility of the ships that swim on the top of the water.

The functions of a vessel of war were:

Defensively:

1. To attack ships that come to bombard our ports.
2. To attack ships that come to blockade us.
3. To attack ships conveying a landing party.
4. To attack the enemy's fleet.
5. To attack ships interfering with our commerce.

Offensively:

1. To bombard an enemy's ports.
2. To blockade an enemy.
3. To convoy a landing party.
4. To attack the enemy's fleet.
5. To attack the enemy's commerce.

The submarine renders 1, 2, and 3 impossible, as no man-of-war will dare to come even within sight of a coast that is adequately protected by submarines; therefore the functions of a battleship, as regards 1, 2, and 3, both defensively and offensively, have disappeared.

The fourth function of a battleship is to attack an enemy's fleet, but there will be no fleet to attack, as it will not be safe for a fleet to put to sea. This has been demonstrated in all recent maneuvers, both at home and abroad, where submarines have been employed, and the demonstration should have made us realize that, now that submarines have come in, battleships are of no use either for defensive or offensive purposes, and consequently building any more in 1914 will be a misuse of money subscribed by the citizens for the defense of the empire.

As regards the protection of our commerce on the high seas, we must examine who can interfere with it.

Turkey, Greece, Austria, and Italy must pass through the narrow Straits of Gibraltar to get at our commerce.

Cyprus, Malta, and Gibraltar, well equipped with aeroplanes to observe the enemy's movements, and submarines to attack him, would make egress from the Mediterranean very difficult.

Spain and Portugal have ports open to the Atlantic and could interfere with our commerce, but war with those countries seems very improbable, and they are not very far from Gibraltar.

France from Brest could harass our commerce, but if homeward-bound ships gave that port a wide berth and signaled by wireless if they were attacked, fast cruisers and submarines from Plymouth could be very soon on the spot.

Russia and Germany are very badly placed for interfering with our commerce; to get to the Atlantic they must either run the gantlet of the Channel or pass to the north of Scotland, and even if they get out they have nowhere to coal.

America could attack our commerce, but they would have a long way to come.

If by submarines we close egress from the North Sea and Mediterranean, it is difficult to see how our commerce can be much interfered with.

It has been suggested to me that submarines and aeroplanes could not stop egress from the Mediterranean; that a fleet would steam through at night. With aeroplanes that would report the approach of a fleet and 30 or 40 invisible submarines in the narrow Strait of Gibraltar, trying to pass through them at night would be a very risky operation.

Submarines and aeroplanes have entirely revolutionized naval warfare; no fleet can hide itself from the aeroplane, and the submarine can deliver a deadly attack even in broad daylight.

Under these circumstances I can see no use for battleships and very little chance of much employment for fast cruisers. The navy will be entirely changed; naval officers will no longer live on the sea, but either above it or under it, and the strain on their system and nerves will be so great that a very lengthy period of service will not be advisable; it will be a navy of youth, for we shall require nothing but boldness and daring.

In war time the scouting aeroplanes will always be high above on the lookout and the submarines in constant readiness, as are the engines at a fire station. If an enemy is sighted, the gong sounds, and the leash of a flotilla of submarines will be slipped. Whether it be night or day, fine or rough, they must go out to search for their quarry; if they find her she is doomed, and they give no quarter; they can not board her and take her as a prize, as in the olden days; they only wait till she sinks, and then return home without even knowing the number of human beings that they have sent to the bottom of the ocean.

Will any battleship expose herself to such a dead certainty of destruction? I say no.

Not only is the open sea unsafe; a battleship is not immune from attack even in a closed harbor, for the so-called protecting boom at the entrance can easily be blown up. With a flotilla of submarines commanded by dashing young officers, of whom we have plenty, I would undertake to get through any boom into any harbor and sink or materially damage all the ships in that harbor.

If a battleship is not safe either on the high seas or in harbor, what is the use of a battleship?

It has been argued to me that if a foreign power destroys our submarines we are at the mercy of his dreadnaughts. There can be no doubt about the accuracy of this statement, but submarines are difficult to destroy, because it is difficult to attack what you can not see. A power that sends out ships to look for and destroy submarines will be courting disaster; the submarine when in the water must be kept away from, not looked for.

Submarines will be hauled up on land, with arrangements for instantly launching them when required; they can only be attacked by airships dropping bombs on them.

What we require is an enormous fleet of submarines, airships, and aeroplanes, and a few fast cruisers, provided we can find a place to keep them in safety during war time.

It has been argued to me that our enemy will seize some island in the Atlantic, get some fast cruisers there, with plenty of coal, and from this island prey on our commerce. This is ridiculous; the moment we hear of it we send a flotilla of submarines towed by an Atlantic liner, she drops them just when in sight of the island, and she brings them back to England when they have sunk everything they found at the island.

If we go to war with a country that is within the striking distance of submarines, I am of opinion that that country will at once lock up their dreadnaughts in some safe harbor; we shall do the same; their aeroplanes and airships will fly over our country; they will know exactly where our ships are, and their submarines will come over and destroy anything and everything that they can get at.

We shall, of course, do the same; but an island with many harbors and much shipping is at a great disadvantage if the enemy has submarines.

I do not think that the importance of submarines has been fully recognized; neither do I think that it has been realized how completely their advent has revolutionized naval warfare. In my opinion, as the motor vehicle has driven the horse from the road so has the submarine driven the battleship from the seas.

I am, yours, truly,

PERCY SCOTT.

A few weeks ago I read an Associated Press dispatch from London which said that the British Admiralty would hurry to completion such battleships as were in process of construction, but would lay down no more. This may be only a shrewd surmise. It can hardly be more, for the Admiralty certainly would not have its secrets cabled around the world, but it is so reasonable that I believe it.

Mr. Chairman, I protest against the expenditure of vast sums of the people's money for vessels of war that all men must now doubt the value of and great sailors say are obsolete. Let us make the country safe against attack by providing the best weapons, but let us avoid waste by refusing to buy any of even doubtful value. This of all times in our history is the one in which we can best afford to go slow in the matter of military equipment. [Applause.]

The great navies of the world are destroying each other. It is entirely within the range of possibility, Mr. Chairman, that before this House convenes again after it adjourns to-day the United States may be the greatest naval power in the world. If the commanders of these battleships have the courage and indiscretion to go out upon the high seas, it is entirely within the range of possibility that before the survivors would come limping back to their home port the Government of the United States will, I repeat, possess the greatest and most powerful Navy in the world. We can afford to wait. The interest of the people demands we should wait, Mr. Chairman, and I sincerely hope that this House will try to make a record for economy in its closing hours and that we will reduce the waste of public funds in the way that has been proposed by the committee. [Applause.]

[From the Cleveland Plain Dealer.]

THE "FORMIDABLE."

The sinking of British warships by mines and submarines is not merely a matter of luck. It has become apparent that the numerous British disasters are the result of a systematic campaign planned by the German naval authorities.

The losses are already so great that Great Britain can not ignore them as insignificant. Ship after ship has been destroyed by unseen agencies. Slowly, but with amazing system, the Germans are reducing the size of the navy which holds their own ships bottled in Prussian havens of refuge. And while the British are losing their ships the Germans are losing almost nothing. Disregarding the battle of the Falklands, which practically wiped out the German force beyond the North Sea, the naval performances of the war have been strongly to the advantage of the Germans.

Of course, the Germans have a better field for operations. The British ships are in the open and can be easily found by the prowling submarines and mine layers. British retaliation in kind is practically impossible, as the Germans do not come out into the open sea.

The war is certain to be long. If month after month the Germans continue to pick off the British ships the vast British superiority will eventually vanish. With anything like equality of forces the Germans will surely come out for battle. The virtual blockade of the German coast is very irksome, and as soon as a fight can be risked without utter foolhardiness the Germans will attempt to open their harbors.

[From the Washington Post, Thursday, October 29, 1914.]

JAPAN FOR DEFENSIVE—NAVAL BUDGET DOES NOT CONTEMPLATE EXPANSION—RUSSIA'S FAITH IN NIPPON—SO DECLARES MINISTER OF JUSTICE OZAKI IN OUTLINING PLAN TO CONSTRUCT ONLY SUBMARINES AND TORPEDO-BOAT DESTROYERS, "TO SET AT REST ANY SUSPICION NEW YORK, October 28.

SOME NAVAL POWER MAY HAVE."

The East and West News Bureau to-day issued the following statement received from Tokyo:

"Yukio Ozaki, minister of justice, who has heretofore consistently advocated the disadvantage of Japan's entering into the race of armament expansion with the great powers, has made a statement with regard to the navy and army budget to be presented before the coming Diet.

WOULD ALLAY SUSPICION.

"In the next budget," he says, "no proposal for construction of any new battleship will be made. It will only provide for building of submarines and torpedo-boat destroyers, with the sole purpose of placing the defense of Japan's adjacent seas on a safer basis. This will set at rest any suspicion some naval power may have harbored toward Japan."

[From the Nashville (Tenn.) Banner, January 8, 1915.]

THE SUBMARINES.

In deep-sea warfare the battleships and armored cruisers will continue to play an important part, but it is already dangerous for such craft to approach anywhere near the shore of an enemy's country, and it will become more so with the improvement of submarines and experience in their use.

The present war has taught that fortifications avail nothing against big siege guns, and it has also impressed the lesson that the greatest dreadnaught is helpless against the insidious attack of the hidden submarine, of whose approach it has no warning until struck by its torpedoes.

These lessons are important ones for the United States, and should be applied to the question of adequate defense, now so much discussed. With big siege guns mounted on the forts that line our coasts, guns that will carry great shells many miles to sea, and a sufficient force of submarines, the landing of an invading army in this country would be such a hazardous task as no European nation will be willing to undertake.

It has been revealed beyond doubt that the British ship *Formidable* was sunk in the English Channel by a German submarine operating probably from one of the towns held by the Germans on the Belgian coast.

A British submarine went under the water out of reach of the forts on both shores of the Dardanelles, sunk a Turkish battleship, and returned by the same route unhurt. How could a transport ship with thousands of soldiers on board, however it might be convoyed, land on the coast of the United States if this country were well supplied with submarines?

It is the German submarines that now protect Bremen, Hamburg, and other German cities in reach of ships from attack. The British and French fleets combined greatly outnumber those of Germany, and under the old conditions they would long ago have assailed the sheltered position of the German fleet beyond Helgoland, about the Elbe's mouth, and in the entrance to the Kiel Canal. To do so with the submarines in use would be to court destruction.

If there had been no submarines and no mines, the first efforts of the British in the present war would have been the destruction of the German Navy. They would have followed it into secluded places, as Nelson did the French fleets at Trafalgar and in the Battle of the Nile.

The big ships will still be needed in the navies of the world for long-distance cruises and fighting in the open seas, but submarines will otherwise revolutionize naval warfare. They are all powerful for coast defense.

[From the Grand Rapids (Mich.) Press, January 2, 1915.]

VICTIMS OF THE SUBMARINE.

The dispatches rouse again the old query, "What's in a name?" Here is H. M. S. *Formidable* at the bottom of the channel, sunk with all on board by an invisible adversary. The *Formidable* lived up to its name only in looks and on paper; in the pinch it was far from formidable. Down went the battleship like an iron pall with a hole punched in the bottom.

The truly formidable craft in this war are the submarines, cheap and humble creations of marine architecture. They are not imposing in line of parade or decorated with fire-breathing names. They struggle through life as colorless units designated by number and letter. The navy departments require a card index to keep track of them. Then suddenly the *E-9* or the *B-11* humbly and dutifully chucks a Whitehead torpedo at a huge and haughty battleship, and Davy Jones gets a fresh companion.

This ought to demonstrate that battleships are costly investments. No doubt they are needed to deliver hard blows, but even at that the mortality among them is bound to be frightful. The larger they are the better targets they become for the stalking submarine. Too slow for scouting blockade work, battleships seem destined to go by the board. Unless the battleship demonstrates its usefulness very shortly it can hardly avoid the scrap heap.

The prospect is encouraging. Battleships are too expensive. The burden of building and maintaining them is too heavy for mankind to bear. Their development no doubt advanced the science of marine construction; but having learned how to build such huge warships, it is now high time to quit building them.

Possibly the world will now enter upon a new era of naval expansion, in which larger and larger submarines will be constructed. But as the submarine has limited the size of surface warships, so is it likely that some future development will operate to keep submarines within reasonable size.

[From the Philadelphia Saturday Evening Post.]

DOUBTFUL INVESTMENTS.

Battleships and forts are two of the costliest objects of military expenditure. This war has demonstrated that the latter, as a means of repelling land attacks, are a poor investment, and has indicated the probability that the day of the dreadnaught is closing.

The Germans have shown that under favorable conditions a submarine can strike and sink any vessel, and it is entirely probable that invention within the next five years will increase the submarine's power of attack much more than it will increase the dreadnaught's power of defense. With better lungs and eyes a submarine would stand an excellent chance of stopping any battleship now.

It is also possible that no battleship laid down now can keep afloat under the attack of aircraft 5 years hence. Within 5 months a big question mark has been written against military objects on which hundreds of millions of dollars have been spent during the last 20 years.

[From the London Morning Post.]

THE NAVAL POSITION—A NEW BATTLESHIP.

[From our naval correspondent.]

The naval and military policy of the United States is her own affair, and criticism of it might by our American friends be considered impertinent. There are, however, certain passages in President Wilson's message to the United States Congress—quoted in these columns yesterday—which, as they strangely resemble assertions with which we used to be familiar in this country, may be usefully considered by the British public. Of that part of the message dealing with the military aspect this is not the place to speak, except to remark that President Wilson affirms that a system of voluntary military training is "right American policy" and is "the only thing we can do or will do," and that if the President thinks that such a force can be raised "for mere health's sake" he is likely to be disappointed.

But, says the President, "a powerful Navy we have always regarded as our proper and natural means of defense." Very right. British politicians have for many years been saying the same thing, and saying it so often that they sometimes induced the public to believe that the mere affirmation of a principle was equivalent to possessing a powerful navy—so potent is the influence of iteration. But the President went on to ask a very pertinent question, which is being asked by a large number of people in this country to-day, "Who shall tell us now what sort of Navy to build?" The immediate answer is that there are many naval architects, both in America and this country, who are competent to supply the information required. The United States enjoys at present the inestimable privilege of being able to benefit by the experience of a naval war in which she is not herself engaged. The conclusion drawn by the President is that no type of vessel can survive the rapid evolution of new ships of war for 10 consecutive years, and he implies that it is therefore of no use to build any ships at all. The same argument has been frequently heard in the British House of Commons.

The United States shipbuilding program for the current year suggests that America is waiting on events, although, with some apparent inconsistency, she is to build two battleships; for if there is one class of vessel more than another concerning which doubts are entertained, it is the existing type of battleship. It may, of course, be that the United States Navy Department will design a new type. That a new type must be evolved is certain. A battleship or a battle cruiser which can be sunk by mine and by submarine torpedo attack is deprived of one-half its value. The other half consists in its ability to meet the enemy's ships of the same class. When the submarine is sufficiently developed to enable it to operate upon equal terms with the battleship in respect of sea endurance and speed, the value of the present battleship will disappear altogether.

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from Texas asks to insert as part of his remarks some memoranda, and also to extend other parts of his remarks. Is there objection? [After a pause.] The Chair hears none.

The gentleman from Massachusetts [Mr. GARDNER] is recognized for one hour.

Mr. GARDNER. Mr. Chairman, I asked to be stopped when I get to the end of three-quarters of an hour, because I have agreed to yield 15 minutes to the gentleman from Kentucky [Mr. BARKLEY].

FLOATING HAS BEENS.
SLOWER THAN THE SLOWEST.

Mr. Chairman, the fastest battleship or armored cruiser which the United States has ever owned or owns to-day, built or building, is slower than the slowest of the nine big warships which fought last Sunday in the North Sea. The *Blücher*, which was sunk because she was 5 knots slower than her companions, was faster than any vessel in our Navy to-day, built or building, except the small fry like destroyers and scouts.

Three of the five British battle cruisers, the *Tiger*, the *Lion*, and the *Princess Royal*, carry more powerful guns than any which have ever been carried by an American ship, except the dreadnaught *Texas* and the dreadnaught *New York*. Great Britain has 26 battleships, built and building, which carry as powerful guns as the *Lion* and the *Princess Royal*; we have, built and building, just 6 ships which carry such powerful guns.

GIVE US FULL CREWS.

What we need most in the Navy to-day is men. We ought to have enough men to provide full crews for all our ships now in commission and in addition full crews for such of our ships "in reserve" as ought to be put in commission. There is not much sense in building ships and then putting them in cold storage for lack of crews to man them. Eighteen thousand men is what we need, say Admiral Badger and Assistant Secretary Roosevelt. In my worthless judgment 18,000 men added to the Navy to-day would help our defense more than 50,000 men added to the Army.

The Navy constitutes our first line of defense, and the harbor fortifications and the field Army constitute our second line of

defense. If we are so anemic that we can not spare enough for both services, for heaven's sake let us spend the money on the Navy and let the Monroe doctrine go. But do not fool yourself into thinking that we can enforce the Monroe doctrine while we sit at home in our own easy chairs.

THE BUILDING PROGRAM.

I stand for the building program of the General Board of the Navy from turret to foundation stone. What has possessed the Naval Committee in times like these to cut that building program in two is one of those things nobody can find out.

Another thing nobody can find out is why Chairman PADGETT absolutely refused to summon before his committee as witnesses Admiral Knight, Admiral Winslow, Admiral Wainwright, and Admiral Brownson. Either Capt. HOBSON or I asked for every one of those men.

What possesses you gentlemen to declare that two battleships this year is a long step toward building up the Navy? Do not you know that the General Board of the Navy has reported that two battleships must be begun in 1915 to take the places of the *Kearsarge* and *Kentucky*, which became antiquated this year? At the rate of speed you are running you will just manage to stay about in the same place. If you want to get ahead, you must run twice as fast as that. You must vote for four battleships this year, as the General Board of the Navy advises. By the way, I wish some one would tell me what, in heaven above or in the earth beneath, is the sense of creating a board of our very best Navy officers to give us advice if we are going to use their reports only as kindling for the furnace of our superheated and childishly self-complacent eloquence?

A NAVY CATECHISM.

I have taken the liberty of assuming that the Members of this Congress are as ignorant on the question of the Navy as I was after I had sat in this House for nearly 12 years. So I have prepared a series of questions and answers concerning certain matters which ought to be familiar to every legislator, but which were, as a matter of fact, entirely unfamiliar to me until four or five months ago:

Question. What is the General Board of the Navy?

Answer. It is an advisory board, composed of the very ablest officers of the Navy.

Question. What does the General Board advise?

Answer. Among other things, it advises us what ships to build to insure our safety, and it advises us how to man those ships.

Question. What do we do with the General Board's advice?

Answer. We chuck it in the wastebasket year after year.

Question. What does the General Board advise for a building program this year?

Answer. It advises 4 battleships, 16 destroyers, 3 fleet submarines, 16 coast submarines, 4 scout cruisers, 4 gunboats, 7 auxiliaries, and \$5,000,000 for the air service.

Question. What are we going to do with the General Board's advice this year?

Answer. We are going to chuck it into the wastebasket, as usual. The committee has more than cut the program in two, except in the matter of submarines.

Question. Is the shipbuilding program which the General Board advises supposed to be sufficient to insure our safety against Great Britain?

Answer. By no means. It is supposed to be sufficient to insure our safety against any nation except Great Britain.

Question. Why is that?

Answer. I give it up.

Question. Are there any authentic figures published showing the standing of the United States Navy as compared with other navies?

Answer. The Bureau of Naval Intelligence in our Navy Department published on July 1, 1914, a table of the warship tonnage of the world's navies.

Question. What did that table show?

Answer. It showed the war tonnage of Great Britain to be 2,157,850 tons, of Germany to be 951,713 tons, of the United States to be 765,133 tons. If you count also the war vessels then building, France led the United States. In other words, in war vessels built and building we stood fourth.

Question. How many battleships of the first line have we?

Answer. We have 10 battleships of the first line, according to the official Navy Directory of January 1, 1915; but 2 of those battleships are slated for retirement to the second line on March 3, 1915.

Question. How many battleships does the Committee on Naval Affairs claim for the first line?

Answer. Twenty-one is the number given on page 39 of its report.

Question. How does this difference arise?

Answer. It is the same old story of counting your chickens before they are hatched. The committee's list includes four ships that are building and three more whose keels have never yet been laid. If we are lucky, they may be ready in 1918. Meanwhile others will be becoming obsolete. Furthermore, the committee has performed the feat of resurrecting the semi-obsolete *Kansas*, *Minnesota*, *Vermont*, and *New Hampshire* from the limbo of the second line and has restored them to the company of the dreadnaughts of the first line; which, by the way, is a sin, whoever did it.

Question. Is our Navy, man for man, as good as foreign navies?

Answer. No one knows. The Secretary of the Navy refuses to publish the figures for target practice.

Question. Is our Navy, ship for ship, as good as foreign navies?

Answer. No one knows. The Secretary of the Navy says so; but recently when an attempt was made to mobilize the 12 submarines which constitute the flotilla for the Atlantic coast it was found that only 1 of them could dive.

Question. Is our fleet prepared for war?

Answer. Against the Mexican fleet; yes. Against a formidable enemy; no. Secretary Daniels in his annual report has a subdivision, which he entitles "Proof of the preparedness of the fleet."

Question. Do other authorities agree with Secretary Daniels?

Answer. They do not. Assistant Secretary Roosevelt has testified that a dozen of our battleships and some 70 or 80 smaller craft are in "cold storage," and that they only can be got out in from 3 to 12 months' time.

Question. What do you mean by "cold storage"?

Answer. Either "in reserve" or "in ordinary" or "out of commission."

Question. What is the difference between a vessel "in reserve" and a vessel "in ordinary"?

Answer. "In ordinary" is scrap-heap common, and "in reserve" is scrap-heap preferred. In reserve a ship has from a quarter to one-half a crew aboard; in ordinary a ship has enough men on board to scare off the rats.

Question. Does anyone else disagree with Secretary Daniels?

Answer. Well, Admiral Fiske, the chief for operations of the fleet, testified that it would take five years to get the Navy in shape to meet a first-class power. Admiral Fletcher, commander of the North Atlantic Fleet, has just written a letter in which he says that there is "an alarming shortage" of 5,219 men and 339 officers aboard the 21 battleships in full commission under his command. Admiral Strauss says that every battleship in commission is "equipped with a short-range torpedo which may be considered obsolete for the battle fleet." Admiral Knight testifies that there is no unity of effort in the fleet. The General Board of the Navy testified last year that the absence of a definite naval policy has placed us in a position of inferiority which is getting more and more marked. Commander Stirling was rebuked by Secretary Daniels for calling attention to the shocking condition of the submarine fleet. Admiral Badger testified that we are 18,000 men short of what we ought to have to man our ships. Capt. Bristol testifies that we have only 12 Navy aeroplanes where we ought to have 200, and so it goes; and yet gentlemen talk of our "preparedness."

Well, what are we going to do about it? The immediate question before us is the building program for the next fiscal year. I favor the program recommended by the General Board of the Navy. The board's building program for the fiscal year, which begins on July 1, 1915, without a break from one end to the other is what I stand for.

Mr. CRISP. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

The CHAIRMAN. Does the gentleman from Massachusetts yield to the gentleman from Georgia?

Mr. GARDNER. Yes; I yield to the gentleman.

Mr. CRISP. Will the gentleman kindly tell us what that program would cost?

Mr. GARDNER. I have no idea, and I do not care, so long as I believe it is a necessary expense.

WE NEED A COMMISSION OF INQUIRY.

I regard it as of very great importance to provide for a commission to examine into this whole question, to bring fresh minds to bear upon the problem—not men who are defending the work of their own departments, not legislators who are examining the results of their own committee decisions of the past. I hope to see a commission appointed, partly by the President, partly by the Speaker, and partly by the President of the Senate—a commission which will get together and consider the problem of our defense as a whole, not by piecemeal. At present we have eight different committees of the House and

Senate which possess jurisdiction over the problem. Can anyone reasonably expect an intelligent solution under the circumstances? I want new blood; I want a commission which will send for the junior officers and get their real opinions. I want a commission which will send for enlisted men and say, "What is your view as to the length of time required to make an able seaman out of a green recruit? Do you believe that merchant-marine training is a step in the journey toward the making of a man-of-war's man?" I want to see Congress get out of this rut of sending, year after year, only for the bureau chiefs.

Mr. McKENZIE. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

The CHAIRMAN. Does the gentleman from Massachusetts yield to the gentleman from Illinois?

Mr. GARDNER. Yes.

Mr. McKENZIE. Does the gentleman think that the recommendations of the commission he proposes would have any greater influence with Members of Congress than the board that we now have?

Mr. GARDNER. Yes; I do, because that commission would be watched by the American people from the start. The moment the American people know where to turn for accurate information our fight for an adequate Navy is won.

PEACE! PEACE!

Andrew Carnegie has given \$10,000,000 as a fund with which to persuade the world that a flexible spine is a better defense than a mighty biceps, but he will never be able to persuade us Americans. Our people will never say "Amen" to such a doctrine as that. The doctrine is not new, by the way. Cobden, the great British apostle of free trade, preached on that text in England in the middle of the last century. I am going to read you from one of his letters written in 1842. Here is what he wrote:

It has struck me that it would be well to try to engraft our free-trade agitation upon the peace movement. They are one and the same cause.

Twenty-two years later Cobden and his school forced Lord Palmerston, the British premier, to abstain from helping out Denmark when Germany and Austria together combined to take away from her Schleswig-Holstein. Great Britain was prevented from interfering by the peace advocates, and what has happened? The Kiel Canal, which connects the North Sea with the Baltic, was cut across Schleswig-Holstein. That intersea canal could never have been so advantageously cut if Schleswig-Holstein had not been taken from Denmark, and the German fleet to-day would be still more seriously restricted in its operations. So you see that the mistakes of the British pacifists of the nineteenth century were but a prelude to the mistakes of the British pacifists of the twentieth century. Ever since the war, "which could not possibly occur," broke out Great Britain has been paying the bill for her lack of preparation against war.

How much time have I consumed, Mr. Chairman?

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman has 15 minutes remaining.

INTERNATIONAL ARMIES.

Mr. GARDNER. I am going to say a word about international courts and international armies, because as fast as one dream is shattered the income of Mr. Carnegie's \$10,000,000 is paying men to invent new dreams and believe them. When, last August, the dream that the bankers would not allow the European countries to have any war was shattered, and the dream that workingmen would not fight each other merely because they wore different uniforms was shattered also—the moment those dreams were dissipated a new vision was promptly dreamed. If I had \$10,000,000 to spend in the business I could get people to dream dreams just as fast as Mr. Carnegie or anybody else can get them.

What is the new dream? An international court and an international army to enforce its decrees—no less.

Supposing that that international court were to decide that the Chinese and the Japanese ought to have equal rights with men of other nationalities to be admitted into this country—which, by the way, is by no means an unlikely decision for an international court to render—do you think that our workingmen would allow us to lie down and permit it? Supposing the international army and the international navy were obliged to attack us in order to force the admission of those Chinese and Japanese, would the American division of the international army fight with the rest of the international army or against it? And if it mutinied, what would be the future of that international army?

Supposing the international court decided that if we would not secure debts owed to foreign countries by Mexico and would not protect foreign investments or persons in Mexico the international army would have the right to do it in our stead—and that is also a very possible verdict—what would happen then? Would we stand by and see that international army invade Mexico? And if the international court decrees that it shall

do so, shall we have no need for an army and navy to resist the international army and the international navy?

My friends, the theory is growing up in the world that the various people of Europe have an inherent right to migrate to the United States or elsewhere if they so desire. You meet that theory in every sort of foreign publication. Our right to exclude immigration seeking to come to these shores has been challenged more than once. Do you suppose our people would bow to an international decision which denied our right to control immigration?

Supposing the doctrine of the single tax becomes an international doctrine, and that also is quite possible. Supposing the international court decides that no man, no nation, no body of men has the right to own the unearned increment of real estate, that no body of men has the right to an unqualified title to the land, for the land is not the product of man's work but the gift of God. Supposing the international court decides that way, are we to give the Ethiopian or the Hindu an equal share in the land for which our fathers toiled and fought? Supposing the international court should say, "You must not be selfish. You must admit immigrants from the overcrowded countries of Europe, and give them some of the wonderful prairie land in the Dakotas. The Lord never meant that land to be parceled out to pioneers in quarter sections. He meant it for the whole world." How about our quota of the international army, when the international court starts to enforce that decree?

Suppose that by some strange mischance two nations at the same time are dissatisfied with the international court. Suppose, for example, that a question arises which involves the right of passage through the Dardanelles or through the Suez Canal, where several nations' interests are vitally concerned. Suppose two powerful nations simultaneously refuse to submit to a decree by an international court on some question involving the commerce of the Mediterranean. The international army will have its hands full. It must ask for more troops, and the United States will be called on for additional men and more money. Do you believe that public opinion in this country would support any administration which involved the United States in a Mediterranean dispute in which we were not concerned? Ask yourselves whether you would vote the additional troops and the additional money for the international army.

WHY NATIONS FIGHT.

In arguing this question do not forget that besides the great question of trade there is another prolific cause of warfare between nations and between men, and that is insolence. A little international insolence will do more to bring on a war than any kind of a trade dispute which you can conceive of. I have not much question that in my own Commonwealth of Massachusetts during the epoch which preceded the Revolution the anger of the people of the town of Boston was aroused more by international insolence than by any question of taxation.

NAVAL DISARMAMENT.

After this war is over, assuming that the allies are successful, many people think that there will be a general disarmament, and that Great Britain will consent to forego her navy. Let us not forget that Great Britain is the only populous country which can not practically feed itself. Therefore it is essential to Great Britain's security that she take no risk of being shut off from her ocean trade. Will she be willing to trust the safety of her ocean trade to the good will of other nations? Such a notion seems to me to be fantastic; yet, of course, it is conceivable that Great Britain might consent to forego her navy if other nations did the same. That would be no true disarmament, however, for in case of war her ocean-going merchant marine is so enormous and so much more powerful than that of other nations that she could easily convert a part of her fleet into warships and still have plenty left for commerce.

GREAT BRITAIN'S TWO-POWER STANDARD.

Great Britain undertakes to have as big a navy as any two European nations put together. Are we forever to go ahead and ignore what that means? Why, recently I received a petition asking me to vote for a reduction in the estimates for our Navy. Why? Because, as my petitioner declared, everybody will be exhausted and unable to fight after this European war is over, except, perhaps, Great Britain, and she is friendly. Well, she is friendly to-day, but in international affairs it is just as it is in politics. Your friend of to-day is the man you may be fighting to-morrow. If we are going into a match against Great Britain in the business of whittling down navies, I should like to start to whittle on a good deal longer stick than we have at present. I do not relish whittling on a short stick while we let Great Britain whittle a little off her long stick.

As to successful nations being so exhausted that they can not fight, I do not believe it. We were never stronger in a military sense than we were in 1865 after four exhausting years of war. Moreover, the victor nations in this European war will, if they think best, provide themselves with funds by the exaction of war indemnities from the vanquished. I want this country to remain on friendly relations with the whole world; but I do not want this country to be at the mercy of any nation's friendliness. My sympathies are entirely with the allies; but, more than anything, I want this country to be in the position to feel toward Great Britain the way one strong man ought to feel toward another strong man. I do not relish the idea that our safety depends on the friendliness of our relations with Great Britain. I hate to feel that Great Britain could wipe our Navy off the seas, and yet I believe such is the case. I want a Navy so strong that our intercourse with that great power may be like the intercourse of two giants who respect each other's strong right arms. I do not any longer wish to see this country subscribe to the doctrine that we must look at Great Britain from the point of view of a man who says, "Well, I know if you choose to hit me over the head, there is nothing I can do about it."

ARE WE GOING TO WAR?

Now, do I expect war? Of course I do not expect war. No sensible man ever expects war, but sometimes war comes. If I go into a neighborhood where there is smallpox, I do not expect to catch smallpox, but I get vaccinated just the same. I hope I shall not run into anybody with my automobile this year, and I do not expect to do so, but I propose to carry some automobile insurance. I am mighty sorry, by the way, that I carried any insurance for the last few years, because I have not run into anybody, and I might as well have saved the money. You see, I am giving you the same line of reasoning as that of the gentleman who yesterday felicitated us on all the money we have saved by inadequate armament.

If we are going to have a Navy at all, let us have a real Navy, such as the General Board of the Navy recommends, and not make a halfway surrender to the torpor of anemia reinforced by the economies of the cheeseparers. If we propose to save our money and surrender to those dreams, let us openly admit it and stop humbugging the people by pretending that the Navy is ready for war.

INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION.

It is all very well to say that we shall never have any trouble if we go ahead and mind our own business. We can not go ahead in this country minding our own business. We never have done so, and probably we never shall do so, because our business is interwoven with the business of other nations. So long as that is true we are bound to have international troubles from time to time. It is pretty nearly certain that we should not be willing to arbitrate those troubles if they were to become too acute. For instance, would this country have consented to arbitrate the question of the annexation of Texas, which brought on the Mexican War? If so, we should have lost our case in any international court.

Would the North have consented to arbitrate the question of slavery? The Missouri compromise and the compromise of 1850 were nothing else but arbitrations of that question, with the usual result of arbitrations, to wit, compromises.

Possibly we might have consented to arbitrate the questions in dispute with Great Britain in 1812; but what international court would have been satisfactory to both parties? All Europe was in arms for Napoleon or against him while our troubles with Great Britain were brewing. Would we have consented to arbitrate the question as to whether the Maine was blown up from the inside or the outside, or would we have consented to arbitrate the question of whether or not Spain must get out of Cuba?

Why, we would not have arbitrated any of those questions, except, possibly, our grievances during the five years preceding the War of 1812. If we had arbitrated the disputed issues of our various wars, we should in all probability have lost nearly every one of our contentions. That is to say, we should have lost them before judges whose verdicts reflected the educated world's opinion of their day. It seems strange to intimate that the educated world would have decided against the North in 1861, and yet that conclusion is almost irresistible to the student of history.

EXHIBIT A.

LETTERS FROM GENERAL BOARD OF NAVY, 1913, ON PROPOSED CONSTRUCTION AND NAVAL POLICY.

From: President General Board.
To: Secretary of the Navy.

Subject: Proposed construction, 1915.

The General Board, in compliance with the duties imposed upon it by article 167, paragraph 3, section 7, of the United States Naval Regula-

tions, 1913, submits to the department the following advice and recommendation upon matters coming within the purview of that paragraph:

Under corresponding paragraphs in preceding regulations the General Board has previously considered the needs of the fleet in relation to adequate requirements for the national defense, and presented in its memorandum G. B. No. 420-422, of September 25, 1912, and again in its letter G. B. No. 445, of March 28, 1913 (copies of which are attached), statements, giving reasons therefor, showing the minimum yearly construction for the years 1913-1917, inclusive, necessary to insure a fleet in 1920 of measurable equality with the fleets of the principal foreign powers.

The General Board as the responsible naval advisers of the Secretary under the regulations referred to above again expresses the conviction that the number and types of vessels recommended in these papers is a concrete expression of what must be considered at this time an adequate Navy for defensive purposes only.

The General Board, adhering to these convictions and recommendations previously made, proposes as the building program to be recommended by the department to Congress at the second session of the Sixty-third Congress: Four battleships, 16 destroyers and 1 destroyer tender, 3 submarines and 1 submarine tender, 2 oilers, 2 gunboats, 1 transport, 1 supply ship, and 1 hospital ship.

The above construction of vessels is submitted in their order of importance.

The General Board further invites particular attention to the fact that the four battleships recommended will not constitute a numerical increase in the battleship strength of the fleet, since these vessels would simply replace the *Indiana*, *Massachusetts*, and *Oregon*, authorized in 1890, and the *Iowa*, authorized in 1892, all of which vessels should be withdrawn, even from the reserve battle line, before the four battleships recommended can be completed.

The military necessity for the lesser units, auxiliaries and gunboats, is set forth fully in the attached memorandum; and to this may be added the statement that frequently in times past and at the present time it has been necessary to detail battleships for duty ordinarily performed by gunboats, at the expense of the military efficiency of the fleet.

While not coming directly under the duties imposed by paragraph 3, section 7, of the regulations, the General Board feels it its duty to also invite the attention of the department to the present, and increasing, inadequacy of docking facilities for the fleet. This inadequacy will increase and become more accentuated on the completion of the ships now building and projected. The board is of the opinion that in the event of war the country would be in a most serious situation, especially in the Pacific, from its lack of docking facilities, and urgently recommends that at least two docks of a capacity to take the largest ships projected be authorized at the coming session of Congress.

GEORGE DEWEY.

From: President General Board.
To: Secretary of the Navy.
Subject: Naval policy.

1. The General Board invites the attention of the department to the fact that in the creation and maintenance of the fleet as an arm of the national defense there is not now and has never been in any true sense a governmental or departmental naval policy. The fleet as it exists is the growth of an inadequately expressed public opinion; and that growth has followed the laws of expediency to meet temporary emergencies and has had little or no relation to the true meaning of naval power, or to the Nation's need therefor for the preservation of peace, and for the support and advancement of our national policies. The Navy, like our foreign policy and diplomacy, of which it is the arm and measure of strength, is broadly national, and has no relation to party or parties; and hence, should not be affected by changes of administration; but should develop and grow with the national growth on a fixed policy that should keep it equal to the demands that will be made upon it to support our just policies on challenge, and to preserve peace.

2. The General Board has from the time of its organization in March, 1900, studied the question of naval policy from the point of view of the Nation's need, free from other influences, and having in mind solely the preservation of peace and the maintenance of the Nation's prosperity as it develops along the lines destiny has marked out, and according to the policies that have become national. In 1903 the General Board formulated its opinion as to what the naval development of the Nation should be, and established a policy for itself which it has consistently followed since, making recommendations to the department in accordance therewith from year to year. This policy—as a policy—has remained a General Board policy only, without adoption by the Government or even by the Navy Department, and without being understood by the people or Congress.

In the opinion of the General Board, any rational and natural development of the Navy looking to the continuance of peace and the maintenance of our national policies demands the adoption of and the consistent adherence to a governmental naval policy founded on our national needs and aims. To give life to such a policy requires the support of the people and of Congress; and this support can only be obtained by giving the widest publicity to the policy itself and to the reasons and arguments in its support, and taking the people and the Congress into the full confidence of the Government, inviting intelligent criticism as well as support.

3. The General Board does not believe the Nation stands ready to abandon or modify any of its well-established national policies, and repeats its position that the naval policy of the country should be to possess a fleet powerful enough to prevent or answer any challenge to these policies. The absolute strength necessary to accomplish this is a question that depends upon the national policies of prospective challengers and the force they can bring against us, and, hence, is relative and varies with their naval policies and building program.

4. The General Board believes that only a lack of understanding of these views by the people at large prevents the adoption of a consistent naval policy; and recommends to the department a system of extended publicity in all matters relating to naval policy, acting through patriotic organizations, the press, or by whatever means a knowledge of the naval needs of the Nation may be brought home to the people of the country, with the meaning and reasons for them. The General Board believes that an understanding by the Nation of the Navy's rôle as a guarantor of peace and an upholder of those doctrines and policies which have become a part and parcel of our national existence will fix a naval policy that will meet those needs.

5. What that policy should be is stated broadly in paragraph 3—the building and maintenance of a fleet powerful enough to prevent or answer any challenge to our national policies. To arrive at any concrete formulation of a naval policy, for recommending to the department for presentation to Congress and the country, the General Board invites attention to the following fundamental facts:

(a) The "power" of the fleet consists of two elements, its personnel and its matériel.

(b) Of these two elements the personnel is of the greater importance.

(c) The measure of the matériel portion of a fleet's power is expressed in the number of its first-line battleships.

(d) The life and continued power to act of these first-line battleships are dependent on the assistance of a number of smaller fighting units of the fleet proper and of a number of auxiliaries in recognized proportion to the battleships.

6. From these fundamental facts two principles follow:

(1) That, in any consideration of naval policy to arrive at a fleet of a power suited to the Nation's needs, questions of personnel and matériel must go hand in hand, and the two must expand and grow together until the needed power is attained.

(2) That the basis of the matériel side of the fleet is the battleship of the first line, and that this basis, for life and action, requires to be supplemented by its military assistants—destroyers, scouts, submarines, aeroplanes—and by its auxiliaries—fuel ships, supply ships, repair ships, etc.—in proper proportionate numbers.

7. The General Board in its letter No. 420-422, of October 17, 1903, expressed an opinion of what the strength of the Navy should be in 1920, based on the second of the principles above stated, and placed the number of ships of the line which should form the basis of the fleet at 48. In paragraph 9 of the same letter it formulated the first principle in these words:

"These recommendations would be incomplete unless the General Board invited your attention to the utility of building vessels for the defense of the country without providing the personnel to man them. Whenever appropriations are made for new vessels the number of officers and enlisted men should be increased in due proportion."

From year to year, since the formulation of those opinions in 1903, the General Board has consistently recommended a building program based on the policy of a 48-battleship strength in 1920, with necessary lesser units and auxiliaries, and these recommendations have varied only in the lesser units of the fleet, as developments and improvements have varied the relative value of those lesser units and the auxiliaries.

8. These recommendations of the board have been made in the pursuance of a fixed and definite "policy" adopted by the board for its guidance after mature and deliberate consideration of all the elements involved and after a careful estimate and forecast of the future as to what would be the naval development of those foreign countries with which conflict might be probable, and what should be our own development to insure peace if possible, or superiority of force if war should be forced upon us. Expressed in concrete words, the "policy" of the board has been to provide the Nation with a fleet equal or superior to that of any probable enemy as a guarantor of peace, and its forecast was that a fleet of 48 battleships, with the attendant lesser units and auxiliaries, ready for action by 1920 would accomplish this result.

9. The forecast of the board with regard to naval development in other countries has proved remarkably accurate. The absence of any definite naval policy on our part, except in the General Board, and the failure of the people, the Congress, and the Executive Government to recognize the necessity for such a policy has already placed us in a position of inferiority which may lead to war, and this inferiority is progressive and will continue to increase until the necessity for a definite policy is recognized and that policy put into operation.

10. The General Board, while adhering to the policy it has consistently followed for the past 10 years, and believing that the naval needs of the Nation call for a fleet of 48 ships of the first line in 1920, with the attendant smaller units and auxiliaries in proper proportion, all with trained personnel, officers and enlisted men, active or reserve, recognizes conditions as they exist and as clearly set forth in its memorandum of September 25, 1912, and the futility of hoping or expecting that the ships and men its policy calls for will be provided by 1920. The board does believe, however, that this result may be eventually attained by the adoption by the Government of a definite naval policy and the putting of it before Congress and the people clearly and succinctly. By this method responsibility for any rupture of our peaceful relations with other nations due to our naval weakness, or any national disaster in war due to the same cause, will be definitely fixed. The General Board believes that the people, with full understanding of the meaning of and the reasons for naval power, will instruct the legislative branch of the Government, and that that branch, with the same understanding, will provide the means. By the adoption and advocacy of a clearly defined, definite policy the department, with whom the responsibility first rests, will have done its part and placed the responsibility with the people and the legislative branch of the Government. If the people, having been given the meaning of and the reasons for naval power, fail to instruct the Congress, the responsibility and the resulting material loss and national humiliation rests upon them; and if the Congress, having been instructed by the people, fails to provide the means, then the responsibility is theirs.

11. In this connection, and for the furtherance of the establishment and carrying out of a definite naval policy, the General Board invites especial attention to the proposed formation of a council of national defense. The formation of such a body would, in the opinion of the board, compel the adoption of a definite naval policy and assure the department of the aid of all other branches of the Government in carrying it out. Further, all other branches of the Government, more especially the legislative, would become instruments for disseminating knowledge of the naval needs of the Nation among the people in justifying the policy, thus giving the people that understanding which is needed for earnest support.

12. The General Board recognizes that full understanding and complete support from the people and from Congress can not be obtained immediately, nor in a few weeks or months, or possibly years. It believes, however, that it can eventually be obtained, and that the best and surest method of doing this is for the department—which has knowledge and understanding of the questions involved—to adopt and maintain consistently from year to year a fixed governmental policy, taking the Congress and the people fully into its confidence, and disseminating generally through the press, through patriotic societies and organizations, and through any other available agencies its reasons and arguments in support of its policy.

13. As a basis for this governmental policy the General Board recommends:

(a) That the fleet shall consist of 48 battleships of the line, with the appropriate number of lesser units and auxiliaries to complete and maintain a fighting whole.

(b) That the personnel of the Navy, officers and enlisted men, shall grow and keep pace with the matériel fleet; and there shall at all times

be on the lists, active and reserve, a sufficient number of officers and men to fully man the existing fleet for war.

(c) That the full strength of the fleet given in (a) shall be attained at the earliest date practicable—by 1920 if possible. That, pending the full cooperation of the people and the Congress in carrying out this program, and as long as the full yearly increase the program calls for can not be obtained, the new construction each year shall be recommended in the proportions based on battleships to keep the fleet a complete fighting whole.

14. As a basis for departmental recommendation to Congress to carry out subhead (c) of the preceding paragraph, the General Board submits, as the results of its studies pursued since 1900, the following proportions of the various units needed for a complete fighting fleet: To 8 battleships there should be 32 destroyers, 16 submarines, 1 ammunition ship, 2 destroyer tenders, 4 fuel ships, 1 hospital ship, 1 repair ship, 2 submarine tenders, 1 supply ship, 1 transport. To these, with the present state of development, should be added at least 16 aeroplanes. With these proportions, to carry out the policy in full, there would be required to be laid down each year until the full fleet of 48 battleships was completed, 4 battleships, 16 destroyers, 8 submarines, 8 aeroplanes, and 6 auxiliaries, the particular kind of auxiliaries to be laid down each year to be of the character to keep the auxiliary fleet in the proportions given above.

(NOTE.—Until a sufficient number of aeroplanes for the existing fleet are obtained, the board recommends that no limitation be placed on the number to be built each year, since the aid for material states that the funds are available.)

15. The General Board recommends that the department place this program before Congress yearly until 1920, in pursuance of its definite policy.

PERSONNEL.

16. The immediate preceding paragraphs have treated of a naval policy in relation to material only. In the opinion of the board a naval policy in relation to personnel is of even greater importance, as all history teaches us that the greatest element of success in all enterprises, and more especially in the enterprises of war, lies in the personnel conducting the enterprise and its morale.

17. The General Board has from its incipency given careful consideration to this question and made recommendations to the department from time to time. These recommendations have varied in details at times to meet conditions existing at the time, but have all been founded on the same fundamental ideas, which are expressed in the citation made in paragraph 11 of this letter from General Board letter No. 420-422, of October 17, 1903. The same idea is expressed in paragraph 4 of General Board letter No. 58, of February 9, 1903, which reads:

"4. The General Board further strongly recommends, as an essential part of any intelligent continued naval policy, that whenever an appropriation is made for an increase in the material of the fleet, the corresponding indispensable increase in personnel of officers and men be simultaneously provided for."

18. In the opinion of the General Board the question of personnel is more urgent now than at any time in the history of the Navy; and the board believes that the adoption and continued advocacy from year to year of a regular policy by the department of expansion and regulation of the personnel coequal with the expansion of the fleet will result in eventual success.

19. The General Board recommends as a basis for such a policy: (a) That the personnel of the Navy, officers and enlisted men, including the active list and an established and trained naval reserve, shall at all times be sufficient to fully man the entire fleet for war.

(b) That the officers, and enlisted men of the Navy on the active list shall bear a definite fixed ratio to the total displacement of the fighting units of the fleet.

(c) That the officers of the active list of the Navy shall be distributed in the various grades in a ratio that will insure the best efficiency of the fleet, by having in all grades the proper proportion of numbers for the duties of the grade, and so regulated as to bring each officer to the grade with sufficient experience and at the age when best equipped to perform the duties of the grade.

20. The General Board in this letter has taken up the question of naval policy in relation to the fighting fleet and its creation only; and has not considered lesser adjuncts, as gunboats, tugs, etc.; nor has it considered the question of policy from the point of view of naval bases, stations, docks, and maintenance. The General Board does not consider that such lesser adjuncts as gunboats, tugs, and naval police duties enter into the broad question of a national naval policy and, hence, need not be discussed in a letter on policy. The broad question of the maintenance and uses of the fleet, however, which includes bases, stations, and docks, is coextensive with the creation of the fleet, and a national naval policy in relation to them will be discussed in another letter.

GEORGE DEWEY.

EXHIBIT B.

REPORT OF THE GENERAL BOARD OF THE NAVY, 1914.
DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY,
GENERAL BOARD,
Washington, November 17, 1914.

To: Secretary of the Navy.
Subject: Increase of the Navy; building program and personnel, 1916.
Reference: Department's indorsement 8557-146: 11, September 22, 1914.

Article 167, paragraph 3, United States Navy Regulations, 1913, reads as follows:

"It (the General Board) shall consider the number and types of ships proper to constitute the fleet, the number and rank of officers, and the number and rating of enlisted men required to man them, and shall advise the Secretary of the Navy respecting the estimates therefor (including such increase as may be requisite) to be submitted annually to Congress."

The General Board, in compliance with duties thus imposed upon it by this and similar paragraphs in preceding regulations, has from year to year recommended to the department a building program and personnel legislation that would, in its opinion, produce a fleet that would be adequate to the needs of the Nation.

2. In view of conditions now existing, the General Board has given particularly careful thought to its recommendations for the coming fiscal year. To make its position clear and place before the department the full meaning of its recommendations, the General Board considers it necessary to review at length all that has preceded these recommendations and led up to them.

CONSISTENT POLICY OF GENERAL BOARD SINCE 1903.

3. In its letter No. 420-2, of October 17, 1903, the general board, after mature consideration of our national policies and interests, and of those of the other leading naval nations of the world, expressed its opinion of what the ultimate strength of the United States Navy should be, and recommended a program for the completion of the Navy to the strength then believed adequate by 1919.

4. The basis of the fleet recommended was 48 battleships; and lesser units and auxiliaries were recommended in the proportions believed to be best to complete a fighting fleet, in the light of the best information obtainable at that time. The influence of the progress made by new inventions and the discovery of new ideas in the development of the lesser units have changed the proportions and character of some of these lesser units; and have, to that extent, modified the original recommendations of the General Board. But the fundamental fact that the power of a fleet is to be measured by the number and efficiency of its heavy fighting units, or battleships, has remained unchanged. The recommendations of the General Board heretofore submitted have consistently followed a policy looking to the creation of a fleet founded on a battleship strength of 48, in accordance with its recommendation made in 1903, of what it considered an adequate fleet to meet the naval needs of the Nation and be an adequate insurance against aggression.

5. The General Board believes that these recommendations made from year to year have been both misunderstood and misconstrued in some quarters. An impression prevails that the General Board has always recommended an annual continuing building program of four battleships, with accompanying lesser units and auxiliaries. A brief analysis of the recommendations made by the General Board, beginning with the original formulation of its policy in 1903, to the present time, will demonstrate the error of this impression, and show that the recommendations made were consistent and contemplated the creation of a battleship fleet of 48 vessels by 1919, but did not involve a constant and fixed program of building 4 battleships a year.

BATTLESHIPS.

6. In October, 1903, the Navy had 10 battleships completed and 14 more either under construction or authorized. The last of these 14 was to be completed by 1907. In view of this condition, and to complete a fleet of 48 battleships by 1919, the General Board, in paragraph 8 of its letter of October 17, 1903, recommended:

"8. To sum up, the General Board recommends that Congress be requested to authorize for the present a yearly building program, not limited by the amount appropriated last year, composed of the following ships: Two battleships, etc."

To this letter was appended a table, quoted below, showing what the condition of the Navy would be in battleships, year by year, to 1919, starting with the 10 completed and 14 already building or authorized, if the recommendation of the General Board for a two battleship per year program from 1904 were followed:

Year.	Battleships.		Year.	Battleships.	
	Completed.	Authorized.		Completed.	Authorized.
1903.....	10	14	1912.....	34	2
1904.....	12	2	1913.....	36	2
1905.....	17	2	1914.....	38	2
1906.....	19	2	1915.....	40	2
1907.....	24	2	1916.....	42
1908.....	26	2	1917.....	44
1909.....	28	2	1918.....	46
1910.....	30	2	1919.....	48
1911.....	32	2			

7. It will be seen from the foregoing table that the General Board's recommendation provided for a two-battleship program consistently pursued from 1904 to 1915 to provide a fleet of 48 battleships by 1919. In these recommendations replacements were not considered, nor had limits of age been placed on battleships. The fundamental idea, however, was a 2-battleship program to provide a fleet of 48 battleships by 1919. A larger program to hasten the completion of the fleet had been considered, but had been rejected because it was believed a fleet of 48 battleships by 1919 would answer all needs, in view of the known building programs of other countries.

8. In pursuance of this policy the General Board, as stated above, began its yearly recommendations by asking that two battleships be authorized in 1904. The following table shows the yearly programs recommended. The reasons for an increase over two battleships annually are given in succeeding paragraphs:

Year.	Battleships.		Year.	Battleships.	
	Recommended by General Board.	Authorized by Congress.		Recommended by General Board.	Authorized by Congress.
1904.....	2	1	1909.....	4	2
1905.....	3	2	1910.....	4	2
1906.....	3	1	1911.....	4	2
1907.....	2	1	1912.....	4	1
1908.....	4	2	1913.....	4	1

9. The recommendation for the laying down of two ships in 1904 failed of enactment, and only one was provided for, leaving the program for the creation of a 48-battleship fleet by 1919 one ship in arrears. To make this deficiency good, and maintain the general program, one additional ship, or three in all, were recommended for the 1905 program. Two were authorized, still leaving a deficiency of one for the two years 1904 and 1905. To provide for this, three were again recommended for the 1906 program. In 1906 and again in 1907

one ship only was authorized, leaving by 1908 the general program three ships in arrears. To begin making this deficiency good the General Board for the 1908 program recommended the authorization of four ships. From 1908 to 1911, inclusive, Congress followed the original program and provided for two battleships yearly. The accumulated shortage of three ships still remained, however, during these four years, and the General Board recommended year by year the laying down of four ships to begin making this good, since each succeeding year found the shortage still there.

10. In 1910 a new element entered, not considered in the original program. The fleet of 48 battleships contemplated in the program put forward in 1903, on a two-battleship per year building program, to be ready by 1919, contained all battleships then borne on the list, beginning with the *Indiana*. Experience had not yet in 1903 demonstrated the effective life of battleships, nor had any exhaustive study been made of it. Beginning with the program recommended for 1911 in General Board's letter No. 420-2, of May 24, 1910, this matter was seriously taken into consideration, since experience had shown that the three older battleships, the *Indiana*, *Massachusetts*, and *Oregon*, then 20 years old from date of authorization, were approaching the limit of their effective life. Further studies from our own experience and from that of other navies and from practice abroad convinced the General Board that the effective life of battleships is about 20 years from time of completion; and that hence, to maintain a fleet at a given strength, it is necessary to lay down a replacement ship 20 years from the time of the laying down of the original ship. Hence, replacement ships for the *Indiana*, *Oregon*, and *Massachusetts* should have been laid down in 1910, for the *Iowa* in 1912, and new replacement ships should be begun for the *Kentucky* and *Kearsarge* in 1915. These matters, together with the shortage of three battleships already existing in 1911, were taken into consideration by the General Board in making its recommendations for a four-battleship program in both 1912 and 1913. One battleship only was authorized in each of these two years, increasing the shortage in the original program to five, without considering replacement ships for the *Indiana*, *Oregon*, *Massachusetts*, and *Iowa*, already overdue for authorization.

11. The preceding analysis shows clearly the error in the prevailing impression that the General Board has heretofore advocated a navy based on a continuous building program of four battleships a year, and proves that up to the present it has advocated continuously and consistently a program to produce a fleet of 48 battleships by 1919. This would have called for, considering replacements, a general two-battleship program with a third added every three years. The number of battleships called for by this policy—48—and the date set for their completion—by 1919—were fixed by a calm and logical review of the policies and aims of the Nation and the known laws and prospective developments and aims of other countries, and the policy was to provide and maintain at all times a fleet equal to or superior to that of any nation likely to challenge our policies.

12. The 1903 program given in paragraph 6 of this letter, as modified by the replacement policy in 1910, called for at this date, November, 1914:

(a) Effective battleships completed and ready for service less than 20 years old from completion	38
(b) Battleships under construction	7
(c) Battleships authorized in 1914	2
Total	47

13. The actual situation of the fleet as relates to battleships at this date, November, 1914, is as follows:

(a) Effective battleships completed and ready for service less than 20 years old from completion (since the sale of the <i>Mississippi</i> and <i>Idaho</i>)	30
(b) Battleships under construction	4
(c) Battleships authorized in 1914	2
(d) To replace <i>Mississippi</i> and <i>Idaho</i>	1
Total	37

14. This shows that we are now deficient 10 battleships, built, building, and authorized, from that contemplated in the 1903 program.

15. The General Board has made the foregoing brief analysis to set forth clearly the reasons for and meaning of all the recommendations it has made for battleship construction up to this time; and to show the conception under which the General Board has acted in the performance of its duty, under the regulations, as the responsible advisers of the Secretary in all matters relating to the strength of the fleet and the number and character of the units composing it. In the matter of battleships, the final result of all recommendations, and of all action taken thereon up to this date, has been to produce a completed battle line of eight units less than the General Board believed to be safe, and with two units less under construction and authorized than was needed to continue the expansion of the fleet to the strength laid down in the policy.

16. The General Board believes the policy it has consistently advocated for the production of an adequate Navy is to the best interests of the country, and that any Navy less than adequate is an expense to the Nation without being a protection. It can not, therefore, too strongly urge the adoption by the Government of a policy looking to the making good of the deficiencies of the past and the building up of this arm of the national defense until it becomes equal to the task that war will put upon it. That point will not be reached until the Navy is strong enough to meet on equal terms the strongest probable adversary.

17. The wisdom of such a policy is well illustrated by recent events, and is reinforced by the teachings of all history. For a review of the history of all ages will show that no nation has ever created and maintained a great over-sea commerce without the support of sea power. It will further show that trade rivalry, which is the active expression of the most universal of all human traits—desire for gain—has been a most fruitful cause of war; and, when the clash has come, the commerce of the weaker sea power has been broken up and driven from the seas. That has been true for all time, and is true to-day; and has a particular bearing on the United States at the present time, when such strenuous efforts are being made to build up a national merchant marine and extend our foreign commerce.

18. In the matter of national defense, history teaches still another great lesson particularly applicable to ourselves. That is, that a nation, insular in character or separated by bodies of water from other nations, can and must rely on its Navy—when that Navy is adequate—for protection and freedom from invasion and may keep its own soil free from all wars other than civil. The United States is one among the few nations of the world that occupy this happy position, being

insular in so far as any nation capable of making serious war upon us is concerned, since any opponent that need be considered must come to us from across the seas. Our main defense and protection from invasion must, therefore, always rest with the Navy, which must ever remain our first and best line of defense. This defense, unless adequate, is impotent; and, as before stated, adequacy is not reached until the Navy is strong enough to meet on equal terms the navy of the strongest probable adversary.

19. In the matter of battleships the General Board remains of the opinion that it has always held, that command of the sea can only be gained and held by vessels that can take and keep the sea in all times and in all weathers and overcome the strongest enemy vessels that may be brought against them. Other types are valuable and have their particular uses, all of which are indispensable, but limited in character. But, what has been true throughout all naval wars of the past, and what is equally true to-day, is that the backbone of any navy that can command the sea consists of the strongest seagoing, sea-keeping ships of its day, or, of its battleships. The General Board recommends, therefore, in the light of all the information it has up to this present date, that the development of the battleship fleet be continued as the primary aim in naval development, and that four of them be authorized in the 1916 program.

DESTROYERS.

20. For the general purposes of war on the sea the General Board has placed the destroyer as the type of warship next in importance to the battleship, and has based the programs it has recommended on that idea. After very mature consideration of all the elements involved and a study of the results obtained from fleet maneuvers, the General Board came to the conclusion that a well-balanced fighting fleet, for all the purposes of offense and defense, called for a relative proportion of four destroyers to one battleship. Hence for every battleship built four destroyers should be provided. The General Board still holds this opinion and, therefore, recommends that 16 destroyers be provided in the 1916 program.

FLEET SUBMARINES.

21. For several years past all leading navies have been striving to perfect a submarine of an enlarged type with habitability, radius, and speed sufficient to enable it to accompany the fleet and act with it tactically, both in offense and defense. Our designers and builders have been devoting their efforts to the same end and are now ready to guarantee such a type and one such vessel was provided for in the appropriation act of 1914. The great difficulty in the past in the production of this type has been the lack of a reliable internal-combustion engine of the requisite power to give the necessary speed. This difficulty has been overcome, and the General Board is assured that engines have been designed and fully tested that will meet the requirements, and the builders stand ready to guarantee the results. The value of such a type in war for distant work with the fleet can hardly be over-estimated, and the General Board recommends that three be provided in the 1916 program. These, with the one already authorized, will form a fleet submarine division of four for work with the fleet, and be the beginning of a powerful arm of the fleet.

COAST SUBMARINES.

22. For the submarine for coast defense and for occasional acting with the fleet in home waters, the General Board sees no necessity for boats of as great speed and size as the later designs, made before the seagoing submarine was believed to be in sight. In fact, any increase of size is detrimental, in that it increases draft and debars them from shallow waters; and any increase of speed in this class of submarines is not needed, and is gained at the expense of other desirable qualities. Between the coast-defense submarine and the submarine of sufficient size, radius, habitability, and surface speed to accompany and act with the fleet tactically, the General Board sees no necessity in naval warfare for an intermediate type. It is therefore recommended that the submarines for the coast work be of the general characteristics already prescribed in General Board letter No. 420-15, of June 10, 1914, and that 16 of these be provided for in the 1916 program.

SCOUT CRUISERS.

23. In the struggle to build up the purely distinctive fighting ships of the Navy—battleships, destroyers, and submarines—the cruising and scouting element of the fleet has been neglected in recent years, and no cruisers or scouts have been provided for since 1904, when the *Montana*, *North Carolina*, *Birmingham*, *Chester*, and *Salem* were authorized. This leaves the fleet peculiarly lacking in this element so necessary for information in a naval campaign, and of such great value in clearing the sea of torpedo and mining craft, in opening and protecting routes of trade for our own commerce, and in closing and prohibiting such routes to the commerce of the enemy. The General Board believes that this branch of the fleet has been too long neglected, and recommends that the construction of this important and necessary type be resumed. For the 1916 program it is recommended that four scout cruisers be provided.

AIR CRAFT.

24. The General Board in its indorsement No. 449 of August 30, 1913, and accompanying memorandum brought to the attention of the department the dangerous situation of the country in the lack of air craft and air men in both the naval and military services. A résumé was given in that indorsement with the accompanying memorandum of conditions in the leading countries abroad at that date, showing the preparations being made for air warfare and the use of air craft by both armies and navies, and contrasting their activity with our own inactivity. Certain recommendations were made in the same indorsement looking to the beginning of the establishment of a proper air service for the Navy.

25. The total result of that effort was the appointment of a board on aeronautics October 9, 1913. That board made further recommendations, among them the establishment of an aeronautic school and station at Pensacola and the purchase of 50 aeroplanes, 1 fleet dirigible, and 2 small dirigibles for training. At the present time, more than a year later, the total number of air craft of any kind owned by the Navy consists of 12 aeroplanes, not more than 2 of which are of the same type, and all reported to have too little speed and carrying capacity for service work.

26. In view of the advance that has been made in aeronautics during the past year and the demonstration now being made of the vital importance of a proper air service to both land and sea warfare, our present situation can be described as nothing less than deplorable. As now developed, air craft are the eyes of both armies and navies, and it is difficult to place any limit to their offensive possibilities.

27. In our present condition of unpreparedness, in contact with any foe possessing a proper air service, our scouting would be blind. We

would be without the means of detecting the presence of submarines or mine fields or of attempting direct attack on the enemy from the air, while our own movements would be an open book to him. The General Board can not too strongly urge that the department's most serious thought be given to this matter, and that immediate steps be taken to remedy it, and recommends that Congress be asked for an appropriation of at least \$5,000,000, to be made available immediately, for the purpose of establishing an efficient air service.

GUNBOATS.

28. The Navy is very deficient in gunboats. Though the Navy list gives 30 names under "gunboats," only a very limited number of these 30 are in a condition to be available for general service. Some, like the *Villalobos*, *Callao*, *Samar*, *Sandoval*, etc., are old boats of little value taken over from Spain, of from 400 to 250 tons and less. Of the others, with the exception of the light-draft river gunboats *Monocacy* and *Palos*, and the *Sacramento*, no gunboats have been authorized since 1902. Seven are at present assigned to Naval Militia duty, and three others have been recently withdrawn from that service because of the crying need for more gunboats for general duty. Those remaining on the list serviceable and fit for general duty are so limited in number that it has been necessary in recent years to detail battleships, large cruisers, and destroyers to do gunboat duty. This has been markedly demonstrated during the past year on the Mexican coast. It would seem superfluous to point out the harmful influence this has on the efficiency and training of the fleet for war, and the General Board advises strongly against such practice whenever it can be possibly avoided. It is therefore recommended that a beginning be made to replace the old and worn-out gunboats, that there may be sufficient of them to do the police and general diplomatic duties required of such vessels in time of peace without disrupting the battle fleet. To this end it is recommended that four be authorized in the 1916 program. With the exception of the *Sacramento*, authorized in 1911, no seagoing gunboat has been authorized since 1902.

AUXILIARIES.

FUEL SHIPS.

29. In the matter of auxiliaries needed for the fleet, the General Board is of the opinion that the most serious situation exists in the matter of fuel-oil supply, and that provision for oil-fuel ships should be given first consideration. This is serious from the point of view of economy in time of peace and would be disastrous in the event of hostilities arising. We have 41 oil-burning destroyers built or building, to be followed by others, 8 ships of the dreadnaught type using oil as an auxiliary fuel, and in 1915 the two first all-oil-fuel battleships will be added to the fleet, to be followed by others. To supply this oil-burning fleet with fuel the Navy possesses the *Arctusa*, an old tank ship of 3,629 tons capacity and not more than 10 knots speed, and seven fleet colliers fitted to carry some fuel oil in addition. The total oil capacity is 23,728 tons, 3,629 tons of which—that in the *Arctusa*—could not accompany the fleet; so that the present available oil supply that could accompany the fleet is 20,109 tons. Logistic studies show that to maintain our present oil-burning fleet in active service across the ocean requires the delivery of about 23,000 tons of fuel oil per month. To maintain this supply we have the seven colliers mentioned above capable of delivering an average of about 10,000 tons per month. This situation will be very much aggravated on the addition to the fleet of the two all-oil-burning battleships, *Oklahoma* and *Nevada*, and the other destroyers now under construction. Nor can commercial oil carriers be relied upon to remedy this deficiency, since ocean tankage, both at home and abroad, is not yet adequate to meet the demands of commerce and industry.

30. To partially meet this situation two oil-fuel ships of a combined cargo capacity of 15,108 tons were authorized in August, 1912. On November 1, 1914, one of these ships was only 82.4 per cent completed and the other only 57.2 per cent completed.

31. To remedy this serious defect in our preparedness for war the General Board recommended the construction of two oil-fuel ships in the 1915 program. These were not authorized, and the General Board therefore emphatically repeats this recommendation for the 1916 program, and further recommends that the construction of the two ships authorized in August, 1912, more than two years ago, be hastened with all possible speed.

DESTROYER TENDERS AND SUBMARINE TENDERS.

32. The auxiliaries of next importance to the fleet at the present time, after the oil-fuel ships, are destroyer tenders and submarine tenders. Of the three improvised vessels used as destroyer tenders the *Iris*, built in 1885, is past her period of usefulness and should be replaced. The General Board recommended one destroyer tender in the 1915 program. This was not authorized, and the recommendation is repeated for the 1916 program.

33. Of the six vessels used as submarine tenders, all are of the improvised variety, and none is well fitted for the service. Three of them are old monitors, two of them old gunboats, and one the old sailing ship *Severn*. To begin replacing these, one submarine tender was authorized in 1911, another in 1912, and one was recommended in 1913 for the 1915 program. This last was not authorized, and this recommendation is repeated for the 1916 program.

TRANSPORTS.

34. The General Board has from time to time, in numerous letters extending over a series of years, called the attention of the department to the inadequacy of preparation in the Navy for advanced base work and to the vital importance of this work to success in war. The prerequisite for any advanced base work is the necessary means for transportation of the personnel and material of the advanced base outfit; and for this reason the General Board has recommended the construction of the two transports needed for the purpose—ships of the size and speed necessary and especially designed for what they were intended to accomplish. Their primary use was to be for war, but secondarily they could be used in general transportation service at all times. Not one of the four improvised transports now in service in the Navy—the *Hancock*, *Rainbow*, *Prairie*, and *Buffalo*—is of the size or is fitted for the work required, nor of the character of construction needed for safety in ships carrying large bodies of men. All are old single-skin ships without proper water-tight subdivision. Of the two transports needed, one was authorized in 1913, and the other recommended in the 1915 program. This was not authorized, and the General Board repeats this recommendation for the 1916 program.

HOSPITAL SHIP.

35. The General Board in making the foregoing recommendations has given preference to what is needed for the fighting efficiency of the fleet over all other matters. Two other types of auxiliaries, however, are required for the successful administration of the fleet—hospital and supply ships.

36. The two hospital ships now borne on the Navy list—the *Solace* and the *Relief*—are both improvised and small, and neither adapted to the service. They have done good service in time of peace in connection with subdivisions of the fleet, but the *Relief* is now unseaworthy and the *Solace* would be of limited value in time of war. To remedy this defect, the General Board recommended the construction of one hospital ship in the 1915 program. This was not authorized, and the General Board repeats this recommendation for the 1916 program.

SUPPLY SHIPS.

37. Of the four ships borne on the Navy list as supply ships, all are improvised and were hurriedly bought and fitted in 1898 to meet the exigencies of the Spanish War. The *Supply* is already beyond her period of usefulness, and has been discarded as a supply ship. The *Culgoa* is approaching her limit of usefulness. The *Celtic* and *Glacier*, while old and inadequately fitted, are still good for some years service. One new ship was authorized in 1913. Another is needed, and to meet this situation the General Board recommended the construction of one supply ship in the 1915 program. This was not authorized, and the General Board repeats this recommendation for the 1916 program.

SUMMARY.

38. To summarize, the General Board recommends for the 1916 program—

- 4 battleships.
- 16 destroyers.
- 3 fleet submarines.
- 16 coast submarines.
- 4 scouts.
- 4 gunboats.
- 2 oil-fuel ships.
- 1 destroyer tender.
- 1 submarine tender.
- 1 Navy transport.
- 1 hospital ship.
- 1 supply ship.
- Air service, \$5,000,000.

PERSONNEL.

39. The General Board can not too strongly urge upon the department the necessity of using its best endeavors to carry out the repeated recommendations of the General Board, made from year to year, to provide the fleet with a personnel, active list, and trained reserve equal to the manning of the fleet of war.

40. In the opinion of the General Board this is a matter of even more serious import than that of construction, for it can not be too often repeated that ships without a trained personnel to man and fight them are useless for the purposes of war. The training needed for the purpose is long and arduous, and can not be done after the outbreak of war. This must have been provided for long previous to the beginning of hostilities; and any ship of the fleet found at the outbreak of war without provision having been made for its manning by officers and men trained for service can be counted as only a useless mass of steel whose existence leads only to a false sense of security.

41. The strength of fleets is measured too often in the public mind by the number and tonnage of its material units. The real strength of a fleet is a combination of its personnel—with their skill and training—and its material; and of these two elements the more important—the personnel—is too often forgotten and neglected in making provision for our fleet. The General Board can not impress this point too strongly on the department or recommend too earnestly that every effort be made to correct it, and that legislation be urged to provide for a personnel on the active list, supplemented by a trained reserve, sufficient to man every vessel of the fleet when the call comes.

42. No nation in time of peace keeps all the ships of its navy fully manned and in full commission. But all leading nations except ourselves provide an active list, officers and men, sufficient to keep the best of their fleet in full commission and all the serviceable ships of their fleet in a material condition for war; and in addition a trained reserve of officers and men sufficient to complete the complements and fully man every serviceable ship of their navies, and furnish a reserve for casualties. Thus, every nation with which conflict is possible is prepared to mobilize its entire navy, by order, with officers and men trained for the service. We alone of the naval powers provide no such reserves, and an active personnel too scant, and trust to the filling of the complements of our ships by untrained men recruited after war is imminent or declared. To quickly man all of the ships of the Navy serviceable for war (including ships which are now in reserve or ordinary) with trained crews is impossible owing to the absence of a trained reserve.

43. In view of all that has been herein set forth, the General Board recommends:

(a) That legislation be asked for providing an active personnel, officers and enlisted force, capable of keeping in full commission all battleships under 15 years of age from date of authorization, all destroyers and submarines under 12 years of age from authorization, half of the cruisers and all gunboats, and all the necessary auxiliaries that go with the active fleet; and of furnishing nucleus crews for all ships in the Navy that would be used in time of war, and the necessary men for the training and other shore stations.

(b) That the general policy be adopted of expanding the active personnel with the expansion of the fleet in the proportions indicated in (a).

(c) That immediate steps be taken to form a national naval reserve of trained officers and men, and that this work be pushed until this reserve, in connection with the Naval Militia, has reached the point where, combined with the active list, it will be possible to fully man the entire fleet with war complements and furnish 10 per cent additional for casualties.

(d) That the Naval Militia be expanded in number and that the department encourage the continuance and improvement of its training to the end that it may still more efficiently serve to reinforce the regular service at need.

GEORGE DEWEY.

EXHIBIT C.

ADMIRAL KNIGHT SURPRISES SECRETARY DANIELS.

UNITED STATES NAVAL WAR COLLEGE,
Newport, R. I., December 15, 1914.

To: The Secretary of the Navy.
Subject: Coordination in the fleet and the Navy Department.
Reference: (a) Department telegram of December 15, 1914.

1. Receipt is hereby acknowledged of the following telegram:

WASHINGTON, D. C., December 15, 1914.

Rear Admiral AUSTIN M. KNIGHT,
Naval War College, Newport, R. I.:

Desire statement by first mail from you for insertion in hearing as to whether or not there is lack of coordination in the administration of the fleet and what the War College says it should accomplish.

JOSEPHUS DANIELS.

2. It is not possible in the brief time before the departure of the mail to compress into a few words a satisfactory reply to these questions, nor would it be possible in any case to avoid some discussion of issues which may appear to lie outside the field—not very closely defined—of the department's inquiry.

3. It will be convenient to reply to the second of the questions before taking up the first.

4. The War College considers that every effort of the fleet and every effort of the department in connection with the fleet should have for its sole aim the war efficiency of the fleet. Every effort which does not directly contribute to this end is in itself a wasteful expenditure of energy, and, so far as it is a diversion from this end, is distinctly harmful.

5. So much for what the fleet should accomplish.

6. Coming now to the question of coordination. By coordination is understood that unity of purpose and of effort which shall insure the concentration upon battle efficiency of all parts of the fleet itself and of all agencies outside of the fleet which bear, or can be made to bear, upon battle efficiency. The coordination of preparation is not less important than that of administration.

7. Coordination of administration calls for unity of effort within the fleet, within the Navy Department, and between the fleet and the Navy Department.

8. Unity of effort within the fleet demands that all elements of the fleet should be under a single administrative head and that they should act together under the direction of this head with singleness of purpose for the development of the ideal, namely, battle efficiency. For this they must, as far as possible, remain in intimate association with each other, with constant drills carefully designed to lead by progressive stages toward war maneuvers on a large scale.

9. It is clear that for many years past no such condition as this has existed. It is idle to connect this lack of coordination with any one administration of the Navy Department. It has characterized our naval policy, or, rather, our complete lack of naval policy, since 1865. One of the harmful manifestations of this lack of coordination is the frequent diversion of battleships and torpedo craft to uses widely different from that for which they exist, with resulting interruption of preparation for battle, and the breaking down of the efficiency of both material and personnel.

10. In many cases it is apparent that this use of the fighting units of the fleet results from the lack of cruisers and gunboats and that it is an emergency measure which can not be avoided. That this is a lack of coordination is not changed by the fact, if it is a fact, that the necessity for this condition is inherent in the present constitution of the fleet and in the exigencies arising from national policies.

11. In one important respect there has been recently a notable gain in coordination. The Navy Department, the fleet, and the War College have been drawn into very much more intimate association than has ever before existed, the importance of this association having for the first time found recognition under the present administration of the Navy Department. There is every reason to believe that these relations will become constantly closer as time goes by with results which will be far-reaching in their effect upon the efficiency of our Naval Establishment as a whole.

12. It is clear that the necessities which have arisen for using battleships to do the work of cruisers and gunboats arises from the lack of coordination in the character of the fleet. A true coordination here would result in an all-around harmonious development providing for all demands upon the Navy in peace and war. In my opinion the responsibility for this lack of coordination rests with Congress and with Congress alone. It is often said that naval officers themselves do not know what they want and neither Congress or the country has any guide in this matter; that naval officers have never stated what they mean by an "adequate navy."

13. No doubt there have been wide differences of opinion upon this subject and many inconsistencies in the views of naval officers themselves. But for many years past the General Board has spoken in no uncertain terms, and its reports are available for anyone who seeks information as to expert naval opinion on the subject of an adequate Navy for peace and war.

14. In some cases the Navy Department has accepted the recommendations of the General Board and passed them on to Congress, where they have never, so far as I recall, been accepted in their entirety. But in nearly all cases the Navy Department has felt called upon, even when agreeing with the views of the General Board, to ask for very much smaller appropriations than the recommendations of the board required. This because it has been considered impossible to obtain appropriations for anything approximating the complete program.

15. Replying specifically, then, to the first of the department's questions, the War College believes that lack of coordination does exist in the fleet; between the Navy Department and the fleet, and between the Navy Department, the fleet, and Congress. The college does not regard this as a new situation, although it happens for the moment to be unusually acute, and this, unfortunately, at a time when perfect coordination is especially to be desired.

16. The remedy for this condition rests partly with the fleet, where it is believed that everything which can be done is already in preparation; partly with the department, where it is understood that plans have already been formulated for more extensive maneuvers than have ever before been attempted by our fleet; and partly—and chiefly—with Congress, which alone has power to correct the imperfections in the composition of the fleet which make coordination difficult, and where there is already pending a bill for a council of national defense, which more than all other agencies combined would make for a coordination

of all the agencies of the Government, many of which lie far outside the fields of the Navy and the Navy Department.

AUSTIN M. KNIGHT.

EXHIBIT D.

A SERMON OF 1785.

"AS A LOVER OF PEACE, I WISH TO SEE MY COUNTRY PREPARED FOR WAR."

The following interesting historical citation is contributed by J. M. Wilson, of Lowell, Mass. The sermon quoted appears in Potter's Biography of Dr. Jeremy Belknap, Manchester Monthly, March, 1852.

The following is an extract from a sermon preached before the General Court of New Hampshire, June 2, 1785, by Rev. Jeremy Belknap, D. D., author of "The History of New Hampshire":

It is a melancholy consideration that one of the most effectual methods to preserve peace is to be prepared for war; but such is the present constitution of things in this unhappy world, and such it will be till the gospel of peace shall so far prevail and extend its influence as that the nations will either avoid all occasions of controversy or agree to refer their disputes to some arbitrating power, with a peaceful design to abide its determination. (The distant hint of such a proposal does honor to the benevolent heart that conceived it and will do more honor to the States or nations that will publicly recommend and adopt it.) But at present it seems as if things must go on in their old course. The lust of power has been a ruling passion since the days of Nimrod, and there is no effectual way to check it but by a forcible resistance. Convinced that a nation can not preserve itself but by rendering itself formidable, as a lover of peace, I wish to see my country prepared for war: to see every cannon which now lies carelessly about our streets and wharves and in our forts properly secured from decay; every musket and sword furnished and kept in the nicest order; our militia officered and instructed, arranged and accoutered, and ready for the field on the shortest notice; our arsenals and magazines well supplied; our fortifications repaired and strengthened and garrisoned. God only knows who our next enemies may be or how soon we may have occasion for our veteran officers and soldiers and our foreign friends and allies.

EXHIBIT E.

Memorandum for the press prepared by Assistant Secretary of the Navy Franklin D. Roosevelt, October 21, 1914:

In answer to certain statements which have appeared in regard to the personnel and the state of preparedness of the Navy at the present time and supplementing what has already been said by the Secretary of the Navy, I wish to call attention to certain facts which have, perhaps, been misunderstood by some. The Navy has always felt glad to have the actual facts relating to the condition and the needs of the service given the widest publicity.

In regard to the numbers of the officers and men of the Navy, there has never been an attempt to hide the fact that although the numbers are recruited up to the limit allowed by Congress we have only sufficient men to man, in an adequate manner, a portion of the vessels already built. At the present time 3 second-line battleships, 2 armored cruisers, 4 first-class cruisers, 1 second-class cruiser, 2 third-class cruisers, 21 destroyers, 3 monitors, 5 submarines, 1 gunboat, 3 fuel ships, and 2 vessels of special type are in commission in reserve; that is to say, they have on board only from 25 to 50 per cent of the crews necessary to man them in case of war.

There are also 6 second-line battleships; 1 armored cruiser; 1 cruiser, second class; and 14 torpedo boats which are in the condition technically called "in ordinary." These vessels are manned by from 10 to 20 per cent of their regular complements—just enough to prevent them from rusting to pieces. Further, there are 3 second-line battleships, 3 second-class cruisers, 1 third-class cruiser, 1 destroyer, 2 monitors, 4 torpedo boats, 6 gunboats, 1 transport, 1 hospital ship, 1 fuel ship, 1 repair ship, and 11 converted yachts which are at present out of commission altogether; these vessels are in nearly every case hopelessly out of date. They are to all intents and purposes unserviceable for war purposes. Several of these gunboats, torpedo boats, and converted yachts are, in the absence of suitable vessels, being used by the Naval Militias of the various States.

To provide a proper complement for all vessels of the Navy which could still be made useful for war purposes would require an addition to the present force allowed by Congress of about 18,000 men. Meanwhile the problem is becoming more difficult as time goes on because of the vessels under construction which must shortly be provided with crews. For instance, during the coming year two battleships, the *Oklahoma* and *Nevada*, will take their places with the fleet. Each of these vessels will require a complement of nearly a thousand men each. Theoretically and on paper the Navy possesses at the present time 10 battleships of the first line and 23 battleships of the second line. Actually, however, only the 10 battleships of the first line and 11 battleships of the second line can be placed in commission for service because of the shortage of men.

In regard to the material of the Navy—that is to say, ships and their equipment, including guns, engines, range finders, etc.—matters are on the whole in excellent shape. As units, the vessels in commission are well built, well designed, and well cared for, and compare in all types very favorably with the vessels of other powers. In fact, I believe that they are better. In a few particulars, such as the lack of sufficient torpedoes, there is room for great improvement. Also, in regard to the lack of certain auxiliaries and the insufficient number of scouts, much can be done to make the fleet better balanced. But the Navy has felt that while it greatly desires a well-rounded fleet in the material sense, it would be the greatest possible mistake to secure such a fleet at the expense of the main seagoing fighting craft; that is to say, our battleships and destroyers. This is because of the fact that makeshift auxiliaries can be improvised in an emergency, whereas battleships must be planned and commenced at least three years beforehand.

Mention has been made of the unreadiness of the fleet at the present time. It is true that during the past two years maneuvers and battle practice of the fleet as a whole have of necessity been greatly curtailed. International affairs have required the use of a certain number of our ships. In many of these cases the department has found it necessary, owing to the shortage of men, to use battleships for duty which could have been performed equally well by gunboats or small cruisers. This lack of fleet maneuvers is, however, a matter which can be remedied by

a few months' practice, and it is hoped that these maneuvers will take place in the near future.

The department has received numberless inquiries in regard to its attitude on the relative merits of battleships and submarines. There can be, of course, no fair or exact comparison between the two types of vessels, each of which has its own sphere of usefulness. In their present stage of development submarines and air craft can make a hostile attack only from a distance of approximately four or five hundred miles. In other words, from the purely technical point of view of national defense the use of a base within that distance of our own territory would be necessary for an attack by submarines and air craft upon our territory. The establishment and maintenance of such a base requires beyond all possibility of dispute the possession of the control of the sea or, in other words, a force of seagoing vessels superior to our own. Again, from the purely technical point of view of national defense submarines can probably be relied upon to ward off an attack by a hostile fleet upon the principal harbors of the continental coast line of the United States, provided the submarines are at the point of attack. The possession, however, of a seagoing fleet having rapidity of movement and the ability to keep the sea unsure, without doubt, the transference of a hostile attack to some point at sea at a great distance from our home shores and an ability to maintain a free highway for American commerce under conditions where the submarine would be practically powerless. All of this refers, of course, to the existing stage of development of all types of vessels of war. It would be foolish to attempt to prophesy what the future will bring forth, but it is at the present time clear that submarines have an undoubted sphere of usefulness in harbor work and within short distances of the coast, and that battleships are still the controlling factor in any war in which the belligerents are separated by great distances of water.

EXHIBIT F.

WARS AND REVOLUTIONS FROM END OF NAPOLEONIC WARS DOWN TO END OF FRANCO-PRUSSIAN WAR.

- 1815. Congress of Vienna; end of Napoleonic Wars.
- 1821-1832. War of Greek Independence.
- 1830. Revolution in France; revolution in Belgium against Holland; constitutional revolutions in Brunswick, Hesse, Hanover, and Saxony; revolution in the Papal States; revolution in Poland.
- 1832. Belgian neutrality guaranteed by the powers.
- 1832-1836. Civil wars in Spain and Portugal.
- 1846-1848. Rebellions of constitutional revolutions in France, Prussia, Hanover, northern Italy, Naples, Galicia, Austria, Hungary, Bohemia, and Switzerland.
- 1849. Independence of Hungary proclaimed.
- 1849-50. War in Schleswig-Holstein.
- 1852. Napoleon III declared Emperor of the French.
- 1854-1856. The Crimean War.
- 1859-60. War of Italian Independence.
- 1861-1865. American Civil War.
- 1862. Creation of Roumania.
- 1862-63. Rebellion in Poland.
- 1864. War in Schleswig-Holstein.
- 1866. War between Austria and Prussia; Venice ceded to Italy.
- 1870-71. Franco-Prussian War; proclamation of the German Empire at Versailles.

Mr. STEPHENS of California. Mr. Chairman, I yield 10 minutes to the gentleman from Pennsylvania [Mr. HULINGS].

Mr. HULINGS. Mr. Chairman, I do not take a great deal of stock in these war scares; but, just as a prudent business man would pay the cost of insurance to prevent loss by fire, I think it would be the part of prudence for this Government to provide a Navy strong enough to make it very improbable that an invading force could land on our shores. Now, just what degree of preparation that would require I am unable to tell, and for that reason I favor the suggestion of the gentleman from Massachusetts [Mr. GARDNER], that this matter should be remitted to a commission of experts who, by careful investigation, would be able to tell us what should be done. The United States Navy should be strictly up to date, perfect as American skill can devise, thoroughly equipped in all the auxiliaries necessary to make it a first-class fighting machine, finely coordinated with the Army and coastal defense, so that England or any other country contemplating an assault upon our shores might well hesitate. But that we should enter the race to build a great Navy is absurd at a time when in all probability it is least likely to be needed.

After this expression of my sentiments on a big or little Navy, I wish to digress to say that I was elected to Congress as a Progressive, and that I have been rather on the side line down here and have been given a greater opportunity to watch the game than to take any active part in it, and so I crave the indulgence of the House for an opportunity to say a few things that I think ought to be said.

I am somewhat in the frame of mind of the tramp printer to whom the editor when he went on a journey committed charge of the office. He collected bills for all the subscriptions and all the advertisements, and then he wrote an editorial and said, "I have always wanted to run a newspaper; I never thought it would be in a guy town like this; but the boss is gone, and I will never have another opportunity to tell you long-faced, hypocritical sneaks and booze hoisters what I think of you." He wrote a most defamatory article calling by name the prominent men of the town. Of course, it kicked up a great row, and when a posse of wrathful citizens went around to hunt up the author they learned that just as the paper had gone to press he had boarded a through train for the West. Unlike the

tramp, I have nothing derogatory to say of this Congress. On the contrary, I have the greatest respect and admiration for and shall always bear testimony to the ability, the great industry, and the high character of the average Member of Congress. The unflinching courtesy which the older Members of Congress give to new Members has put me under obligations that I shall never forget, and in singing my swan song before I board the train for the West, I only regret I shall have to part from gentlemen on both sides of this House whose friendship I shall always cherish among my dearest possessions.

Now, I have said that to square myself with you as most charming gentlemen with whom I do not agree politically, because I am going to tell you some things which, as Democrats, you will not like.

The Democratic Party came into power by the divine appointment (?) of 41 per cent of the voters. The other 59 per cent were not and never will be Democrats.

The Democrats were wildly enthusiastic about things they would do which they have not done and about things they would not do which they have done.

They were especially enthusiastic about the "pie counter," and created 5,500 new offices, at an annual expense of \$6,975,000.

They promised economy, and gave the country the most expensive administration the country has ever known.

They have stricken down the civil-service law in three separate assaults, approved by the President, to provide places to "reward faithful Democrats."

For 30 years the transcontinental railroads prevented the building of the Panama Canal. We gave our coastwise shipping free tolls. I think this was a mistake, and that as a mere economic policy every ship should pay a fair share of the cost; but it was done with the approval of the President and all political parties. But when Great Britain, whose shipping will get 80 per cent of the use of the canal, claimed that we had no more right in the canal than any other nation, except the exclusive right to pay the bills, the administration made a pusillanimous surrender.

They promised to take from Wall Street the control of business credits and enacted a measure which in the last analysis gives the banking interests legalized control of every great operation which requires large sums of money. The currency law, of which they so loudly boast, provides, indeed, elasticity, which was so greatly needed, but in other respects it is a complete surrender to the money power, at least so long as the Reserve Board is constituted as it now is.

They promised to reduce the cost of living, and only increased the number of those who have nothing to buy with.

But the Democratic tariff bill was to prove the divine commission of the Democratic Party to bring prosperity, "New Freedom," "markets beyond the seas," and other "phantom and psychological" blessings to the American people, with the physical, actual result of men out of employment, factories closed, and soup houses in full blast.

The bombastic threat that if anybody dared to say Democratic times were not good times the public prosecutor would jump on him has failed to suppress widespread complaint.

Everybody but a Democrat knew what would happen. Foreign goods came in, displacing American goods, but the rates were so low that there is a deficit in the revenues.

The President assured Congress that the tariff was working "admirably until the war came along and stopped imports." Nobody laughed, but most people knew four months before there was any war that the Democratic leaders were behind the door gnawing their fingers, at their wits' end to devise some way to meet the deficit.

The imports have not fallen off considerably, but so much comes in free or at reduced rates that you had to levy a "war" tax.

You threw away \$50,000,000 of revenue derived from sugar imports and gave it to the sugar refineries. You fixed it up so that any foreign country can buy sugar in New York at 1 cent per pound less than our own people are obliged to pay.

You are now figuring some way out of the slough into which your misguided policy has plunged the country.

You can not do it with your shipping bill. You can not do it by stopping necessary works and improvements.

You can do it by repealing the sugar schedule, by repealing the Underwood Tariff Act, and enacting a substantial protective tariff.

The American people believe in a protective tariff. At the last election they repudiated your Democratic tariff.

There are Democrats on this floor who have seen these mistakes, but the party lash with few exceptions has whipped them into line; and there has never been an administration more

fanatically partisan nor a more subservient Congress in the history of the country.

When the Republican leaders in 1912 refused to nominate the man whom an overwhelming majority of the party wanted they trampled upon the fundamental doctrine of Republicanism. It was the culmination of an era of oligarchic tendencies and subserviency to special interests. [Applause on the Democratic side.]

The election of 1912 was a revolt against "boss politics." [Applause on the Democratic side.]

The election of 1914 was a revolt against Democratic administration. [Applause on the Republican side.]

The average progressive in 1912 was in comparatively prosperous circumstances. He indulged in hopes, perhaps in "dreams," of reforms and betterments. He revolted against the alliances of political bosses and big business, against privilege; but, in 1914, the same man was hungry and out of a job, and, as the quickest way to get relief from the hard times brought about by the Democratic Party, he voted the Republican ticket as the quickest means of relief, but he did not abandon his progressivism.

What the Progressive will do in 1916 will decide that election.

The same old leaders are in the Republican saddle. PENROSE is there, Cannon is there, and SMOOT and GALLINGER and all the other repudiators of the party will in 1916. Have they learned anything?

If they resume their former arrogant disregard of public sentiment and again make the Republican organization the citadel of "privilege," they will ride to a fall; but if they will make the organization responsive to the public will; if they will make it an efficient agency to meet the public demands, there will be no good reason why the Progressive who cherishes the Republicanism of Abraham Lincoln should not find in a reformed and rehabilitated Republican Party the realization of his "dreams." [Applause.]

[During the delivery of the foregoing remarks Mr. STEPHENS of California yielded five minutes additional to the gentleman from Pennsylvania, Mr. HULINGS.]

Gentlemen, what will happen in 1916 depends entirely upon what the Republican Party does meanwhile. Here, of course, the Democrats are responsible, and it would be difficult to determine what the leaders of a minority party in Congress would do if they were returned to power; but the Republican Party is fully in control in many States, and it will be easily seen whether the leaders have learned anything or will be up to their old tricks. Up in Pennsylvania, for instance, Gov. Brumbaugh was elected as a Republican. If he will clean out the boodlers, the grafters, and the place warmers that have infested the State capitol for a generation; if he will give the people of Pennsylvania a clean administration—oh, not a perfect; but a good, substantial administration, free from the dictation of the "interests" or the control of the bosses—there is no reason why the Progressives in that State should not support him, and I believe they will. They ought to support him, for anybody who has inspected the organization of the State senate knows Gov. Brumbaugh has a rocky road before him if he means to make a fight for clean politics; and he ought to be supported by every man who is opposed to the corrupt methods that so long have disgraced the Republican machine. [Applause on the Republican side.]

Mr. PADGETT. Mr. Chairman, I yield 40 minutes to the gentleman from Alabama [Mr. HOBSON].

Mr. STEPHENS of California. Mr. Chairman, I yield five minutes to the gentleman from Alabama [Mr. HOBSON] also.

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from Alabama is recognized for 45 minutes.

Mr. HOBSON. Mr. Chairman, before I begin I desire to request to be notified when I have proceeded for 30 minutes and to request gentlemen to defer questions until after that time. I also ask unanimous consent, in case I shall not be able to complete my remarks, to extend them in the RECORD and print certain documentary material.

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from Alabama asks unanimous consent to print certain additional documentary material and extend his remarks. Is there objection? [After a pause.] The Chair hears none.

Mr. HOBSON. Mr. Chairman, we have come again to the consideration of the naval appropriation bill. Since the naval bill was considered last year events of great importance have occurred in the world. From a world at peace we have suddenly become a world at war, and the field of operations has extended over the ocean until to-day there are active war operations in Canada, to the north of us; in Europe, to the east of us; in Asia, to the west of us; and internal war in Mexico, to

the south of us; and every day that our citizens awaken they see hostile men-of-war hovering over our ports in both oceans. This disturbed condition in the world's affairs certainly calls upon us to give the question of national defense at this time our most earnest and painstaking consideration.

Our national defense must be founded essentially upon our world policies, and especially upon that part of our world policies that conflict, or are supposed to conflict, with the world policies of other nations. Let us consider briefly the world policies of America. America, like all nations and like all other living things, owes its first duty to itself and to nature—the duty of self-preservation. In my judgment, it is not a necessary corollary of international relations that under the dictates of self-preservation the world policies of one nation must inherently conflict with those of other nations. I am fundamentally convinced that the test for fitness to survive is no longer might and brute force to conquer, destroy, and rule, but is essentially a capacity and willingness to cooperate with others and actually to contribute substantially to the welfare of others. In other words, to serve. This conception of the fitness to survive is not now accepted the world over. On the contrary, there are great nations whose peoples honestly believe that their duty of self-preservation involves harm and even destruction to other nations. We must, therefore, make provision to protect our vital interests against violence. By vital interest I mean, first, the lives, property, and commerce of our citizens, including the integrity of our territory. When we contemplate the great exposure of these, our vital interests, the thought is almost staggering. The vast stretch of the Atlantic coast and its bays, harbors, and tributaries, upon which are built our great centers of population; the Gulf, the Pacific, the Panama Canal; and then, beyond our shores, Alaska, Hawaii, Guam, the Philippine Islands, in the Pacific; Porto Rico, Cuba, Mexico, in the Atlantic. In a conservative calculation we will find that we have the homes of over 30,000,000 of our citizens, with a property aggregation of more than \$37,000,000,000, located within gunshot of the water, so that a foreign foe attacking us would not have to proceed inland. He could permanently occupy the outlying territory with great armies without opposition if he had control of the sea. On our mainland he could make raids and levy ransom, striking us long before we could organize any material resistance, and he could then retire with his booty, having destroyed our military resources, military stores, arsenals, factories, shipyards—all without suffering any serious loss.

As to the question of the Philippine Islands I think this is the time for me to express certain convictions that have grown upon me in the last few years. I am convinced that whatever may be our political relations to the Philippine Islands, whether we grant them partial or complete independence—and I for one am in favor of the principle of granting them a larger measure of self-government than they are even capable of successfully conducting, so that in the exercise and even in the mistakes of self-government they can make progress in the capacity for self-government—I am clearly and strongly convinced, from my knowledge of the American people, that whatever our relations with the Philippine Islands this Nation will always protect those helpless Filipinos, as we have undertaken to protect the helpless Cubans, against any intervention or oppression by any military monarchy. I know there are many of my countrymen who disagree with me, many of my countrymen who openly express the idea of our evacuating those islands in order to escape the exposure to attack that their possession brings to us. My conviction is that the policy of the present administration is to get in a position free from responsibilities in the Philippine Islands, so that if during this war or after this world war a foreign power proceeded to occupy them America might remain aloof with some show of honor.

I have just had a conversation with the Secretary of State over the phone, and I wish to state carefully what he has said to me clearly, that there has been no understanding whatsoever with Japan in this matter; that this question has not been officially discussed—that phase of it—either in Washington or in Tokyo, and I am glad to make that statement in connection with my own. And I make my statements simply as a conviction. I hope my conviction is not correct, but the natural statement or disclaimer of the Secretary of State has not changed my conviction partially founded upon a news report last summer, shortly after the world war began, apparently emanating from the White House, but whether literally given out or not, I care but little. That report intimated that the administration desired the Philippine independence bill to be hastened, so that in case the belligerent conditions in the world required our retirement from those islands we would be in a position to retire quickly. Of course I would expect the Secretary of State to deny this;

and of course I do not impugn his good faith and conscientiousness in making his disclaimer. This question of the conflict of our vital interests on the Pacific with the vital interests of another nation has been brought up on a number of occasions on the floor of this House. At the risk of continued misunderstanding and widespread criticism I have each time undertaken to give a warning to my countrymen, and I now repeat the warning. A great military nation of Asia believes that its vital interests in the Pacific Ocean run counter to ours.

Now, I have made the statement that our relations with that nation have repeatedly been strained. I wish now to repeat that statement, and I desire also to state that the Secretary of State has just assured me that he does not agree with me on that proposition; that he has not considered our relations with this power as strained at any time since he has held office. But I repeat the statement I made in the Naval Committee.

Mr. FESS. Will the gentleman yield for a question?

Mr. HOBSON. Yes.

Mr. FESS. It was rumored here soon after the President spoke on the Mexican situation, in which he spoke of the Philippine situation, that what he had in mind was to have the other nations to assist in neutralizing the islands. Have you any information on that?

Mr. HOBSON. I have no positive information, Mr. Chairman; but I wish now to renew my statement, without any chance of contradiction, because it was drawn out of me by a taunt in the Naval Committee, and then and there I called on the Secretary of the Navy to deny it if it were not true. I said then, and I repeat it now, that our Government believed in May and June, and up into July of 1913, that war was imminent, and our gunners at Corregidor Island at the mouth of the Manila Bay slept on their guns for six weeks, and were on duty night and day; that the harbor was mined, and that every hour they expected the appearance of a hostile fleet. Furthermore, cipher instructions were sent to navy-yard commandants to be prepared to instantly put their station on a war basis. But that is neither here nor there. Denials or differences of opinion are of little consequence. The principles of national defense that I have laid down demand that we recognize this condition in the Pacific Ocean. In that ocean, as in the Atlantic, since we have no large standing army and are inadequately provided with coast defenses, the only basis for the security for our vital interests is control of the sea. This control of the sea by America would not be a menace to any nation in Asia or anywhere else, because there would be no great army upon it, the fleet not being able to march ashore.

Mr. Chairman, there are other considerations that are becoming more and more dear to the American people which are not wholly based on our material interests and self-preservation.

Our free institutions have always been very dear; especially the principle of the right of local self-government, the corner stone of liberty; the principle that there can be many local sovereignties exercising the functions of local sovereignty consistently with the wider sovereignty of the Nation. But that thought has never yet been accepted by the great nations of the world. In the matter of the exercise of the police power by the individual States there have been 13 cases where the life and property of aliens have been put in jeopardy and injured. In those cases the foreign Governments concerned demanded action on the part of our Federal Government looking to the punishment of the offenders; and at each time our Government replied, "We regret the occurrence, but we can not interfere."

This question has gone further than that of lynching and violence. It has touched the question of land tenure, the right of a sovereign State to control and regulate the question of land tenure. It has gone even further and touched the question of school regulation, the right of a sovereign State itself, without interference from the Federal Government, to determine its own school policy. These matters have not been conceded; they have been challenged, and are now openly challenged. Could America surrender to such a challenge? Not while our Nation lives.

Not only are our free institutions here at home dear to the American people, but we are becoming more and more committed to the principles of the rights of man everywhere—the principle of justice and right and equality of opportunity, irrespective of the force or the might or the power of the individual nation.

The Monroe doctrine was enunciated as a doctrine of self-preservation simply because in international law, so called, no other principle has ever been recognized. But the fact is imbedded down deep in the heart of the great American people that this Nation proposes to protect the weaker nations of this hemisphere against military aggression and colonization by monarchies across the sea. And yet imperial colonization goes on

all over the world. It is the fixed, established policy of European monarchies.

When this Nation had her hands tied in the Civil War, Maximilian led the French and occupied Mexico. He proceeded against the strongest protests from our Government. The protest was ignored. When the war was over and America had command of the sea and not another French soldier could be sent across to Mexico, then we repeated our request and sent Gen. Sheridan to the frontier. Promptly the French retired, but when they retired they never conceded the right of America to undertake the protection of Mexico. Neither has Germany ever conceded that right. Neither has England ever conceded that right. In the midst of all the disturbance of Europe we may not see the question arise during the period of war, but if either side comes out overwhelmingly victorious the question of Mexico may become critical in our foreign relations.

Mr. FESS. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield for a question?

Mr. HOBSON. When my 30 minutes are up, I will yield to questions. I can not well maintain the continuity of my argument if I am interrupted, but, of course, I will yield to the gentleman.

Mr. FESS. Suppose that for destruction of property, either English or German or French, in Mexico, there is an indemnity demanded and Mexico can not pay it and they demand a coaling station in lieu thereof. What will be our situation?

Mr. HOBSON. I believe it would be a plain question of whether we would abolish and abrogate the Monroe doctrine or fight.

Now, this Nation has a permanent policy of conscience and conviction; it has made up its mind to thus protect the weaker nations in this hemisphere; yet this policy has not been recognized by the great military nations of the earth. Therefore it is very clear, since our armies could not reach Central and South America, if we would maintain the Monroe doctrine in peace, we must have control of the sea.

I want to refer, incidentally, to other instances of the infringement of the Monroe doctrine besides that of Maximilian in Mexico. We recall that in the history of the dispute between Great Britain and Venezuela Great Britain was proposing to proceed, because of the weakness of Venezuela, without regard to an adjudication or settlement, and President Cleveland sent a message practically announcing that the clear right of Venezuela to recourse to arbitration should be respected. His message had a sympathetic response in the heart of all America, unprepared as we were. Every man here who remembers the time knows that, without respect to party, we would have all supported the President. [Applause.]

Now, not long after that Germany hoisted her flag over the customhouses in Venezuela. Our President promptly assembled our whole fleet at Guantanamo and sent Admiral Dewey to take charge of it, and then requested Germany to haul down her flag and retire. Germany promptly did haul down her flag and retire. But when Great Britain granted arbitration to Venezuela and when Germany retired from Venezuela neither nation acknowledged the right of America to assume to protect those people.

Now let us pass from the Atlantic over to the Pacific and consider the open-door policy. Why did this find such a prompt response in America's heart? Because beneath it lies the same principle that underlies the Monroe doctrine. It is true that America did not inaugurate the open-door policy in China, yet America was one of the first nations to champion its acceptance by the nations of the world. When Russia entered Manchuria and occupied Port Arthur America made a vigorous protest. She practically demanded that Russia evacuate China, but we had no fleet, and Russia declined. War came, as the result, between Russia and Japan. When Russia retired Japan took Russia's place.

Why did we find such a response in America's heart in behalf of the open-door policy in China? It was because China, though with vast resources, had no preparations for national defense, and the great military nations were carving her up like vultures. China was helpless before the militarism and greed of the world. Of course, America had rights under her treaties to equal opportunity, under the most-favored-nation clause, in seeking markets in China. But, as I said, Japan stayed when Russia retired. The violation of the open-door policy was the same by Japan that it had been by Russia.

The effect upon our commerce was quickly seen. America's cotton-goods trade alone in Manchuria fell off \$20,000,000 the first year of Japanese occupation. We have not yet made a protest to Japan against this permanent occupation of Chinese territory as we made to Russia for a similar occupation. Now

we are confronted with a situation where the Japanese have supplanted the Germans at Kiaochow, with assurances to the world that it was temporary, but later tentative statements that it would be permanent.

Disquieting reports have come from Tokio recently, one of them saying that Japan regarded China as committing an unfriendly act when she simply put an end to the war zone about Kiaochow when war ceased.

Another disquieting report has come that Japan is now taking up negotiations with China with a view to regulating the development of that empire. We got a dispatch this morning from London that Japan's ally in her spoliation of China put an O. K. on Japanese procedure. Great Britain herself is in the same category. She seized Hongkong, and then extended it with the Kowloon extension, and fought two bloody wars with China to compel her to receive the opium produced by the British companies in India.

I have referred to Germany. She occupied Kiaochow, and when she retired recently under force she never said she respected the open-door policy. The day is fast at hand when this Nation, which has championed that policy as we championed the Monroe doctrine, on the principle that the weak are entitled to consideration and respect of their rights by the strong, and the principle that over that great ocean there shall be equality of opportunity and fair chance, and no favor when commercial and industrial nations trade with China; the day is fast approaching when, in my judgment, this Nation will be compelled to surrender every vestige of the maintenance of the open-door policy in the Chinese Empire or fight. It is possible I may be mistaken in my deductions, but I am not mistaken in my facts. If we would see to it that the principles of justice and right, the rights of the weak as against the strong shall be respected wherever America has influence over the Pacific, there is only one policy of defense in that ocean. We must control the sea.

Human evolution in the world must rely upon America, the great peace Nation, a Nation which has no enemy in all the world. Our inherent altruism stands out everywhere. America returned to Japan the indemnity collected from that country in the sixties, when Great Britain, France, the Netherlands, and ourselves bombarded the straits of Shimonoseki and collected an indemnity. The other nations divided the indemnity and took their share and used it up, as they always do, but the United States, by the unanimous vote of the American Congress, returned to Japan the last dollar of our share of that indemnity.

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman has consumed half an hour.

Mr. HOBSON. When the huge indemnities were collected from China in connection with the Boxer disturbances, against the constant protest of America at their being collected, particularly against the exorbitant amounts, there are Members who remember with what alacrity in due time this House by unanimous vote returned the last dollar of our share to the Chinese Government. It was one of the happiest votes I ever cast.

Members will remember that after the Spanish War, when Spain lay prostrate, we did not want to harm Spain. We sent peace envoys to meet her peace envoys, and we ended a victorious war by paying a conquered foe \$20,000,000 and voluntarily transporting the Spanish soldiers for her back to Spain. And when Cuba was in our hands the world could not believe their own eyes when they saw America did not only not keep Cuba as a source of revenue, not even ask her to pay back the cost of the war, but saw us go back and spend more money to set Cuba on her feet, and then patted her on the shoulder and gave her her independence and told her we would protect her until the end of time. This is the only Government in the world that practices such principles of altruism in its relations with other nations, and this fact increases the importance of our possessing the power to promote the cause of such principles in the world.

Now consider the question of the rights of neutrals. It is in the interests of civilization that these rights should not be subordinated further to the alleged rights of belligerents founded solely upon the rule of might. Similarly in the question of the rights of weak nations neutral in war time. The principle of altruism ought to be projected more and more into the so-called international law, into the precedents and practices of the great nations of the world. In this America is the natural champion.

I am not asking America to go far afield, a wild champion of the weak everywhere, undertaking to dictate to the world and assuming that she alone can determine the true ethics of international conduct; but where we have such a settled policy as the Monroe doctrine, and as the open-door policy, we ought not to do as we did toward Korea. We were really under treaty

obligation to protect the sovereignty of Korea, yet we would not even allow her ambassador, who was sent to Washington, to appear in the White House to ask us to observe our treaty. Orders were issued to prevent him from coming to the White House. America should not have her hands tied and be impotent in matters of humanity any more than in matters of vital interest. More and more the world policy of America should be based on altruism, and the only way to have it is to give America power on the seas.

Mr. J. M. C. SMITH. Will the gentleman yield?

Mr. HOBSON. Yes.

Mr. J. M. C. SMITH. The gentleman has spoken of the Monroe doctrine, and knowing that the gentleman has paid as much attention to that as any person in the House, I would like to inquire whether we are not under obligations to keep the peace if other nations interfere in Mexican affairs?

Mr. HOBSON. I think I should refer my friend to the watchful-waiting policy.

Mr. J. M. C. SMITH. Whether or not there could be any liability attached to us for the loss of property and lives of other nations by our undertaking to enforce the Monroe doctrine.

Mr. HOBSON. I doubt whether there would be financial responsibility upon us, but I can see that if there should come the threat of foreign military aggression in Mexico our responsibility of protection would be clear.

Mr. J. M. C. SMITH. I take it that the gentleman is not in accord with the watchful-waiting policy.

Mr. HOBSON. On the contrary, I do not approve all the things we have done, but I wish to take occasion to compliment the President and the Secretary of State, and compliment this Congress and the people of the United States upon their patience and good will and long-suffering waiting. I do not wish to be put in the attitude of condemning the policy.

Having established these principles for our defense, I now desire to discuss the question of our defense policy. How can we expect to determine and maintain a sound defensive policy as long as there is no agency in the Government for that purpose? There is no agency in this Government with the responsibility of investigating and determining questions of a defense. Ours is the only Government in the world that has no such an agency.

A bill has been pending in this House for six years to establish such an agency—a bill to establish a council of national defense—upon which there would be a representative of the whole Nation, the President ex officio; then the Secretary of State, representing world policy; and the War Department and the Navy Department, represented by their heads and by their great experts, to give full knowledge on these matters, these all representing the executive branch of the Government. Then there would be the chairmen of the great committees of the House and Senate—Military and Naval, the purse strings, and Foreign Relations. Six years I have been earnestly endeavoring to have this bill favorably acted upon. All investigating measures have been taken—elaborate hearings before the Naval Committee.

Take, for instance, such testimony as that Gen. Wotherpoon, president of the War College and late Chief of the General Staff, gave. He said, in effect, that it would treble the efficiency of the Army and cut its cost in half.

Twice the bill has been reported by the naval committee. I will append the report from the committee. It has been approved by all the Secretaries of War, I think four of them, and by the Secretaries of the Navy down to the present Secretary. The measure is mentioned by name in the Democratic platform at Baltimore, giving the country to understand at that time that the Democratic Party if intrusted with power would be constructive in dealing with our national defense, by creating an agency to treat it rationally.

That bill to-day would be on the statute books but for the opposition of the President and the Secretary of State.

In order that my words may not be misquoted or misunderstood, I will read them.

THE PRESIDENT AND SECRETARY OF STATE THE GREATEST OBSTACLES OF NATIONAL DEFENSE.

The fact that the council of national defense bill is a plank in the Democratic platform seems to have no influence with the administration. This bill would long since have been a law but for the opposition of the President and the Secretary of State. This opposition to the most vital and fundamental measure, similar to measures that have been taken by all the other nations of the world, opposition that keeps America from making a start, constitutes the President and the Secretary of State the greatest obstacle of their country's defense.

It seems a singular irony that the movement for national prohibition likewise has found greatest opposition from the present administration. To thoughtful men these two questions are the

most vital and the most fundamental before the Nation, one affecting the integrity of the Nation within and the other the security of the Nation without. It seems passing strange that measured by these two great causes we find the highest official of the Nation is the greatest obstacle to progress.

This brings me to the question of a naval program. I wish in the remaining 10 minutes, Mr. Chairman, to come down to the specific question of a naval program. I submit to the thoughtful consideration of my colleagues that our first duty, though not exclusive duty, is to make efficient the Navy that we actually have. It would be a singular thing, but for the fact that our people are nonmilitary, that in all the legislation relating to the Navy Department and the organization of the seven bureaus of that department there is not one word about keeping the Navy always prepared and ready for war under plans definitely worked out in advance. There is actually no agency in our Navy Department to work out detailed plans prior to war, to coordinate all agencies of the Navy, and insure efficiency when the war actually comes.

This present bill carries in it a provision to create a chief of naval operations and assigns him 15 assistants; this body, then, for the first time will give us an agency to take charge of this great question.

Mr. OLDFIELD. Will the gentleman yield?

Mr. HOBSON. I will.

Mr. OLDFIELD. What is the object of that board of which Admiral Dewey is the head?

Mr. HOBSON. I am gratified the gentleman asked that question. That board is only established by regulations, not by statute; it is a general accommodation board and is used for a lot of miscellaneous duties in the Navy. There are three active members of it, and one of those has the question of general plans, but it has no provision for working out complete detail plans; most of the time that board is working on knotty problems for the Navy and the Government at large. By the way, at the present time two of those three members of the board are occupied by duty with the State Department working up precedents on international law involved in neutrality. In other navies they will have 20, 30, 40, or 50 officers and assistants trained to this work, giving themselves over to this work exclusively all the time. We need not imagine that one or even several officers' sporadic work on general plans could answer. That is one of the most important parts of the whole bill.

Next comes the question of the fleet itself. What shall we do to make efficient the fleet that we have? There is a vast extent of ocean, the Atlantic and Pacific, over which our fleet will have to operate. It will have to see farther than any other fleet.

Mr. PADGETT. Will the gentleman yield there for about a minute?

Mr. HOBSON. Yes.

Mr. PADGETT. I have a letter from Admiral Dewey, which I received yesterday, with reference to the duties of the General Board on preparing plans.

Mr. HOBSON. Will the gentleman incorporate them or allow me to incorporate them in my remarks as an extension?

Mr. PADGETT. It is for the benefit of the House, and I would like to have read the letter the Secretary of the Navy forwarded to me.

Mr. HOBSON. I will read them. [Reading:]

THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY,
Washington, January 28, 1915.

HON. L. P. PADGETT,
Chairman House Committee on Naval Affairs,
House of Representatives.

MY DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: In my hearings before the Naval Committee I stated that the Navy Department, through the General Board, carried out the naval regulations providing for plans of campaign if our country should be engaged in war.

I am inclosing herein a copy of a letter from Admiral Dewey, president of the General Board, stating that the General Board has prepared such plans; that they are constantly revised and kept up to date, and are in such condition as to be immediately available for the use of the Navy Department.

Sincerely yours,

JOSEPHUS DANIELS,

THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY,
Washington, January 28, 1915.

To: Secretary of the Navy.
Subject: Preparation of war plans by General Board.

In compliance with your verbal request of this date for information as to the work done by the General Board in the preparation of war plans, I submit the following:

Article 167 (2) of the Navy Regulations is as follows:

"It (the General Board) shall prepare and submit to the Secretary of the Navy plans of campaign, including cooperation with the Army and the employment of all the elements of naval defense, such as the Naval Militia, Coast Survey, Lighthouse Service, Revenue-Cutter Service, and merchant vessels, and shall constantly revise these plans in accordance with the latest information received."

2. The General Board has prepared plans, in cooperation with the Naval War College and the Office of Naval Intelligence, for war with various nations which may be considered as being our most probable adversaries. These plans are being constantly revised and kept up to date, and are in such condition as to be immediately available for the use of the Navy Department.

GEORGE DEWEY.

When I made my statement in the beginning I was then aware of this naval regulation and the work which the naval board has done in the way of general plans, but I do not wish now to discuss the adequacy or inadequacy of that kind of a plan.

Mr. PADGETT. With the gentleman's permission I will insert in the RECORD a letter from the Secretary setting out the regulations, etc., in regard to the board in the preparation of plans.

Mr. HOBSON. Yes; I will also put those in my remarks as an extension, together with the general functions of this chief of naval operations and his assistants when they finally put that in operation.

The letter is as follows:

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
Washington, January 28, 1915.

HON. L. P. PADGETT,
Chairman House Naval Committee, Washington, D. C.

MY DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: Referring to my testimony before your committee regarding the preparation of war plans and to your inquiry by telephone in regard to the same, I quote below for your information the Navy Regulations covering the subject in question:

"SECTION 7.

"ART. 166. (1) The General Board shall be composed of the Admiral of the Navy, the aid for operations, the aid for material, the director of naval intelligence, the president of the Naval War College, and such additional officers as the Secretary of the Navy may designate.

"(2) An officer above the grade of lieutenant shall be detailed as secretary to the General Board. He shall record its proceedings and have charge and custody of its files and correspondence.

"ART. 167. (1) The General Board shall devise measures and plans for the effective preparation and maintenance of the fleet for war and shall advise the Secretary of the Navy as to the disposition and distribution of the fleet and of the reinforcements of ships, officers, and men of the Navy and Marine Corps.

"(2) It shall prepare and submit to the Secretary of the Navy plans of campaign, including cooperation with the Army and the employment of all the elements of naval defense, such as the Naval Militia, Coast Survey, Lighthouse Service, Revenue-Cutter Service, and merchant vessels, and shall constantly revise these plans in accordance with the latest information received.

"(3) It shall consider the number and types of ships proper to constitute the fleet, the number and rank of officers, and the number and ratings of enlisted men required to man them, and shall advise the Secretary of the Navy respecting the estimates therefor (including such increase as may be requisite) to be submitted annually to Congress.

"(4) It shall advise the Secretary of the Navy concerning the location, capacity, and protection of fuel depots and supplies of fuel, and of navy yards and naval stations; also in regard to the establishment and maintenance of reserves of ordnance and ammunition and depots of supplies; and shall advise as to the delivery of provisions and stores of every kind required by the fleet.

"(5) It shall coordinate the work of the Naval War College and the Office of Naval Intelligence, and shall consider and report upon naval operations, maneuvers, tactics, organization, training, and such other subjects as the Secretary of the Navy may lay before it."

SECTION 8.

"ART. 126. (1) The aid for operations shall advise the Secretary as to strategic and tactical matters, in conjunction with the recommendations of the General Board, as covered by section 7 of this chapter, and shall also advise regarding all movements of naval vessels, and in general regarding the operations of the vessels of the Navy.

"(2) He shall advise the Secretary as to the submission of subjects to the General Board and Naval War College, and, in order that he may properly perform this duty, all papers which are required to be submitted to the General Board of War College shall be forwarded to the department (Division of Operations of the Fleet) for such reference.

"(13) He shall in conjunction with the General Board, advise the Secretary as to coordinating the work of the Naval War College and the Office of Naval Intelligence. (Art. 167, par. 5.)"

SECTION 1.

"ART. 105. The Division of Operations of the Fleet shall include the Office of Naval Intelligence, the Office of Target Practice and Steaming Competitions, the Naval War College, and a Section of Movements of the Fleet."

Pursuant to the above regulations the General Board makes a study of the armaments and war resources of foreign nations as compared to our own and their probable strategic plans for defensive and offensive operations against us in case of war, and prepares war plans for our use in operations against them.

In the preparation of such plans it has advantage of the studies on strategy, tactics, and logistics made at the War College on various situations that might arise. The president of the War College is a member of the General Board, and attends its regular monthly sessions. The General Board transfers its place of work to the War College during about three months every year. The Office of Naval Intelligence, whose director is also a regular member of the General Board, is located in the same building with the General Board, and furnishes it with all information obtainable relating to armaments and war resources of foreign nations.

The General Board, through the aid for material, who is also a member, has the means of obtaining all information relating to the material condition of the Navy, including ships, navy yards, and naval stations, and ways and means of supplying the fleet in time of war and peace.

The aid for operations, who is also a member, is charged with assisting the board in the preparation of war plans and with advising the Secretary in regard to the same, and in coordinating the work of the various utilities of the Navy Department in carrying them out.

Under the system briefly outlined the General Board has prepared war plans for use in possible contingencies against various nations, and these are now on file for immediate use should the occasion arise.

Sincerely, yours,

JOSEPHUS DANIELS.

TENTATIVE DUTIES OF PROPOSED CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS AND HIS ASSISTANTS.

The work may be conveniently divided among nine committees, or "sections."

The historical section studies past campaigns, analyzes them, and deduces a comprehensive conception of war. From this conception it deduces broad and general "doctrines," as guides for our officer, personnel in their conduct of war. By means of these "doctrines," the personnel works with a prearranged understanding, without the necessity for awaiting long and detailed orders.

The policy section makes studies of the inherent interests of all nations, and the policies which logically follow. They endeavor to forecast the possibilities of international conflict and to devise measures to carry out the policies determined by the Government. The various policies of their own Nation, as outlined by the State Department, are studied, and upon these are based the naval strategy of possible future war.

The strategic section studies the theaters of possible wars from every aspect, and the sources and means of supply to the military and naval forces. The strategic situation in each case is studied not only from our point of view but also from the enemy's point of view, and his probable course of action is deduced.

The tactical section studies tactics, particularly in relation to the strategy determined, and endeavors to insure that the tactics of the fleet are kept constantly up to date and conform to the character of the ships and weapons that will be used. They also study the enemy's forces, together with the probable tactics which he will employ.

The logistic section studies the logistic aspects of the strategic and tactical plans, and deduces the following:

- (a) The requirements as to supplies at the beginning of war.
- (b) The requirements for subsequent phases of the war.
- (c) The sources of supply and supplies available.
- (d) The organization of transportation.
- (e) The organization of the auxiliaries forming the fleet train.
- (f) A list of available merchant vessels, their characteristics, whereabouts, and places of assembly for alterations, and the time required to place each in readiness.
- (g) Inspection of merchant vessels, and detail decision in each case as to the use to which the vessel shall be put, the alterations to be made, the yard to which assigned; and tentative arrangements with owners as to price and mode of transfer.
- (h) Detailed plans for the assemblage of supplies.
- (i) Orders necessary for the execution of the plans.

The organization section studies and devises plans of organization for war in order to secure the most efficient flow of authority; the best administrative and tactical grouping of the forces; the detail of personnel for command; and the orders necessary for the execution of the various plans.

The mobilization section prepares and keeps always up to date plans of mobilization for war for each of the various situations arising from conflict with possible enemies. These plans must show:

- (a) The vessels to be mobilized.
- (b) Detailed scheme of organization and utilization of Naval Reserves, Naval Militia, ex-Navy men, and others who would be needed on outbreak of war.
- (c) The names of their chief officers.
- (d) The dates when mobilization of the various types of ships must be completed.
- (e) The places of assembly.
- (f) The plan of recruiting organization.
- (g) Orders necessary for execution of plans.

The training section studies methods for the training of the naval forces, and devises strategical problems and tactical exercises involving combined maneuvers of battleships, scouts, cruisers, destroyers, submarines, air craft, and mining vessels.

The executive section sees that the plans devised are executed. The importance of the work may be judged from the fact that in Great Britain it is performed by a separate organization called the naval war staff, composed of about 39 line officers, a few staff officers, and about 31 civilian assistants; in Germany by the admiral staff, composed of 22 officers with 13 officer-assistants and a librarian; and in Japan by a general staff, which is immediately under the Emperor.

In the duties of each of the present bureaus of the Navy Department, as explicitly defined by law, not one word appears as to the necessity of being prepared for war, or for the steps to be taken in preparation therefor. The Navy has no such bureau.

Now, as to the fleet itself. We have a vast extent of ocean which we must cover in our fleet operations.

Mr. CURRY. Will the gentleman yield?

Mr. HOBSON. Yes.

Mr. CURRY. The naval board has no real power. It simply makes recommendations, which are usually ignored.

Mr. HOBSON. It has no statutory power. Its power would be merely advisory.

Mr. CURRY. And the advice is not accepted.

Mr. HOBSON. The gentleman is correct that it may not be accepted. Now, in these vast operations our fleet ought to be able to see farther than any fleet in the world. Our fleet to-day is blind. There is not in the North Atlantic Fleet nor in the naval service a single efficient scout vessel, a vessel that could scout and do its scouting out on the high seas and keep there. Every other navy in the world has them. These fleets have eyes. Most up-to-date fleets have, in addition to regular scouts, these great battle cruisers that can make their reconnaissance in force at a long distance. Our Navy has not one. That I regard as a prime necessity for making the battleships we now have effective. We should no longer turn down amendments offered here for years, and which will be offered again, to au-

thorize two battle cruisers. My conception of the best vessel for this service is a vessel of about 40,000 tons displacement, having guns as big as any built, with at least 30 knots speed, and having armor such as would protect them at battle ranges against attack by an armor-piercing shell. In addition to that, we ought to have at least five regular scouts—

Mr. McLAUGHLIN. How much would the vessel cost?

Mr. HOBSON. The 40,000 tons.

Mr. McLAUGHLIN. Yes.

Mr. HOBSON. I imagine the one I recommend would cost about \$22,000,000. It is the 30-knot speed that makes it so expensive; the machinery is exceedingly expensive. All the nations of the world have seen fit to go to extra expense in order to get these vessels. The prime requisites are speed and power of hitting, enabling the vessel to choose its own range as against most vessels, at least those that are met in scouting, and be able to take its distance and then by a superior attack at long range destroy the enemy without having the enemy become effective against the ship itself. That is what has been done in all the battles recently fought. The one off the Chilean coast, Members will remember, was fought at a long range, nearly 14,000 yards, although the biggest guns were only 9.2; but through superior speed the German fleet was able to totally destroy the English fleet, although one of the English ships had larger guns than the Germans. Through superior speed the Germans were able not only to choose their own range, but also to choose their location, so that when the sun set the English ships could not see the German ships, while the German ships were practically destroying the English.

Now, in the Falkland Islands the tables were exactly turned, but the results were the same. The two English battle cruisers that went there chose their range and distance and destroyed the Germans.

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman has expired.

Mr. HOBSON. Mr. Chairman, I will extend my remarks in the RECORD in more consecutive form.

Mr. Chairman, we have again reached the time when the Sixty-third Congress is to consider and to provide for the maintenance and development of the Navy. This is a momentous year in the history of the world. Amidst the clash of arms in all parts of the world our people have a general feeling of alarm and some misgivings and forebodings. The war area has extended until we find it in Canada to our north, in Europe to our east, in Asia to our west, and the echo of internal war in Mexico to our south. Daily we see the warships of belligerent nations hovering off our shores. There has never been such a disturbed condition of the world, certainly not since the Napoleonic wars.

CONDITIONS ANALOGOUS TO THOSE BEFORE THE WAR OF 1812.

Both sides in the great European struggle are taking occasion to bitterly criticize America's conduct. We have suffered already a serious interruption of our commerce and an economic dislocation requiring emergency revenue legislation for the Government and entailing hundreds of millions of dollars' loss by our people. The situation is closely analogous to the situation at the close of the eighteenth and beginning of the nineteenth centuries, when Great Britain was the moving spirit in directing allied nations against Napoleon. Indeed the situation now is more ominous than the situation at that time.

WAR WITH FRANCE IN 1800.

Napoleon's resentment which led to the war with France in 1800 was not as intense as the growing resentment of the Germans to-day at the great source of supply of war materials her enemy allies are finding in America.

WAR OF 1812.

The arbitrary treatment of American ships and American commerce by Great Britain to-day are closely parallel to similar treatment in the years preceding the War of 1812. The attitude of Great Britain toward America in recent years should give serious concern to all thoughtful Americans.

PANAMA CANAL TOLLS.

It was exceedingly ungracious, to say the least, for Great Britain to press us as she did over the question of simply granting free tolls through the Panama Canal to our coastwise shipping.

SHIP PURCHASE.

Great Britain's attitude toward our purchase of ships from Germany is nothing short of menacing.

RIGHTS OF NEUTRALS.

Her continual and arbitrary abridgment of the rights of neutrals to the great disturbance of our foreign commerce, and her arbitrary extension of the list of contraband to suit her own convenience, regardless of the Declaration of London and

of other international conferences, is a serious menace to the development of our foreign commerce and infringes the just rights of all neutrals.

THE ANGLO-JAPANESE ALLIANCE.

The disturbance in China, growing out of the seizure of Kiaochow by Japan, with the occupation of islands near our possessions, are causing disturbances in the Pacific where conditions were already serious.

The most ominous and significant event of the year is the giving out to the world that the Anglo-Japanese treaty is an alliance offensive and defensive.

TIME TO TAKE ACCOUNT OF NATIONAL DEFENSE.

It is high time that all thoughtful Americans should pause and earnestly consider the condition of our national defense.

Beware of Peace Dreamers.

Let us particularly beware of those who come and who have been coming crying, "Peace, peace," when there is no peace; those who fold their hands like followers of Confucius and would pray for peace, but do nothing to actually insure peace. Peace is nowhere maintained without definite and adequate provision for its maintenance. Definite organization has been evolved in every community where peace prevails, whose principal purpose is to insure peace and that administration of justice upon which alone abiding peace can rest. There is no such organization between the nations of the world. Each nation is sovereign, acknowledging no superior, subject to no restraining authority. The prosecution of the war in Europe is a constant reminder that nations are beyond the domain of law and are subject only to the impulses that sway human nature unrestrained. An idealistic enthusiasm that assumes that organization exists between nations capable of assuming the responsibility of administering justice deceives itself and endangers the real progress of peace and justice. It becomes a public menace when it advocates leaving a nation's life, independence, and vital interest to hang upon a myth. To advise our country and other peaceable nations to go disarmed simply because we would prefer an international organization for justice would be like advising the peaceable inhabitants on a wild frontier to disarm and allow the lawless to reign. Such action would prevent the development of a condition of law and order.

MUST RELY UPON OUR OWN RIGHT ARM.

America never has been an aggressive Nation. She is not now and never will be. But America lives amidst the powerful military nations of the earth. As pointed out, we can not look to an international organization for our protection. There is no international court; only the embryo, in the form of The Hague tribunal; no international parliament, only the embryo of The Hague conference, whose third convocation, due in 1915, is now being allowed to lapse. Where are the peace dreamers? Sitting idly by, without raising a finger to avert this tragedy to the little embryo. In vain have I sought to interest the Secretary of State. He also will not raise a finger, out of fear, evidently, of displeasing those belligerents who do not wish any measures to be taken to hasten the advent of peace. There is no international executive—not even an embryo.

THE QUESTION OF TREATIES.

Treaties lack the main basis of a contract—the power of enforcement; the question of arbitration. Arbitration up to the present time, as between great nations, specifically excludes from consideration questions of vital interest and questions of honor—the very questions over which nations wage war. Having no outside recourse, nations must provide their own means of defense. At this stage of the world's political and social evolution we must rely upon our own strong arm alone for our national defense.

THE RIGHTS OF PEACE VERSUS THE RIGHTS OF WAR.

A very illuminating example is now seen of the encroachments of nations at war upon the rights of nations at peace simply and solely because of their preponderance of power over the latter. America's woeful lack of preparation is the fundamental reason for the reversal of the ordinary progress of humanity, the contraction of the rights of peace before the encroachment of the so-called rights of war, based solely upon the preponderance of brute force. It is no exaggeration to say that the condition of preparation for national defense in America is now and will remain the largest determining factor in the preservation of our own peace and the establishment and extension of peace throughout the world.

AMERICA'S WORLD POLICIES.

A nation's position among the nations of the world and its own world policies are the foundation considerations for working out a policy of national defense.

SELF-PRESERVATION THE FIRST LAW OF NATURE.

For America and for all other nations, as for all living organisms, the first law is self-preservation.

DANGER OF ATTACK IN THE ATLANTIC.

We have 5,300 miles of Atlantic coast line, and bays and harbors and navigable rivers leading up to the same, upon which are located, within 15 miles of water, the homes of 15,000,000 American citizens and over seventeen billions of American property. On the Gulf coast we have the homes of nearly 2,000,000 citizens and over eight hundred millions of property; on the Great Lakes, the homes of about 8,000,000 citizens, with about seven and a half billions of property; in the great Mississippi Valley, 11,500,000 citizens and nearly nine billions of property. In addition to our mainland exposure, we must protect Cuba, Porto Rico, and the Panama Canal.

DANGER OF ATTACK IN THE PACIFIC.

In the Pacific Coast States the homes of nearly 2,000,000 citizens are exposed, with nearly three billions of property. In addition to the mainland, we have the great treasure house of Alaska, the great strategic harbor and islands of Hawaii, together with the Philippine Islands, and also the Panama Canal.

MUST ALWAYS PROTECT THE FILIPINOS.

Whatever may be our political relations with the Philippine Islands, America will always protect the Filipinos, as she protects the Cubans, against military aggression.

INADEQUACY AND IMPOSSIBILITY OF DEFENSE BY LAND FORCES.

As compared with the great nations, our regular standing Army may be considered a negligible quantity. Likewise our militia and reserve. The same may be said of coast fortifications, which are open to capture from the rear because of the lack of a mobile army for their defense. Therefore an enemy in control of the sea could occupy Cuba, Porto Rico, and Panama, in the Atlantic; Alaska, Hawaii, Guam, and the Philippine Islands, in the Pacific, all with little practicable resistance in case of attack in force. In addition to definite occupation of this outlying territory, an enemy could raid our mainland coasts in force, occupy and levy upon our great cities without any chance whatever of effective resistance until long after they could retire with their booty, after destroying our navy yards, shipbuilding yards, arsenals, shipping, and public works. It is vain to imagine that our cities would be spared after the experience of cities abroad. It is likewise vain to imagine that the meager land forces available could make any serious resistance.

AMERICA MUST CONTROL THE SEA.

In order to realize the first policy, namely, that of security of our vital interests against violence in accord with the dictates of self-preservation, there is no other recourse. America must control the sea in the Atlantic, and thereby keep the European armies in Europe, and must control the sea in the Pacific, to keep the Asiatic armies in Asia; and since these oceans are so far apart and since nations that are liable to attack us in Europe and Asia are liable to establish and have already established alliances, offensive and defensive, we must control the sea in both oceans at the same time.

PROTECTION OF OUR COMMERCE AND FOREIGN MARKETS.

America is rapidly becoming a great industrial nation, competing for the markets of the world. The jealousy of industrial nations in this competition is illustrated by the attitude of Great Britain toward Germany before the war. America need not hope to have a fair chance to gain supremacy in world commerce any more than Germany if she has no more formidable naval strength than Germany had. The alacrity with which our rights as a neutral are invaded and the quickness with which every means is sought to hamper the growth of our merchant marine at the present time clearly show that neither when Europe is at war or at peace will our commercial and industrial expansion over seas be permitted normal and legitimate course unless we have control of the sea. Thus control of the sea must be the foundation for the security of our property rights on land and on sea.

MENACE TO OUR INSTITUTIONS.

Our Government was established and will have to be maintained in the face of antagonistic institutions of the Old World. Believing, as we do, in the principle of the right of self-government and of equality of opportunity, no European or Asiatic monarchy has yet acknowledged the right of sovereign local self-government as vested in our individual States. There have been 13 cases in our country's history where the subjects of foreign powers have been maltreated in individual States; in 11 cases these foreign subjects suffered violence. The foreign Governments promptly made demands upon our central Government to interfere, and our central Government informed

them with regret that it could not interfere. In most cases an indemnity was afterwards made as a matter of humanity but not as a matter of law. In one recent case a foreign Government questioned the right of a State to regulate its own school system, and in another case now pending it challenges the right of a State to determine the question of tenure of lands and property rights. It is not necessary to cite the dangers involved in this case on account of the race question. Thus, for the security of our institutions as for the security of our homes, our property rights on land and on sea demand that America should control the sea.

THE CAUSE OF JUSTICE AND OF RIGHT.

In world relations under the dictates of self-preservation the game should be played according to the rules of justice and of right, not the rules of brute force and of might.

The ascendancy of right is in line with the law of evolution. The progressive development of the higher and nobler faculties of men and of nations, indeed cooperation and service, should supplant the destroying principle in the relationship of nations as in men. America has already historically become the champion of the right of the weak against encroachments of the might of the strong.

THE MONROE DOCTRINE.

Though the Monroe doctrine may have been conceived with the idea of self-protection for the United States, and though from time to time its justification is based upon considerations of vital interest, nevertheless the spirit of the Monroe doctrine is our championship of the rights of the weak against the oppressions of the strong and our championship of the principle that among all strong and weak alike there shall be equality of opportunity, fair chance and no favor. This doctrine cuts off the Western Hemisphere from the extension of colonial policies of Europe and Asia. It is natural and inevitable that the security of this policy rests, and can permanently rest alone upon the control of the sea.

MAXIMILLIAN AND MEXICO.

When America was embroiled in a civil war the French invaded Mexico against the protest of the United States. When the war was over and America had control of the sea and her armies were ready to be turned into Mexico the French promptly retired.

GREAT BRITAIN AND VENEZUELA.

In the boundary dispute between Great Britain and Venezuela the former proceeded against the latter in defiance of the expressed wishes of America until President Cleveland sent his Venezuelan message, "Arbitrate with Venezuela or fight." The British chose the former.

GERMANY AND VENEZUELA.

Germany hoisted her flag over the customhouses of Venezuela against the expressed wishes of America. President Roosevelt assembled our whole fleet at Guantanamo, then requested Germany to haul down her flag. The request was complied with.

MEXICO AFTER THE EUROPEAN WAR.

When Europe is relieved of the absorbing activities of the great war what will likely be the attitude of the victorious nation toward Mexico, especially in the event that the allies are victorious and British financial interests are greatly disturbed and injured by Mexican disorder? No one can tell when or in what way the issue may arise, but certain it is that America will be called on to surrender the Monroe doctrine unless she is able to defend it, and since the countries involved, Mexico and Central and South America, are over the seas this defense will hinge absolutely upon our Navy, whether it is powerful enough to control the sea.

CANADA AND THE MONROE DOCTRINE.

A new complication of the Monroe doctrine has arisen in the participation by Canada in the European war. If Germany were victorious and gained control of the sea, she would probably send an expeditionary force against the British colonies. In the event of such a force conquering Canada, question would arise whether Germany following her natural inclination to remain should be allowed by the United States to establish a German colony on our borders. In case German and American policies should conflict, the question of peace and war—the question of the integrity of the Monroe doctrine—would hang upon the strength of our Navy. If we want peace with the Monroe doctrine, we must control the sea.

THE OPEN-DOOR POLICY IN CHINA.

America has been the champion of the open-door policy in China, beneath which lies essentially the same principle underlying the Monroe doctrine, namely, justice to the weak and equal opportunity to all; respect for the integrity of China

and equal opportunity for all nations in their competition for the trade of China.

Russian encroachments through Manchuria continued until Port Arthur was occupied. America promptly protested and practically called on Russia to retire. We had no strong fleet and no military strength behind the fleet we had. Russia ignored our demand and remained, and from her remaining came the war between Russia and Japan. Great Britain has shown scarcely more consideration for the integrity of China than Russia. She seized Hongkong after imposing her opium from India upon the unwilling Chinese by war. She has since extended the territory first seized in the mainland in the Kaloon extension. She made a second war on China to further impose opium upon her people, and later seized Wei-hai-wei, though it appears that since the Japanese alliance she has dismantled this station. Germany has shown a similar attitude toward China, especially when she seized Kiaochow and fortified the harbor of Tsing Tau.

JAPAN AND THE OPEN-DOOR POLICY.

Japan has shown less regard than all the other nations for the integrity of China. She has annexed Korea, part of the Liao Tung Peninsula with Port Arthur; she has practically annexed southern Manchuria, and now has seized Kiaochow. She went to war against Russia ostensibly to get Russia out of Port Arthur and out of Chinese territory, but when Russia withdrew Japan remained and never made any pretense of returning the Chinese territory to China. The probabilities amount to almost a certainty that having gone to war with Germany ostensibly to remove Germany from its encroachment upon China Japan now in Germany's place will never dream of retiring herself.

JAPAN'S MENACE TO CHINA.

Count Okuma, prime minister of Japan, in an article in the Shin Nippon, used these words, referring to the struggle for existence:

We must be careful to keep this point in mind and prepare ourselves with power to meet the struggle for existence. The people who can not meet the struggle will be crushed * * *

Thus, those who are superior will govern those who are inferior. I believe within two or three centuries the world will have a few great governing countries and others will be governed by them—will pay homage to the mighty * * *

Woe to the nations which are governed. We should from now on prepare ourselves to become a governing nation.

These statements are significant in light of the recent dispatches from Japan stating in effect that Japan had practically sent an ultimatum to China, because China had, naturally, ordered the discontinuation of the war zone around Kiao Chao, since war there had ceased, and a later dispatch stating that Japan had taken up negotiations with Peking for the purpose of "determining the development policies of China."

JAPAN AND AMERICA.

In the same article referred to above Count Okuma stated:

Although we hold Germany as our enemy, yet we do not forget the part played by Germany * * *. In future as in the past we will continue to pay our respect to German knowledge and scientific genius, but we must at all costs fight against the Kaiser's spirit of conquest until we shall have crushed it * * *. Our attitude toward the American people will be the same; we shall attack any mistaken ideas or policies without mercy. We do not, of course, hate the individuals. The time has now come when humanity should awaken. The present war has brought about the opportunity. We should free ourselves from the mistaken racial competition arising from prejudice.

ANTI-AMERICAN PROPAGANDA IN JAPAN.

The cosmopolitan press and the dispatches to the foreign press from Japan continue more or less the same kind of smooth generalities regarding the Japanese and American relations, but in the vernacular press all kinds of disquieting and misleading rumors are being energetically circulated, all tending to arouse enmity and hatred of Americans among the Japanese populace, ending in the conviction that war with the United States is inevitable. A similar propaganda against Russia preceded the Russo-Japanese War. Among the rumors and misrepresentations may be mentioned the following: That the United States had territorial ambitions in the Far East and proposed to seize a naval station on the continent of Asia; that the United States is seeking to undermine Japanese commerce and the like. It is authentically reported that when the Japanese troops were mobilized for the expedition against Kiao Chao the soldiers for a long time thought they were starting for war against America.

ANOTHER WARNING.

My warnings to my countrymen as to the dangers in the Pacific Ocean arising from our lack of defensive preparations have been little heeded, and in some quarters have even been ridiculed.

Officers high in the councils of our Government have joined in the scoffing when they themselves knew that code messages

had been sent to commandants of our navy yards to be prepared to put their stations on a war basis upon short notice and that our troops in the Philippines protecting the harbor of Manila had slept at their guns for weeks with the harbor mined, hourly expecting an attack by the Japanese fleet. I renew my warning. The only security for permanent peace in the Pacific Ocean is our unquestioned control of the sea in that ocean.

THE PACIFIC OCEAN CLEARED OF AMERICAN BATTLESHIPS.

When our battleship fleet started around the world I endeavored to have it stopped and remain in the Pacific Ocean. The impression I received led me to the firm conviction which I have not since changed, that our fleet was allowed to go to the Pacific Ocean by Japan only upon our assurance that it would be out of that ocean by a fixed date. I have felt for some time that our battleship fleet will never go to the Pacific Ocean under the present administration. My conviction is firm that, protestations to the contrary notwithstanding, peace with Japan has thus far been secured by the present administration and war was averted at the critical juncture to which I have referred by assurances that America would speedily retire from the Philippine Islands. I am further convinced that our first inquiry as to the intentions of Japan in seizing Kiao Chao and the islands in the Pacific Ocean will not be followed up, at least by this administration, and that Japan, as a price of peace, will be given a free hand in China with the prospect of the complete overthrow of the open-door policy, leaving China to its fate to become a "governed" nation, while the commerce of America, which in cotton goods alone fell off over twenty millions in Manchuria after Japanese occupation, will be at the mercy of a competitor, while the complete overthrow of the balance of power in the Pacific Ocean would lead to one inevitable result, war.

THE GRAVITY OF THE ANGLO-JAPANESE ALLIANCE.

In determining the movements of our battleship fleet we can not escape leaving one ocean undefended. We may rest assured that in our negotiations with England that country has in mind her alliance, offensive and defensive, with Japan, knowing that both the Japanese Navy and the Japanese Army would be available for cooperation should war result, while in our negotiations with Japan that country will bear in mind that the British fleet, or part of it, and possibly the forces of other allies will be available in the Atlantic to prevent our battle fleet from going to the Pacific, insuring Japanese control of the sea and the availability of her overpowering army already on a war footing.

This brief scan of America's policies, the Monroe doctrine, and the open-door policy, based upon the principle of right and justice like America's policies based upon the necessity of self-preservation, both meet in the same inevitable conclusion. We must control the sea in the Atlantic and in the Pacific, both at the same time.

COOPERATION AND SERVICE.

In the relations of nations to each other as in the relations of individuals with each other there should not only be justice and right but also cooperation and service, generosity, mercy, charity, good will, brotherhood.

MILITARISM VERSUS INDUSTRIALISM.

Two forms of civilization are passing through a test of survival—militarism, with its concurrent institutions, based on monarchy and a privileged hierarchy of royalty and nobility and bureaucracy, and the system of industrialism, based upon productiveness with institutions free from privilege. America is the Nation that embodies industrialism; Japan and Asia and the great military nations in Europe embody the system of militarism. In a fair competition in times of peace militarism must go down, but industrialism unprepared would as inevitably fall in war. In the interest of humanity, that lies upon the survival of industrialism, America should with her vast resources make adequate preparations, taking care always to safeguard her own people against the spirit of militarism.

AMERICA THE MERCIFUL AND THE GENEROUS.

When Great Britain, France, the Netherlands, and the United States jointly bombarded Shimonoski and exacted \$3,000,000 indemnity from the Japanese Government for having closed the straits at that point, the other nations took their equal shares and expended them. America's share was duly received, but ere long, by a unanimous vote of the American Congress, every dollar was returned to the Japanese Government.

In the Boxer disturbances, when the allied nations invading China levied huge indemnities against America's pleading and allotted America \$12,000,000, by a unanimous vote of our Congress we returned the last dollar to the Chinese Government.

When our blood and treasure had been freely poured out in Cuba and the world expected us to remain and hold Cuba as a fruit of conquest and a source of revenue, America astonished

the whole world by voluntarily giving Cuba her independence. What nation on earth would have been so patient, so long suffering in Mexico as have been the American people?

AMERICA THE PEACEMAKER.

America is the one great Nation that covets no territory of any other nation. America is the one great Nation that has no enemies. America is the one great Nation that would recoil at the very thought of becoming a "governing" nation. In America Jews and Gentiles have become reconciled, Protestants and Catholics. America is a blood kinsman of the Anglo-Saxons, of the Germans, of the Frenchmen, of the Austro-Hungarian, of the Italian, of the Russian, the common friend of Celt, Slav, Teuton, Latin. America opened up Japan with the blessing of an elder brother. America to-day is the one disinterested friend of China in all the world. Shall this great Nation of destiny be impotent when it raises its voice for the establishment of such policies as the Monroe doctrine, the open-door policy, such principles as justice and equal opportunity and rights of the weak? Shall America be impotent when she seeks to restrain the cruel march of war and permit the operation of great organic forces of commerce and industry, of education, the moral and religious forces of the world, to work out the overthrow of war and the ultimate establishment of the era of peace on earth, good will to men?

THE RIGHTS OF NEUTRALS VERSUS THE RIGHTS OF BELLIGERENTS.

The swift events are daily bringing into contrast the so-called rights of belligerents and their restraint upon the inherent rights of neutrals. America is the only great nation in the world logically constituted the champion of the latter. The so-called rights of belligerents are founded solely upon might. For instance, Great Britain maintains that she has a right to negotiate unlimited credits and purchase unlimited amounts of war material in America and denies the right of Germany to sell ships to America from which a credit might be derived that, when derived, could not be used to supply war materials. Our Secretary of State takes the position that we ought to be parties to the proposition of giving great military aid to Great Britain and her allies and withholding even commercial aid to Germany, because the British and allied fleets are stronger in might than the Germans and have control of the sea.

A statement was made some time back, emanating evidently from the White House, that our Government in bona fide transactions and our citizens in similar transactions could purchase vessels where they pleased, but now we hear no murmur of protest when Great Britain informs us that a ship purchased in good faith from Germany by an American citizen will not be allowed to carry on peaceful commerce over the high seas. Every arbitrary action of the British Government in extending the list of contraband and the exercise of search and seizure represents an encroachment for all future time, at least as far as precedents go upon the sphere of neutral rights, simply because the combination of the allies represents so much power upon the high seas the limited progress already made in the rights of peace must be turned back. America must fold her hands while her own opportunities for commercial expansion are limited and the evolution of the rights of neutrals, the rights of peace, is set back.

NO CHRONIC BELLIGERENT SHOULD HENCEFORWARD BE ALLOWED CONTROL OF THE SEA.

Great Britain has undertaken for a long time to maintain power upon the sea greater than that of any two nations—in fact, more than double that of any other nation—so that the high seas are practically under the control of a partisan. In the interest of humanity at large and the orderly evolution of peace and right, and especially the development of the rights of neutrals, minimizing and localizing of the disruption of war demand that the scepter of the sea shall pass from the hands of Great Britain and hereafter rest in the hands of the great peaceful kinsman of all nations, the United States.

AMERICA'S DEFENSE POLICIES.

Having reviewed America's world policies, we can now proceed to establish our defense policies.

The elements of national defense may be divided into two classes—national resources and national preparations.

The trend of the times is to increase the already preponderant advantages of preparations as compared to potential resources. When Prussia struck Austria in 1866, the war was over in a few months. When Germany struck France in 1870, the same result followed. When Japan struck Russia, the same. In the great world war now raging both factors may be brought into the field, because both sides had ample preparations to insure having a time element sufficient to develop and bring to bear their resources. America's preparations are so utterly inadequate that the prospects are the blow struck would seriously

endanger our chances of being able to bring our resources to bear at all. It is estimated that at least three years would be necessary to create a model army in America, prepared to cope with modern armies abroad, which are kept ready to move on a moment's notice, with transportation facilities sufficient to cross the ocean in a few weeks. Our mobile army being so small and so widely scattered and our militia being in the same condition, with the complete absence of any reserve, America must rely upon her naval forces to insure the time element in which to bring to bear our great resources. Fortunately from our geographical position over seas from the great military nations, naval forces sufficiently powerful can insure us a security greater even than that England has enjoyed for hundreds of years, enabling her to escape the necessity of conscription and permitting her to evolve liberal institutions.

NAVAL POWER VERSUS MILITARY POWER.

Military power involves large numbers of men organized into armies; naval power consists chiefly in property made up of ships. A dreadnaught to-day, with its crew of 1,000 men, is ordinarily estimated to be more than equivalent in power to an army corps of more than 40,000 men. Take Germany's case to-day: Twenty additional dreadnaughts would give her control of the seas, and at least cut off the 2,000,000 men England is preparing to place on the Continent drawn from the British Isles and the colonies of the British Empire. Germany would have access to the resources of the whole world, while England could be starved into submission in a few months. The additional 20 dreadnaughts would be worth to Germany more than a billion of dollars, more than millions of men. It would mean sure victory; in fact, it would have prevented the participation of Great Britain in the war. It would have determined the course of history. A few more battleships in our Navy before the war with Spain would have insured control of the sea without the necessity of the test of war, and would have saved the cost of the hundreds upon hundreds of millions of dollars entailed by the war itself. Defense by naval power, therefore, does not involve military activities of the people, and what few people there are involved are far away from the mass of the people themselves. Thus there is no tendency to militarism. On the contrary, when people can secure their defense by naval power, then industrial activities are uppermost, and their civilization follows the lines of industrialism instead of militarism. It is this great fact in history that has caused all the Republics of the world to be built upon naval power. This will account for the fact that it is such countries where defense comes through naval power that free institutions have developed most, as in the case of England. The evolution of the world has been away from militarism and toward an industrial civilization, so the history of the world has persistently hung upon the course of sea power, and the great crises, the great decisive battles, have really been naval and not military.

The perpetuation of Grecian civilization as against Persian was not settled at the Battle of Thermopylae on the land, but at the Battle of Salamis on the water. Likewise, the advent of the Augustan era of Roman history was not settled at the Battle of Philippi, but at the Battle of Actium. Indeed, the survival of Rome as against Carthage was settled when the Roman galleys gained control of the Mediterranean. The English civilization of Elizabeth overcame the Spanish civilization of Philip II because of the destruction of the Spanish Armada. England came through the Napoleonic wars supreme as against Napoleon because Napoleon could not cross the English Channel. England at Waterloo fought for victory; England at Trafalgar fought for existence. Anglo-Saxons are associated with the most advanced civilizations in the world, with the most advanced institutions of human liberty, because the Anglo-Saxon has held naval supremacy for a thousand years and has not been subjected to military conscription. The future of the world, like the past, is going to be determined by the control of the sea. Industrial nations sufficiently farsighted to make naval preparations to insure their bringing to bear their great resources are the ones that are going to survive as against the nations that continually maintain great armies.

OUR POLICY FOR LAND FORCES.

The fact that defense through naval forces where available is more advantageous than defense through land forces does not nullify the importance of the latter nor the necessity of clearly establishing a policy for land forces.

AMERICA A NONMILITARY COUNTRY.

We are a nonmilitary country, and our very civilization demands for its perpetuation that we remain a nonmilitary country. Therefore we can not have and should not have large standing armies, maintained under conscription like the military nations of the world. Our relatively small standing army there-

fore must be maintained in the highest state of efficiency, and must be kept at such station as to permit of rapid concentration at our vital points of exposure.

PRESENT POLICY WASTEFUL AND INEFFICIENT.

The policy of maintaining small detachments in scores of points widely scattered is absolutely contrary to such a policy, since it prevents practice in large units and prevents efficiency and makes rapid concentration an impossibility, while the cost per soldier is increased beyond all reasonable limits. There should be two main points on the Atlantic, one on the Gulf, two on the Pacific. Most of the others should be abandoned.

Having such a small standing army increases the importance of maintaining a comparatively large militia and military reserve force.

MILITARY PAY BILL A NECESSITY.

Congress should speedily take measures to encourage the States and the citizenship to develop in numbers and efficiency the National Guard. This, of course, can not be done without the Federal Government's sharing a reasonable amount of the expense necessary. A comprehensive militia pay bill insuring not only expansion but increased regulation and efficiency of the militia is a military necessity.

A GREAT CITIZENRY RESERVE FORCE MUST BE DEVELOPED.

We should adopt national policies to encourage the average citizen to secure that minimum amount of military training necessary for a speedy development of the citizen into a good soldier after war comes. This will involve the Federal Government's cooperation in the educational policies of the Nation, and a comprehensive plan for financial aid should be established to apply to all high schools and colleges and even to the seventh and eighth grades in the graded schools. The cost in equipment would, of course, be large, since the Federal Government in all probability will find it necessary to provide the essentials, but the success of the Boy Scout movement shows that cooperation on the part of the people and the boys would greatly reduce the total cost from what would naturally be the estimate.

EX-SOLDIERS AND OFFICERS.

A definite military reserve should be maintained in such a way as to keep together the bulk of discharged soldiers, and colleges, high schools, together with the militia and reserve, should be conducted with a special view to preparing a large contingent of officers ready for taking charge of the great volunteer armies in time of war.

COORDINATION.

Our land forces and our policies controlling same should be determined in coordination with our naval forces and the policies controlling the same. The two are essentially supplemental. In proportion as the land forces are weak so the naval forces must be strong. In a few moments I will discuss the elements that should determine our naval policy. It is clear, however, that before any real permanent efficiency and economy can be realized in our national defense we must create an agency competent to investigate the whole question of national defense, whose duty it would be to work out and recommend to the Government a comprehensive policy.

THE COUNCIL OF NATIONAL DEFENSE BILL.

For six years such a measure has been before Congress in the form of a bill to establish a council of national defense. This bill has been twice favorably reported by the Naval Committee of the House. It has been incorporated in the Democratic platform of Baltimore. In the hearings before the Naval Committee Gen. Wotherspoon, president of the Army War College, made the significant statement that under the operation of such a council the efficiency of the Army could be trebled while its expense could be cut in half. Similar testimony was given by other officers in the Army and Navy, and favorable action has been urged by the late President of the United States and by the last four Secretaries of War and by the late Secretary of the Navy.

Such a council would only have advisory power, and could not possibly interfere with the jurisdiction of the legislative or executive branches or with their independent operation. Upon the council would be found with the President the Secretary of State, the highest authority on our world policies; the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy, with their highest technical experts and advisers; along with the chairmen of the committees of the Senate and the House having cognizance of naval and military affairs, foreign relations, and the purse strings.

THE PRESIDENT AND SECRETARY OF STATE THE GREATEST OBSTACLES OF NATIONAL DEFENSE.

The fact that the council of national defense bill is a plank in the Democratic platform seems to have no influence with the administration. This bill would long since have been a law

but for the opposition of the President and the Secretary of State. This opposition to the most vital and fundamental measure, similar to measures that have been taken by all the other nations of the world, opposition that keeps America from making a start, constitutes the President and the Secretary of State the greatest obstacle of their country's defense.

It seems a singular irony that the movement for national prohibition likewise has found greatest opposition from the present administration. To thoughtful men these two questions are the most vital and the most fundamental before the Nation, one affecting the integrity of the Nation within and the other the security of the Nation without. It seems passing strange that, measured by these two great causes, we find the highest official of the Nation is the greatest obstacle to progress.

THE COUNTRY'S GREATEST LIABILITY.

It is far from me to question the patriotism and the conscientious devotion of this eminent citizen. This only deepens the tragedy of the situation and the deadening effect of his influence in these two fields of public endeavor. I do not disparage the usefulness of his services in other lines and the beneficent educational influence his life has had upon his country. These, again, only deepen the tragedy.

Every citizen is entitled to his own appraisal of the relative importance of public questions. I expect others to differ with me. To me, however, the first question in importance before this Nation or any other nation is to make and keep the nation sober. The question of next importance before our Nation is to provide an adequate defense, so that as a people we may live in peace and security and work out our institutions at home without molestation and with the minimum disturbance when war exists in other lands, and so that we may without fear be able to effectively champion the cause of the weak and the principles of right and justice in the Western Hemisphere, and even ultimately in the Eastern Hemisphere, thus insuring the survival of industrialism, bringing about the passing of militarism, causing war to steadily recede, so that at last peace can reign throughout the earth, free institutions can be developed in all lands, leading toward the ultimate goal of the brotherhood of man under the fatherhood of God.

Nothing is so much needed in this country as for the public to be apprised of the truth that really bears upon great public questions. If there were any chance of my being mistaken about the obstacles in the path of these two great lines of national progress, I would not raise my voice; but being in the heart of the public movements in both lines, I have felt only too heavily the power of the obstacles represented by the President. My conception of duty as a public official is to do the duty, whatever it may be, without flinching, though it be "to his own hurt." It is only when the truth is fully known to our people that the real obstacles in the path of progress can be appreciated, and a beginning made toward ultimate realization of a great objective. If national prohibition and national defense are the greatest questions in America, as I believe them to be, then the President of the United States instead of being our country's greatest asset is our country's greatest liability.

I am fully aware, Mr. Chairman, what these words of mine mean, and the effect they will have in the minds of millions, perhaps, especially the effect upon the feelings of partisans, particularly those who exalt party because party constitutes for them the ladder upon which to climb to offices of preferment and eminence. There are some who place self above party and party above country, even without being conscious of their own subconscious classification. My conception is exactly the reverse. I look upon all parties as human agencies organized fundamentally to promote the public welfare. If our country were at war in the presence of a deadly foe, whether within or without, the patriotic citizen would subordinate self, and if necessary subordinate party. Others may differ with me, but I do not believe that in our country's whole history, whether in peace or in war, we have ever been confronted with a more critical situation.

OUR NAVAL POLICY.

Mr. Chairman, I will not repeat to-day the substance of my speech of April 23 of last year, setting forth, as many previous speeches in this House have set forth, my ideas of a true naval policy for America. I wish to make a supplemental addition brought out by the great world war that has come since our last appropriation bill. My previous investigations led to the final conclusion that America should always maintain in the Atlantic Ocean a fleet the equal of the fleet of any military nation of Europe possessing a big standing army, and that we should maintain permanently in the Pacific a fleet as large as the fleet of any military nation of Asia possessing a large standing army. Formerly this standard demanded that our Navy

in the Atlantic should be equal to the navy of Germany, and that our Navy in the Pacific should be equal to the navy of Japan. The war in Europe, as previously pointed out, has shown that Great Britain is not a nation whose relations with other nations permits her to be safely trusted to dominate the waters of the world. In the interest of our own peaceful commerce when warlike nations are at war, in the interest of the rights of peace of all nations as against the usurped rights of belligerents based on might, the interests of neutrals, the interests of peace throughout the world now demand that our two fleets in the Atlantic and the Pacific should always at least equal the British Navy, and during the continuation of the Anglo-Japanese alliance they should be together equal to the navy of Great Britain and the navy of Japan combined. This should be the foundation upon which to determine our naval program.

OUR NAVAL PROGRAM.

The true naval program for our country at this juncture should be to speedily take measures to render the Navy that we have efficient and to adequately increase its strength. The great lacking of the Navy as a whole to-day is that naval administration in our country has been developed almost wholly in times of peace. Not since we have had a Navy Department beyond an embryo stage has our country ever engaged a powerful naval foe. It is not surprising therefore that the organization of the Navy Department, based upon seven bureaus, has not included an agency for coordinating all the elements of the Navy and for preparing plans and directing their execution in time of war in order to insure naval victory. Every navy department and every military department of every other nation of the world has such an agency; ours alone is lacking.

CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS.

In my judgment, the most important part of the present bill is the paragraph establishing a chief of naval operations, with 15 assistants. The enactment of this legislation would represent the real beginning of ultimate efficiency for the Navy we have, whatever its size. It is needless to remark that the efficient navy is beyond all comparison to the economical navy. Whatever the size of an organization, nothing is so wasteful in its operation as inefficiency. In my extension of remarks I will print a speech recently delivered by Rear Admiral Austin M. Knight, United States Navy, before the Efficiency Club of New York City, and I will also print a brief outline of the natural subdivisions or sections in the organization of the office of a chief of naval operations.

OUR FLEET IS BLIND.

Although the field of operations of our fleet must cover inevitably not a narrow channel nor a comparatively small sea, but the great extent of an ocean, nevertheless to-day we have no scouting ship, either weak or strong, and consequently our fleet is blind. All other navies have eyes in the form of not only scout ships properly adequate to the task of scouting on the high seas, but great battle cruisers that can make swift "reconnaissance in force" over long distances. Irrespective of the qualities to be developed on the part of the fighting ships, the imperative need of the fleet we have to-day is two great battle cruisers of about 40,000 tons displacement making more than 30 knots, carrying the heaviest guns afloat, and sufficient armor to keep out armor-piercing projectiles at usual battle ranges, with a radius of action larger than that of any vessel afloat. In addition to these we should provide at least four scout ships proper, three for the Atlantic and one for the Pacific.

INCREASE IN ENLISTED MEN.

To make our Navy efficient for the vessels that we now have and would expect to commission instantly on the outbreak of war would require at least 20,000 additional enlisted men. The report from the commander in chief of the battleship fleet, on the findings of various boards, shows an "alarming" shortage of enlisted men. The admiral refers to the findings as follows:

These boards have now completed their work and the result has developed an alarming shortage of officers and men that are required to efficiently man our ships for battle. The reports of all these boards were made independently and are singularly unanimous in their conclusions, presenting a more serious shortage than could have been anticipated by either the Navy Department or the fleet until brought to light by this searching investigation.

The reports of these boards show that in the 21 battleships in commission and now composing the Atlantic Fleet there is a shortage of 5,219 men and 339 officers required to fill all stations necessary to efficiently fight the ships in battle.

The least we can do at this session of Congress is to provide for additional men to make up this deficiency on the battleships alone now in commission. Taking into account the fact that we have a comparatively small ocean-going merchant marine, a small Naval Militia, and as yet no naval reserve at all, we should endeavor to have our complements on our ships in commission relatively larger than on the ships of other nations. I shall

offer an amendment at the proper place to begin by the authorization of an increase of 5,000 men in the enlisted force of the Navy. This would entail an additional provision of a little over two millions of dollars and would ultimately require about three millions a year.

THE BUILDING PROGRAM.

In order to approximate a Navy equal to the Japanese Navy and the German Navy combined, and equal to and ultimately superior to the British Navy, we should adopt a consistent program of six capital ships per year, and I trust that sooner or later we may reach this basis. Knowing, however, that this Congress will not provide such a program, at the proper time I shall move to increase the number of battleships from two to four, in addition to offering an amendment of a new paragraph to provide for two battle cruisers.

I will not discuss at length the characteristics of these capital ships, but the experiences in the present war confirm the contention I have consistently made for many years before the Naval Committee and before this House that our capital ships should have superior speed along with the most powerful guns.

AUXILIARIES.

It is a corollary or an axiom that with the capital ships we must provide auxiliaries in sufficient numbers to make the capital ships most effective and to balance the fleet.

THE QUESTION OF SUBMARINES.

The submarine has rapidly demonstrated its power in the course of operations in Europe, a demonstration that shows that the defense from torpedo attacks heretofore provided is not adequate. As yet the use of destroyers and picket boats seems to have been the only available defense. There are indications, however, that other means of defense may be developed. Nevertheless the great usefulness of the submarine is fully demonstrated, and its numbers should be rapidly increased.

CAPITAL SHIPS DETERMINE THE CONTROL OF THE SEA.

It should be borne in mind that however useful auxiliaries may be, it is the preponderance of capital ships of the latest type that gives a nation control of the sea—the all-determining factor in the course of the world. No matter how many submarines Germany possessed, no matter how many auxiliaries of other types she possessed, the heavy preponderance of the allies' capital ships insures them the control of the high seas and recourse to the resources of the world.

EXPERIMENTATION.

The question of types of ships and of the qualities of each type involves evolution and change, particularly during and immediately following war. Orderly and useful developments of complicated implements of war entail laborious, patient experimentation. The organization of the Navy Department contains no agency to conduct such experimentations, and only at intervals does a bureau appoint a board for such special purposes. The Committee on Naval Affairs of the House has had a subcommittee on ordnance experiments cooperating with the Navy Department for several years in the development of ordnance materials. The results of the investigations are naturally of a confidential nature, but their importance can not be overestimated. In the conduct of these investigations a member of the Senate Committee on Naval Affairs has been frequently present. I trust that this special subcommittee work may be continued after my leaving Congress and may become a joint subcommittee of the two naval committees, and may have cooperating with it a corresponding board of the Navy Department, which could be provided by slight extension of the present board appointed to conduct experimentation on torpedo shells. At the proper place I shall move an amendment for a reasonable increase in the appropriations for experimentation.

AIR CRAFT.

I can not close, Mr. Chairman, without urging—what I have urged for a number of years—the systematic development of experimentation and building of air craft of all types. The utter decadence of aviation in our Army and Navy is due to lack of sympathetic legislation of Congress. I remember with painful vividness the defeat several years ago of a measure brought to the floor of the House from the naval committee to simply cooperate with private individuals to establish in Washington a laboratory and plant for experimentation in aeronautics. I hope the day will some day come when America—the great peacemaker, the great Nation championing the cause of free institutions and of humanity, championing the cause of the weak; our great peace Nation of America—will not only be mistress of the seas but mistress of the air.

Under my leave to print I will here print the speech of Rear Admiral Austin M. Knight, United States Navy, delivered at the

annual banquet of the Efficiency Club of New York City, January 25, 1915. The address is as follows:

ADDRESS BY REAR ADMIRAL AUSTIN M. KNIGHT, UNITED STATES NAVY, AT THE ANNUAL BANQUET OF THE EFFICIENCY CLUB OF NEW YORK CITY, JANUARY 25, 1915.

I appreciate very highly the privilege of addressing you this evening, not alone because of the compliment which the privilege involves, but because of the possibility of usefulness to the Navy and the country which seems to be connected with it. If I do not speak as full as you might wish me to, I shall at least speak frankly.

It is not my intention to go into questions of the efficiency of individual ships, the results of target practice, and kindred topics. I propose to deal with the efficiency of the Navy as a whole, considering it as a great and very complicated machine, upon which hundreds of millions of dollars have been expended, with one end in view, and only one—the development of a supremely efficient weapon for the defense of the country against any and every enemy which may come against us.

I was asked a few weeks ago what the War College considered that the fleet should do, and I replied:

"The War College considers that every effort of the fleet, and every effort of the department in connection with the fleet, should have for its sole aim the war efficiency of the fleet. Every effort which does not directly contribute to this end is in itself a wasteful expenditure of energy, and, so far as it is a diversion from this end, is distinctly harmful."

No doubt there are many differences of opinion among those assembled here to-night as to what constitutes an adequate Navy for the defense of the United States. There may even be some present who think that we should have no Navy at all. But on one point I am sure there will be no difference of opinion—that if we are to have a Navy it should be as efficient as it can possibly be made. And everybody who knows anything about the Navy knows that this is not its present condition. I am not one of those who hold that it is altogether inefficient. Unsatisfactory as conditions are, it would be very easy to exaggerate them. When things are wrong you can always find extremists to tell you that they are much worse than they actually are. Some people think that this is the only way to make an impression. Others are so constituted temperamentally that they can see nothing good in anything which falls short of perfection as they see it.

I am going to assume that all of you who are gathered here to-night occupy a reasonable middle ground so far as temperament is concerned, and that to make an impression upon you I need not do violence to my own temperament by painting the picture which I shall draw for you in maximum contrasts of light and shade.

There is much about the Navy which is splendidly efficient, but as a whole it is far less efficient than it can and ought to be. Our ships are fine. Our officers are capable, industrious, and ambitious. Our enlisted men are the equals of those in other navies. But efficient ships and men do not alone make an efficient navy. They must be welded into an efficient whole by a unity of organization and administration and purpose which coordinates their capabilities and directs their efforts toward a common end, wisely selected, and very clearly seen. Here is the first point at which we are lacking. We are lacking also in that harmonious composition of the fleet which is needed to give to every element of it the support that it needs from other elements to make up a symmetrical and well-balanced whole. And we are lacking to a marked degree in absolutely essential facilities for the care and preservation of our ships, especially in the matter of dry docks.

Finally, we are lacking in efficient organization of the personnel. Here, so far as officers are concerned, the conditions are altogether deplorable. In a service like the Navy, where spirit is everything, where enthusiasm must be the driving power back of every activity, I ask you to picture the effect of a condition where a young officer, graduating from the Naval Academy, full of spirit and enthusiasm, finds himself confronted with a prospect of promotion to the grade of lieutenant at the age of 52 years.

If you ask me who is responsible for these conditions, I can only reply that the responsibility comes home to nearly all of us. Some of it, I am sure, rests with me; much of it, I believe, with you. Certainly it can not be attributed in excessive measure to any one administration of the Navy Department, for it has existed for half a century at least. So let us not cloud the issue by assuming that it is a new condition and that all administrations up to some recent date have been models of wisdom and efficiency or that naval officers themselves have always been ready with good advice. Speaking as the representative of naval officers as a body, I frankly admit that we have not always seen clearly what was needed and have not always worked together even for ends which we did see clearly. As for the Secretaries of the Navy, it is not surprising that many of them have failed to realize that their first duty was to strive, in season and out of season, to promote the war efficiency of the Navy as a whole. Many of them have not remained in office long enough to learn this. Some, perhaps, have realized it more or less clearly, but have not found at hand an organization through which they could produce results. A few have made material contributions toward improved conditions. I shall have the pleasure a little later of calling attention to one important step in advance which was taken by the present Secretary at the very beginning of his term of office.

A large part of the responsibility, especially that connected with the small size and the unbalanced composition of the fleet and the lack of dry docks, rests with Congress, which has always approached naval legislation from the wrong side so far as efficiency is concerned—asking, not what do we need for efficiency, but what can we afford to spend for efficiency. Behind the responsibility of Congress lies the responsibility of the country—and you, gentlemen, represent the country—because it has not insisted upon having what was needed without reference to cost. It may be that this attitude of both Congress and the country is necessary and even inevitable. But I am one of those who believe that this great country of ours can afford to have anything in the way of national defense which it needs, and I assume that all present here to-night agree that we need a Navy, and if a Navy then an efficient one, and that whatever efficiency costs is the measure of what we can afford to spend.

One particularly unfortunate feature about the application of the policy of "economy first" in naval expenditures is that it has often been invoked to prevent a small appropriation which would have added many times its own cost to the value of those items for which money was cheerfully appropriated. I shall discuss this more at length hereafter.

But, after all, is it not rather futile to spend our time in trying to place responsibility for existing conditions? It seems to me that what

we ought to do is to recognize the conditions clearly—neither exaggerating nor minimizing them—and to dissociate them absolutely from personalities. We can then proceed, with a perfectly open mind, to consider how the conditions can be improved.

I ask you to accept this point of view and to banish from your mind all thought of politics and every trace of partisanship, and fix your attention upon the question before us as one of national, not of political, significance.

The conditions, then, to which I shall invite your attention are those connected with, first, the size and composition of the fleet; second, the organization of the personnel; third, the organization and administration of the Navy Department.

First, as to the size of the fleet. I shall not go into this very fully because my subject is not so much adequacy as efficiency. A small machine may be efficient within the limits fixed by its size. It is from the point of view of efficiency within the Navy as it exists that I wish chiefly to consider my subject this evening. It must be recognized, however, that the actual efficiency for war of a battleship fleet which is efficient within itself may be seriously compromised by the lack of those supporting units which are vitally essential to its operation. There is, moreover, a sense in which we may say that a machine is not efficient if it is too small for the task for which it is designed.

What constitutes an adequate navy for the United States? The answer will depend, of course, upon the purpose for which we assume that the Navy is to be used. We are all agreed, I presume, that it is not to be used for aggression. Is it, then, to be used solely for defense? If we answer "yes," we ought to do so with a full recognition of what we are to defend and also of the elementary maxim that the best defense is a vigorous offense. In other words, no matter how resolute we may be to use our Navy only for repelling aggression, it does not follow that we should plan for meeting the aggressor only at our gates. Even if we had no interests outside our borders and no responsibilities for the defense of our outlying possessions and dependencies, we should still, as reasonable beings not wholly ignorant of history, prepare to project our battle line toward the enemy's coasts and to assume a course which would throw upon him the burden of replying to our initiative. In this sense, then, we need a Navy for offense; that is to say, for offensive action with a defensive purpose. In shaping our plans along these lines we should not overlook the fact that the policy which dictates the measure of our defense must take full note of the larger national policy which it is to enforce in relation, for example, to the Monroe doctrine, the Panama Canal, the Philippines, and other matters which are at once of national and of international significance.

The statement is often made—I have heard it made on the floors of Congress—that naval officers themselves do not know what they need. There are, naturally, differences of opinion among naval officers as to what the strength of the Navy should be and as to the types of which it should be composed. But the country has in the General Board a body of mature and experienced officers, whose business it is to study this question and to speak authoritatively upon it. In the main the recommendations of this board from year to year have been consistent with each other and consistent with the best naval sentiment. It has stood since 1903 for a fleet of 48 battleships and necessary smaller units and auxiliaries. The character of the smaller units and auxiliaries recommended has varied from time to time, following the developments of naval art and science; but the basis of 48 battleships, to be kept up to date by eliminating ships more than 20 years of age and replacing them by new construction, has been steadily adhered to. Now, it may be that we need fewer than 48 battleships or that we need more. Whatever their number is to be, we should have a policy in the matter looking as far into the future as practicable, and one which, in providing for capital ships, provides also for the smaller units and auxiliaries to round out the fleet into a complete and well-balanced whole, with an appropriate number of cruisers, scouts, destroyers, submarines, collers, tank ships, supply ships, repair ships, mine-laying ships, tenders, and gunboats.

The program advocated by the General Board would, if it had been followed, have given us 47 battleships, built and building, in 1914. This program has not been followed, and we have at present 37 battleships instead of 47. It seems to me that he would be a bold man who, recalling the history of the last days of August, 1914, when the world passed within a week from a condition of universal peace to one of almost universal war, should say that we do not need the full number of battleships proposed by the General Board—and more.

But battleships alone do not make up a fleet, much less a navy. A fleet without fuel ships is crippled and one without scouts is blind. It can neither secure information of the enemy's movements nor deny information of its own. To send a fleet thus blind and crippled into hostile waters would be to invite destruction. We have an altogether insufficient number of fuel ships and practically no scouts. Moreover, we are very weak in destroyers, of which a large number should accompany the fleet to back up the scouts, to act in part as scouts themselves, to stiffen up the screen about the battleships, and to be ready for a dash against the enemy when an opening is presented. The effect of the conditions actually existing is to almost completely nullify the power of our fighting ships. Picture to yourselves the plight of a battleship fleet operating in hostile waters against a fleet much smaller, but with all its elements complete. The smaller fleet, with scouts thrown out a hundred miles or more around its main body, every scout in touch with every other one and with the commander in chief, and with a horde of destroyers backing up the scouts and awaiting the word to attack, would gain and keep touch with the larger fleet, while itself evading discovery, and would send its destroyers in at night, unchecked and unnoted by any protecting screen, to drive home an attack which might decide the issue without the main fleets ever having seen each other. And if nothing of this sort occurred, consider the situation where the fleet, with its fuel supply exhausted, finds itself without a reserve supply on which to draw.

There is a widespread and very dangerous opinion that all the fuel ships and scouts we need can be improvised on short notice from merchant vessels. This is one of those miserable fallacies based upon experience in the Civil War and the Spanish War, in both of which we won because our opponents were even more grotesquely unprepared than we were. The Civil War was, I suppose, the most costly war ever fought and the most unpardonably wasteful in money and in human life. But its cost did not end with the end of the war. Apart from the tremendous pension list, which our pacifist friends insist upon charging up to what they are fond of calling "militarism," although it was really the direct result of the criminal folly of unpreparedness; apart from this is the indirect cost of the perpetuation of that folly. Since we were successful in that war—so the implied argument runs—our preparation for it must have been of the kind that makes for

success, and we can look for success hereafter from the same policy. To these gentlemen I commend the perusal of a book called *The Military Policy of the United States*, by Gen. Emory H. Upton. If any of you here present to-night have failed to read this book, I urge you to read it at once. It exists in conveniently available form as Senate Document No. 494, Sixty-second Congress, second session. It would be interesting to know how many Senators have read it. It is the best antidote I know for the monstrous delusion which sees in every American citizen a soldier, trained, efficient, ready to take his place in the ranks at a moment's notice and sweep the loathed invader from our soil, and in every ship that floats a potential man-of-war complete in everything but guns.

By what seems almost a misfortune, in view of its effect upon the minds of many of our people, the delusion that we alone of all the nations of the earth can carry on a successful war without preparation was confirmed by our easy victory in the Spanish War—our opponent again being as unprepared as we were. I should be sorry to agree with those who hold that nothing short of an overwhelming defeat in some future war will ever open our eyes to the danger of existing conditions, and I wish to do my part toward opening the eyes of my countrymen before such disaster comes. We must recognize the fact that war is an art and a very highly specialized art. For every task which it involves there is a need of special tools, efficient in themselves and contributing to the efficiency of the whole organization. And these can not be improvised. Yachts, tugs, and ferry boats can perform certain duties in waters close to our own coasts when they are absolutely unopposed. And any steamer capable of carrying a thousand tons of coal can get the coal to a fleet which is lying quietly outside a quiet port with no threat of interruption to its lines of communication. But no language is strong enough to characterize the fatuity of relying upon such tools for carrying on a real naval war. It is true, no doubt, that there are many fuel-carrying ships that can be utilized by the Navy in time of war. But let us consider briefly the characteristics which they should have, and then inquire how many of them we would probably find available in our waters on the sudden outbreak of war. First of all, a goodly proportion of them must carry fuel oil instead of coal or in addition to coal. Second, they must be large. A great number of small craft, manned by untrained crews and commanded by untrained officers, might be a fatal handicap to a fleet operating at sea. Third, they must be fast, for the speed of the fleet will be the speed of the slowest craft accompanying it. Fourth, they must have facilities for handling and transferring their fuel at sea.

I do not know how many such ships there are under the United States flag at this moment. But somebody ought to know how many there are, and how and where they can be reached. This should all be provided for in advance. But when it is provided for, it is safe to say that the number will be far short of what a fleet would need. And it is clear that, at the best, such craft could not work at maximum efficiency with a fleet engaged in operations where perfect military coordination is of the first importance.

We need, then, in order to make our 37 or our 47 battleships efficient, more large, fast Navy fuel ships of the *Jupiter* type, many more destroyers, and a considerable number of scout cruisers, designed and built as such, with a speed of not less than 28 knots.

It goes without saying that in these days a scout should carry aeroplanes to be launched from her decks, and this means, of course, that we need a large number of these, and of the most efficient type obtainable. It has been suggested that we can rely upon aeroplanes alone for scouting, sending them out from battleships, and so dispense with cruisers altogether. This might work if no other function were involved than that of locating the enemy; but the screening duty of the outlying line of cruisers is even more important than the scouting duty. To discover an enemy force is helpful; to arrest its advance is far more so, especially when by arresting it we deny the enemy the information about our whereabouts and our movements which it will be his object to secure.

We are weak in submarines, and the submarine, as you are all aware, has within the last few months established its claim to very serious consideration as an element in naval warfare. It has not shown itself the master of the battleship, and I doubt if it will ever do so; but it has taken a more commanding place than most of us have heretofore assigned it. I should rejoice if we had to-day 100 submarines instead of less than half that number, built and building. Those that we have are only half efficient because they lack tenders of the proper type to accompany them and care for their needs and the needs of their personnel. Here, again, crops up the old idea that a vessel for a special purpose, demanding special characteristics, and vitally necessary to the efficiency of a vital part of our naval force, can be improvised out of any old craft which happens to be handy. And here, again, is illustrated the false economy which in providing a weapon efficient within itself denies it the support outside itself which alone can make it efficient in application.

Running parallel with the omissions in the fleet itself is a corresponding list of omissions in the provisions for its upkeep—in dry docks and other navy-yard facilities especially. A fleet without dry docks of suitable capacity and suitably located is only a little less helpless than one without fuel ships.

We have at Guantanamo a station which should be the principal base of our fleet for operations in the Caribbean, the area in which, if anywhere, our control of the Panama Canal will be challenged. But not only have we no dry dock or efficient repair shops there, we have none within a thousand miles of it. Here the expenditure of \$2,000,000 might conceivably double the efficiency of the fleet in some critical emergency by making it possible for every ship to go out in perfect condition; and it requires no stretch of the imagination to picture the importance of a war as hinging upon this point alone. After a battle the importance of a dock close at hand for repairing damages is too apparent to require more than a passing mention. It might enable the fleet to take the sea again after a brief delay, with every advantage over an enemy fleet less favorably situated.

It is understood, of course, that every station which is designed to serve as a base of supply, of repair, or of refuge for the fleet should be adequately fortified. This is a phase of my subject upon which I should like to dwell at considerable length, but time and other considerations make it impracticable for me to do so.

If I have made myself clear up to the present point, you will understand by how narrow a margin we have missed efficiency in the composition of our fleet and the provision for its upkeep; and yet of what vast importance is the space that separates us from it. Two per cent, perhaps—5 per cent, certainly—added to our expenditures year after year would have added at least 50 per cent to the efficiency of the fleet as a whole.

I come now to the question of personnel. In an ideal system the development here as regards both officers and men would keep pace automatically with the development of the fleet through a law by which the authorization for a certain increase in the number of ships would carry with it the authorization for a corresponding increase in officers and men and for a reasonable flow of promotion. Failing this ideal, we should at least have a periodical readjustment such as to maintain a personnel ample in numbers, amply trained, and so organized as to insure a flow of promotion which will secure contentment, foster ambition, and bring officers to the command of ships and fleets while still in the perfection of their mental and physical powers. Unfortunately, the present conditions are as far from this ideal as could be imagined. To begin with, we have not the officers and men to man our ships efficiently. This is serious enough, but much more serious is the fact that the promotion of officers is so completely blocked that a young man graduating from the Naval Academy must look forward to spending all the best years of his life in the two lowest grades of the service; to performing, as a gray-headed man, the same duties that he has performed as a boy; and to receiving but a very small increase in salary. I need not point out to you the inevitable effect of this upon efficiency.

For this condition I could not place the responsibility if I would. Congress has long been calling upon the Navy Department for a satisfactory personnel bill. Several bills have been prepared and every one has had support. But none has had the cordial support of the Navy as a whole. A new one has been presented to Congress this month. I hope it is a good one, but I confess that I do not know.

In this matter, as in that of the fleet, the question of expense stands in the way of every easy solution that can be suggested. Here is the problem in a few words: We need in the three lower grades of the Navy—ensign, junior lieutenant, and lieutenant—a very large number of officers. We can find room in the highest grade, that of rear admiral, for very few. Let us say, simply as an illustration and without any attempt of arithmetical accuracy, that of 100 men who reach the lieutenant's list not more than 5 can ever become rear admirals. Our problem is to eliminate the other 95 between these two grades without injustice to individuals or unreasonable expense to the Government, always remembering that expense is of far less consequence than the efficiency of which it is the price. The interest of the Navy should, naturally, take precedence over the interest of individuals; yet if it appears that a given scheme in conducting to the efficiency which we all so much desire chances to conduce also to the advantage of individuals, it should not on that account be abandoned.

The enlisted personnel is inadequate for the manning of the fleet as it exists to-day, and falls far short of what would be absolutely necessary in time of war. And we have no reserve on which to call. The present shortage is variously estimated at from 5,000 to 18,000 men, the wide difference between these figures being accounted for by different views as to the manning of ships not actually present with the active fleet. The extreme view on one side is that battleships can be laid up at navy yards for long periods of time with 50 or 100 men on board and still be counted as serviceable. The extreme view on the other side is that when a ship is to be laid up approximately half of her crew should remain with her, and she should be kept ready to join the fleet not in a year or a month but in 48 hours. If ships in reserve are to be borne on the Navy list and to stand before the country as available for war, there is no doubt that the second of these views is the correct one. A battleship "in ordinary," as it is called, with less than a hundred men on board, might as well be eliminated from the list of ships available for any service within a reasonable length of time.

Added to the deterioration in the ships themselves after a certain period of the neglect that is inevitable where crews are greatly reduced, is the fact that among the plans for utilizing the ships in an emergency is one which contemplates manning them with untrained or half-trained reserves. Such reserves may doubtless be made very useful in time of war if they can be distributed throughout the fleet, to be assimilated by the regular crews of active ships. But the fate of the *Good Hope* and the *Monmouth* is an object lesson on the folly of manning ships exclusively or even chiefly with reservists.

Here, again, I want to call attention to the mistake of providing the largest and finest fighting ships in the world—for this is what our dreadnaughts are, and it is largely due to the insistence of Congress that they are so—and balking at the comparatively trifling cost of providing the officers and men to make them fully efficient.

Other factors, less concrete than those that I have named, have militated and are militating against ideal efficiency. You will all understand that a fleet can not be efficient unless it has abundant opportunity for drilling as a unit. No matter how admirable may be the training and the discipline of the individual ships they will not work together efficiently as a fleet without the teamwork which comes from constant drilling in company with each other under the direction of the commander in chief. And their exercises must be progressive, leading up to war maneuvers on a large scale. We have had too little of this training at all times, and especially within the past year, the necessity of keeping the battleships in Mexican waters having been a controlling factor in all phases of administration of the Navy. This has not made for efficiency, but both the present commander in chief of the fleet and his immediate predecessor testify that the effect upon efficiency has not been as great as might have been expected. Many of the battleships have missed opportunities for target practice; but here, too, the commander in chief reports that the effect has not been disastrous. That conditions remain so good in spite of such extremely unfavorable conditions is a gratifying evidence of the excellence of our ships and the fundamental soundness of our personnel. We must, nevertheless, recognize that the necessity for using battleships in this way is seriously detrimental to their efficiency, and this throws further emphasis upon the importance of an all-around development of our fleet with the demands of peace in mind as well as those of war. If cruisers and gunboats had been available for service in Mexican, Haitian, and Santo Dominican waters the battleships could have spent the past year together in a good climate, carrying on their maneuvers and target practice under favorable conditions.

I come now to what is, perhaps, the most important part of my subject—the organization of the Navy Department, viewed from the standpoint of efficiency. There can be no question that the existing organization is inadequate and would break down under the strain of war. The administration starts from too many sources and flows through too many channels. It lacks the unity of purpose which would come from recognition of the fact that a navy has one excuse for existing, and only one—that it shall always be ready to strike on the minute and with every element of power concentrated behind its blow for the defense of the country.

Do not misunderstand me. I am not telling you that our organization is wholly bad. I am telling you that it is inadequate. In many cases it works rather surprisingly well. But if you analyze these cases you will find that in so far as the results are good, they are so in spite of the system and because of some personal factor which has compelled efficiency. Moreover, and this is the crux of the whole matter, the cases with which we can deal at the present time are illustrations of peace efficiency, whereas the efficiency upon which our attention should be fixed unwaveringly is war efficiency; not because we are going to have war, but because we may have it, and because the one supreme duty of the Navy is to be ready for it if it comes.

I suppose this relation of the Navy to war, whether possible war or actual war, has always been understood more or less clearly. But it is a singular fact that the organization of the Navy Department takes no account of it. War is the one thing for which no arrangement is made. There are seven bureaus in the department, each with clearly defined duties; but in all the elaborate legislation creating these bureaus and defining their duties there is not a word about the duty of keeping the Navy in readiness for war or preparing plans for war or conducting war after it begins. There would be a certain element of comedy in this if there were not so many elements of possible tragedy. There is a bureau in the department charged with the construction and repair of ships, one with the design of machinery, one with the preparation of ordnance, one with the direction of personnel, and so on; but nowhere is it said "this bureau shall be responsible for the readiness of the fleet for war, for the preparation of war plans, and for the conduct of war." This, then, is the last and great defect in the efficiency of the Navy. How shall it be remedied? The answer is, I think, by the creation in the Navy Department of a "Division of Strategy and Operations" preferably not coequal with the present bureaus, but superior to them and standing between them and the Secretary. This arrangement would be a recognition of the fact that all the activities of the present bureaus should lead up to the Secretary through a channel which coordinates them all and directs them toward war efficiency.

The title proposed for the new office, Division of Strategy and Operations, covers very completely the ground that I have in mind. As standing for strategy, this division would plan what to do, and as standing for operations it would direct the execution of its plans. It would correspond more or less closely with the General Staff of the Army and the First Sea Lord of the British Admiralty, whose duties are thus defined:

"1. Preparation for war: All large questions of naval policy and maritime warfare—to advise. 2. Fighting and seagoing efficiency of the fleet, its organization and mobilization, including complements of ships as affecting total numbers; system of gunnery and torpedo exercises of the fleet, and tactical employment of air craft, and all military questions connected with the foregoing; distribution and movements of all ships in commission and in reserve. 3. Superintendence of the war staff and the hydrographic department."

These duties are all performed subject to the general authority of the First Lord of the Admiralty, who corresponds to our Secretary of the Navy; and I wish to emphasize the fact that I am not advocating a reorganization which would in any way reduce the authority of the Secretary.

I have spoken of strategy as shaping plans which are later carried out by operations. This is a convenient distinction but not an exact one, for in a broad sense strategy both plans and executes. It may be defined as the art of so shaping plans and directing forces as to concentrate the maximum of pressure upon the enemy at the time and place best suited to accomplish the purpose at which we aim. This evidently presupposes a clear conception of what the purpose is at which we aim, and a careful preparation—in advance—of the forces and the plans required for attaining the purpose. The strategy of a far-sighted nation does not begin with the beginning of war. It has its origin far back in the history of international relations and runs parallel with national policies, taking account of the ends at which these national policies aim and accepting their ends as its own.

First of all, then, strategy is preparation. Secondly, it is execution; always—if it deserves the name of strategy—through the medium of forces and of plans previously prepared.

I have explained that the defects in the organization of the Navy Department are a lack of coordination of authority, as a result of which the administration starts from too many sources and flows through too many channels, and a total lack of provision for planning and carrying forward the operations of war. It must not be supposed that these defects have escaped recognition or that no efforts have been made to correct them. The most successful of the efforts to secure coordination between the bureaus was the adoption during the last administration of a system of aids to the Secretary, who coordinated the work of the various bureaus, and who, when important questions were under consideration, formed a council upon which he could call for advice. The weak point about this system was, and is, that the aids have never been legalized by Congress, and therefore have no permanent status whatever. In spite of this, they are in a position to do much toward improving the administration of the department.

The General Board was called into existence in 1900 by an order of the Secretary of the Navy to provide a body for the consideration of war plans and allied subjects. It has performed and is performing work of the very highest importance, but it, like the Council of Aids, lacks legislative sanction, although Congress has for many years past shown great interest in its work and not a little deference to its views.

Another and a very important agency to which the Navy Department looks for a contribution to its work in strategy and other matters connected with preparation for war and the conduct of war is the Naval War College at Newport. The War College has been in existence since 1884 and has been an important factor in the education of officers from the very beginning. For some reason, however, it has failed until very recently to command the full recognition which it has deserved from the Navy Department or even from the officers of the Navy. The present Secretary of the Navy visited the college shortly after coming into office and, with an insight of which many naval officers have shown themselves incapable, recognized its possibilities for usefulness and pronounced himself its friend. Since that time he has done everything to forward its work which could be dictated by the most thorough comprehension of its mission and its needs, and as a result of this generous support, both moral and material, the college has taken its proper place as an institution for the training of officers for high command and for the development of the art of naval warfare. Thus the college is enabled to contribute something toward making good the lack of a strategic division in the Navy Department itself.

You will see, therefore, that, although no law takes cognizance of the necessity for keeping the Navy ready for war, there are many

agencies which cooperate toward that end—the Council of Aids, to which the Secretary would naturally turn in an emergency, the General Board, and the War College. These agencies are so closely in sympathy that they are able to cooperate harmoniously with each other and with the fleet, and this cooperation is having important and very valuable results. This does not change the fact that there should be—that indeed there must be—in the Navy Department itself and close to the Secretary a coordinating office to bring the efforts of these and other agencies to an administrative focus bearing directly upon the efficiency for war. Such a coordinating office I have already sketched as a division of strategy and operations immediately below the Secretary of the Navy in authority.

The creation of this office would provide a policy for the Navy, so far as the activities of the Navy itself are concerned, insuring unity of effort and shaping plans toward the end which we have recognized to-night as the proper end of all our efforts—preparedness for war.

But a policy within the Navy is not enough. I have said of strategy that it should take account of national policy as applied to international affairs. We need, then, a policy broader than our naval policy and including it. Thus must be a national policy, dealing with both Army and Navy, and bringing the broadest statesmanship as well as the highest technical knowledge to bear upon the whole question of national defense. Its enunciation must come from the highest authority in the land, executive and legislative.

This points to a council of national defense, for the creation of which a bill is already before Congress. In such a council, with the President of the United States at its head, we should have the last word in the coordination of national resources for national defense.

I will now print the report of the Naval Committee on the council of national defense bill.

[House of Representatives. Report No. 584. Sixty-second Congress, second session.]

COUNCIL OF NATIONAL DEFENSE.

Mr. HOBSON, from the Committee on Naval Affairs, submitted the following report:

The Committee on Naval Affairs, to whom was referred the bill (H. R. 1309) to establish a council of national defense, having had the same under consideration, report the same to the House with the following amendments, and recommend that the amendments be adopted and that the bill as amended do pass:

Page 1, lines 4 and 5, strike out the words "Secretary of War, who shall be president of the council," and insert in lieu thereof the following:

"President of the United States, who shall be ex officio president of the council; the Secretary of State, who shall preside in the absence of the President; the Secretary of War."

Page 2, lines 1 and 2, strike out the words "the aid for operations of the fleet of the Navy," and insert in lieu thereof the following:

"An officer of the Navy not below the rank of captain to be designated by the Secretary of the Navy."

Page 2, after line 3, add a new section, as follows:

"Sec. 2. The chairmen of the several committees of the Senate and House of Representatives herein named shall act as members of the council until their successors have been selected."

Page 2, section 2, strike out the section and add the following:

"Sec. 3. That said council shall report to the President for transmission to Congress a general policy of national defense and such recommendation of measures relating thereto as it shall deem necessary and expedient."

Page 2, section 3, at the end of line 11, insert the following:

"Provided, That in the time of war said council shall meet only upon the call of the President of the United States."

Page 2, line 10, strike out the words "Sec. 3" and insert in lieu thereof the words "Sec. 4."

Page 2, section 3, line 12, after the word "Provided," insert "further."

Page 2, section 3, line 13, strike out the words "except in time of war."

Page 2, section 3, line 14, strike out all after the word "that" and strike out all of lines 15, 16, and 17, and insert in lieu thereof:

"The council may summon for consultation at any of its meetings any citizen of the United States, and upon request by the council the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy shall order any officer of the Army, Navy, or Marine Corps to appear before the council for consultation."

Page 2, line 18, strike out the words "Sec. 4" and insert in lieu thereof the words "Sec. 5."

Page 3, line 2, after the word "session," insert the following:

"And the necessary expenses of all persons summoned."

The bill as amended reads as follows:

"A bill to establish a council of national defense.

"Be it enacted, etc., That there is hereby established a council of national defense, consisting of the President of the United States, who shall be ex officio president of the council; the Secretary of State, who shall preside in the absence of the President; the Secretary of War, the Secretary of the Navy, the chairman of the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate, the chairman of the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate, the chairman of the Committee on Military Affairs of the Senate, the chairman of the Committee on Naval Affairs of the Senate, the chairman of the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives, the chairman of the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives, the chairman of the Committee on Military Affairs of the House of Representatives, the chairman of the Committee on Naval Affairs of the House of Representatives, the Chief of the General Staff of the Army, an officer of the Navy not below the rank of captain to be designated by the Secretary of the Navy, the president of the Army War College, and the president of the Navy War College.

"Sec. 2. The chairmen of the several committees of the Senate and the House of Representatives herein named shall act as members of the council until their successors have been selected.

"Sec. 3. That said council shall report to the President, for transmission to Congress a general policy of national defense and such recommendations or measures relating thereto as it shall deem necessary and expedient.

"Sec. 4. That said council shall meet at least once in each calendar year, on such date or dates as it shall fix; Provided, That in time of war said council shall meet only upon the call of the President of the United States; Provided further, That special meetings may be called by the president of the council: And provided further, That the council

may summon for consultation at any of its meetings any citizen of the United States, and upon request by the council the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy shall order any officer of the Army, Navy, or Marine Corps to appear before the council for consultation.

"Sec. 5. That for carrying out the purposes of this act there is hereby appropriated, out of any funds in the Treasury not otherwise appropriated, the sum of \$20,000, to be available until expended, and to be expended upon vouchers signed by the president of the council: Provided, That all necessary expenses of the chairmen of committees of the Senate and of the House of Representatives, when called to attend meetings of said council when Congress is not in session, and the necessary expenses of all persons summoned shall be paid from this appropriation upon approval by the president of the council."

This bill is approved by the President of the United States, by the late Secretary of War, by the present Secretary of War, the Secretary of the Navy, and without exception officers of high rank, knowledge, and experience of both the Army and Navy. The council entails practically no cost. A similar council has been established in every other great nation in the world.

The President, in a message to this Congress, says:

COUNCIL OF NATIONAL DEFENSE.

"I urge again upon Congress the desirability of establishing the council of national defense. The bill to establish this council was passed Congress last winter, and it is hoped that this legislation will pass during the present session. The purpose of the council is to determine the general policy of national defense and to recommend to Congress and to the President such measures relating to it as it shall deem necessary and expedient.

"No such machinery is now provided by which the readiness of the Army and Navy may be improved, and the programs of military and naval requirements shall be coordinated and properly scrutinized with a view to the necessities of the whole Nation rather than of separate departments."

The late Secretary of War, to whom was referred H. R. 29371, an almost identical bill, states as follows:

"WAR DEPARTMENT, December 16, 1910.

"Respectfully returned to Hon. George Edmund Foss, Committee on Naval Affairs, House of Representatives.

"I approve of the provisions of this bill and recommend its enactment into law.

"J. M. DICKINSON,
"Secretary of War."

The last Secretary of War further stated in a hearing before the committee in part as follows:

"I do desire, however, to avail myself of this opportunity to say that I have considered the question and am very heartily in favor of the bill. I think one of the main troubles that we have had is that we have not proceeded upon a comprehensive and uniform plan in the development of our schemes for military defense. What we have done in that line has been largely sporadic, brought forward from time to time upon individual suggestion and reflecting more or less the views of some particular Secretary of War, so far as the Army is concerned, or the Chief of Staff, and there has never been any system of uniform legislation well thought out, planned, thoroughly studied, and proceeded with.

"There are great advantages, I think, to be gotten from the establishment of a board of this character. It provides for men of technical information. Then, it has represented upon it both branches of the legislative assembly. If the board shall be created, I believe that they can adopt a plan which will be utilized, and that then all legislation will be correlated with that plan. It will proceed then in a systematic way and not run out at tangents as it does now. That is a general statement, Mr. Chairman, of my views of the advantages of a bill of this character.

"The legislation that would be the outcome of an investigation by such a board as this, and recommended by such a board, would command the executive support and the legislative support, and it would command the confidence of the country, and it would not be upset from time to time by legislation that would emanate merely from some individual standpoint. I think that it would result in great economy and great efficiency."

The present Secretary of War, in his annual report dated December 4, 1911, states as follows:

"The House Committee on Naval Affairs has submitted a favorable report upon a bill to establish a council of national defense. This bill is approved by the President of the United States and the Secretary of the Navy. Its duties are to make practicable the formulation and execution of a consistent and continuing policy of national defense, to help in coordinating the plans of the Army and Navy, and furnish a means of coordinating military and financial questions before submitting to the President and to Congress recommendations for measures of national defense. It is hoped that this bill will receive favorable consideration during the present session of Congress."

The Secretary of the Navy states as follows, referring to a similar bill:

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY,
Washington, December 27, 1910.

SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge receipt of your letter of the 15th instant transmitting a bill (H. R. 29371) to establish a council of national defense, and requesting the views and recommendations of this department thereon.

"The proposed bill is regarded as very desirable to the Navy in that it would make practicable the formulation and execution of a consistent and continuing policy of national defense; it would help to coordinate the plans of the Army and Navy and furnish a means of reconciling the military and financial interests before submitting to the President and the Congress recommendations for measures of national defense, and would furnish the President and the Congress a ready means of ascertaining at any time the condition of the Nation for defense.

"Favorable consideration of this bill is recommended.
"G. V. L. MEYER,
"Secretary of the Navy."

"CHAIRMAN COMMITTEE ON NAVAL AFFAIRS,
"House of Representatives, Washington, D. C."

Again, in a hearing before the committee on May 19, 1911, the Secretary of the Navy said in part:

"Mr. Chairman and gentlemen of the committee, in war nothing fails like failure. Now, in order to have success we must have efficiency. To have efficiency we must have a definite policy; and to bring about a definite policy we have to have cooperation and coordination of

Congress, the Army, and the Navy. To bring about this cooperation we have to have an intelligent understanding.

"Now, this national council of defense bill is made up of two Cabinet officers, four Senators, four Congressmen, two Army officers, and two naval officers. It would seem that this council would tend toward and result in an intelligent understanding and assist in cooperation of Congress to a definite policy. I can not help feeling, after due consideration, that this council would result in a definite policy and would encourage cooperation, and would increase efficiency as well as economy.

"The President as Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy should be a member ex officio of this board. I say this without consulting with the President. I do not know whether or not that has come to the attention of the committee."

Again, the Secretary of the Navy, in a hearing before the committee on March 1, 1912, said in part:

"We feel that this council of national defense will be an additional benefit to the Navy, to the country, and to the Nation. It will in a way be a vehicle between the department and Congress. There will be representatives in this council from the Congress and from the departments of the Army and Navy, and they will be in touch with exactly what the future requirements may be in the Army and the Navy, and it will enable them to be in council with the two departments.

"In that way it will keep the departments and Congress in touch with each other and encourage continuity of policy, which is of vital importance to the best results. I will not go into the details of the bill, because it is all in the hearing which took place May 19, 1911, when Secretary of War Dickinson, the Secretary of the Navy, Admiral Mahan, Gen. Wood, Admiral Wainwright, Gen. Wotherspoon, president of the Army War College, and a number of officers from both the Army and Navy were present. The departmental heads of the Army and Navy are in sympathy with it, and the President is also in sympathy with it.

"In other countries—in England, and particularly in Germany and Japan—they are working out in advance policies for the next few years. If Congress were more in touch with the aims and objects of those two departments and felt that they thoroughly understood them, they could in turn inform and keep informed, not only in an intelligent way but in a sympathetic way, the Representatives of Congress, and thus be of great benefit in furthering proper and necessary legislation. I hope the committee will give this matter further consideration."

Sections 1 and 2 of the bill establish a council of national defense, composed of six officials of the legislative branch of the Government, four officials of the executive branch, and four technical and expert officers of high rank, two in the Army and two in the Navy. The officials of the legislative branch are the four chairmen of the two service committees, Naval and Military, of the Senate and the House of Representatives, and the two chairmen of the Appropriation Committees of the same.

The officials of the executive branch of the Government are the President, the Secretary of State, and the two Cabinet officers at the head of the two services, naval and military. The four technical officers of the Army and Navy are those charged with duties pertaining to high matters of national defense.

Thus in its composition the council brings together the officials charged with responsibility and most competent to pass on questions of national defense and insures unity, continuity, and cooperation heretofore impossible and the lack of which has entailed added expense and lowered efficiency in all branches of national defense.

Section 3 makes it the duty of the council to report a general policy of national defense and to recommend measures for carrying out the same. Under present conditions there is no authoritative official or body of officials to perform this important function. The lack of a definite policy at the time of and during our past wars has always entailed enormous outlay of treasure, loss of life, and at times has cost us victory on the battle field.

The necessity of having a definite policy worked out in advance of war has become of greater and greater importance in the conduct of modern war. Indeed, it is not overdrawn the facts to say that victory in modern war has invariably gone to the side of the nation with its policy the best determined.

The experience of these modern wars has caused all important nations to develop a council of national defense with duties similar to those prescribed in this section. This is noticeable in the cases of the two last wars, the Russo-Japanese War and the Boer War. Both Russia and Great Britain found the lack of a definite, carefully prepared policy chiefly responsible for their reverses.

The composition and duties of the similar councils abroad are as follows:

For Great Britain, including India, the name of the council is "The Committee on Imperial Defense."

GREAT BRITAIN, INCLUDING INDIA. THE COMMITTEE ON IMPERIAL DEFENSE.

"The defense committee, assisted by a small secretariat, will deal with questions of national defense and will foresee imperial requirements.

"The prime minister, who is president of the committee, and the secretarial staff are the only permanent members of the defense committee. The other officials who attend the meetings do so by invitation, and invitations are sent out for each meeting.

"The members who ordinarily attend the meetings of the defense committee are: The prime minister, the secretary of state for foreign affairs, the secretary of state for war, the secretary of state for India, the chancellor of the exchequer, the first lord of the admiralty, the first sea lord of the admiralty, the director of naval intelligence, the chief of the general staff, the director of military operations, Lord Escher, and Gen. Sir John French. Other members of the cabinet and officials who possess special knowledge on subjects under consideration are asked to attend meetings of the committee from time to time.

"The secretariat, or, as it is sometimes called, the 'permanent nucleus,' was appointed with a view to insure continuity of work and that a record of work done might be kept for the information of succeeding committees.

"The following statements, made in the house by the present and late prime ministers on August 2, 1906, will show clearly the status and functions of the committee:

"Sir H. Campbell-Bannerman said:
"The defense committee act as the expert advisers of the Government in regard to technical questions.

"It was for the cabinet to determine their political policy, and then it was for the expert members of the defense committee to furnish them with the information as to how they were to carry out their policy. Questions of high policy were beyond the ken of the committee of im-

perial defense. It was no part of the duty of the committee to pronounce an opinion on the general policy of the Government, either naval or military."

"Mr. Balfour said:
"The committee was summoned by the prime minister to assist him in dealing with matters outside the purview of a single department, and it was the prime minister's business to choose which heads of departments he would summon, and what experts were to be brought in * * *. There was a natural elasticity in the committee of defense depending on the problems to be dealt with, and the prime minister of the day must decide for himself whose advice he would take." (Organization and Equipment, Lieut. Col. Brunker.)

FRANCE.

DECRET RELATIVE TO THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A SUPREME BOARD OF NATIONAL DEFENSE.

PARIS, April 3, 1906.

"ARTICLE 1. A supreme board of national defense is instituted for the examination of all questions requiring the cooperation of two or more ministerial departments.

"ART. 5. The supreme board of national defense shall be composed of: The president of the board of ministers, presiding; the minister of foreign affairs; the minister of finance; the minister of war; the minister of marine; the minister for the colonies.

"ART. 6. The chief of staff of the army, the chief of staff of the navy, and the president of the consultative committee for colonial defense shall be present at meetings of the supreme board with deliberative voice."

GERMANY.

"In order that the whole undivided strength of the fleet may be successfully employed in the destruction of the enemy and in defending our coasts, it is necessary that the army and navy should have a common commander in chief, whom the German Empire possesses in His Majesty the Emperor. The navy, as well as the army, must receive its instructions from the great headquarters, and this will be taken into consideration in the composition of the latter.

"In view of the importance of the German fleet at the present day and of the still greater importance which it will have in the future, the chief of staff of the navy and the chief of the naval cabinet with their staffs will in future be attached to the headquarters staff in order to insure the cooperation of the navy with the army.

"To some extent the two services already work together in peace times. This is the case as regards the enlistment of sailors by the military administrative circles, the joint action of the admiralty, the war office, and the general staff of the army on mobilization, the defense of our coasts, and so forth; but these joint duties are of little assistance in making the services better acquainted with one another, since they affect but a small number of officers of each branch.

"Something has been effected in this direction by the practice, recently introduced, of appointing naval officers to the army staff, and vice versa; of detailing joint committees of naval and military officers; and of selecting officers to attend the maneuvers of the sister service; but much more than this is required to instill into all ranks of the army and of the navy the necessity for combined action and mutual support in war." (The Duties of the General Staff, 1905, Gen. Bronsart von Schellendorf.)

The great successes of Germany in the wars of 1866 and 1870 were chiefly due to the policy and preparations resulting from the cooperation of the civil and the military embodied in Bismarck, the statesman, and Von Moltke, the soldier.

RUSSIA.

BOARD OF NATIONAL DEFENSE.

(This and a great general staff were created by the Emperor of Russia as a result of the experience of the Russo-Japanese War.)

The board of national defense is charged with the study of questions which relate to the security of the Empire. It acts under the direct orders of the Emperor, and is made up of a president and six permanent members—all named by the Emperor—but has also a certain number of other members, some on account of the offices which they hold, as the ministers of war and of the navy, the chief of the general staff, the chief of the great general staff of the navy, and the inspectors of the army, and others because of their personal knowledge or because of the needs of the service as, for example, ministers, commanders of army corps, etc.

"The board of national defense has the following duties:
(a) Study of general measures so that a fixed plan may be determined upon by the ministers of war and of the navy in order to assure the development of the military power of the Empire in conformity to the political ends which it is desired to accomplish.

"(b) To watch that these measures are carried out as soon as they have the approval of the Emperor.

"(c) Study of propositions emanating from the military ministers and conforming them in order that all resources may be employed in time of war and unification and direction of all preliminary measures.

"(d) Study of modifications which it is desirable to make in the plans of the two military ministers.

"(e) Study and solution of the questions of the fitness of the different branches of the administration and the differences which exist in them from the standpoint of national defense.

"The board of national defense has no executive power, but is limited to recommendations to the Emperor. The execution of measures which require the approval of the Emperor is in charge of the minister of war. The president has direct communication with the Emperor, and speaks as his mouthpiece when he presides in the board. Said president forms a part by virtue of his office of the imperial council and of the council of ministers. He has the right to ask from the various ministers anything which can contribute to the work of the board, and receives from the minister of war, of the navy, and of foreign affairs information relating to the national defense. All the deliberations and actions of the board are considered as state secrets." (Revista Científico-Militar y Biblioteca Militar, 25 Septiembre, 1905.)

AUSTRIA-HUNGARY.

"In Austria-Hungary there is no minister of the navy. The minister of war of the monarchy has in his charge questions relating to the navy. On this account the bureaus of the navy constitute a section attached to the ministry of war." (L'Etat Militaire des Principales Puissances Etrangères en 1902, Lauth.)

ITALY.

"By a decree of the 16th of July, 1897, the supreme mixed commission for the defense of the Empire was organized. This is charged with the duty of giving advice on all important questions concerning the defense of Italy. The Duke of Genoa is president; the members are: The admiral president of the superior council of the navy, the generals designated to command the various armies in case of war, the admirals designated to command the fleets, and the chief of the general staff of the army and of the navy. The generals, the commanders of army corps, the inspectors general and admirals, when it appears that their presence will be useful, may be invited to attend the meetings of the commission for consultation only." (L'Etat Militaire des Principales Puissances Etrangères en 1902, Lauth.)

SPAIN.

"Spain has a consultative board for war which is concerned with the large questions in reference to preparation for war, etc. The organization and the composition of this board are regulated by decisions made in the council of ministers." (L'Etat Militaire des Principales Puissances Etrangères en 1902, Lauth.)

JAPAN.

THE SUPREME MILITARY COUNCIL.

This was created in 1898 as the highest advisory body on naval and military matters to the Emperor. It was made up of six members, three army and three navy officers of the highest rank.

THE SUPREME COUNCIL OF WAR.

"This is a special office created on the eve of the outbreak of the late war, and may be regarded as the Emperor's advisors and staff officers on all important matter pertaining to war. The members of the supreme military council, ministers of war and of the navy, chiefs of the general staff, and of the naval staff board are entitled to membership by virtue of their official positions." (Japan Year Book, 1907.)

In the hearings before the committee the last chairman of the Committee on Military Affairs, Mr. Hull, made a statement in part as follows:

"A board of the kind provided for would be of great benefit to the country at large and would enable the Government to pursue a settled policy, and when that policy should be changed it would only be after very mature deliberation.

"I heard the question of my colleague from Iowa [Mr. Dawson], and I can not see any objection to creating a board of this character whose action is simply advisory. It can not have any effect until Congress acts, the same as it did with the Endicott board, the same as it does with plans for improvements at different institutions like the Military Academy and the Naval Academy. Congress must first adopt its recommendations.

"One great advantage of having a board of this character is, to my mind, to have some definite policy decided on. I do not know whether the Navy Department changes its mind very often or not, but the War Department changes its mind very often, and we are pushed into a line of legislation under one Chief of Staff, and when the head of the bureau changes or a new Chief of Staff comes in he urges sometimes a different line from that urged by his predecessor.

"Our whole system would be steadied if there was a board composed of these experts of the Army and Navy and the Members of Congress who have charge of these matters. In my judgment, the whole line of legislation would be steadied and benefited by the creation of this board. We can not conceive that there is any constitutional objection to creating it and, as it is not a board that has absolute power to go ahead and do things, I can not conceive of any objections to both the experts and Members of Congress being joined together to get information. Personally, I think it is a splendid bill, and I should like to see it adopted. It will not cost us much; it will be of benefit to the Government; and we do need something in the way of a permanent policy of defense, and then let Congress carry it out; or, if the time comes to change it, we do need more than one man's technical ideas, no matter who he may be, before we can change it. You will never succeed in getting a continuous line of work unless you have some permanent authority, that Congress will have confidence in after it has been tested, or abolish it if you do not have confidence in it.

"I do believe in the bill, and I believe it is one of the best things you can do to get a board that can have some permanency and adopt some permanent policy and quit this makeshift we have been suffering from.

"I do want to see this act put in some shape where the vast sums we expend will be beneficial for the country as a whole, not only for this year, but growing up each year, with better results each year for our defenses, and getting results for the money we appropriate for the national defense. We are not doing it now. There has been a wonderful advance in the Army for the last four or five years. We are getting a better system all the time, and yet it has not that steadiness of purpose it ought to have and will have, in my judgment, if we adopt this bill."

Major Gen. Leonard Wood, United States Army, Chief of the General Staff, made a statement in part as follows:

"I believe thoroughly in the bill. I consider it to be the most important measure for military efficiency that has come up for consideration since I have had anything whatever to do with my present duties in Washington, and probably one of the most important that has ever come up. My reasons for making this statement so strong are as follows: If we succeed in having this bill enacted into law, it means that we shall have a committee consisting of the elements directly interested in the preparation and maintenance of national defense. It will insure the military proposition, and by 'military' I mean the propositions advanced by the naval and military authorities, being considered by a committee in which both Houses of Congress and the President's Cabinet are strongly represented, and it means that matters which are approved by this committee will be presented to Congress under an indorsement guaranteeing to that body that four of its own Members and two officers of the Cabinet, all civilians, have very carefully considered the measure and believe in it and recommend its enactment.

"It is well known to all of us that officers of the Army and Navy are generally looked upon as being a little overenthusiastic in military matters, and I believe that the effect of a joint committee of this sort taking up and considering questions of policy will, if it approves them, bring these matters before Congress in a much stronger way than we could possibly do it ourselves. It means, moreover, that we shall be able to establish and maintain a general military policy. The committee will change its membership gradually. We shall be able to adopt a general policy and carry it out from one administration to another without the radical changes which occur at the present time.

"A committee of this sort will insure a continuity of policy and a harmonizing, I think, of the military policy of the Government; it will provide a body in which the civilian element outnumbers the military, and whatever it approves is bound, I think, to appeal very strongly to Congress. I think it will be safe, sane, and strong for the betterment of the national defense."

Admiral Richard Wainwright, United States Navy, late aid for operations of the fleet, made a statement in part as follows:

"I am entirely in favor of the objects of the bill. I believe they will promote both efficiency and economy. With the same amount of money we should get more efficient military and naval forces, or for the same efficiency we should do it for less money. I think the object is to better bring before the Members of both Houses the requirements of the country, and then they would determine how much their resources were to be turned into preparation. I think, after the first formulation of the policy there would not be a necessity of many meetings. Of course from time to time the circumstances of the country would change its foreign relations, etc., that might require changes in the broad policy. And of course each year the question of how much should be recommended to do in that year—that is, broadly, between all the services taken together—would have to be largely determined by the Members who are representing the Senate and House.

"I can not see why there should be any emergency meetings of this council. Of course it would be better if the council could meet a little prior to the session of Congress, as Mr. PADGETT suggested, because they are very busy when Congress meets, and it would take a little time to carry it out. The English imperial council of defense was organized in 1895.

"Mr. HOBSON. Right there, will you explain why they came to organize that council in England?"

"Admiral WAINWRIGHT. The 1895 one?"

"Mr. HOBSON. Yes; and the subsequent one."

"Admiral WAINWRIGHT. The object of the subsequent one was more apparent. In 1895 there were no technical men in the council, and they felt they were not spending their money to the best advantage. They saw certain deficiencies in both army and navy."

"Mr. BATES. May I ask how that council was constituted—from what personnel?"

"Admiral WAINWRIGHT. In 1895 the president of the council, the prime minister, the secretary of state for war, and the first lord of the admiralty."

"Mr. BATES. Were there members of Parliament in that council?"

"Admiral WAINWRIGHT. The first lord of admiralty is a member of Parliament; the prime minister is a member of Parliament; the secretary of state for war is a member of Parliament. The president of the council is probably almost always a member of the House of Lords. So they are all legislative men."

"Mr. ROBERTS. You are speaking of the first council, of 1895?"

"Admiral WAINWRIGHT. Yes. In 1903, after the Boer War, when they saw how deficient the army was, they increased the council by putting in the commander in chief of the army, the first naval lord (the first sea lord) of the admiralty, and the two intelligence officers, the officer in charge of military intelligence and the officer in charge of naval intelligence. They really represent what our presidents of the War College do, except that our president of the War College now has not the Office of Naval Intelligence under him. It would be better if he had."

"Mr. HOBSON. I want to ask Admiral Wainwright, in connection with his account of the second and current council in England, whether the Boer War threw any light on the necessity for the council?"

"Admiral WAINWRIGHT. The Boer War was the reason they strengthened their council with technical members. Formerly they would call in technical people to explain to them the necessities, and after their great troubles in the Boer War they found that their army was not properly organized, and they also thought they could do better with regular technical members on the board they could talk more freely with the legislative members than if they were called in for a mere hearing. I do not think that in any of these boards it can ever become a question of voting. I think if the legislative members, for instance, did not agree to a policy the recommendation would not be made, because it would be ineffective. It would be like our meetings of the joint board."

"Mr. HOBSON. Admiral, as to the necessities or needs of that general policy now, do you think that it would facilitate settlement of the broad question of naval bases?"

"Admiral WAINWRIGHT. As to the question of naval bases, naval stations, and fortifications, I think both the Army and Navy—a great many of us think there should be a uniform policy as to what should be fortified; that the country should not put money where it is not needed, in fortifications or in permanent naval stations, and that some places may not be neglected; but a uniform policy which would state what we are looking forward to I think would be of great value."

"Mr. HOBSON. In connection with that arises the question of joint operations of Army and Navy in time of war and preparation in time of peace for such matters as transportation."

"Admiral WAINWRIGHT. The question of preparation and how they should cooperate, not how they should operate after the war came; that should become technical."

Rear Admiral Raymond P. Rodgers, president of the Naval War College, United States Navy, made a statement in part as follows:

"I think the principle embodied in this bill is most desirable and necessary for us in determining any policy of preparation for war. It not only brings together the two executive military departments, the Army and Navy Departments, but it brings into this council several of the principal Representatives of both Houses of Congress to shape these policies. Councils similar to the one proposed are found in all the parliamentary countries of the world, and the advantage of them has been found to be very great. We have not had very much policy heretofore, for anything we got in the way of increase was of value; but now that we have developed so widely as we have it seems most important that there should be a policy for future development and expenditure in preparedness for war, and it seems that a council of this character is the best adapted for the purpose."

Brig. Gen. William W. Wotherspoon, United States Army, president of the Army War College, made a statement in part as follows:

"I consider this the most important bill in regard to the military efficiency of the country that has ever come under my observation. I say that from the standpoint purely of the Army. The great trouble we find at the War College is in ascertaining what the policy of Congress, the legislative body, is in regard to military affairs. We can only deduce that from its legislative acts. If we can crystallize that into a few brief sentences, it would be this, that Congress expects, on the breaking out of war, that the gathering together of untrained, unskilled,

and uneducated men will constitute an efficient Army for the country. That has always been the course pursued, and until we get some council like this probably it will be continued to be pursued. The result of that apparent policy has been most disastrous in the past, both financially and from the point of conservation of our human resources. In the War of 1812 Great Britain had never at any time on this continent a greater force than 16,500 soldiers. We mustered into the service 527,000 men, more than half a million. In 1878 we had a pension roll of 78,000 pensioners from the War of 1812, costing over half a million more than the entire Regular Army cost in 1811. That is simply an illustration.

"The most important feature, however, of this bill, so far as the Army is concerned, is this: The Army, drifting along from its old days in Indian campaigning, settled down here, there, and everywhere in the West and we have posts in the most out-of-the-way corners you can conceive of, the farthest possible from sources of supply and sources of recruits, so that the administration of the Army is enormously expensive. I conceive that such a board would take this up."

At another hearing Gen. Wotherspoon said:

"I consider this as decidedly the most important measure that has ever come under my observation since I have been in the Army, in forty-odd years. I should say that I have been working continuously for the last six years in order to get some such body as is proposed in this bill to pass authoritatively upon a national policy with regard to national defense. I have been compelled, as president of the War College, in preparing plans to pass from a state of peace to a state of war to search the records to see if there existed such a thing as a military policy in the United States. I found no evidence whatever of it. There is nothing that anyone can point to and say, 'This is the policy the Nation will pursue in the event of war or in the preparation for war.' In those studies I have seen that the expenditures for the Army are enormous, without results adequate to the cost. We have our Army scattered all over the country in the most expensive situations that there are, far from the sources of recruitment, far from the sources of supplies, far from railroad communication, where the cost of assembly at any definite point where their services would be required would be a great deal more than if we could have a scientific assembly. We have none of the higher organizations, such as brigades and divisions, which all other nations consider as absolutely essential for military efficiency. I have been in the service for 40 years, and I have never seen 5,000 men assembled. I have only once had control as a general officer of about 4,000 men, and then only for a few weeks in a militia camp.

"I have never seen a staff for one of these higher organizations trained. I consider that this bill will coordinate the efforts of the Army and the Navy and the legislative branch into some unified policy which will make for decided economy and still more decidedly for efficiency. I have stated to this committee before and to the Military Committee that I am perfectly convinced that an army three times as efficient and probably twice as strong as we have now can be maintained for the money we are at present spending for the Army. I should regret very much to see this bill fail, because it will throw us back to where we have always been, so that when a war comes on the first step is to evolve a policy from uncoordinated elements; the next step is to organize the higher fighting units; the third step, and that we always fail in, is the equipment of those units. I do not know that the committee knows that when the War of 1861-1865 came on it was the Secretary of the Treasury that drafted the bill for the United States Army or the Federal Army. The Secretary of War was too busy at that time to establish either a policy or to prepare for an organization. Consequently it was left to Mr. Chase."

Admiral A. T. Mahan, United States Navy (retired), made a statement in part as follows:

"The general purpose of the bill seems to me excellent. It would compel the deliberation in common of a number of men whose specialties are closely allied actually, but are not brought into formal cooperation, as the bill provides they shall hereafter be. For the information of each member of the council, and of the whole as a body, and for the subsequent formulation of measures, this method is superior to the appearance of experts before a committee, though it doubtless will not supersede that. Experts before a committee are like witnesses in a box, and confine themselves very closely to the matter in hand, whereas in discussion between equals many collateral facts and considerations transpire because of the freedom of range. Time is not thereby lost, at least to any greater extent than the half-informed questionings of those who are eliciting statements from a witness. I believe that Congress, the ultimate arbiter in matters of military provision, would be enabled to judge much better through the institution of this proposed council.

"As to questions of detail, I have very little to suggest. The proposed composition of the council, by ex officio members, seems to me very judicious.

"It has been justly remarked (Corbett's Seven Years War) that the strength of Great Britain's action in that war was that the three allied functions—diplomacy, army, and navy—were in one hand. In my judgment, they should all be represented in the proposed council."

Commander Frank Kinsey Hill, United States Navy, of the Naval War College, made a statement in part as follows:

"A war will be properly carried on when the statesmen who control the steps preceding and subsequent to war work with and sustain the two military branches in harmonious plans during war, which plans are drawn to further the policies which caused the war; and, further, that it is necessary for the military commanders to study and broadly comprehend the policies of government, so that their plans will fit the ends to be attained. * * * Now, unless the statesmen will tell us what the policies are we can not make proper strategic plans. I would like to illustrate this in one case with regard to Russia and Japan. The Russian statesmen did not coordinate with the army or navy. They did not know that a war was coming on between those two countries, as a matter of fact. The result was that they did not have the Russian forces in place to fight at the beginning of the war. The result was that Russia was defeated up to the time of the treaty. It is now considered by many that if war had been continued for a few months longer Russia would have prevailed. But lack of harmony between the Russian statesmen and the Russian army and navy commanders caused the defeat of that country. Another case, if you wish, is the Boer War, when exactly the same thing happened. * * * Having established a policy, then it is next the business of the military officers to state the necessities for their branches to carry out the policy.

"There is one other question which was asked several times by the chairman, and that is the question of economy, and the answers were wholly based on the economy due to coordination and a directive force. I consider that two economies will result, and the one named is the minor one. The largest economy which will ever come from this bill

will result from our being so prepared for war that the enemy will decide not to have war with us. We would save a couple of billion dollars and several hundred thousand lives over and above the few millions which we could save by this fixing up of the stations, as mentioned by Gen. Wotherspoon. * * *

"We thus see that a definite responsibility can and ought to be fixed: first, for the decision as to what the policies of the Government will be; second, for the recommendation concerning the forces necessary to carry out the policies; third, for the appropriations necessary to provide these forces; and, fourth, for the right use of these forces by the military and naval commanders after they have been provided. The people of the United States, who delegate power to carry on the Government, should be thoroughly informed as to the various responsibilities, so that the credit for success or odium for failure should rest where it belongs. * * *

"War, being the result of policies enforced, should be based on strategic plans to gain certain definite ends. For instance, if the United States had a policy of extension of territory by absorption of Canada, the war would be directed so as to gain military control of that territory, and if the war ended successfully for the United States, the treaty would probably cede to them such territory as was held under military control at the end of the war.

"It is thus seen that the strategic objective of a war must rightly comprehend a knowledge of the policies which preceded war and contemplate the treaty which is to conclude the war.

CONCLUSIONS.

"War is not independent of political considerations, but must be outlined and carried on with due regard to these considerations. That to properly outline the war the three branches of the Government (State, War, and Navy Departments) should act in conjunction, and that peace preparation in anticipation of war should be the joint action of Congress, the War and the Navy Departments.

"Finally, both the peace preparations and war will best be carried out by a national board for war comprised of units representing both branches of Congress and the Departments of State, War, and Navy."

The three greatest authorities on the art of war are Jomini, Clausewitz, and Von der Goltz.

Von der Goltz says:

"Upon policy the whole condition, the feeling, the constitution, and the moral and physical affairs of a State depend; and upon these depends, again, the waging of war. * * * Policy, again, regulates the relations not merely of those States immediately concerned, but also those of such as are indirectly interested in the final issue. Their favor or disfavor may be of very great significance, impeding the course of events or promoting them. Politics, again, as a rule determine the moment for the outbreak of hostilities, upon the happy choice of which much depends. They, in short, create the general situation, in which the State enters into the struggle, and this will be of material influence upon the decisions and attitude of the commander in chief, and even upon the general esprit of the army. * * *

"War serves politics both before and after. War waged only for annihilation and destruction is in these days inconceivable. An end and aim that is of permanent value to the State, be it only a question of ascendancy, must be existent; and this can only arise from political considerations.

"The object of a war is of such importance and will be of such lasting effect upon the exertions which nations make to attain it that we ought, almost on this account alone, to place policy first among conditions of success. Now, as we have here pointed out, many motives are also attendant, and thus we may without hesitation lay down a maxim that without a good policy a successful war is not probable."

Clausewitz says:

"Thus, therefore, the political object, as the original motive of the war, will be the standard for determining both the aim of the military force and also the amount of effort to be made. * * *

"We see, therefore, in the first place, that under all circumstances war is to be regarded not as an independent thing, but as a political instrument; and it is only by taking this point of view that we can avoid finding ourselves in opposition to all military history. This is the only means of unlocking the great book and making it intelligible. Secondly, this view shows us how wars must differ in character according to the nature of the motives and circumstances from which they proceed.

"Now, the first, the grandest, and most decisive act of judgment which the statesman and general exercise is rightly to understand in this respect the war in which he engages, not to take it for something or to wish to make of it something which by the nature of its relations it is impossible for it to be. This is, therefore, the first, the most comprehensive, of all strategical questions."

Jomini says:

"The art of war consists of six distinct parts:

- "(1) Statesmanship in its relation to war.
- "(2) Strategy, or the art of properly directing masses upon the theater of war, either for defense or for invasion.
- "(3) Grand tactics.
- "(4) Logistics, or the art of moving armies.
- "(5) Engineering the attack and defense of fortifications.
- "(6) Minor tactics.

STATESMANSHIP IN ITS RELATION TO WAR.

"Under this head are included those considerations from which a statesman concludes whether a war is proper, opportune, or indispensable, and determines the various operations necessary to attain the object of the war.

"War is always to be conducted according to the great principles of the art; but great discretion must be exercised in the nature of the operations to be undertaken, which should depend upon the circumstances of the case.

"To these different combinations, which belong more or less to statesmanship, may be added others which relate solely to the management of armies. The name 'military policy' is given to them, for they belong exclusively neither to diplomacy nor to strategy, but are still of the highest importance in the plans both of a statesman and a general."

Col. Henderson, of the British Army, in his book, *The Science of War*, says:

"While a statesman may be competent to appreciate the general principles of the projects of operations laid before him, he should never attempt to frame a project for himself. * * *

"But political and financial considerations may not present themselves in quite the same light to the soldier as to the statesman, and the latter is bound to make certain that they have received due attention. If, however, modifications are necessary, they should be made before the plan of campaign is finally approved, and in any case the purely military considerations should be most carefully weighed. It should be remembered that an unfavorable political situation is best redeemed by a decisive victory, while a reverse will do more to shake confidence in the Government than even the temporary surrender of some portion of the national domains. 'Be sure before striking' and 'reculer pour mieux sauter' are both admirable maxims; but their practical application requires a thorough appreciation of the true principles of war and a very large degree of moral courage, both in the soldier who suggests and in the statesman who approves. If, however, the soldier and the statesman are supported by an enlightened public, sufficiently acquainted with war to realize that patience is to be preferred to precipitation, that retreat, though inglorious, is not necessarily humiliating, their task is very considerably lightened."

The question of the constitutionality of this measure was referred to the Attorney General, who gave an opinion as follows:

"I see no constitutional objection to the proposed measure. It merely empowers a number of officials—some in the executive and some in the legislative department—to meet and recommend to the President such measures relating to the national defense as it shall deem necessary and expedient. I suppose that the President might without any act of Congress call together the same officials and discuss with them any measure of government in which he is interested. As a matter of fact, that is what he does with respect to important legislation of any kind. Take the various conferences that the President had with the members of the executive and the legislative branches of the Government regarding the railroad legislation two years ago and with respect to the tariff."

"I know of nothing in the Constitution to interfere with such legislation as is proposed by this bill."

A precedent for associating together members of the different branches of the Government is found in the act establishing the Smithsonian Institution and the Board of Regents of that institution.

Under the act of March 12, 1894, the President, Vice President, and Chief Justice of the United States are associated together in the charter body, and under section 5580, Revised Statutes, the Vice President, members of the Cabinet, the Chief Justice, and six Members of Congress—three from the Senate and three from the House—are associated together on the Board of Regents.

Every bill signed by the President is the joint work of the two branches of the Government. The complete separation of authority lodged in the two branches of the Government will be no more affected by joint action in the council than it is by joint action upon bills. The advantages of having the wisdom of both branches invoked in determining policies of national defense are even greater than in determining the usual laws.

Indeed, it is inherently impossible to attain a high degree of effectiveness in policies of national defense without bringing together the two branches of the Government.

The chief original purpose of the separation of the two branches of the Government was to avoid combining the powers of the two in the same man or group of men. Such a combination does not in the remotest degree result from the council.

No member of the executive branch is given any legislative power, nor is any member of the legislative branch given any executive power. In fact, the authority of the council is only advisory, and before any of its reports can be effective the recommendations made must be acted on by Congress and by the Executive.

The very fact that our two branches of Government, legislative and executive, are so entirely distinct, so much so that a member of the Cabinet may not even address the Houses of Congress and a Member of Congress may not hold an executive office, makes it far more imperative in America than in any other great country to establish a council of national defense in which the divergent branches may meet. Unity, continuity, and harmony are otherwise impossible, and without these there can be neither effectiveness nor economy.

The investigations of military authorities, notably the late Gen. Upton, show conclusively that the lack of a well-developed policy and the lack of harmony in our past wars are chiefly responsible for the larger part of our sacrifices of blood and treasure and for most of our reverses, if not for the wars themselves, while the hearings before this committee on this bill show clearly the same lack to be at the bottom of the high cost and lack of efficiency in our Military Establishment in time of peace.

George Washington, in a letter to the President of Congress, dated August 20, 1780, sets forth the serious and all but fatal consequences of a lack of a real definite policy of defense during the Revolutionary War. He says:

"Had we formed a permanent army in the beginning which, by the continuance of the same men in service, had been capable of discipline, we never should have had to retreat with a handful of men across the Delaware in 1776, trembling for the fate of America, which nothing but the infatuation of the enemy could have saved; we should not have remained all the succeeding winter at their mercy, with sometimes scarcely a sufficient body of men to mount the ordinary guards, liable at every moment to be dissipated, if they had only thought proper to march against us; we should not have been under the necessity of fighting Brandywine, with an unequal number of raw troops, and afterwards seeing Philadelphia fall a prey to a victorious army; we should not have been at Valley Forge with less than half the force of the enemy, destitute of everything, in a situation neither to resist nor to retire; we should not have seen New York left with a handful of men, yet an overmatch for the main army of these States, while the principal part of their force was detached for the reduction of two of them; we should not have found ourselves this spring so weak as to be insulted by 5,000 men, unable to protect our baggage and magazines, their security depending on a good countenance and a want of enterprise in the enemy; we should not have been the greatest part of the war inferior to the enemy, indebted for our safety to their inactivity, enduring frequently the mortification of seeing inviting opportunities to ruin them pass unimproved for want of a force which the country was completely able to afford, and of seeing the country ravaged, our towns burnt, the inhabitants plundered, abused, murdered, with impunity from the same cause."

"Nor have the ill effects been confined to the military line. A great part of the embarrassments in the civil departments flow from the same source. The derangement of our finances is essentially to be ascribed to it. The expenses of the war and the paper emissions have been greatly multiplied by it. We have had a great part of the time two sets of men to feed and pay—the discharged men going home and the

levies coming in. This was more remarkably the case in 1775 and 1776. The difficulty and cost of engaging men have increased at every successive attempt, till among the present lines we find there are some who have received \$150 in specie for five months' service, while our officers are reduced to the disagreeable necessity of performing the duties of drill sergeants to them, with this mortifying reduction annexed to the business, that by the time they have taught these men the rudiments of a soldier's duty their services will have expired and the work recommenced with a new set."

"The consumption of provisions, arms, accouterments, and stores of every kind has been doubled in spite of every precaution I could use, not only from the cause just mentioned, but from the carelessness and licentiousness incident to militia and irregular troops. Our discipline also has been much hurt, if not ruined, by such constant changes. The frequent calls upon the militia have interrupted the cultivation of the land, and of course have lessened the quantity of its produce, occasioned a scarcity, and enhanced the prices. In an army so unstable as ours order and economy have been impracticable. No person who has been a close observer of the progress of our affairs can doubt that our currency has depreciated without comparison more rapidly from the system of short enlistments than it would have done otherwise."

"There is every reason to believe that the war has been protracted on this account. Our opposition being less, the successes of the enemy have been greater. The fluctuation of the army kept alive their hopes, and at every period of the dissolution of a considerable part of it they have flattered themselves with some decisive advantages. Had we kept a permanent army on foot the enemy could have had nothing to hope for, and would in all probability have listened to terms long since."

In a subsequent letter to the President of the Congress, dated September 15, 1780, he says:

"I am happy to find that the last disaster in Carolina has not been so great as its first features indicated. This event, however, adds itself to many others to exemplify the necessity of an army and the fatal consequences of depending on militia. Regular troops alone are equal to the exigencies of modern war, as well for defense as offense, and whenever a substitute is attempted it must prove illusory and ruinous. No militia will ever acquire the habits necessary to resist a regular force. Even those nearest to the seat of war are only valuable as light troops to be scattered in the woods and harass rather than do serious injury to the enemy. The firmness requisite for the real business of fighting is only to be attained by a constant course of discipline and service. I have never yet been witness to a single instance that can justify a different opinion, and it is most earnestly to be wished that the liberties of America may no longer be trusted, in any material degree, to so precarious a dependence. I can not but remark that it gives me pain to find the measures pursuing at the southward still turn upon accumulating large bodies of militia, instead of once for all making a decided effort to have a permanent force. In my ideas of the true system of war at the southward, the object ought to be to have a good army rather than a large one."

The late Gen. Upton, perhaps the greatest military authority in America, in his book on "The Military Policy of the United States," in summing up the conclusions as to the War of 1812, says:

"The lessons of the war are so obvious that they need not be stated. Nearly all the blunders committed were repetitions in an aggravated form of the same blunders in the Revolution, and like them had their origin either in the mistakes or omissions of military legislation."

"In the war under the Confederation Congress in its own name could not raise a dollar nor arm and equip a single soldier. Under the Constitution it had the sovereign authority to call forth the entire financial and military resources of the people."

"In one war, with a debt of \$200,000,000, the Nation became bankrupt at the end of five years; in the other, a debt of nearly equal magnitude was contracted in two and one-half years."

"In the first war, notwithstanding the steady decline of our military strength, two British armies of more than 6,000 men each were made captive; in the other, less than 5,000 men for the period of two years brought war and devastation into our territory and successfully withstood the misapplied power of 7,000,000 people."

These ideas were concurred in by Gen. James A. Garfield and by Gen. William T. Sherman, who pencilled the following notes on Gen. Upton's original manuscript:

"I renew the suggestion that a further statement of the composition of the British forces against us ought to be made."

"J. A. G."

"A compliance with Gen. Garfield's suggestion will strengthen your argument. Many strong men will contest your conclusions by charging the lamentable failure of the War of 1812 to other causes than false legislation; to want of skill by generals and officers, such as the want of concert of action and dispersion of our strength, the want of men of action as leaders, rather than want of wisdom in council. I doubt if you will convince the powers that be, but the facts stated, the references from authority, and the military conclusions are most valuable, and should be printed and made accessible. The time may not be now, but will come, when these will be appreciated, and may bear fruit even in our day."

"W. T. SHERMAN."

Gen. Upton in the same work points out the similar consequences in the Florida War, 1836-1843, in which over 40,000 troops were engaged. The 4,000 Regulars engaged alone lost 1,500 men. He says:

"For want of a well-defined peace organization, a nation of 17,000,000 of people contended for some years with 1,200 warriors and finally closed the struggle without accomplishing the forcible emigration of the Indians, which was the original and sole cause of the war."

Gen. Upton is authority for the statement that the Mexican War, though successful, was longer than should have been required and exposed both the army of Gen. Taylor and the army of Gen. Scott to unnecessary peril. The events attending the annexation of Texas caused a degree of preparation for this war excelling anything in our previous annals. We were fortunate in the ability and experience of our officers, and their determining influence was felt as much in the preparations as in the battles. A crude approximation to a definite policy in this war, as compared with previous wars, was rewarded by an unbroken series of victories.

It remained for the Civil War to bring out the staggering price in blood and treasure a nation may pay for having no definite policy of defense.

Capt. J. M. Palmer, of the General Staff, investigating the causes that led up to this war, drew the conclusion that the utter lack of a military policy and of preparation on the part of the Union is the real responsible cause of the war. He says in Scribner's Magazine, February, 1912:

"A study of the period immediately preceding the Civil War reveals that secession was a formal and carefully preconceived act. * * * The southern people took the step that meant war simply because they thought that they could win. It must be remembered that Jefferson Davis was not only a trained soldier but an ex-Secretary of War of the United States. As a trained soldier he knew what military institutions should be, and as a Secretary of War of the United States he had learned what military institutions should not be. He knew that the United States was unprepared for war, he knew that it had no intelligent military policy, and he knew that know-nothingism in military affairs was cultivated as a positive civic virtue among northern politicians. He knew that the North had greater resources of wealth and population, but he knew that the war must be a war of subjugation, and as a trained military expert he knew that a war of subjugation can not be successfully waged by raw levies. He realized that the southern armies must also be largely untrained at first, but he was acquainted with the scientific fact that troops can be trained to defend long before they can be trained to conquer. He knew also that the military situation would impose a policy of invasion upon the North and that invasion would largely neutralize the advantage of superior numbers.

"Mr. Davis and his associates also knew the military history of the United States to be a history of legislative incapacity. They knew that Washington considered the British Army to be a much less formidable obstacle to success than the stupid military policy of the Continental Congress. * * * They knew that in the War of 1812, a war conducted on Jeffersonian principles, 16,000 British soldiers had been able to prevent 500,000 Americans from conquering Canada. They knew that during the Mexican War Gen. Taylor was left with only 5,000 men to bear the brunt of Buena Vista, and that when Gen. Scott was within three days' march of the City of Mexico, with victory behind him and final victory within his grasp, he was deprived of half of his little army on account of an oft-repeated legislative blunder. They knew that in all of our wars the American soldier has been called upon to win in spite of an unintelligent military statesmanship, and they did not believe that with such military institutions as these the North could successfully undertake the conquest of 5,000,000 Americans.

"Such was the logical estimate of the military situation. The appeal to arms was made by the southern leaders because in all human probability their cause would succeed. And they were almost right. But they failed to estimate the marvelous endurance of the northern people, who, spite of defeat, spite of unprecedented wastes of their blood and treasure, and spite of an unenlightened military policy, clung to the fearful burden of the war and bore it to the bitter end.

"The Civil War was a long and protracted struggle because it takes two years to convert armed mobs into armies, and until that conversion is complete there can be no decisive scientific military action. It was indeed fortunate for the United States that in this war its antagonist also began operations with an armed mob instead of an army.

"Our analysis of the facts of the Civil War has thus far led us to two important conclusions: First, that efforts to prevent it judicially were vain; and, second, that the undoubted proximate cause of the war was the military unpreparedness of the United States. * * * At the close of 1860 the Regular Army of the United States comprised 16,367 officers and enlisted men. This force consisted of 198 companies, and of these 183 companies were stationed on the Mexican and Indian frontier or were en route to distant posts west of the Mississippi. The 15 remaining companies were employed in guarding the Canadian frontier and the Atlantic coast from Maine to the Gulf of Mexico.

"On October 29, 1860, in view of the 'imminent danger of a disruption of the Union by the secession of one or more of the States,' Gen. Scott recommended that Forts Moultrie and Monroe and other southern forts be reinforced in order to prevent their capture by a coup de main or surprise. In a postscript added to his letter to the Secretary of War he stated that the forces of the United States available for the purpose were only five companies, stationed as follows: One company at Boston, one company at the Narrows (New York Harbor), one company at Pittsburgh, one company at Augusta, Ga., and one company at Baton Rouge. These five scattered companies, comprising about 400 men, constituted the total military force of the United States available for any sudden emergency.

"The propriety of reinforcing the southern forts was carefully considered by Mr. Buchanan and his Cabinet, but the project was overruled, and thereupon the Secretary of War, Gen. Cass, resigned.

"But in its decision the administration of Mr. Buchanan should not be criticized without weighing the means at his disposal. The demands of the military situation were very clear. Prompt and decisive military action must have terminated the crisis, but prompt and decisive military action is not to be expected of a nation that has no military power. A vigorous national policy could hardly be supported by five scattered companies numbering 400 men. The tone of the southern leaders at this time was one of contempt for the weakness of the Federal Government. Their contempt was justified by the facts, and out of their contempt grew war. * * * The total cost of the Civil War to date has been over \$9,000,000,000. It might have been prevented by an appropriation of \$5,000,000 per annum from 1850 to 1860. But though it has already cost \$9,000,000,000, it is still costing over \$160,000,000 per annum for pensions on account of preventable military service, death, and suffering. In view of its consequences was the military retrenchment of the "fifties" a true economy? For every dollar spared from the proper military budget of 1860 we have so far paid \$1,800, and we are still paying \$32 a year almost half a century after the war. And this is the traditional military policy of the United States.

"Although our analysis of the causes of the Civil War has necessarily been brief, it throws a suggestive light on several phases of the profound problem of war and peace. We find that the controversies that led to the Civil War were first brought before a competent tribunal, but that judicial action even under the most favorable circumstances was unable to prevent the appeal to arms. We find, however, upon further examination that the war in all human probability was a preventable struggle and that the proper preventive measure was simply Washington's classical remedy, preparedness for war.

"We also find a remarkable illustration of the vast difference that exists between military retrenchment and military economy. Economy always demands efficiency, no matter how much efficiency may cost, and retrenchment at the expense of efficiency is never economy. Because our fathers ignored this truth, we are still paying thirtyfold for an unintelligent retrenchment of 60 years ago."

There can be no doubt that the lack of a definite policy, the lack of harmony and organization, at the outbreak of the War with Spain are the chief causes of the heavy toll of life and health paid to disease,

fourteen times that paid to bullets, though the bulk of our forces never left our own shores.

In fact, this lack of a defense policy is no doubt the real cause of the war itself. Any rational policy would have dictated our holding control of the sea as the Cuban question grew more acute. Ten million dollars put into ships in the early nineties would have insured this control and would have guaranteed the settlement of the Cuban controversy by diplomacy. With control of the sea there would have been no war. As soon as we gained control of the sea the war ended. A few millions of dollars put out in pursuance of a policy would have saved hundreds of millions poured out in war.

America has 30,000,000 of her citizens and \$37,000,000,000 of her property exposed to naval attack. We have an expanding foreign commerce coming more and more in competition with the commerce of the great military powers of Europe and Asia. We propose to maintain the Monroe doctrine and insist on the "open-door policy," and are pledged to maintain the neutrality of the Panama Canal. Our possessions, whether to our liking or not, are spread all over the Pacific Ocean, placing us in the vortex of the world's politics. There is no choice. We must make adequate provision for self-defense.

This can not be done with efficiency and economy without a proper agency. This bill establishes such an agency without creating any new offices, and practically without entailing any additional expense. The committee unanimously recommends its passage at an early date.

The great weakness of our Nation from the standpoint of national defense has been the want of a definite policy and the want of cooperation between the various agencies involved. This bill makes up for this weakness and will promote economy and efficiency in peace and increases the chances of victory in war.

I will also print a letter from Admiral Fletcher bearing on the question of shortage of officers and men in the Atlantic Fleet.

AMENDMENT OF TESTIMONY BY REAR ADMIRAL FLETCHER, UNITED STATES NAVY.

UNITED STATES ATLANTIC FLEET,
U. S. S. "WYOMING," FLAGSHIP,
Navy Yard, New York, January 14, 1915.

MY DEAR MR. PADGETT: I desire to correct my testimony as given on page 547 of the hearings before your committee. The testimony is in answer to the question as to "how many short we would be if we attempted to put all our fighting ships in commission with trained service." My reply was to the effect that I could not give exact figures, but my impression was that it would take 4,000 or 5,000 additional men to fully man the ships which I think ought to be manned upon the opening of hostilities, and 5,000 in addition to the above to man other ships that should immediately be called out of reserve.

I am now able to give more exact information. Boards, consisting of the captain and other ranking officers of experience, by order of the Navy Department, have been appointed upon every battleship of the Atlantic Fleet, with instructions to carefully consider the complements of both officers and men required on the various types of vessels and scrutinize the number allowed in each rank and rating, with a view to reducing the same to the lowest practicable number consistent with efficiency for a peace complement and the lowest number that would be desirable for a war complement.

These boards have now completed their work, and the result has developed an alarming shortage of officers and men that are required to efficiently man our ships for battle. The reports of all these boards were made independently and are singularly unanimous in their conclusions, presenting a more serious shortage than could have been anticipated by either the Navy Department or the fleet until brought to light by this searching investigation.

The reports of these boards show that in the 21 battleships in commission, and now composing the Atlantic Fleet, there is a shortage of 5,219 men and 339 officers required to fill all stations necessary to efficiently fight the ships in battle.

The above figures refer to the commissioned battle fleet alone, and this shortage does not include "4,000 or 5,000 additional to fully man the ships which I think ought to be fully manned upon the opening of hostilities," as stated in my testimony.

My complete report has been sent to the Secretary of the Navy, but I desire the above facts to be placed in your possession in order that the testimony I gave before your committee may not be misleading.

Very respectfully,

F. F. FLETCHER,
Rear Admiral, United States Navy.

HON. L. P. PADGETT,
Chairman Naval Committee,
House of Representatives, Washington, D. C.

Mr. HENSLEY. Mr. Chairman, I yield 15 minutes to the gentleman from Wisconsin [Mr. REILLY].

[Mr. REILLY of Wisconsin addressed the committee. See Appendix.]

Mr. GRAHAM of Illinois. Mr. Chairman, this does not seem to be an opportune time to invest heavily in fighting ships. The experience of the present European war will doubtless shed much light on naval attack and defense. Up to this time what was clear before has been made clearer still, namely, that in naval engagements, as in prize-ring engagements, speed and "the punch" wins. Neither one enough. It takes both combined. It would seem to be almost criminally unwise to build fighting ships which were known to be slower than those of a possible enemy.

The ship which has speed enough to decline the combat, unless the conditions are favorable to it, has a great advantage, but if to greater speed it adds guns which are effective at longer range than its opponent's, it is complete master of the situation. Hence, every ship we build should have the greatest practicable amount of speed, should be faster than any now in service, if that is practicable, and should carry guns of the greatest range.

Our Government recognized the force of this position when it sold the *Idaho* and the *Mississippi* because they were practically out of date on account of their lack of speed and lack of effective armament.

But it may be claimed that as we do not intend making war on any nation and need ships only for defense, we do not need such high speed in our ships; their principal function being to defend our coasts.

There are at least two answers to this. In the first place, one of the best methods of defense often is a vigorous attack. Hannibal taught the world that lesson, and Scipio learned it so well from him that he gave a demonstration of it. It is still true. For that reason alone we need speedy ships, if we need any.

The second answer is that we have so large a number of slow fighting ships now that we should equip them for coast-defense purposes, or such other work as slow ships can do, and put all the money we are now going to appropriate for naval purposes into fast ships only. Other nations now have great fighting monsters capable of a speed of 28 to 34 knots. Our new ones should have as great or greater speed than that.

I have heard the argument made repeatedly that speed is not important for defense; that big guns and heavy armor are what is needed. The bulldog, they say, does not need to be as fast as the greyhound; he does not have to seek safety by flight.

The illustration does not illustrate. There are many things the bulldog could do if he were capable of greater speed which he can not do now. Who would think of putting the most faithful of bulldogs to guard his flock of sheep or to run down a wolf? The greyhound or the wolf could kill every sheep in the field with the bulldog in full pursuit trying to prevent it. The bulldog's range of usefulness is quite limited because he has been developed into mere jaws, just biting capacity. But he must catch before he can bite. If his legs fail to serve his jaws they will soon grow weak from hunger.

I do not know whether it is practicable to develop a breed of dogs having the fleetness of the greyhound and the jaws and courage of the bulldog, but I do know it is practicable to develop a class of ships having both these qualities, having the speed of the fastest cruiser and gun power of the heaviest superdreadnaught. She may not carry as many heavy guns as the latter but she can carry enough to conquer with when she cares to fight, and she has speed enough to decline to fight when prudence dictates such a course.

Not long ago we sold two ships to Greece—the *Idaho* and the *Mississippi*. We sold them because they were practically superannuated; that is, newer and better methods of construction as to speed and armament had rendered them ineffective. As against faster ships armed with guns of longer range they would be mere targets.

But we still have 28 ships of practically the same character both as to armament and speed. What are we to do with them? If slow ships can do coast-defense duty, surely we have enough of them now. With 28 such slow ships on hand and no fast ones, it would be more than mere folly—it would be criminal folly—to build more of the slow ones and no fast ones.

It may be of interest to have more specific information as to these ships, and for that purpose I give a list of them, with their principal armament. Their approximate speed ranges from 14 to 19 knots an hour:

Name of ship.	Large guns.	Small guns.
Alabama.....	4 13-inch.....	14 6-inch.
Connecticut.....	4 12-inch.....	8 8-inch and 12 7-inch.
Delaware.....	10 12-inch.....	14 5-inch.
Florida.....	10 12-inch.....	16 5-inch.
Georgia.....	4 12-inch.....	8 8-inch and 12 6-inch.
Illinois.....	4 13-inch.....	14 6-inch.
Iowa.....	4 12-inch.....	8 8-inch.
Kansas.....	4 12-inch.....	8 8-inch and 12 7-inch.
Kearsarge.....	4 13-inch.....	4 8-inch and 18 5-inch.
Kentucky.....	4 13-inch.....	4 8-inch and 18 5-inch.
Louisiana.....	4 12-inch.....	8 8-inch and 12 7-inch.
Maine.....do.....	16 6-inch.
Michigan.....	8 12-inch.....
Minnesota.....	4 13-inch.....	8 8-inch and 12 7-inch.
Missouri.....	4 12-inch.....	16 6-inch.
Nebraska.....do.....	8 8-inch and 12 6-inch.
New Hampshire.....do.....	8 8-inch and 12 7-inch.
New Jersey.....do.....	8 8-inch and 12 6-inch.
North Dakota.....	10 12-inch.....	14 5-inch.
Ohio.....	4 12-inch.....	16 6-inch.
South Carolina.....	8 12-inch.....
Utah.....	10 12-inch.....	16 5-inch.
Vermont.....	4 12-inch.....	8 8-inch and 12 7-inch.
Virginia.....do.....	8 8-inch and 12 6-inch.
Wyoming.....	12 12-inch.....	4 5-inch.

The other three, the *Oregon*, *Indiana*, and *Massachusetts*, are on the retired list.

When we take into consideration that every one of these ships carries only armor-piercing shells, it is perfectly apparent that they would be entirely harmless to an enemy of greater speed, with guns of equal or greater caliber firing high explosive shells.

The range of vision from ship to ship at sea is about 12 miles; that is, a man on a ship, at an elevation of about 25 feet, can see the top works of another ship, in clear weather, about 12 miles away. Many modern guns carry farther than that, and a shell loaded with guncotton, gelatin, or some other high explosive striking a ship at that, or even at a greater distance, would in all human probability sink it. The *Empress of India*, a British ship, was used as a target for such shells and sunk at a distance of about 9 miles. At that distance our A. P., or armor-piercing, shell would be as harmless as a popgun.

But we are on the eve of better things in that regard. Even reactionary ordnance bureaus can not much longer delay a change. We must soon adopt high-explosive shells and high-power guns, and if these 28 slow-going ships were armed with such guns and such shells they would be quite effective for coast defense and for many other purposes. It is not any defect in the structure of the ships, beyond their lack of speed, that makes them antiquated; it is only the armament, and particularly the use of a shell which is destructive only when it penetrates the enemy's armor and explodes after penetration. As that is possible only at comparatively short ranges, say, 4 or 5 miles, it can be readily seen how helpless such a ship is against an enemy with high-explosive shells, which are as effective at 10 miles as at 1 mile, if hits are made at the greater distance.

This whole matter and other matters of great interest are set out so clearly in an article printed in the *New York American*, of November 1, 1914, that I quote it.

After referring to the speech of Congressman GARDNER of Massachusetts, the article continues:

Mr. GARDNER's speech has served to call attention to another notable address recently made to the Senate Naval Affairs Committee by Mr. Willard S. Isham, a military engineer and expert, and the inventor of a torpedo shell. Mr. Isham makes five very specific charges of inefficiency against the United States Navy. These charges were made on September 30, publicly, and in the presence of high officials of the Navy, and they have not been challenged, explained, nor denied.

The graveness of Mr. Isham's charges can scarcely be overestimated. If they are unjustified they ought to be proved untrue by the Navy experts; if they are true our Navy administration needs immediate investigation and reorganization.

Here is an official copy of Mr. Isham's address to the Naval Affairs Committee of the Senate:

"Gentlemen: The main purpose of this brief presentation is to direct attention to some of the many defects in the matériel of our Navy which, neutralizing many good points, destroy the efficiency of our Navy as a means of national defense. A further purpose is to disclose some of the contributing causes that have resulted in present conditions in the expectation that when these are fully considered a searching investigation of our national defenses will result.

"Since the time when our Government was established it has been recognized that an efficient Navy operating on the high sea was the most practical means for the protection of our long coast lines against hostile invasion. A Navy to accomplish this purpose must be able to intercept and overcome any convoyed force before a port suitable for a base could be secured and made defensible, and since it is obviously impossible to determine in advance the objective point of attack of an enemy it is necessary that our Navy, to be efficient, must possess eyes, as it is recognized that a blind fighter could never accomplish much in a combat with an active enemy.

"Hence an important adjunct to a fleet consists in scout ships for scouring the seas and ascertaining the strength, location, direction, and speed of an enemy's expeditionary force, so that he may be met by a suitable force at such a point and at such a time that a tactical advantage may be secured and a favorable result obtained. We possess no ships capable of cruising as scouts at a distance from our battle fleet which could not be quickly destroyed by the faster and more powerfully armed battleships and battle cruisers of other navies. Hence at the door of those responsible for the condition of our Navy is laid charge number 1.

"1. Our Navy is inefficient because of its inability to scout out an enemy on the high seas.

"Our battle fleets are made up of battleships in which speed has been sacrificed for armor plate and from a strategical or tactical standpoint are no better than floating fortresses, as they can never force a battle upon an unwilling enemy or interfere with any of his movements. Moreover, no part of a battle fleet can be safely detached as a flying base for cruisers, destroyers, or other fast ships acting as scouts, since they might be cut off and destroyed by a concentrated force of ships having superior speed and armament. Hence it is that our battle fleets must operate as an entity and must possess the force necessary to meet at any time or place the maximum force which an enemy can concentrate against them. This condition also results from the second defect in our Navy.

"2. We possess no ships capable of operating at such a distance from our battle fleets as to screen its formation and strength from the scout ships of an enemy.

"Because of this defect our fleets are compelled to be always ready and are as a consequence never ready to meet an enemy to the best advantage. This defect makes the defense of our fleets impossible at night, since it permits a hostile torpedo flotilla to hover about them at sundown like a pack of coyotes around a campfire ready to rush in when the conditions are favorable. Against this attack our battleships are powerless, as shown by Lord Charles Beresford in *The Betrayal*, page 62:

"No guns, heavy or light, will protect a battle fleet from torpedo attack at night. The only effective method of protection is to employ a large number of small cruisers to clear a wide area about the battle fleet at sundown. These cruisers do not exist in the requisite number. * * * The small cruiser force must be disposed so that they form a protecting screen distant 120 or 140 miles on all sides from the battle squadron. By no other means is it possible to move a battle squadron at night without risking its destruction by the attack of torpedo craft."

"Rear Admiral Twining, late Chief of the Bureau of Ordnance, stated in the House hearings, March 12, 1912, page 907:

"The torpedo boat continues to be held in great favor as a weapon of underwater attack, and it must be admitted that no navy has at present an adequate system of defense against such attack if efficiently delivered. Torpedoes have been designed which can cut, penetrate, or displace the nets. The searchlight is ineffective, since a torpedo may be successfully launched at a range beyond its reach. Gunfire is ineffective against an invisible target, and the torpedo boat can launch its weapon while still invisible to the gun."

"The great naval expert, Percy Scott, who formerly championed the construction of battleships, now declares them to be worthless and defenseless against underwater attack. The European war thus far has shown that no commander dares to expose a battleship to underwater attack. Hence the charge is laid and should be investigated:

"3. Our battleships are defenseless in a fog or at night.

"Moreover, the results thus far obtained as to the naval operations in the European war seem to indicate that heavy ships are defenseless by day against underwater attack. Notwithstanding this accumulation of evidence, our technical boards still propose to construct slow battleships, and one week from to-day bids will be opened for three such ships that will cost \$45,000,000 and that an investigation will show to be as worthless and as antiquated as the flintlock musket.

"These defects in our battleships result from the sacrifice of active aggression for passive resistance, a vital sacrifice in speed for an unnecessary increase in armor plate. Because of this our ships are compelled to fight fleets, which make them an easy prey for the torpedo and which fired at the line of battleships will in one case out of four hit and sink a ship. The Napoleonic maxim that "The thicker the grass, the faster it is mown," applies with especial force to naval warfare. This is one of the fruits of armor-plate domination in the construction of our Navy. Had our battleships been constructed with such speed that they could cruise as fighting units they would have nothing to fear on the high seas from torpedo attack. Let us examine the advantages which this excess armor plate has given our ships.

"Since the remotest ages the art of war and the implements of warfare have developed according to certain immutable principles. For example, the boy David slew the giant Goliath because he could select a range for his attack where his sling was destructive, but which range the slow-moving Goliath could not lessen so as to make his ponderous sword and spear effective. This principle has been expounded for centuries and employed to secure victories in all ages, and it was recently reaffirmed as the basis of an argument for the sale of the *Idaho* and *Mississippi* that they were outranged by the larger guns of foreign fast ships. Hence charge 4 is laid and should be investigated:

"4. Thirty-two of our older battleships, carrying guns of equal or lesser power than those in the *Idaho*, are inefficient for the purposes for which they were designed because they are outranged by foreign ships having guns of superior range and possessing superior speed.

"A corollary of this principle is that the effect of a missile weapon is not dependent upon its ultimate range, but upon its destructive range. The guns of the *Idaho* and *Mississippi* and our other 32 ships having the same armament fire shell weighing 870 pounds at 22,000 yards, yet these shells can not destroy a battleship at even one-half this range, which general fact is stated not only in the last British Naval Annual and in other technical journals, but also has been proven by tests carried out by a special committee of Congress and reported to Congress by the chairman, Capt. Hobson, on April 30 of the present year. Admiral Twining, in testimony referred to, stated that hits could be made at a range of 16,000 yards. The British navy last December sunk the battleship *Empress of India* at over 16,000 yards, and the account of the test in the Naval Institute Proceedings for April of the present year states that "holes were blown in her like lock gates," showing the employment of torpedo shell, since A. P. shells never make a hole larger than their diameter. Since then torpedo shells are used abroad that are effective at 16,000 yards or up to the limit of range fixed by visual conditions, as stated by Admiral Twining.

"The question naturally arises why these 32 battleships of our Navy are not supplied with such shells so as to prevent them from being outranged, as it is stated they would be in combat with foreign ships. Several types of torpedo shell were brought out in this country nearly 20 years ago. The War Department perfected one. I presented one, but neither type has been adopted. The cry of danger was raised against one of these types. That charge would have been accepted as honest had either of the other types of torpedo shell been adopted and against which no such charge could be brought. Either of these shells could destroy any battleship without even exploding in contact with it, as was established by experiments carried out by Gen. Abbott nearly 20 years ago. It was also proven by tests made with the Army shell against a caisson representing a battleship and furnished by the Navy Department, an account of which test is contained in Ordnance and Gunnery, by Lissak, page 583, which shows that this shell would destroy a battleship at even a distance of 15 feet from it. Hence charge 5 is laid and should be investigated:

"5. Ordnance officers of this country for the past 15 or 20 years have been in possession of safe torpedo shells that could destroy any ship at any range within the limit fixed by visual and other conditions, but, notwithstanding this, such shells have not been adopted for the service and our ships have not been constructed either to employ them or meet the change that would result if other navies adopted them.

"Tests of these shells have shown that by means of them not only can ships be sunk at extreme range, but also irrespective of their armor protection, as their most favorable point of attack is below the water line. Has this recognized destructive effect of torpedo shells which discounts the use of armor plate been the cause of the vigorous opposition to their adoption? Has their use been opposed because their adoption would at once extend the destructive range of all the primary guns on all our battleships and thereby prevent such ships from ever becoming obsolete? Has their use been opposed because their adoption would destroy the basis of the permanent naval building program so dear to many? Those back of this opposition should be permitted to give the reasons therefor, and these reasons should be weighed and tested by a searching investigation.

"The immediate cause for this request for a hearing in the hope of securing an investigation has been the arrogant act of the Naval Chief of Ordnance, who has refused to carry out tests with either of two types of torpedo shell in which I am interested, and as requested by the House Subcommittee on Ordnance Tests, but who has at the same time carried out a test with one of these shells in utter disregard of the wishes of either the House committee or myself, which for high-handed disregard for the interests of the Navy and of this country stands without parallel in the history of his department; and I am informed, having thereby secured the material for an unfavorable report, the caisson employed in the test was blown up and destroyed, thereby preventing further tests to disprove the inaccuracy of the reports and conclusions obtained and uttered by the department.

"It is recognized that a saw may be proven to be worthless if tested as a means to drive nails. Likewise a hammer may be proven worthless as a means for cutting off timber; but a test to prove their efficiency should be made under such conditions as they are designed to be used, and I am informed by many Members of Congress who received invitations to be present at a test requested by the House Committee on Ordnance Tests that they expected such test to take place. I am also informed that if the subterfuge of blowing up the caisson has been resorted to in order to prevent the result of an honest test from stopping contracts for battleships or shells, the blame will be placed where it belongs.

"The issue is not the Isham shell, or anybody's shell in particular. The question is whether the ordnance officers shall prevent the use of any torpedo shell because they lessen the demand for armor plate and for new ships. This issue, it is submitted, should be decided by an investigation and by honest tests, and it is believed that it will be so decided.

"Believing that the few serious charges herein made can be established by the honest officers, composing 95 per cent of those in the service, and that a searching investigation will result in great good to our Navy, I respectfully request that such an investigation be made."

It was my privilege to go down the bay this week to witness some experiments with a shell containing a high explosive, the invention of the Mr. Isham referred to above. To my mind the experiments demonstrated the excellence of the invention, and point unmistakably to a change—almost a revolution—in naval warfare.

Up to this time it has been found impossible to devise a form of shell which would not skip along the surface of the water, or ricochet, as it is technically called.

This fact made it impossible to hit a ship below the water line with a shell, and hence it was unnecessary to put armor plate below that line. Hence the submerged portion of the ship is especially weak against attack, and a hard blow delivered under the water is usually fatal. This, together with the secrecy with which its blow can be delivered, constitute the main reasons for the submarine and the torpedo. From shells which refuse to go into the water before exploding the submarine is, of course, practically immune. But if a shell could be found to enter the water and explode under the water, the submarine would be another Othello—its occupation would be gone. That is just what Mr. Isham has accomplished. By a device which is unerring in accuracy and so simple that one wonders why it was not discovered before, every shell not fired at too short a range enters the water on contact, and equipped with a time fuse, travels under the water a distance of from 100 to 200 feet before exploding.

No ship and no submarine within a distance of 15 or 20 feet from this shell at the moment of explosion could survive. The effect is manifest. The attack is carried direct to the weakest point of the ship and irreparable damage is done. In this way every shell becomes a mine, and it is difficult to conceive of a defense against it. Such a shell takes the place of the torpedo and, in addition, possesses tremendous advantages over it. In the first place its cost is but a small fraction of the cost of the torpedo. In the next place it is far more practicable. It will travel through the air in 15 seconds a distance which it would take the torpedo at least 5 minutes to travel through the water. In 5 minutes the ship may change its course so as to miss the torpedo, but if the high explosive shell is properly aimed, the ship can not in 15 seconds gain anything by change of position, and, in addition, during the 5 minutes the torpedo is making its journey at least 15 shells could be fired from a single gun. And in the third place, the shell has for its target the whole ship, both above and below the water line, whereas the torpedo has only the part below the water line.

I do not believe we are in danger of being involved in war very soon. I have the most abundant confidence in the ability of the President and Secretary of State Bryan to avoid such a calamity. It would be almost unpardonable that not even one of the great nations remained at peace. But if we appropriate money to build additional ships for our defense they should possess every quality of excellence—of superiority that skill and intelligence can supply.

Mr. PADGETT. I yield 15 minutes to the gentleman from Rhode Island [Mr. GERRY], a member of the Committee on Naval Affairs.

Mr. GERRY. Mr. Chairman, the present war has proven beyond question the value of the control of the sea, and has made our people realize more than ever the importance of an adequate

Navy to the United States. Oceans are the great highways over which the preponderance of commerce must travel. The nation that controls them has the world to draw upon, and its influence must be felt at all shores. In time of war the protection of one's commerce is an elementary and fundamental necessity for continuing commercial prosperity. A country that is able to carry on its foreign trade while its enemies' ships are driven to port has a great economic advantage. Sound finances are as fundamentally important to a government as they are to a business man, and the successful combatant in a great war is generally, in the long run, the one that has the deepest purse. Napoleon recognized this fact when he inaugurated his continental system and attempted to conquer England by closing the markets of Europe to her commerce, but his policy failed because he did not have command of the sea.

Apart from mere commercial considerations, there is also the advantage to military strategy that naval supremacy gives. If the enemy's navy is blockaded, advantageous points of attack can be chosen, colonies at the other end of the world can send aid to the mother country, and a concentration of troops is easily accomplished.

These are a few of the fundamental advantages that go with the command of the sea, and which experience is teaching today as it has in the past. In fact, I think it would be hard now to find any thinking person who would question the importance of naval supremacy. It therefore only remains to consider what is the best way to obtain it. All facts point to one sound principle, namely, to have the largest and most efficient fleet of capital ships. There are many different fighting vessels that can aid a navy, but there are none that can take the place of the first line of battleships. The mere fact that there is such a fleet capable of attacking the enemy's armada, if it comes out, is enough to keep it in port and give the command of the sea to the greater navy. England has proven this in the present war. Her superiority of superdreadnaughts has prevented the German Navy from attempting a battle, because they realize that the odds are greatly against them—too heavy to be recommended by sound policy.

Submarines have done effective work, and they are valuable adjuncts to a fleet; but, as Commander Stirling said before the committee this year, "It is a weapon of the battleship, just the same as the battleship's 12-inch turret."

In other words, the dreadnaught has not been superseded, but an additional destructive force has been added to the fleet, useful as harbor defense and helpful in conjunction with battleships. To rely solely upon a submarine attack to destroy a first line of battleships is to put much to chance, for the submarines must succeed in evading the aeroplane lookouts that in clear weather can see them although their periscopes are submerged some distance. They must be able to dive under the screen of cruisers and scouts that are extended far out to protect the dreadnaughts. Once or twice they must come to the surface if they are to determine the speed of their opponent and other questions of range, without which there can be little accuracy in discharging the torpedo. They must overcome all these difficulties and get in striking distance, although under the most favorable circumstances with new batteries they can only make 10 knots an hour submerged, and that for but one hour before their speed is cut in two by the using up of the electricity. While they are making 10 knots the dreadnaughts can make 20; therefore any change away from them in the direction of the fleet places the submarine at an irreparable disadvantage.

The reason why the submarine has proven so effective in the present European war is because of the close proximity of the belligerent nations, the waters that the skirmishes are taking place in are limited in area, home bases are never far off, and the scouts which the English have thrown out to protect their dreadnaughts and coast have given the submarine a great field for effective work, being near the enemy's bases. The only vessels that are known authentically to have been sunk by submarines were the units of this screen and not the protected vessels themselves. In other words, the outpost vessels were lost. Naturally, these scouting vessels are bound to suffer from the submarine's hands, and that is why the latter is being more and more recognized as a valuable new auxiliary; but how little naval commanders will consider them when they desire to make a raid is shown by the action of the Germans when they attacked the coast of England with their battle cruisers. The bombardment was effected and the retreat made without submarines being able to do any damage to the enemy, and this on a short coast line which was supposed to be protected by scouts that could give the alarm and create a rendezvous of forces when necessary. A similar raid was evidently attempted a few days ago, but this time they met the enemy's fleet of

battle cruisers. The odds were at once recognized as too great and a retreat was made, with a loss to the attacking party. It is worth noting here that it was not until capital ships were met that the expedition had to be abandoned. Submarines alone would have been discounted as a negligible danger. I do not believe that there is a naval authority who would suggest for one instant that if England only had a fleet of submarines, she would have been able to have blockaded the North Sea.

The soundness of the United States maintaining a consistent policy of sustaining an adequate Navy can not be denied with any force of argument. Such a defense means that our shores can be kept from the ravages of war, our colonies protected, and the Panama Canal retained. As an adjunct to the Monroe doctrine it is absolutely essential, for, unless we can enforce our wishes, little respect will be paid to them. Might is still essential in international controversies. This defense of our country is maintained by a Navy at low cost, if we consider how vast would have to be our expenditure should we try to adequately fortify our great seacoast and support these fortifications with a standing army. An immense Army is not desired by the American people, and history shows that it is an unwise policy for Republics to pursue if they are to maintain the character of their Government, but by relying upon naval defense all these dangers are eliminated. Even with the Navy on a war basis, the number of men are few, in comparison with the millions in our country, and the danger of these few creating any spirit of militarism throughout the Nation, as a standing army might do, is not possible.

A glance at the table of the building program of the great nations of the world shows that their program calls for more ships than ours; and even should there be an important naval battle in the near future, history teaches and the present experiences show that the victor is not likely to lose many ships although the defeated is annihilated. In the battle off the Chilean coast the German fleet destroyed two of the English boats and escaped themselves unharmed. When, however, they were met by a superior force, all their ships but one were lost and their conquerors were practically unscathed. It would therefore seem an unwise policy for us to rely on the possibility of future loss among other powers instead of trying to continue our own strength among the sea powers of the world.

This bill reported by the Navy Committee is the best bill that has been presented to the House in years, and a vote for it is supporting policies that must appeal to us as patriotic Americans.

Mr. Chairman, I yield back the remainder of my time.

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman yields back five minutes.

Mr. BUTLER. I yield 20 minutes to the gentleman from Iowa [Mr. Good].

Mr. GOOD. Mr. Chairman, while we are considering a bill providing funds for our occupation of the seas by our Navy I desire for a few minutes to discuss a serious problem growing out of the soil.

I wish to submit a few observations with regard to the price paid for live stock in the principal live stock markets in the country. Apparently but few people realize the great loss that is being sustained every day by our farmers and stockmen. I undertake to say that if the same demoralization of earnings and actual losses sustained by our farmers and feeders during the last few months were visited upon the railroads of the country they would be given instant relief.

Unquestionably the live-stock industry has received a staggering blow. The men who to-day are engaged in furnishing the meat supply of the country are doing it at a loss that will total many millions of dollars.

I have before me a Chicago paper of yesterday, January 28, from which I quote the following:

Live-stock quotations.

CATTLE.	
Beef steers, good to choice	\$8.00 @ \$8.75
Beef steers, fair to good	7.00 @ 8.00
Beef steers, common to fair	5.25 @ 7.00
Yearlings	7.00 @ 9.50
Beef cows	4.50 @ 6.75
Fat heifers, fair to selected	5.00 @ 8.00
Bulls	5.00 @ 6.75
HOGS.	
Bulk of sales	6.40 @ 6.55
Common to good, mixed	6.25 @ 6.45
Fair to choice, medium weight	6.45 @ 6.55
Lightweights	6.50 @ 6.60
Fair to selected butcher's	6.50 @ 6.60
Select, 260 to 300 pounds, packer's	6.45 @ 6.50
Boars, according to weight	3.00 @ 4.00
Pigs	5.75 @ 6.35
Stags	6.00 @ 6.25

AVERAGE PRICES OF CATTLE AND HOGS.

From these quotations it will be seen that the average price paid for fat cattle at the Chicago market on yesterday was

\$6.90 per hundred and that the average price paid for hogs was \$6.06 per hundred pounds.

PRICES DEPEND ON COST AND DEMAND.

Mr. Chairman, as a general rule there is a corresponding relation between the price of fat cattle and hogs and the price of corn, the principal food on which hogs and cattle are matured. To-day there is no relation whatever between the price of fat cattle and hogs and the price of corn. Fat cattle and hogs are selling to-day in the principal stockyards of the country for considerably less than the actual cost of the corn to produce them.

Obviously there should also be a corresponding relation between the price paid for cattle and hogs and the prevailing price of fresh beef and pork. When the domestic and foreign price of fresh meats advance, should not the price of fat cattle and hogs also advance? Since the outbreak of the European war all foodstuffs have rapidly advanced, both here and abroad, but, strange to say, the price at which the American farmer has been obliged to sell his hogs has declined from \$8.90 per hundred on July 18, 1914, to \$6.06 on January 28. The average price of cattle has declined from \$9.10 on July 18 last to \$6.90 on January 28.

FARMERS UNABLE TO FORCE COMPETITION.

No one at all familiar with the live-stock industry will underate the effect which this unreasonable depression in the price of fat cattle and hogs is having on the American farmer and cattle raisers. When a feeder picks up a daily paper and reads that the price of wheat to the wheat grower has doubled in the last six months, and sees that the price of his commodity has declined by leaps and bounds while everything that goes to mature his product has greatly increased in price, he naturally begins to question the forces that makes this unnatural, unjust, and unreasonable condition possible. He realizes his helpless condition; but, try as he may, he can not improve it. He sees heavy losses staring him in the face every day, but he is unable to reduce them. Great transportation companies similarly situated would have redress by interesting the President of the United States, as they have already done, and have him appoint men on the Interstate Commerce Commission who favor the granting of increased freight rates. By newspaper advertisements to create a public sentiment, and by political pressure from the White House, the railroads will get the increase which they are seeking, but where is the Government executive official who is demanding that the farmer receive even a "square deal"?

1912 AND 1915 COMPARED.

I suppose some one will claim that inasmuch as hogs sold on January 28 for almost as much as the average price of hogs in January, 1912, that the farmers should not complain. In comparing prices we must not lose sight of the comparative cost of production. While it is true the average price of hogs on January 28 last was almost as high as the average price of hogs in January, 1912, we must also remember that it costs a great deal more to produce fat hogs to-day than it did in January, 1912. In January, 1912, corn on the Chicago market sold for 47 cents per bushel, while to-day it sells for better than 70 cents per bushel. A farmer could make money feeding cattle and hogs at the prevailing prices in 1912, whereas he can not help losing money feeding stock at the prevailing prices of to-day.

COST TO PRODUCE CATTLE AND HOGS.

The Department of Agriculture has determined the amount of corn necessary to produce 100 pounds of gain on a hog or a steer. It claims that 1 bushel of corn will make 10 pounds of gain on a hog, and that it requires 922 pounds, or 13.17 bushels of corn, to produce 100 pounds of gain on a steer. Mumford and Hall, of the Illinois Experiment Station, after a most extensive investigation, concluded that 1 bushel of corn will produce:

	Pounds of gain in wintered lot.	Pounds of gain in summer on pasture.
With calves.....	8.9	10.0
With yearlings.....	6.5	7.6
With 2-year-olds.....	5.4	6.8

That 1 bushel of corn will produce 10.5 pounds of gain on hogs.

COSTS OF PRODUCTION GREATLY INCREASED.

Applying the first rule, because it is more general, let us see whether or not the farmers have a just cause of complaint with regard to the present price paid for fat cattle and hogs at the stockyards of the country. The facts are that the price paid to-day for fat cattle and fat hogs does not begin to pay the corn cost alone of their production.

I have prepared a table showing the profit or loss in producing fat cattle and fat hogs at the prevailing prices of beef cattle

and hogs, and also the price of corn on the Chicago market for 1912, 1913, 1914, and for January 28, 1915. The table is as follows:

Table showing profit or loss in producing 100 pounds of gain on cattle and hogs from standpoint of corn costs only, as of Jan. 28, 1915, and for 1912, 1913, and 1914.

Year.	Average price of cattle per 100 pounds.	Average price of hogs per 100 pounds.	December and January price of corn per bushel.	Corn cost.		Profit or loss.	
				To produce 100 pounds gain on cattle.	To produce 100 pounds gain on hogs.	To produce 100 pounds gain on cattle.	To produce 100 pounds gain on hogs.
1912.....	\$7.75	\$7.55	\$0.47	\$6.17	\$4.70	\$1.38	\$2.85
1913.....	8.25	8.35	.46	6.21	4.60	2.14	3.65
1914.....	8.65	8.30	.60	7.90	6.00	.75	2.30
1915 (Jan. 28).....	6.90	6.06	.70	9.45	7.00	2.55	1.94

¹Loss.

NOTE.—Prices for 1912, 1913, and 1914 are from Yearbook of Figures, published by the Daily Farmers and Drovers' Journal, January, 1915; prices for January 28, 1915, taken from Chicago papers—all prices at Chicago. Labor costs and losses through disease not included.

PROFITS IN 1912; LOSSES NOW.

It will be observed that the corn cost to produce 100 pounds of beef in 1912 was \$6.17; that the average price for cattle that year was \$7.75, leaving a profit on the corn cost to the farmer of \$1.38 for every hundred pounds of gain produced. There was a profit on the corn cost to produce 100 pounds of pork that year of \$2.85. In 1913 the profit in producing 100 pounds of pork, so far as the corn is concerned, was \$3.65, and \$2.30 in 1914, while on January 28, 1915, there was a loss of 94 cents for every hundred pounds of pork produced. In other words, the farmer who fed hogs on 70-cent corn until they weighed 300 pounds and sold them yesterday on the Chicago market for \$6.06 per hundred lost over \$2.80 on every hog he matured, to say nothing of his loss for labor in raising the hog or his loss through cholera and other risks which he had assumed.

So, too, the farmer who fed cattle in 1912 made a profit of \$1.38 per hundred pounds, exclusive of the cost of labor and the risks assumed. In 1913 he made a profit of \$2.14 per hundred pounds; in 1914 he made a profit of 75 cents per hundred pounds; and at the prevailing prices of both fat cattle and corn on January 28, 1915, he sustained a loss of \$2.55 per hundred pounds.

In other words, the farmer who sold 1,200-pound steers yesterday at the average price suffered a loss on the cost of the corn alone to produce them of \$30.60 for each steer sold, while at the average price paid in 1913 he had a profit of \$25.60 on each 1,200-pound steer produced. His profits were not large in 1913. But who will question the seriousness of his losses in 1915?

PRODUCER SELLS FOR LESS WHILE CONSUMER PAYS MORE.

The wholesale price of fresh beef in London advanced 2 cents per pound from July 13 to December 21, 1914, while the average price of fat cattle on the Chicago market declined from \$9.10 per hundred pounds for the week ending July 18, 1914, to \$6.90 per hundred pounds on January 28, 1915. No one can dispute these prices. The English price will be found in Mark Lane Express Agricultural Journal and Live Stock Record, while the prices of live stock will be found in the Chicago papers. Who can explain how such things are possible, except through the violation of law? Who can justify such practices, which, if continued, will destroy the live-stock industry in this country? But where is the executive officer of the Government who is attempting to enforce the law and put a stop to this practice?

The Chicago wholesale price of pork for the week ending July 18, according to the National Provisioner, was 13 cents per pound. The average price of hogs at the Chicago market for that week was \$8.90 per hundred pounds. The Chicago wholesale price of pork for the week ending December 19, 1914, was 13 to 14 cents per pound, while the average price paid for hogs in the Chicago market was \$7.10 per hundred.

The American consumer paid more for his pork in December than he paid in July, but the American farmer sold the hogs out of which that pork was made for 20 per cent less in December than the price he received in July. The wholesale price of pork in London increased 25 per cent from July 18 to December 13, 1914, while the average price at which the American farmer was compelled to sell his hogs declined during the same time \$1.80 per hundred pounds, or 20 per cent. This condition is unbearable, almost unthinkable, and yet it has been going on month after month, and not a single executive officer of the Government has interceded in behalf of the American farmer to put a stop to a pernicious practice if not an unlawful conspiracy.

The executive officers of the Government, whose sworn duties are to enforce the law, may give as an excuse for their failure to prosecute these violators of the Sherman antitrust law that the farmers have received an increase in the price of their wheat and their oats and their corn and that they should not therefore complain. It is true that the price of wheat has advanced from 78 cents a bushel to \$1.50 per bushel during the past six months. Oats have advanced, and likewise corn has gone up in price; but these advances aid only the farmers who have these cereals for sale. They do not help the farmer who uses his corn and his oats for the purpose of maturing his stock and who looks to the sale of his fat stock for his annual income.

SUPPLY NOT EQUAL TO DEMAND, BUT PRICES DECLINE.

Let us remember that it can not be successfully urged as an excuse of these falling prices that there has been an overproduction or that the supply exceeds that of previous years. Just the reverse is the case. The demand for fresh meats has increased, and there has been a great falling off in the number of cattle and hogs sold on the stock markets in 1914, as compared with previous years, yet prices decline. Take the Chicago market, for example, and we find the live-stock movement for several years to be as follows:

	1914	1913	1912	1911
Cattle.....	2,237,881	2,513,074	2,652,342	2,931,831
Hogs.....	6,618,166	7,570,938	7,180,961	7,103,360

The combined total of receipts of all kinds of live stock at the 14 live-stock markets of the country show a great falling off in receipts in 1914, as compared with previous years. These combined receipts are as follows:

1914.....	53,700,238
1913.....	57,339,840
1912.....	57,268,861
1911.....	57,023,951

With this great shortage in the live stock in the country, why should our farmers be compelled to sell at the present bankrupt prices? With the demand for fresh meat increasing, with rising prices therefor to the consumer, and with the supply falling off why should there be such a great reduction, a reduction of over 20 per cent in price of fat cattle and hogs to the American farmer?

HOW PRESENT PRICES AFFECT IOWA FARMERS.

Take the State of Iowa, for example, for it is a typical stock-raising State: The farmers of that State naturally desire some of the benefits flowing from the great advance that has been made in the price in all food products by reason of the war in Europe. But the fact is that the farmers of Iowa, under present conditions, obtain but little of the great increase in the price of foodstuffs.

The entire State of Iowa produces only about 15,000,000 bushels of wheat and consumes about 13,000,000 bushels. Take from our production of wheat the amount that we consume and what we use for seed, but very little remains for sale.

The farmers of Iowa for several years have been advised by such eminent men as the Hon. James Wilson, the real father and builder of the now great United States Department of Agriculture, to conserve their lands by raising live stock and feeding their cereals on their farms. They have followed this advice, and in recent years have taken to raising cattle and hogs as their principal source of profit.

While we raise wheat, we raise only a little more than our people consume. We raise more oats by far than any State in the Union, but a large portion of our oat production is fed to our live stock. We excel all of the other States in the Union in the production of corn, producing in 1914, 389,424,000 bushels, yet of that great crop we will feed more than 85 per cent to our live stock. In the production of hay Iowa excels all the other States in the Union, save only the great Empire State of New York, but this crop, too, is largely fed to our horses and cattle. Iowa produces more horses than any State in the Union. It produces more cattle than any State except Texas, and it produces more hogs by 2,500,000 head than any other State.

It can be said as a general rule that the great production of cereals in Iowa is to a large extent fed to the live stock raised or matured within the State. It is therefore to the sale of live stock, and especially to the sale of fat cattle and hogs, that our farmers must look for their annual return, and when they see the price of pork advancing in London at the rate of 25 per cent in six months, and at the same time see the price of their hogs decline on our markets 20 per cent, they realize that some strong forces, stronger than the law of competition, is at work undermining their profits and destroying their industry.

When our farmers see the foreign and domestic price of beef advance, and at the same time are forced to sell their fat cattle on the live-stock markets, their only market, at a greatly reduced price, they are forced to the conclusion that powerful interests have combined against them to unreasonably depress the price of their principal product and to ruin their prosperity. Will this Congress refuse to grant the farmers relief?

There was a time not many years ago when our farmers having cereals for sale were obliged to sell their grain to the Elevator Trust at the price fixed by that combination. The farmers solved that question by going into the elevator business. The result has been that to-day the farmer who has grain to sell receives the advantage of the natural rise in price.

The slaughter of live stock and the operation of stockyards presents a far more difficult question. The magnitude of the investment alone in such enterprise has prevented our farmers engaging in this industry. But who can say that the losses which they will sustain this year by reason of this unjustifiable depression in the price of live stock will not force them to find some more profitable way of marketing this great crop?

LOSSES TO IOWA FARMERS.

Take the losses which the farmers of Iowa will sustain this year on their hogs alone. They raised last year 6,976,000 head. If three-fourths of them were matured to a weight of 250 pounds each and marketed this year at the average price paid on the Chicago market on yesterday, the loss to the Iowa farmers alone on the corn which was consumed in maturing these hogs would total over \$11,000,000. Fortunately for the farmers of Iowa they have not all sold their hogs at the prevailing price of yesterday, but they have all sold their hogs at a much lower price than they should have received for them. Instead of sustaining a loss, if they had received the same percentage of profit which they realized in 1913, of \$3.65 per hundred pounds, on the corn cost to produce their hogs, they would have realized on the same sales a profit of more than \$19,000,000. Considering the profit which should have gone to the farmers and stock raisers of Iowa by reason of the advanced prices in beef and pork, which the farmers did not receive, I believe that loss of the Iowa farmers on cattle and hogs this year will total over \$25,000,000.

I do not know who is responsible for this unreasonable decline in the stock market. I do not know who is controlling it. I only know that the farmers are receiving far less for their fat cattle and hogs than they should receive. The law of competition, uncontrolled, would have forced the price of cattle and hogs even higher than the prevailing prices at the time of the outbreak of the European war.

ANDERSON RESOLUTION.

I believe that the resolution offered by the gentleman from Minnesota [Mr. ANDERSON] should be adopted by the House, and that the Department of Justice should, in justice to the farmers, make a thorough examination into the causes of this decline in the price of cattle and hogs. If there has been a manipulation of these markets and a violation of the antitrust laws, those guilty of such violations should be punished. If there has been no violation of such laws, and if the prices paid at the various stockyards of the country for live stock have been the natural prices established by the law of competition, then the men engaged in the packing industry and in the ownership of stockyards should not be compelled to rest under the indictment fixed in the minds of thousands of farmers throughout the land that they are responsible for this manipulation of prices and the loss of untold millions to the stock-raising industry. If there has been no violation of the law, a thorough investigation of this subject should disclose what additional legislation is necessary to insure a full return to competitive conditions. [Applause.]

Average weekly prices of cattle and hogs at Chicago from June 27, 1914, until Jan. 21, 1915.

Week ending—	Beef cattle.	Hogs.
June 27, 1914.....	\$8.70	\$8.30
July 15, 1914.....	9.10	8.90
Aug. 1, 1914.....	8.80	8.80
Aug. 15, 1914.....	9.20	9.40
Sept. 5, 1914.....	9.25	9.20
Sept. 19, 1914.....	9.30	8.80
Oct. 3, 1914.....	9.20	8.35
Oct. 17, 1914.....	9.00	8.65
Oct. 31, 1914.....	9.25	7.40
Nov. 7, 1914.....	9.10	7.50
Nov. 21, 1914.....	8.80	7.45
Dec. 5, 1914.....	8.30	7.00
Dec. 19, 1914.....	7.95	7.15
Jan. 2, 1915.....	8.50	7.20
Jan. 16, 1915.....	8.20	6.80
On Jan. 28, 1915.....	6.90	6.06

Average weekly prices per pound of wholesale fresh meats at Chicago from July 4, 1914, until Jan. 16, 1915.

Week ending—	Carcass beef—prime native steers	Fresh pork—dressed hogs.
July 4.....	\$0.131-0.14	\$0.13
July 18.....	.131- .14	.13
Aug. 1.....	.14- .15	.13
Aug. 15.....	.14- .15	.13
Sept. 5.....	.141- .151	\$0.131- .14
Sept. 19.....	.141- .151	.141- .141
Oct. 3.....	.141- .15	.141- .141
Oct. 17.....	.141- .15	.14- .15
Nov. 7.....	.141- .151	.13- .14
Nov. 14.....	.141- .151	.13- .14
Dec. 5.....	.141- .151	.13- .14
Dec. 12.....	.141- .151	.13- .14
Dec. 26.....	.141- .16	.111- .13

Prices of beef per pound at London from July 13, 1914, to Dec. 21, 1914.

Week ending Monday—	Beef.
July 13, 1914.....	\$0.121-0.131
July 27, 1914.....	.13- .14
Aug. 10, 1914.....	.13- .131
Aug. 31, 1914.....	.13- .14
Sept. 14, 1914.....	.13- .14
Sept. 28, 1914.....	.13- .14
Oct. 12, 1914.....	.13- .14
Oct. 26, 1914.....	.121- .131
Nov. 16, 1914.....	.121- .131
Nov. 30, 1914.....	.121- .131
Dec. 14, 1914.....	.13- .141
Dec. 21, 1914.....	.141- .151

Mr. PADGETT. I yield 15 minutes to the gentleman from Louisiana [Mr. ESTOPINAL].

Mr. ESTOPINAL. Mr. Chairman, I believe in a strong Navy, because the Navy is our main dependence for national defense. It is the line of the first resistance to enable us to prepare our military defense, should invasion be attempted. I am against territorial expansion, but realize that we have assumed responsibilities which must be reckoned with; and, besides, we have, not counting these outlying possessions, a large coast line of rich interests and development which must be considered. While recognizing these responsibilities and willing to prepare ourselves so that we may not be derelict in meeting them, we may take comfort from the fact that the deadlocked condition, so to term it, of the novel overhead, underground, and underwater warfare of the present war seem to point to conditions which will make warfare impossible; but I am not willing to pin my faith on that appearance to the extent of ceasing adequate preparations for a real, competent defense; for, however much the opponents of a large Navy may talk of financial burdens, bankruptcy, and so forth, we know that two, or three, or even four hundred million dollars a year spent on our Navy would be a cheap insurance on the lives of a hundred million people and property wealth of one hundred and fifty billion dollars, not reckoning our pride as a people.

To have faith in peace and brotherly love among the peoples is a fine ideal, and we should cultivate that faith. It may serve to prevent warfare, but I am not of those who believe so.

So, in my opinion, we must not be so beguiled by this idealism as to fail to make preparation to meet any eventualities. History has always repeated itself, and until the nature of man is changed and his economic ideals and environment are different we may see the philosophers and advocates of peace thrown into confusion again and again by warfare, and in which we ourselves may be involved.

As I have already inferred, we have at stake, in the lives of our people, in the wealth of our cities, and in the pride of our national spirit, too much compared to the insignificant expenditure that is necessary to keep up our building program.

There are some who contend that fast cruisers must replace battleships; but, Mr. Chairman, for national defense it is imperative that we have powerful mobile fortresses capable of keeping the seas and clearing them of hostile vessels of all kinds. In this work these fighting machines must go hundreds, and even thousands, of miles from their base, and, after traversing such a distance, must be ready for conflict with similar fighting machines of an enemy bent upon breaking down the defense of our seacoast. Our naval experts and those of foreign nations are agreed that the modern dreadnaught is the only answer to this requirement, since this type of ship combines (1) the ability to inflict the greatest injury on the enemy, (2) the maximum protection to itself, and (3) the maximum speed practicable for any fortress which must carry all the weight of the guns, ammunition, armor, fuel, provisions, and

so forth, that are imperative for the very object of the ship's existence. It is a truism to state that a ship of 30,000 tons displacement can not be loaded with more than 30,000 tons of weight without going deeper into the water and sacrificing essential fighting qualities. If, therefore, we wish to increase the speed of a ship of a given size, we must add more weight for machinery; which means that we must take away weight for guns or armor, or both. While we would like to give our dreadnaughts as much speed as we can, if we put too large a proportion of the weight in machinery to increase speed the ship could not carry enough guns and armor to enable her to stand up against an enemy's corresponding ship which carries a greater preponderance of weight in artillery and protection, and our ship could only run away from the fleet that would constitute the backbone of the enemy's sea power. We must therefore be amply provided with real first-class fighting machines, and these must be extremely powerful in their offensive and defensive qualities, with as much speed as is compatible with these primary qualities. It would be a great mistake to infer from results of the present naval hostilities that the modern battleship or dreadnaught has not amply justified its existence; as a matter of fact, it appears to be doing exactly the work it was designed to do. To state that opposing vessels of this class have not come into conflict in large numbers, the one with the other, is merely to state that the weaker fleet has stayed at home, while the stronger fleet has had the freedom and control of the seas.

While dreadnaughts "form the backbone" of any efficient fighting fleet, it is absolutely essential that the vessels of this class be provided with the necessary auxiliaries, including submarines, destroyers, fuel ship, etc., in order that they may find and engage the enemy and defend our country by bringing a sea campaign to a successful termination. It is noted that the bill as reported in the House provides an addition of 17 submarines. Vessels of this class have amply proven their value in the present naval war, particularly in defending the home coast. The 17 vessels of this class covered by this bill will add greatly to the national defense.

Of course we need vastly more of these types of vessels, but we are, even with this increase, conservative.

The strategy board recommends a material addition to our fleet of air craft and states that they "are the eyes of both the armies and navies, and it is difficult to place any limit to their offensive possibilities," and further states that in this respect "our present situation can be described as nothing less than deplorable." The bill as reported calls for \$1,000,000 for air craft. This million dollars is ample to encourage the spirit of enterprise in building these craft. Only a few days ago there was sent to me a copy of the Yale paper, which mentioned the organization of a company to build dirigibles of the Parseval and Zodiac type, with the following comment:

Up to a year ago very little had been done regarding the building of dirigibles in this country, but since the formation of the Connecticut Aircraft Co., with ample funds, they have conducted a private research and to-day possess constructive genius, experienced builders, and reliable drivers. They have evolved a design that has been tested with favorable results in the wind tunnel at Boston.

Mr. Chairman, I am in favor of building up a merchant marine and would go to almost any lengths to attain this object. The need of this, both as regards auxiliary vessels to be used in time of warfare and for the development of a seafaring addition to our population, is so apparent and so fully recognized that it is needless to discuss it.

When the last naval appropriation bill was being considered by this body I claimed that our country could well afford to spend ample sums to build and maintain a large navy. I am stronger in this conviction than ever. The condition of Germany to-day, with her fleet bottled up in the Baltic and her commerce destroyed, and the attitude of Great Britain toward the neutral powers, emphasizes the need of a strong navy. It is a great mistake to say that the people of this country are opposed to an effective navy. I believe this question, as well as that of the merchant marine, will be made an issue in the next presidential campaign, and that the majority of the people will strongly pronounce in favor of these measures.

The bill now under consideration is not too large, and it should receive the hearty approval of every Member of the House.

Mr. Chairman, in closing my remarks on the naval bill of last session, I used the following language:

There has probably not been a year in the last decade—no; not in the last two decades—when there were not more than three times as many idle men tramping the streets of our cities and along the railroads of this country marauding and destroying than were enlisted in the Army and Navy. Before we decry the Army and Navy for taking men out of the productive channels of life, and thus causing the high cost of living, we should try to solve the problem of voluntary and involuntary idleness of these three times as many that stagnate in cities and tramp the

country and the several times as many more that are idle at home during certain seasons of the year.

To measure up to a full and symmetrical development of national defense, as well as international influence that may serve us to make a national defense unnecessary, I wish again to emphasize the economic problems which in themselves form the basic features of a stronger national life, and a stronger national cohesive support, in case that, unfortunately, warfare should become our portion. Successful issue of any country engaged in warfare is dependent upon the fiber of its citizenship. This is fundamental and underlies all other preparation. [Applause.]

Mr. PADGETT. On behalf of the gentleman from California [Mr. STEPHENS] I yield five minutes to his colleague, the gentleman from California [Mr. KETTNER].

Mr. KETTNER. Mr. Chairman, in this morning's mail I received a pamphlet from California dealing with a subject that has engrossed my attention for some time past. It deals with the report of four very prominent citizens of my State, all Free Masons, and active in that fraternal order. The report is made to Judge Paul J. McCormick, of Los Angeles, a Roman Catholic citizen of that city, who had submitted to the Masonic committee, with full authority of the supreme officer of the Knights of Columbus in the United States, a complete copy of all the work, ceremonies, and pledges used by the order of the Knights of Columbus for their full examination and inspection. That Masonic committee, consisting of Motley Hewes Flint, thirty-third degree Mason and past grand master of Masons of California, formerly postmaster of the city of Los Angeles, and president of one of the largest banks in that city; Dana Reid Weller, thirty-second degree Mason and past grand master of California, and a distinguished member of the California bar; William Rhodes Hervey, thirty-third degree Mason and past master and master of Scottish Rite Lodge, and formerly a superior court judge of Los Angeles County; and Samuel E. Burke, thirty-second degree Mason and past master and inspector of Masonic district, one of the most prominent dentists of Los Angeles.

These four men, than whom none stand higher for probity and honor in the State of California, and who are known throughout the State for their adherence to the highest standards of personal integrity, have just made a report on the ceremonies and ritual of the Knights of Columbus. They find unanimously that "the ceremonial of the order teaches a high and noble patriotism, instills a love of country, inculcates a reverence for law and order, urges the conscientious and unselfish performance of civic duty, and holds up the Constitution of our country as the richest and most precious possession of a knight of the order." They state further that they "can find nothing in the entire ceremonials of the order that to our minds could be objected to by any person."

As a thirty-third degree Mason and a working member of the Masonic order, I esteem it a privilege to present this report of these distinguished and fair-minded men on a subject which has been grossly misrepresented, and has caused religious bitterness and strife. I believe in justice and fair play. In the Sixty-second Congress the Committee on Elections No. 1, in a certain contested election case, incorporated in their report (H. Rept. No. 1523) an alleged oath or obligation of the Knights of Columbus, the publication of the said alleged oath being in connection with a contest for membership in this body. This alleged oath, which can be found in the bound CONGRESSIONAL RECORD of the Sixty-second Congress, third session, page 3216, was used to the detriment of the Knights of Columbus, whose critics pointed to the publication in the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD of the alleged oath as sort of proof of its genuineness. The alleged oath having found publication in the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD, I think it but fair that this report dealing with the oath of the Knights of Columbus by this distinguished Masonic committee should likewise be given the same prominence.

LOS ANGELES INVESTIGATION.

The following letter needs no explanation:

Hon. PAUL J. MCCORMICK,
Court House, Los Angeles.

MY DEAR JUDGE: I take pleasure in handing you herewith the findings of the committee of Free Masons to whom you exhibited the ceremonials and pledges of the Order of Knights of Columbus.

I am very glad that I have been able, in a measure, to secure this refutation of a slanderous lie which has been widely circulated and which has been disseminated in many cases by well meaning, credulous, and deluded persons.

I shall see to it that this report has wide circulation among Masons, and you may use it in any way you deem best to bring about an understanding of the truth among men who, above all controversies and contentions, desire to know and to follow that which is right and true.

Yours, cordially,

W. R. HERVEY.

OCTOBER 9, 1914.

We hereby certify that by authority of the highest officer of the Knights of Columbus in the State of California, who acted under instructions from the supreme officer of the order in the United States, we were furnished a complete copy of all the work, ceremonies, and pledges used by the order, and that we carefully read, discussed, and examined the same. We found that while the order is in a sense a secret association, it is not an oath-bound organization, and that its ceremonies are comprised in four degrees, which are intended to teach and inculcate principles that lie at the foundation of every great religion and every free State. Our examination of these ceremonials and obligations was made primarily for the purpose of ascertaining whether or not a certain alleged oath of the Knights of Columbus, which has been printed and widely circulated, was in fact used by the order, and whether if it was not used, any oath, obligation, or pledge was used which was or would be offensive to Protestants or Masons, or those who are engaged in circulating a document of peculiar viciousness and wickedness. We find that neither the alleged oath nor any oath or pledge bearing the remotest resemblance thereto in matter, manner, spirit, or purpose is used or forms a part of the ceremonies of any degree of the Knights of Columbus. The alleged oath is scurrilous, wicked, and libelous, and must be the invention of an impious and venomous mind. We find that the order of Knights of Columbus, as shown by its rituals, is dedicated to the Catholic religion, charity, and patriotism. There is no propaganda proposed or taught against Protestants or Masons or persons not of Catholic faith. Indeed, Protestants and Masons are not referred to directly or indirectly in the ceremonials and pledges. The ceremonial of the order teaches a high and noble patriotism; instills a love of country, inculcates a reverence for law and order, urges the conscientious and unselfish performance of civic duty, and holds up the Constitution of our country as the richest and most precious possession of a knight of the order. We can find nothing in the entire ceremonials of the order that to our minds could be objected to by any person.

MOTLEY HEWES FLINT,

Thirty-third Degree Past Grand Master of Masons of California.

DANA REID WELLER,

Thirty-second Degree Past Grand Master of Masons of California.

WM. RHODES HERVEY,

Thirty-third Degree Past Master and Master of Scottish Rite Lodge.

SAMUEL E. BURKE,

Thirty-second Degree Past Master and Inspector of Masonic District.

Mr. HENSLEY. Mr. Chairman, I yield 20 minutes to the gentleman from Indiana [Mr. CLINE].

THE REMEDY FOR UNPREPAREDNESS, IF ANY EXISTS IN THE ARMY AND NAVY, AND THE MENACE OF A MILITARISM.

Mr. CLINE. Mr. Chairman, for five years I have patiently listened to discussions of naval appropriation bills to discover our true policy of construction and the reason for it. No man during that time has attempted to lay down a well-defined policy; no man has attempted to discuss the subject as related to a democratic form of government, and particularly in connection with our historic policies and physical environment. We have argued much upon our needs under the ambiguous phrase, "An adequate Navy." The man who would spend \$700,000,000 a year and the one who would spend \$7,000,000 a year can find shelter and political security for his theory, whatever that may be, under that declaration. Our discussions have always proceeded on relative assumptions; namely, that we should build battleships because other governments built them. We have always talked about, not what our needs are to-day, but what they might be to-morrow. The advocates of large naval construction and of large standing armies have always proceeded upon comparison. No advocate has based our policy upon what we ought to do because of our coast line and our exposed and unfortified cities.

No man has until the immediate present proposed that we should have as large a Navy as Great Britain. We have usually contented ourselves with the statement that we ought to have a Navy as large as Germany has, though no one has given a reason why we should have one just as powerful and be contented with it. The naval policy of every nation must be anchored in reasons essentially individual and always looking to the promotion and accomplishment of the nation's ultimate purposes. The nation's ideal is always the controlling force. Who has not asked himself why Great Britain has constructed a great navy; why Germany in the last quarter of a century has copied English activities not only in manufacture and commerce, but in naval construction? To illustrate what I previously stated, that the policy of every nation must be individual in her construction, there was no other recourse for England than to build and maintain a great sea-going power. Her territory covers one-fifth of the habitable globe; her victory at Trafalgar a century ago gave her the control of the sea. She did not scatter her surplus population into her islands and continental possessions, but kept it at home to build a complete mastery of the world's trade. And let it be remembered that that mastery has always been maintained, either by the sharpest possible competition or by cutting off the commercial lines of her rivals. Australia and India and South Africa and Canada, where she holds large possessions, have always contributed to the maintenance of her prestige. She scattered her warships to the strategic points in the Mediterranean, Indian Ocean, and the Yellow Sea; to the Straits of Magellan and the Cape of Good Hope, and to the most advantageous coaling stations in all the world. A new period came in vessel construction—

steel ships operated by steam. England rapidly laid the keels for great warships, to protect her colonies and keep her immense business. Continental Europe had no modern ships, no war vessels, but England looked upon the swift mobilization of petty States in the continental center of Europe under the German flag with a suspicious eye. England blocked up the channel and crowded the North and Baltic Seas with her vessels, so that she could be in complete command, knowing that every dollar of export coming from central continental Europe would have to pass that way and under her observation.

The rapidly increasing German population, immense commerce, and national spirit sought new territory into which to spill her surplus population. Her trade sought sale in the English colonies. She became a rival of England for South American business. The restless and aggressive spirit of Germany sought a wider field of activity—cemented her national unity—and she now believes that her future depends upon becoming the dominating force in all Europe. There was only one barrier for her to break down, and that was the English Navy. Germany knows she has no way to the world's market except over water that her bitter antagonists control; that the Mediterranean and the North Sea are in England's control; that her racial enemy in the east, Russia, controls the railroads leading to China and Japan. With that situation confronting her, with a virile race of 60,000,000 looking to the strongest centralized Government on the earth for employment and destiny, she saw that her future as a people lay in the complete absorption of Continental Europe and in wresting the control of the seas from the British Empire. Her idea now is that she shall be the Roman Empire of the twentieth century in Europe. She began a naval program of construction with that idea in view. To return to my original proposition, the far-reaching ideal of a nation is always its controlling motive—the unifying power of her people in her military and naval program. That idea arises out of the nation's geographical location, its form of government, and its economic necessity. If it is the ambition of Germany to become pan-German in western Europe, there is no moral force to which to appeal. The arbitrament of this proposition must be determined by the force of arms. If England shall retain her grip on her colonies, her prestige on the sea, her commerce, she must remain master of the seas and be able to maintain all her strategic positions. The concurrence of conditions both in Germany and in England—and I am speaking of naval power—gave rise to both of their successes in naval construction. The result is not artificial. It is necessarily evolved out of the acts that complete the realization of the national idea. Germany has cast into the world's crucible of powers her industrial, commercial, and race problems for settlement. England, prompted by the history of her heroism, her chivalry, and her traditions for 20 centuries, has hurled her race against a most aggressive and determined people to protect her political integrity, her territorial limitations, and her supremacy over the waters of the globe. But none of these economic positions, none of these environments, none of these necessities need shape our opinions or our activities in naval or military armament. We have no island continents to protect, no pathways over the seas to guard, no enemy sworn to absorb and destroy us. We have no need of some place to dump our surplus population, to build up and protect new markets. No power is attempting to prohibit us from entering the world's trade, or intercepting our commercial highways, or standing over us to intimidate us with great war vessels as we pass to and fro in the pathways of a water. The relationship of our mixed population is not in harmony with any propaganda to acquire additional territory, especially by conquest.

These European conditions are due in part to the forms of government with which their respective territories are invested. American democracy is not in harmony with great military power. The militarism that has invested these monarchies is in deathless antagonism with a representative government like ours. We have never had great military or naval establishments. Recently ill-considerate enthusiasts have attempted to create a sentiment for a great standing army and a great navy. I am opposed to both. I believe in efficient naval and military power. Many problems enter into the solution of what constitutes such efficiency. We have no demand or necessity for an offensive naval and military establishment. Military power thrives in a centralized monarchy, whose efficiency to command when national sentiment and submissive obedience makes the prompt realization of every resource and activity sure. Decentralization of power is destructive of military force. I want to inquire into the probability of this country aping the great military forces of Europe by raising our standing army to the strength of half a million enlisted men, with a great trained

reserve force. I want to inquire whether we need a navy exceeding that of any world power, clamored for only by a yellow press and the limelight exhibitors? There are many reasons why we do not need a large standing army and a greater navy than we now have. Our entire policy from the foundation of the Government has been to maintain friendly relations without alliances with all Governments. We have a Nation of mixed nationalities, whose tender and affectionate sympathies reach back to the fatherland, wherever that may be; hence the necessity for absolute neutrality. Because of the very fact that we may keep intact a complete national sentiment that shall dominate and control all ancestral relationship we must avoid all foreign complications. The steady march of democratic impulse is manifesting itself in Europe and in the Far East. The Hindu and the Egyptian, the Persian, and the inhabitant of the Balkan States all dream of new governments, of a nation administered by themselves on their own territory, independent of and tributary to none. These demonstrations will give birth to a new democracy that shall supersede autocratic and monarchical rule. I do not stop here. The interdependence of nations in commerce and trade, that has become profitable in the proportion that they participate in it, is always contingent upon the continuance of peace. Our own suffering, commercially speaking, since this world conflagration of war was inaugurated is to us conclusive proof upon that subject. There is a world-wide drift of all these forces that tends to eliminate war, and consequently the suppression of those agencies that develop war. These tendencies form a solid basis for great organized movements in favor of international arbitration. I have for years listened to the arguments that preparation for war was the surest guaranty of peace. How quickly that fallacy has been exploded. Why should we follow the trend of Germany, England, and France, that has brought them financial and industrial ruin? I call your attention to economic reasons that are world-wide in their application why disarmament should begin and militarism should cease.

We ourselves have paid out of the Public Treasury to develop and maintain the Army and Navy from 1901 to 1914 the incredible sum of three billion five hundred and thirty-eight million, an amount staggering the imagination. I do not know. Mr. Chairman, how better to understand such expressions of amounts unless we make comparisons of them with matters we are familiar with. I know, though, that three billion five hundred and thirty-eight million is nearly 3 per cent of all the taxable wealth the country has accumulated since the landing of the Pilgrim Fathers nearly three centuries ago. In 13 years we have paid out an amount to support the Army and Navy alone equal to three-fourths of all the taxable wealth of the two greatest States in the upper Mississippi Valley, Indiana and Illinois. The homes of 8,000,000 people, with their towns, villages, and cities, one of them the second on the Western Hemisphere; their railroads, telegraphs, and telephones; their banks, stocks and bonds, credits and cash; their thousands of square miles of the richest farming lands in the world; their improvements, flocks, and herds, are only 25 per cent more than the vast sum we have contributed to the Army and Navy. The taxable value of the 11 Southern States, known as the seceding States, with 22,000,000 people developing that great region of natural resources—collect all their taxable resources, consisting of railroads, cities and towns, farming lands and improvements, their mines, great smelting furnaces and steel mills, millions of cotton spindles, their cotton that clothes the world, their bank stock, loans, credits, and money, and it all amounts to but a trifle more than twice our contribution in the last 13 years to the Army and Navy. But there are other great overshadowing reasons why governments should cease to build great armaments and organize great military systems that invite war. The credit system of international exchange, merging into vast transactions where time and distance have been eliminated, has revolutionized and greatly multiplied the business of the world. Great aggregations of capital in the hands of powerful corporations for the purpose of financing single enterprises in modern industry have become a stupendous power in the material development of nations. This is world business. It can not be fostered, encouraged, and developed when nations are at war. Capital will hide away; industrial paralysis will seize business everywhere the sword is in action. These reasons could be indefinitely multiplied. I am opposed to an increased Navy. I want to balance it up and maintain it at its present state of efficiency. That is my attitude. We are the second naval power in the world. Since this world-wide war began England has lost 200,000 tons and Germany 190,000 tons displacement. The statement of Rear Admiral Badger, in a hearing before the Naval Affairs Committee, during the construction of the present bill, on cross-

examination by Judge WITHERSPOON, declared the American Navy to be better, ship for ship, in construction, in activity, and in effectiveness, than that of the German Navy. That authority convinces me; if it did not, the comparison made by Judge WITHERSPOON of our Navy with that of the German Navy in the preceding session of this Congress that demonstrated that fact has not been answered and will not be answered. Only one gentleman has attempted it, and his efforts, although his life has been spent almost continuously in the service of the Navy, reminded one of the adage that a certain class of people "rush in" where the angels exercise more caution.

I said in the outset that no man has laid down a basis for our naval construction. No one has undertaken it but the gentleman from Massachusetts [Mr. GARDNER], who runs into Congress with a resolution and into the press and the limelight with the declaration that the Nation was in a state of unpreparedness. Unpreparedness for what? For an attack by one of the great powers of the world now engaged in the bloodiest war of all the ages? There is not a student of history but knows that the present war in Europe will so exhaust the combatants that another international war involving these same powers is an absolute impossibility for a half century to come. England, France, Germany, Austria-Hungary are crushed to earth with the burden of expenditures, their standing army slaughtered, industry closed, credit gone, equipment destroyed, their cities and farming land laid waste, and their industrial activities paralyzed. Neither of them has had a war of any consequence in 45 years; they give us no fear of another early contest. That condition is not sufficient to quiet the alarmist, the militarist that seeks to plant that vicious doctrine in the democracy of this Republic. No rational basis has been laid down for naval construction. Shall we build a Navy for coast defenses compared with what other nations have builded for their coast defenses? If so, then you would build more battleships, more cruisers, more torpedo boats, more submarines, more transports than the entire Continental Europe, for we have more coast line than all of them. Shall our naval construction be built equal to the fighting force of the greatest naval power? That would not answer. Suppose England should attack us. This European conflagration has welded the triple entente into a league of offensive and defensive operation that no one supposes will soon be dissolved, and instead of having England to fight, we should have with her Russia and France. So that, following the logic of a gentleman from Massachusetts, we should have a Navy equal or superior to all of them; that is the absurdity of the logical deduction that the argument of a gentleman from Massachusetts leads us to. Of what efficiency has the German Navy been to its country in this contest? England has not only Germany's battleships, but her merchant vessels, interned in the bays and harbors of the great seas, while England remains so far as commerce is concerned, an outlaw upon the world's waters, with no power on the globe to successfully dispute her control. In this whirlwind of destruction now enveloping European nations the militarist of our country has seized the psychological moment to raise the alarm of unpreparedness and fire the country to demand a standing army of 500,000 men and the Navy equal to that of the English. May I digress sufficiently to say no effort has been overlooked to intimidate and alarm the public mind and business of the country by the war enthusiast who thinks more of seizing the present opportunity for self-aggrandizement than to patriotically promote the public welfare? It was handy to have an impromptu uprising in the Philippines pulled off to illustrate the necessity of more soldiers in the Regular Army and a greater Navy. A gentleman who for a long time ably administered the second office in the civil government of the islands was called 7,000 miles to testify before the Senate Committee on Military Affairs on the subject of conditions in the Philippines; an influential part of the metropolitan press turned its editorial battery upon the opponents of militarism in the attempt to popularize sentiment for a large navy and military establishment. Such ponderous military personages as Assistant Secretary Breckinridge and the "brass-button" and "gold-fringed" brigade who feed and live and retire on the toil of other men, rush to banquets and public functions to tell the dear people of the awful unpreparedness of this country for war.

The *Dacia* incident—sailing with a noncontraband cargo of cotton for Rotterdam—and Great Britain's answer to our protest for interfering with our neutral commerce has been worked as a scarecrow for all its worth, and last, but not most ineffective, a "back fire," systematically scheduled, on Members of Congress, to have our constituents' chambers of commerce bombard us with resolutions already drawn, letters already directed, and telegrams already paid for, the most contemptible and despicable engagement a Member of this House can resort to,

has been started. These parties not only demand a standing Army of half a million men, but a military trained reserve supported largely by the Federal Government. Every man in favor of a large standing Army knows that it can not be maintained in this country except under a statute requiring compulsory service. Every country in the world maintaining an immense military establishment does so by force of law enforcing conscriptive service. Every country in Europe except Great Britain maintains this service. I note with what alacrity the militarist rises to deny that there is any idea of conscriptive or compulsory service to be enforced in the United States in the building up and maintaining great fighting forces. I quote from the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD of the present session, page 1609, the words of the distinguished member of another legislative body, who, speaking of a reserve force auxiliary to the standing Army, used these words:

These reserves should be created. No one would think of suggesting either conscription or compulsory service for this purpose, but the end can be attained without either.

Well, let us see whether "no one" is suggesting compulsory service to create a great reserve force for military services in the United States. I note in the Army and Navy Journal, the ready conduit through which the prominent figures of the Army and Navy and the devotees of that proposition reach the public and attempt to develop and control the sentiment of the American people, that in a recent editorial from which I quote, written October 3, 1914, discussing and commending German militarism, it uses these words:

There is left, then, only the last supposition, namely, that "German militarism" is condemnable because of its extreme readiness. As Gen. McCoskry Butt wrote from Europe the other day, Germany was ready; the other countries were not. But this is a feature of her military system for which Germany should be praised, not blamed; for what is any army worth if it is not ready when the call comes? The more nearly ready it is the more nearly it approaches those standards of value and efficiency for which all great commanders have striven through all the ages. Instead, therefore, of "German militarism" being something that should be "wiped out," it is something that should be imitated closely by other nations, not excepting our own United States.

I note also in the Associated Press report that Col. O. S. Heistand, adjutant general of the central department of the Army, in an address at Chicago on the evening of December 24, 1914, used these words:

For the purposes of the Army of defense I would have every male citizen of the United States in the early part of his life give a sufficient time to the United States to qualify himself in the essentials of a soldier. * * * I would have him submit his will to that of his commander.

The Army and Navy Journal, whose policy is shaped by the personnel of the Army and Navy, commending "German militarism" as a proper thing for the United States to adopt, and Col. Heistand, commanding the central division of the Army of the United States, advocating a doctrine of conscription, and then to be told that "No one would think of suggesting either conscriptive or compulsory service" is a surprising statement to come from one of the greatest of present-day American statesmen. I am opposed to a large standing Army, because one can not be maintained in this democracy without dangerous complementary burden of militarism. I challenge the preposterous proposition preached by the Army and Navy Journal, known to be at least the semi-official publication of the commanding forces of both of these features of our national life. The Army and Navy Journal expresses the sentiment of those officers in both branches of the service who direct their activities to mold public sentiment in affairs. Since this journal gratuitously advised the people of the United States that it was our business to follow the example of European countries and practice compulsory service not a single officer connected with either branch of that service except Secretary Garrison has seen fit to publicly repudiate its attitude and its statements. No man objects to a proper standing Army; no man objects to preparedness for national defense. We object to the militarism advocated by the Army and Navy Journal and by Col. Heistand. The militarism preached and indorsed by the Journal and its followers takes the best years out of the life of every young American, withdraws him from the farm and from productive pursuits, and puts him on the back of another man to keep and feed. The fact and skill with which the idea of compulsory service is kept in the background at the present time surprises no one; every advocate of a standing Army of a half million men knows better than to advocate compulsory service before we get a law authorizing such enlistment. But the hour that such an Army is authorized by law all sorts of arguments will be resorted to to make compulsory service obligatory. There is not a militarist now but knows that a standing Army of half a million men and a naval reserve like that of Germany can not be recruited in this Republic without compulsory service. I am opposed to the standing Army and a complementary Navy of

the dimensions suggested, because it burdens not one nation alone but every nation with neutral commercial interests with great armaments that can be sustained only by crushing taxation. I am opposed to it because it begets a military oligarchy and silently issues a command that comes from an irresponsible power that the productive forces of the Government shall be diverted to the uses of destruction. These great standing armies and great navies, this militarism, must be paid for and its subjects fed by the men who work, by the citizen, the tradesman, the clerk behind the counter, and the husbandmen in the field, whose hands have fed the maw of competitive armament for a generation in the name of "armed peace."

The pretense that its purposes are to establish a guardianship of peace and progress on this continent is the most contemptible hypocrisy. A half million men, an immense standing army, an unmatched navy is sponsor for the philosophy that war and the destruction of property, paralysis of industry, and death of a multitude of men is the most exalted and glorious engagement of men and nations, and that peace is a cowardly surrender. The militarist, and he is universally and always in favor of a great standing army and a complementary or great navy, believes that the crowning glory in this generation is the supremacy of brute force. I quote from a great newspaper:

A vast standing army overshadows pacific traditions and humanizing policies with a dazzling ideal of conquest. It holds that the strong alone have a right to exist, and that the weak must be thrust aside in the interest of evolution toward a more vigorous type of men and nation. Such abstract virtues as sympathy, generosity, and justice it derides as systems of weakness.

A mighty standing army and great navy and its accompanying militarism gives the soldier preeminence over every other type of men. It sneers at peace and lauds military power. The temper with which the brass-button brigade entertain the right of Congress that represents a hundred millions of American people to express its opinion upon the Army and Navy is admirably illustrated in the sneering and contemptuous remarks of Rear Admiral W. F. Fullam, of the Naval Academy, at a meeting of the Efficiency Club in New York on the evening of January 25, 1915, when he insolently used these words:

In this country the only people who feel they ought to discuss the Navy are those who are not in the Navy; if you want to be a naval expert don't go into the Navy. Become a Congressman, or a lawyer, or a newspaper man; it seems that the citizens are made up of natural-born admirals and generals.

No great standing army ever existed except by compulsory service that did not create a self-sufficient aristocracy, of which Rear Admiral Fullam is a happy illustration; they constitute themselves a super caste, whose leaders sooner or later become the controlling forces in the Government. Its supporters of this propaganda exhaust the tactics of the soft-cushion boards of strategy to keep prominently before the masses the supremacy of their mission, and if criticized for their conduct whimper like a whipped cur that an ungrateful people are persecuting the apostles of peace. A vast standing army with its immense armament invest the people with a constant air of uncertainty and insecurity, and if the people complain they are rebuked by the snobbish aristocracy that we do not appreciate the respect they show us in not using the power they possess.

Great military power, so large that it can control conditions, puts international law and solemn treaties and conventions into the scrap heap. Militarism, when it is not at war, gives us apprehension all the time that we soon shall be, and when in war it becomes a livid horror and defends itself with the plea of complete justification in race and territorial aggrandizement; it respects no neutral territory, and its wicked and destructive hand lays a ruinous tribute upon conquered cities. It seizes innocent citizens and hangs the postponement of the execution up as a hostage for the surrender of their fellow citizens who revolt against the destruction of their homes and the ruin of their families. Militarism flings its bombs out of the clouds upon mothers and sleeping children and the helpless and unfortunate. Its justification is in the complete annihilation of home, of government, and all that is sacred. That is militarism; the handmaiden of a great standing army and an immense navy. Our protection lies in our system of Government, in the dissemination of power, in our democracy. I hate militarism because its influences are always political; because it seeks always to belittle and secretly subvert the civil authority; because it seeks to minimize a real patriotism and build upon it its insolent prestige. These are the logical results of great military systems. They can not exist in a true democracy because they draw their sustenance from a dominating and controlling caste. Between militarism and a self-governing, self-reliant, self-respected democracy there is an irresistible antipathy, and yet the Army and Navy Journal says that German militarism "is something that should be imitated closely by other nations,

not excepting our own United States." That is the publication that assumes to speak for the American people.

Mr. Chairman, what is the present situation? We are told by the advocate of a large military and naval establishment that we ought to have a trained reserve force, ready at any time that we might be attacked. We have now a large reserve of enlisted men amounting to 120,000 in the National Guard. We will next year, and each year thereafter, under the 4-year terms of enlistment, discharge from the Regular Army at least 15,000 men. We will likewise discharge from the National Guard at least 20,000 more. There will graduate from military schools and colleges and schools that teach military tactics at least 25,000 more, making a well-trained force of 60,000 men that we turn back into civil life every year, fully equipped in all the lines of military tactics to mobilize a great reserve civil enlistment. A little calculation will show that in 5 years we could have a well-seasoned, well-trained reserve force of 300,000 men. We have still another greater reserve force; we have 16,000,000 of patriotic American citizens who are ready at all times when the occasion demands to volunteer their services to defend the flag and American institutions. That great moral force in American democracy is more effective than the standing armies of Europe. What we ought to do is to supply the Naval arm of the service with sufficient officers and enlisted men to properly man the vessels we now have, and build those accompanying auxiliaries—submarines, torpedo boats—that shall properly equip them and maintain the Navy in statu quo by new construction when it is necessary to supply worn-out equipment. We should do another thing; every vessel, whether great or small, should be built in the United States navy yards; our armor plate, powder, small arms, field guns, munitions of war, clothing, boots and shoes, and all equipment necessary to supply the Army and Navy, should be made by the Government itself and thereby eliminate a long line of grafters who stand for a large standing army and a big navy, because they think there is something in it for them. Let it be remembered, however, that any settlement growing out of the present war that does not look toward a gradual disarmament and an international arbitration of all differences is not a peaceful settlement. That if unnecessary armament shall continue to be made under strong competition war will simply be postponed. Such a settlement would be only a truce. On no other terms than those looking to a final arbitrament of international difficulties through arbitration can a peaceful civilization again reestablish itself. [Applause.]

Mr. PADGETT. Mr. Chairman, I yield 30 minutes to the gentleman from Illinois [Mr. WILLIAMS].

Mr. WILLIAMS. Mr. Chairman, I will define my position with reference to our naval program at the outset of my remarks, that what I say may be the better understood. I am for a conservative naval program. Heretofore the question has been presented from two viewpoints, represented by those who are opposed to any increase of the Navy and those who have stood for a conservative constructive program. This year the issue presents three angles, and in addition to the arguments heretofore advanced we find a third element entering into consideration represented by gentlemen on the floor who favor a distinctively large navy and who are much concerned lest we are inadequately prepared for immediate war. The arguments of those who are opposed to any navy are familiar to us and have been replied to so often that I will not take time to discuss the issues raised by these gentlemen. I do not mean thereby to underestimate or disparage the very able arguments made by distinguished gentlemen who have from year to year ridiculed the importance of a good and adequate navy. I have time only to present the case from the standpoint of one who favors an adequate navy as against the arguments advanced by those gentlemen who urge the necessity of a navy equal to or superior to any afloat.

I must confess that the hallucinations which seem to disturb the gentleman from Massachusetts [Mr. GARDNER] have not occasioned any nightmares for me, and that I do not feel any urgent, immediate necessity for great military preparation. I am sure that no Member of this House would go further to protect and defend the honor and the integrity of the flag if assailed or threatened than would I, but I can not agree with the gentlemen that the country is assailed or that the integrity of the flag is threatened. I know that complications arise from day to day, growing out of the unfortunate conditions which exist abroad, and that these complications will require diplomacy and statesmanship to solve, but I do not apprehend that questions of such great moment will arise as to precipitate war or to even threaten the peace of our country or disturb the quietude of our people. I have implicit faith and absolute confidence in the President and know his intention to avoid war

and to maintain peace. In this I am hopeful that he will succeed. If there was ever a time in the history of the world when a peace-loving people, bent on the pursuit of material gain, should stop and consider the prodigious cost and the enormous and fearful consequences of war, it is now, when conflagration rages around the globe and when we of all the great nations of the earth are at peace.

The only argument that can be advanced by the most zealous advocate of a great army and navy is the possibility of war arising out of world-wide conditions as we face them to-day. There are but few nations which maintain a great naval establishment, and but two at most which have a navy superior to our own, and these nations—all of them—are engaged in a death struggle to maintain national existence. These powers consist of Great Britain, Germany, Russia, France, Austria, Turkey, and Japan, with other and lesser powers involved. The struggle is stupendous, and the resources of each and every one of these powers are taxed to the utmost. Which one of these countries, think you, could or would be willing under any ordinary cause of war to engage the United States on sea or on land? There is not the remotest possibility of war with Russia. There is no occasion for strained relations and no disposition on the part of either country to encourage or provoke hostilities. And Russia's hands are full. Her task is herculean, and Russia has all that she can accomplish if she maintains her territory intact. France is friendly, but if she were disposed otherwise she could not spare a man nor a ship in a conflict with the United States. Germany is encompassed in a struggle for her very existence, beset upon every hand, approached from every quarter, and defending almost single handed and alone against four of the greatest powers of earth. Do you anticipate trouble with Germany now or in the near future? Even though she emerges from this struggle without territorial impairment, without the exaction of enormous indemnity, her trade will be paralyzed, her population decimated, her people impoverished. Do gentlemen who start in their sleep and imagine they descry upon the horizon myriad ships and phantom fleets approaching our shores fear England? Why should England and the United States go to war? What has either country to gain? What devilish spirit or malevolent influence could impel war between the two great English-speaking peoples, whose traditions and customs and laws are one, whose hopes and aspirations are in common, and whose combined power and influence must dominate the world for centuries to come? These two nations have been foremost in advocating peace and promoting arbitration by means of which disputes between nations may be peaceably adjusted. But if England were disposed to be unfriendly, if our commercial and political relations were strained, how could England contend upon land or sea with the United States now, at this time, when she stands in armed conflict, face to face, locked in mortal combat with the greatest people, the best armed, the best trained, the best equipped armies which ever went to battle in all the history of Europe?

If England, together with her allies, succeeds in driving Germany within her own borders and dictating terms of peace she will have accomplished more than her most sanguine friends can hope for or expect within many months to come. This war is a drain upon her mighty resources, on men and means, and common sense teaches me and convinces the mind of the reasoning and thinking everywhere that England can not if she would deliberately provoke or cause war with this mighty Nation. It is true that England controls the seas in this war; but why? Because her enemy is at bay and her whole resources and extensive navy are concentrated in a limited area. Let her divide her fleet and engage in naval war across the seas with so dominant a power as the United States, and it would be but a day until Germany's fleet would emerge en masse from its shelter, challenge Britain's supremacy in the North Sea, and imperil her commerce in the four quarters of the globe. Are the English so foolhardy, are her statesmen so puerile as to invite a condition that would hamper, menace, and, perhaps, destroy the one thing upon which she must rely if she hopes to win in this war?

Does anyone fear Turkey? She has no navy and is not a menace to us at home nor abroad. And what of Japan? Japan is a thrifty, progressive, and ambitious nation. She acquitted herself well in a 200 days' war with Russia, at her own doors, within a short radius of her own base. But suppose she had been called upon to attack Russia thousands of miles away from home. Would anyone entertain the belief that she would either have undertaken the task or would have stood any chance of victory? We have no cause of quarrel and are not seeking war with Japan. Will she attack us? Just now, with limited resources and an exhausted treasury as a result of the war with Russia, she has plenty to do in safeguarding and protecting the

interests of England and her own in the Far East. She could not bring to her assistance the active aid of any other nation. She could not involve us in war with Europe, because the countries of Europe would not involve. She would have to fight her battle alone. It is the most ridiculous and nonsensical notion advanced by some that Japan could land an army on the Pacific coast and invade the domain of the United States. It would require a thousand transports each conveying a thousand men, with provisions, munitions of war, and equipment, convoyed by a hundred battleships to effect a landing and to secure a foothold on our shores. These could not come en masse, nor in a day, but would have to come detached, in installments, under convoy, and would be dispatched in succession as they arrived, if not waylaid at sea by our Navy and sent to the bottom. Japan knows this as well as we know it. Let no man nurse a thought nor harbor a dream that this will ever happen. War with Japan is only a remote possibility, now or hereafter, and if it ever comes it will be when we are involved in war with some nation which is foot-loose and free-handed to engage with us in the Atlantic. That time is not near. It will be many years before any other respectable military power will sufficiently recuperate to go to war with the United States. Hence I see no spectacle, feel no alarm, and fear no war in the immediate future from any source nor with any country.

Then why a great navy? We have a magnificent navy now. I favor such a constructive program as will maintain our relative place among the navies of the world. If Europe were at peace to-day and their navies not impaired in battle I would favor a continuation of the program which Congress has authorized in recent years, and I see no reason why that program should be altered or changed by reason of anything now occurring across the Atlantic. To my mind the lessons and the consequences of this war would argue for a reduction rather than an increase in naval construction. This because of the reasons which I have already stated, that Europe can not disengage herself at home and engage in war with us now nor in the immediate future and because of the impairment of their navies which must inevitably occur as a result of naval engagements from day to day, and for the further reason I hope and confidently expect world-wide disarmament as the one beneficent result of this awful conflict. I am not for the whole of this bill. I am not for any increase greater than that recommended by the department. I opposed in committee the increase of submarines and will vote here to limit the number to that recommended by the Secretary. I voted in committee against the hospital ship and the transport provided for in the bill and will vote to eliminate them here. I stand substantially for the rest of this bill, including two battleships. There is but one thing which I would add to this bill, and that would be a battle cruiser. I believe that the efficiency of our Navy would be materially enhanced by battle cruisers of maximum speed, and I hope that some day, if naval construction throughout the world continues, we will authorize the construction of cruisers and strengthen this arm of our Navy. I favor battleships because we can maintain the present efficiency of our Navy only by a systematic, uniform building program and offset deterioration by new construction. I have no patience with men who decry the battleship and disparage its usefulness. It is no argument to my mind to say that they have not actively participated in the present war. These constitute the main reliance which must determine the eventual outcome of the struggle. Lesser craft, including destroyers and submarines and scouting ships, may maneuver and harass the enemy in the front and in the rear, but in this war, as in every naval war, the time will come when the monsters of the sea, the dreadnaughts, will, like two great armies after preliminary maneuvers, strategy, and skirmish, come together and decide the conflict. In that awful clash, when the fatal test comes, when the fleets of contending nations grapple in a final struggle for supremacy, the side that can bring into action the best-equipped and the greatest number of modern battleships will win the victory and determine the fate of nations and the future of the world. [Applause.]

Mr. STEPHENS of California. Mr. Chairman, I yield 10 minutes to the gentleman from Kansas [Mr. TAGGART].

Mr. TAGGART. Mr. Chairman, I have no written remarks on this bill. It is my purpose only to make some comment on what seems to me an unnecessary degree of interest at this time in national defense. I shall discuss for a few minutes the European war as it seems to me it should affect our policy of national armament.

This war has demonstrated that a battleship is not an instrument of national defense and that it is not a weapon of offense in conducting a war under present conditions. The two greatest navies on earth are employed in this war as far as

possible. The greatest navy in the world has not knocked one brick off another on the soil of Germany after the war has been in progress nearly six months. The great dreadnaughts of the British Navy have not appeared anywhere near the coast of the enemy. For the first time in the history of Great Britain the British Navy has England between the navy and the enemy instead of having the navy between England and the enemy. It has been demonstrated that a battleship is the most helpless thing in the world when attacked from under water; on account of its ponderous weight it immediately sinks, and so far it has been more dangerous to the crew than it has been to the enemy. [Laughter and applause.]

This war has further demonstrated that a navy can serve only one great purpose, and that is to protect the commerce of a nation that may be at war. The logical conclusion from this war is that the nation that can not be starved into submission does not need a single battleship in order to maintain a complete national defense. If the navy of England was at the bottom of the sea to-morrow, it would not be six months until that Empire would have to sue for peace, for the people would be face to face with famine. Britain must maintain her supremacy on the sea in time of war or starve, and so far she has been able to maintain that supremacy on account of her superior navy. The German Empire, fighting for its life, finds it unnecessary to expose its navy. It has food for its army and can maintain the struggle, while the British Empire must maintain its supremacy on the sea because it has not the food for its people or army without the ports of England remain open to the commerce of the world.

I would like to ask gentlemen who seem to be nervous at this time about our national defense which of the cripples are they afraid of. Every great nation but this one, as the gentleman preceding me stated, is at war. Great wars are always followed by periods of profound peace. The Napoleonic wars ended 100 years ago this year, in 1815. Then for a period of 29 years there was no war of any consequence in Europe until 1854, when the Crimean War occurred, and that was not a war of great consequence. The Crimean War and the disastrous invasion of Russia by Napoleon absolutely proved that a great continental nation can not be successfully invaded. Russia never was successfully invaded, and in this great war there is absolutely no attempt, and will be no attempt, to invade Russia. After the Crimean War there was a short war between France and Italy, and then in 1866 there was a six weeks' war between Germany and Austria, and four years later came the Franco-Prussian War.

Then for 43 years the two nations that represent one side of this struggle, Austria and Germany, were the only two great nations in Europe that did not fire hostile shots. Every other great nation that is at war at this time had war in that period with some other country, but those two maintained absolute peace for a period of 43 years. Now, who will say that after this European struggle is over that there will not be a long period of peace? If we are ever to have such a thing as international disarmament, it is going to come after this war is over. If it is possible to teach humanity that it is wiser and better to maintain peace, I believe this sacrifice will bring that lesson home to the nations of the world. It is again demonstrated that the little streak of silver sea that has protected Britain through all the centuries is just as effective now, if not more effective, than it was ever before.

If less than 100 miles at the widest and 23 miles at the narrowest place will protect England against the power of Germany what will you say to the 3,000 miles that separates us from Europe? Why, is it not plain that it would be impossible to conduct a successful war against the United States even if all the powers of Europe with all the navies of Europe were combined for the purpose? But we went into the expansion business some 20 years ago. We went out looking for nations to conquer. We took possession of the Philippine Islands. We have spent more than a billion of dollars holding those islands.

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman has expired.

Mr. HENSLEY. I yield five minutes additional time to the gentleman.

Mr. TAGGART. In case of war between us and an Asiatic nation we would be obliged to hold those islands or surrender them. Then perhaps the question of the supremacy on sea will come to us, and then, as stated by the gentleman from Illinois, the superiority of the battleships in mid-ocean may be tested. If those islands are protected by submarines their cities can not be attacked by any navy. If it is necessary in the protection of those and other islands to maintain our supremacy in the Pacific Ocean it is the only condition under which we can say that we would ever employ a battleship. But who would reason

if he had charge over the Japanese Government that it would result in any profit to Japan to have a war with the United States?

Now, in these war colleges where young officers are studying they give to one group of young men the problem of invading the United States from Asia, and they give to another group of officers the problem of defending the United States, and the conclusion is always reached that the final result of such an attempt would prove that it would be impossible for an Asiatic nation to effect a permanent lodgment or to maintain an army on the soil of continental United States. If a foreign army invaded Alaska, it would be almost impossible to maintain it there. The only danger we could encounter would be the loss of the Hawaiian Islands and the Philippine Islands, and we are trying to get rid of all responsibility in the Philippine Islands. If we do, we will have no place subject to attack in the Pacific Ocean except the Hawaiian Islands. It seems to me that if we should have a war with any nation and the enemy took possession of the Hawaiian Islands we could do as Germany is doing now with the little possession it held in China—just overlook the matter until the final settlement of the war. We would not need to speed our strength in defense of those little islands, but in the final adjustment of any war we might have they would be restored to us if we were successful.

Of all the times that we could ever feel safe it is now. Whenever great nations are preparing navies and armies, and those navies and armies have not been employed and militarism is at its highest pitch and military enthusiasm and navy enthusiasm pervades the great nations of the world, then is the time that peaceful and peace-loving nations are in danger. But now, when these fighting nations are exhausting each other's strength, until they are leaving each other prostrate and helpless, this is a time when we can afford to look forward to a period of profound and uninterrupted peace. [Applause.] I have here a list which I presume is correct, and it has been referred to in other speeches here, of 13 British vessels aggregating a tonnage of 133,000 tons, carrying crews in the aggregate of more than 8,000 men, all of which have been sunk to the bottom of the sea without a single shot having been fired at any of them, without the intervention of a single battleship—all of them sunk by submarine boats.

Vessels.	Class.	Tonnage.	Crew.	Date.
Amphion.....	Third-class cruiser.....	3,440	320	Aug. 6
Pathfinder.....	Patrol scout.....	2,940	268	Sept. 17
Hogue.....	Armored cruiser.....	12,000	755	Sept. 22
Cressy.....do.....	12,000	755	Do.
Atoukir.....do.....	12,000	755	Do.
Hawke.....	Protected cruiser.....	7,350	544	Oct. 15
Audacious.....	Battleship.....	23,000	900	Oct. 27
Hermes.....	Protected cruiser.....	5,600	456	Oct. 31
Good Hope.....	Armored cruiser.....	14,100	900	Nov. 1
Monmouth.....do.....	9,800	754	Do.
Niger.....	Gunboat.....	810	85	Nov. 11
Bulwark.....	Battleship.....	15,000	781	Nov. 26
Formidable.....do.....	15,000	750	Jan. 1
		133,040	8,023	

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman has again expired.

Mr. HENSLEY. Does the gentleman desire more time?

Mr. TAGGART. I should like about three minutes.

Mr. HENSLEY. I will yield to the gentleman five minutes more.

Mr. TAGGART. The tonnage of these ships is greater than the whole tonnage of the navy of Great Britain 110 years ago, when it was under the command of Nelson. Of what use is a battleship near a coast? If it is near the coast of its own nation, it is not as effective as a submarine boat.

If it dares approach the coast of the enemy, it is in immediate danger of being sent to the bottom of the sea. By the inexorable logic of war its place is in mid-ocean. Its function is to protect the commerce of a nation. Its purpose now is to allow a nation to be fed while it conducts a war; and, as far as our Nation is concerned, we could not be starved in any war. We have talked about the high cost of living; we have argued it from every angle; but I can not imagine anything that would so effectively lower the cost of living as to have all the navies of the world combined together to shut up the ports of the United States and forbid anything to leave this country. It would solve the problem. And I do not know of anything that ought to suit one of our great parties, which is so ably represented here this evening, as to have all the ports of the Nation shut up, so that we could not import anything. In their opinion, American business would flourish then as it never did before. That would be protection without revenue. I am afraid that

if such a thing ever happened that great political party, with its usual luck, would be restored to power.

We do not need to defend the highway of the ocean if any nation attacks us. Great Britain is not going to attack us. The centerpiece of the British Empire lying next to us has an unprotected frontier of 4,000 miles. Any trouble between us and Great Britain would mean the dismemberment of the Empire. We have nothing that the Germans want except our trade and our good will. They do not want our territory. They want a market for their manufactures. We want their patronage; and I say here and now, while I digress from the subject, that of all the short-sighted policies that was ever pursued by the American press and some American people, the most unfortunate thing for us is for them to continue to heap insult on the most thrifty—

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman has expired.

Mr. HENSLEY. Mr. Chairman, I yield five minutes of additional time to the gentleman.

Mr. TAGGART (continuing). On the most skillful, the most industrious, and the ablest people in the world—the people of Germany. [Applause.] We will have to look to them as customers when this war is over. Now, imagine a business man in the case where two of his customers were fighting, and he would go and hand a weapon to one of them. After the fight was over he would have one customer, the one he helped, and he would lose the customer that he had helped to injure. That great nation, that wants nothing but peaceful commerce with all the world, which maintains its army for its own defense and is now demonstrating to the world the supreme necessity of that army, does not want our territory, and has not, and never had, any purpose to attack the United States. The Germans have no cause of quarrel with us. We have nothing belonging to them, unless it is that we have with us their best blood, their most enterprising children, inheriting all of the great qualities of their ancestors, as true to our flag as their cousins are to the Fatherland.

I will oppose any more than one battleship in this bill. I will vote for all the submarine craft that is provided for in the bill. I will vote for everything in this bill that looks like national defense and against everything that looks like national offense. We should not prepare to carry war to any nation, but we should prepare to defend our coast against all the nations.

Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent to extend my remarks in the Record, and I yield back the balance of my time.

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman yields back two minutes. The gentleman also asks unanimous consent to extend his remarks in the Record. Is there objection? [After a pause.] The Chair hears none.

Mr. BROWNING. Mr. Chairman, I yield 20 minutes to the gentleman from California [Mr. J. R. KNOWLAND]. [Applause.]

Mr. J. R. KNOWLAND. Mr. Chairman and Members, I favor the pending bill. While it does not carry such character of increases as I personally favor, nevertheless I believe it is a decided improvement over any naval appropriation bill reported to this House since the Democratic Party came into control of this branch of the Government.

I listened to-day with a great deal of interest to the chief small-Navy advocate, the gentleman from Mississippi [Mr. WITHERSPOON]. I knew that he was opposed to battleships, but during the discussion I became somewhat hopeful that he was at least in favor of submarines, because he spoke very highly of this character of defense, but in answer to a question I ascertained, much to my amazement, that he had not voted in committee for even the submarine increase, and as an excuse declared that he believed we had a sufficient number of submarines at the present time. I recall, however, in looking over the testimony before the Committee on Naval Affairs, that the commander of the submarine fleet, Commander Yates Stirling, jr., stated that when he was asked to appear for maneuvers on the 1st day of November last he was compelled to report that there was only one submarine on the Atlantic coast in condition to be submerged. So I do not feel that our submarine flotilla, according to that testimony, is sufficiently formidable at the present time to offer him a valid excuse for refusing to vote for the submarine increase carried in this bill. My own idea is that the gentleman is opposed to any Navy at all, and for that reason voted against both battleships and submarines.

Mr. CALLAWAY. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. J. R. KNOWLAND. I will.

Mr. CALLAWAY. Do you not think he was telling the truth when he named the number of submarines that we had?

Mr. J. R. KNOWLAND. We may have obsolete submarines, but what good are they if they can not be submerged?

Mr. CALLAWAY. They might be out of commission.

Mr. J. R. KNOWLAND. If they are out of commission, what use are they in case of a sudden war?

Mr. CALLAWAY. Do you know anything about the different submarines we have?

Mr. J. R. KNOWLAND. I know from the testimony, and I take it that is all you know about it. I have read it just as carefully as has the gentleman from Texas.

Mr. CALLAWAY. You heard a gentleman speak here this evening and tell how many submarines there are. I assume he was telling the truth; in fact, I know it as well as anything I can hear.

Mr. J. R. KNOWLAND. I assume that the gentleman in command of the submarine flotilla was also telling the truth.

Mr. CALLAWAY. Who said that we did not have but one?

Mr. J. R. KNOWLAND. Commander Stirling said that on November 1 last there was only one submarine capable of being submerged.

Mr. HENSLEY. He never stated anything of the kind.

Mr. J. R. KNOWLAND. I have the testimony showing that he did. When he was called upon to report for maneuvers with the fleet he reported there was only one submarine fit to be submerged.

Mr. PADGETT. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

The CHAIRMAN. Does the gentleman from California yield to the gentleman from Tennessee?

Mr. J. R. KNOWLAND. I will, if the gentleman will yield to me the time he takes up.

Mr. PADGETT. I will yield to the gentleman whatever time I take up.

Mr. J. R. KNOWLAND. Very well.

Mr. PADGETT. The gentleman's statement was misleading. He made the statement that we had seven submarines on the Atlantic coast; five of them were in Panama and in good shape.

Mr. J. R. KNOWLAND. But he said they were not equipped with the proper kind of torpedoes.

Mr. PADGETT. That is not the fault of the submarines. He said they simply had a short-radius torpedo. But in that connection I want to state that the range of the torpedo in our submarines has recently been cut down on the recommendation of the General Board, and even with its reduced radius it is superior to that of England or France, so there is nothing in that.

The fact is that there were five submarines at Panama in good condition. There were four at Norfolk, on their annual overhaul. There were some at New York undergoing their annual overhaul. He carried four with him to the maneuvers, but on the way one of them broke down—broke a crank shaft. The other two had batteries that were 4 years old, and they would not submerge well.

You will find all that recorded on pages 864, 865, and 866 of the hearings of Commander Stirling, so that at the time the gentleman refers to about there being only one, it was simply a date that had been selected when the others were taking their annual overhaul, as we do with our battleships and all other ships.

Mr. J. R. KNOWLAND. In other words, you do not challenge my statement that when called upon to mobilize the submarine flotilla he made the report to the department that there was only 1 of the 17 submarines on the Atlantic coast that could be submerged?

Mr. PADGETT. No; he did not say that.

Mr. J. R. KNOWLAND. He states that he made that report.

Mr. PADGETT. No. If you will look at pages 865 and 866 of the hearings you will see that he says this:

I think I can explain where they got that impression. The commander in chief ordered a mobilization of the Atlantic submarine flotilla at Hampton Roads on the 1st of November of all available vessels. He left it to me to say what vessels I would bring down there. He did not consider the five at Colon.

He had already stated that the ones at Colon were in good condition. Then he added:

That reduced the submarine flotilla to 12.

Two of the 12 had but recently been turned over by the contractors. Their officers and men were new, and the boats had not been given their torpedoes; they had not left the navy yard. So I excluded them. That left 10, and 2 of them had been ordered by the Navy Department to have necessary alterations made on them at the contractor's yard at Groton.

If the contractors had been ready to do the work, and if the department had held those boats up and sent them to Hampton Roads, they were perfectly able to go there and would have been efficient, but it would have cost the Government a good deal of money by holding up the contractors.

So that it was a matter of adapting the time so as to let the contractors fulfill their contracts.

Mr. J. R. KNOWLAND. How many does that cut it down to?

Mr. PADGETT. Eight. Then he says:

Of the eight, one of them had, after a submerged run, developed salt water in the battery. It was sent to the navy yard, and they were reconstructing the battery tank, and at the time of the mobilization the alterations had not been completed; and that left seven.

[Laughter.]

The *G-4* had only been in operation a few weeks, and had only joined the flotilla a couple of weeks before that—about 10 days before the order came—and I considered that her best duty would be to train herself in submerged running, and that the best locality to do that was where she could base on some vessel that could look out for her crews more or less, and so I gave her the *McDonough*, an old destroyer, and based her on New London, and she went out two or three times a day and got in good shape.

Not that she was not able to submerge, but that it was better for her to do her work at another place. He says that left six. [Laughter.] Then the colloquy continues:

Mr. ROBERTS. The *G-4* was the Lorenti boat?

Commander STIRLING. The *G-4* was the Lorenti boat.

Mr. ROBERTS. You say her batteries are too weak for underwater running?

Commander STIRLING. No; but batteries are defective. That left six. Two of those were the *G* boats, under alterations and in reserve. So that left only four.

[Laughter.]

So I took the four submarines from Newport to the mobilization, and one tender, the *Tonopah*. When we left Newport the condition of the submarines was this: There were two boats in good shape in every way. There were two other boats with negligible battery capacity. They could submerge for 10 or 15 minutes only. Their batteries were dead. They were 4 years old.

Mr. J. R. KNOWLAND. That left two. [Laughter.]

Mr. PADGETT. And the other, as I stated, broke a crankshaft. So that, as I said, there were a number in there that could submerge. All the others that could be submerged had been sent on their annual overhaul.

Mr. J. R. KNOWLAND. Well, the chairman of the committee having proven my case better than I could myself, I would like to yield him more time if he desires. [Laughter.]

Mr. PADGETT. You are perfectly welcome to my statement.

Mr. J. R. KNOWLAND. According to the chairman's own statement he finally got down to my figures, showing that the small Navy Member, Mr. WITHERSPOON, when he said that we had an ample number of submarines did not make a statement that was entirely in accordance with the facts. Although we have submarines, we do not have the number claimed, at least in condition for service. The committee evidently felt as I do, because they gave an increased appropriation for submarines, and I commend the committee for its action.

Mr. PADGETT. The committee did vote it. The chairman did not. But permit me to say that every year we send our battleships to the navy yard for their annual overhaul. Because we send them there for their overhaul and to be docked that does not mean that the battleships are inefficient or that they are incapable. It was a routine matter that at that time they were there for their annual overhaul.

Mr. J. R. KNOWLAND. All I can say in answer is that it is mighty fortunate for this Government that a sudden war did not break out with our submarine fleet in the condition in which it was found on the 1st day of November of last year.

Mr. PADGETT. On that very question Commander Stirling stated that if an emergency had arisen he could have had them all ready in 10 days or two weeks.

Mr. J. R. KNOWLAND. A delay of 10 days or two weeks at the breaking out of a war might prove serious.

Mr. PADGETT. That does not amount to anything. Now, in order to clarify the subject further, I will read again. The question was as to whether there was anything the matter. He said:

No; nothing seriously or fundamentally.

Then, on page 906 of the hearings:

The CHAIRMAN. These batteries that you spoke of in the other boats are simply exhausted by use, are they?

Commander STIRLING. By constant use; by charging and recharging.

The CHAIRMAN. That is just simply putting in new batteries, as you would have to do with any boat that you used that had batteries?

Commander STIRLING. Yes, sir; absolutely.

The CHAIRMAN. And that is the condition of those?

Commander STIRLING. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. And the other two that you mention, the Lake boats, they did not come up to contract?

Commander STIRLING. They never have.

Those were some that the Government has not yet accepted, and they have not yet been accepted.

The CHAIRMAN. And the department has not accepted them?

Commander STIRLING. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. And is requiring the contractors to put them up to contract?

Commander STIRLING. The Government is completing them at the navy yard, New York.

The CHAIRMAN. And that they are doing?

Commander STIRLING. That they are doing; yes, sir.

And I may add that the Government is doing this at the cost of the contractors, they having requested the Government to do it. So that is the situation that was presented. These boats were simply undergoing their annual overhaul, as we do with our torpedo boats, as we do with our cruisers, as we do with our battleships; but it does not mean or argue that they were incapable.

Now, Mr. Chairman, I will yield to the gentleman five minutes out of my time, to make up for the time that I have used.

Mr. J. R. KNOWLAND. The gentleman will have to yield me more than that, because the understanding was that I was to be yielded the time he used out of my allotted time.

Mr. PADGETT. I will yield to the gentleman 10 minutes, though I only took 5.

Mr. J. R. KNOWLAND. I thank the gentleman.

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman has expired, and he is now recognized for 10 minutes more.

Mr. PADGETT. I will yield to the gentleman 15 minutes.

Mr. BROWNING. Have the 20 minutes expired which I yielded to the gentleman?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes. The Chair is controlling the time. The gentleman from California is recognized for 15 minutes.

DEMOCRATIC PARTY ON RECORD AGAINST AN ADEQUATE NAVY.

Mr. J. R. KNOWLAND. The gentleman from Michigan [Mr. KELLEY] this afternoon stated that upon the question of an adequate Navy the parties in this House had not divided, or, at least, that they were about evenly divided. Lest we forget, I want to call the attention of this House to the fact that the first year the Democratic Party came into control of this branch of the Government they met in caucus and voted against a single battleship. The gentleman from Massachusetts [Mr. ROBERTS], a Republican, moved, on May 28, to recommit the bill when reported from the Committee of the Whole to the House, with instructions to report back a provision for one first-class battleship. The amendment failed by a vote of—yeas 106, nays 140. Ninety-seven Republicans voted for the motion and but 9 Democrats. Going on record as against a single battleship were 137 Democrats and but 3 Republicans. A Republican Senate amended the bill by providing for two battleships, and the conferees were forced to finally agree to one.

In 1913 the naval bill as reported made provision for two battleships. An amendment was offered in the House to reduce the number to one. On this vote there were 174 yeas and 156 noes. Of those voting against two battleships, as recommended by a Democratic committee, were 146 Democrats and but 27 Republicans, while those who supported the two-battleship program and the Democratic committee were 102 Republicans and but 54 Democrats.

DEMOCRATIC OPPOSITION TO BATTLESHIPS CONTINUES.

The Senate provided for two ships by a vote of 55 to 16, and of the 16 small-Navy votes 12 were Democrats and but 4 Republicans. When the conference report came before the House the Senate amendment for two ships was defeated by a vote of 144 to 168. Of the 144 voting in favor of two battleships there were 94 Republicans and but 54 Democrats, while those opposing the modest program of two ships were 147 Democrats and but 20 Republicans.

Having felt the pulse of the American people, the naval bill of 1914 came from the Democratic Naval Committee with an authorization for two ships, but even in the committee there were some recalcitrant small-Navy Democrats, and on May 7 1914, the gentleman from Mississippi [Mr. WITHERSPOON], a member of the committee, moved to recommit the bill with instructions to report back a provision for one battleship only, which motion was lost by a vote of 106 in favor to 202 against, and of those voting for the small-Navy program were 96 Democrats and but 10 Republicans. This record is illuminating and conclusive in showing the attitude of a majority of the Democratic Party toward the American Navy.

PENDING BILL MORE IN HARMONY WITH PUBLIC SENTIMENT.

The bill now before the House authorizes 2 first-class battleships, carrying as heavy armor and as powerful armament as any vessel of their class and with the highest practicable speed. In addition, 6 torpedo-boat destroyers, 17 submarines, 1 oil-fuel ship, 1 transport, and 1 hospital ship are provided.

I want to say that the gentleman from Tennessee [Mr. PADGETT], the chairman of the committee, has, I believe, always, from the time he assumed the chairmanship of this committee and when he was the ranking minority member of that committee, been a firm advocate of an adequate American Navy.

Mr. PADGETT. I do not want the gentleman to mislead. He uses the word "adequate." Sometimes I have supported one, and sometimes I have supported two, and in the last Congress

I favored three, so that I have accommodated myself to the wisdom of the occasion.

Mr. J. R. KNOWLAND. The gentleman's wisdom has made his judgment sound. The program in this bill is in response to a well-defined public sentiment, which our Democratic friends are beginning to sense. The American people favor an adequate Navy. The advocates of a Navy capable at all times of upholding the dignity, honor, and prestige of this great Republic can not be classed as opponents of peace. Those who would neglect and weaken our Navy are the individuals who would jeopardize the peace of the Nation. I contend that one of the strongest influences for peace is a Navy strong enough to meet any international emergency.

INTERNATIONAL DISARMAMENT FAVORED.

I favor international disarmament, and would gladly vote in favor of this Nation joining in such a movement, but in the meantime let our Navy be equal to the world responsibilities that we have assumed. I am inclined to agree with the Secretary of the Navy, who honors us with his presence this evening, that this country would have a greater voice in urging disarmament while in a condition of preparedness than by allowing the impression to go abroad that we were weak, urging a peace program because we lacked an adequate Navy to protect our interests.

RESPONSIBILITY OF UNPREPAREDNESS WOULD REST UPON CONGRESS.

During the 11 years that I have been a Member of the House I have never failed to cast my vote in accordance with the views I now express. I have realized, as every sensible man must, that upon the shoulders of the Members of Congress would full responsibility rest and the wrath of the people be visited should a sudden war find this Nation unprepared. Year after year I have heard the statement made on the floor of the House that the possibility of a war between this Nation and a foreign power was preposterous. Yes; and I have heard it just as positively asserted that a European war was almost beyond the realm of possibility. In this debate such statements will not be heard. Our small-Navy men have taken to the cyclone cellar.

VERA CRUZ INCIDENT.

With what suddenness we found ourselves in Vera Cruz. In this connection I may be pardoned for adverting to the fact that while there were some American citizens who wondered why we entered that Mexican port, there are many more who are in a quandary as to why we slunk away. It was an abandonment more than an evacuation. The only excuse for taking Vera Cruz was to obtain reparation from Huerta for indignities to the flag. It was a sudden and rather unexpected exhibition of backbone on the part of the administration which many Americans, irrespective of party, applauded. The demand for a salute of the flag was abandoned. We lowered the Stars and Stripes, yet unsaluted, and steamed out of the harbor; but scarcely had we weighed anchor when shots rang out from the shore signaling the return of chaos then existing throughout the balance of Mexico.

HUERTA ELIMINATED BUT THE FLAG NOT SALUTED.

Oh, yes; it is true that while the flag was not saluted the demand for which salute brought us into Vera Cruz, resulting in the sacrifice of 19 American lives, we eliminated Huerta. Eliminated Huerta! For whom and for what purpose? What leader there to-day is one whit more desirable than the man we forced out to vindicate a policy? Has murder ceased? Do American citizens command any greater respect? Is American property any more secure?

LANGUAGE OF PRESIDENT INCONSISTENT WITH ACTIONS.

Does the language of the President concerning Mexico, uttered at Indianapolis on January 8, square with our performance at Vera Cruz? Here is what he said:

It is none of my business, and it is none of your business, how long they—

The people of Mexico—
take in determining it. As far as my influence goes while I am President nobody shall interfere with them. Have not European nations split as much blood as they pleased in settling their affairs, and shall we deny that to Mexico?

Was it our business, then, to take Vera Cruz and shed blood to eliminate Huerta, although we may have disliked him? Have we not as much right to eliminate the bandit Villa or the blood-thirsty Carranza? Conditions in Mexico but emphasize the necessity for preparedness. Foreign nations hold us responsible, and will continue to look to this Nation while we see "that nobody interferes" during the continuance of the reign of terror.

RESPONSIBILITIES OF UNITED STATES INCREASING.

It should be borne in mind that up to 1898 the United States was almost isolated and was much less concerned with the affairs of the world, but the War with Spain brought in its wake the acquisition of the Philippines and Porto Rico and the

Independence of Cuba, the latter island coming under our protection.

MONROE DOCTRINE BROADENING.

As the years pass the Monroe doctrine seems to broaden and assume new significance, entailing greater responsibilities. We do not allow foreign nations to acquire territory nor secure a foothold in Central or South America. We practically guarantee them against invasion. Recently we have announced that no harbor or other property must be acquired on the American continent so situated that its occupation for naval or military purposes might threaten the communications or safety of the United States. This broadening of the Monroe doctrine was set forth in the Lodge resolution which passed the United States Senate on August 2, 1912, by a vote of 57 to 4, the resolution reading as follows:

Resolved, That when any harbor or other place in the American Continent is so situated that the occupation thereof for naval or military purposes might threaten the communications or the safety of the United States, the Government of the United States could not see without grave concern the possession of such harbor or other places by any corporation or association which has such a relation to another Government, not American, as to give that Government practical power of control for military or naval purposes.

The threatened acquisition by a foreign power of a base on Magdalena Bay no doubt prompted this resolution.

PACIFIC ISLAND POSSESSIONS INCREASE RESPONSIBILITY.

Hawaii and Alaska have both increased the demands upon the Navy. Tutuila and Guam and other Pacific islands of naval importance add to our responsibilities. The Panama Canal is now open and naval experts regard the Canal Zone as the most vulnerable part of our entire possessions, and yet we hear it argued that we have no use for a large Navy.

SANTO DOMINGO AND HAITI.

The Monroe doctrine is responsible for our present interest in the affairs of Santo Domingo, which Republic has proven so useful to the present Secretary of State in finding places for deserving politicians, a rather new and unique argument, advanced for the first time by a Democratic Secretary of State, in favor of upholding the Monroe doctrine.

The black Republic of Haiti, now presided over by two opposing Presidents, at this very moment calls for the presence of an American naval vessel. Are we to meet these responsibilities? If so, is not an adequate Navy essential?

EXPERTS DECLARE NAVY NOT ADEQUATE.

Is our Navy adequate? Naval experts tell us it is not. Admiral Fiske, in the recent hearings before the House Committee on Naval Affairs, declared we were behind other nations in mines and air craft. (See p. 1007, Naval Hearings, Dec., 1914.)

Interrogated as to how long it would take our Navy to get ready to fight, he declared it would take five years. (P. 1023, Hearings.) Asked if we were doing the essential things to make ready, declared we were not. (Pp. 1047-1050, Hearings.) Assistant Secretary Roosevelt declared that in case of war there would be a shortage in the Navy of between 23,000 and 43,000 men. (P. 932, Hearings.) He also made the statement that it would take the ships in reserve three months to get ready for actual battle. (P. 939, Hearings.)

Admiral Fletcher, when asked how many unharbored places there were on the Atlantic coast where a landing could be made in case our fleet was unable to prevent the approach of a hostile force, stated that in smooth water and fine weather they could land almost any place (p. 536).

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman has again expired.

Mr. BROWNING. I yield to the gentleman 10 minutes.

Mr. J. R. KNOWLAND. Commander Yates Stirling, jr., in charge of the Atlantic submarine flotilla, to whose testimony I have already made reference, told some rather unpleasant truths concerning our submarine strength, or rather lack of strength, for which action he was reduced.

When the vessels now building are completed by the various nations, according to the Navy Yearbook just issued by the Senate Committee on Naval Affairs, the United States will be fourth in naval strength. Our ships lack speed, a fatal defect in the light of last Sunday's naval battle in the North Sea.

Had we followed the recommendations of the General Board since 1904 for a building program we would have authorized 38 battleships instead of 17. And this holds good for practically all of their other recommendations.

PACIFIC COAST LACKS PROTECTION.

It is admitted that the Pacific coast is not as well protected as the Atlantic. Naval strategists hold that it is unsafe to divide a fleet no less formidable than the one we now possess, and it has therefore been the policy to keep the fleet in the Atlantic. With the opening of the canal it is, of course, recognized that the Atlantic Fleet would be available in case of dan-

ger, provided, of course, that the canal was not rendered inoperative. With our Pacific possessions, and with the knowledge of the tremendous importance of that great ocean, and the problems it presents, it would seem important that we have a navy adequate to protect both oceans. We should have two effective units of the Navy. On April 10, 1908, on the floor of this House, I used these words:

The people of the Pacific ask and insist—and their request is but reasonable—that there be permanently assigned to the far western seaboard of this great Nation a fleet of battleships commensurate with the growing importance of the Pacific.

The opening of the Panama Canal has, of course, resulted in a greater feeling of security on the part of the people of the Pacific coast, yet the necessity for a formidable Pacific fleet still exists. We also lack proper naval stations on the Pacific. The Atlantic coast is far better equipped.

FORTIFICATIONS USELESS WITHOUT A NAVY.

Fortifications are important on our great coasts, but these guns can do no damage to a blockading fleet if it keeps out of range. The Navy must drive off the enemy's ships. We were recently informed by Secretary of War Garrison, in response to a congressional resolution of inquiry, that there is no gun mounted on the fortifications of the United States proper more than 12 inches in diameter; that these 12-inch guns as mounted have a range of 13,000 yards, and that the larger dreadnaughts of the *Queen Elizabeth* type are equipped with 15-inch, 45-caliber guns with a range of 21,000 yards. In other words, one of these dreadnaughts of an enemy could exceed the range of our coast guns by 4 miles—but another argument showing the necessity of a formidable fleet.

WHAT THE NAVY MEANS TO GREAT BRITAIN.

In the present war Great Britain rules the seas, as she has since the days of Queen Elizabeth. Her navy has, to a very large extent, made of England what it is commercially and politically. In the present great European contest we are assuming a position of neutrality, but vexatious questions are continually arising. Americans are growing restive under the attitude of Great Britain toward our shipping. She laid down the terms upon which we can use the canal commercially, and we acquiesced in her terms.

It does not follow, however, that we will as meekly submit to a continuation of outrages to American commerce on the high seas.

It would seem to be the irony of fate that England was reported to be the first nation to violate the neutrality of the canal.

IS WAR POSSIBLE?

There never may be another war in which the United States may be involved, but is it safe to act upon that assumption? I sincerely hope that there will not be another conflict. It has never been denied, and can not be, that in May, 1913, and for several weeks thereafter, our gunners at Corregidor Island stayed at their guns night and day.

NECESSITY OF AN ADEQUATE NAVY.

The Spanish-American War was decided by the Navy at Manila Bay and Santiago Harbor. As has been stated so well, right backed by might is irresistible. We have a striking example of unpreparedness in the case of China, which nation, lacking an adequate army and navy, has suffered the greatest humiliation and been involved in costly and disastrous wars.

The United States can not assume its present position among the nations of the world without a navy commensurate with our needs. It is essential for the protection of our coasts, to guard the Panama Canal, to safeguard our insular possessions and dependencies, to uphold the Monroe doctrine, to protect our shipping, and to command the proper respect for our flag in every section of the world. [Applause.]

I yield back the remainder of my time.

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman yields back four minutes.

Mr. STEPHENS of California. Mr. Chairman, believing that I have six minutes remaining to my credit, I yield that much to the gentleman from Washington [Mr. BRYAN].

Mr. BRYAN. Mr. Chairman, I am not going to attempt to discuss the Navy in its relation to our foreign affairs, the Mexican policy, or anything of that kind during the few minutes that are allotted to me; but I want to call attention to one or two features of naval accomplishment, which I think are very commendable and reflect credit upon the present administration of the Navy. In the first place, it has always been my delight to look upon our Navy with a great deal of pride. I believe the American Navy has a record of unusual accomplishment, and every American is justly proud of its achievement. We on the Pacific coast do not know very much about the modern Navy, because we seldom see the big units of the Navy referred to as the line battleships, which constitute the real

Navy. We do not see any of the real battleships out there. Since, by order of that President of whom a great and much-loved historian, now in the White House, said his administration was one that reflected great credit and was one of ideas, 16 battleships turned their prows toward Puget Sound as they skirted the Horn, we have not seen a battleship. They came; and they went; and they never came back any more.

We have a few little boats, a few cruisers, but if the canal is kept open, I understand, we will see some real battleships once in a while, and that some of those big vessels will guard our interests out there occasionally.

The Secretary of the Navy has done some things in connection with the internal management of the Navy that I think he ought to be given due credit for. He has instituted certain rules and regulations for the control of the men in the Navy. For one thing he has issued an order that shuts liquor out of the Navy. [Applause.] I believe the Secretary should receive hearty commendation and the backing of every governmental officer and every element in the national administration in that particular movement, and in the enforcing of that order.

I know something about the influence of liquor on men in the Navy.

Mr. HENSLEY. Will the gentleman yield?

Mr. BRYAN. Yes.

Mr. HENSLEY. Does the gentleman realize that the Navy League criticized the Secretary of the Navy for that order?

Mr. BRYAN. Oh, yes; but that does not make any difference. The Navy League probably had some champagne on the banquet board at the time they criticized the Secretary. [Laughter.] I do not care to enter into any crusade against the Navy League, for the league may be doing some good along some other lines.

It was impossible to keep the men free from liquor if the officers of the Navy indulged in that way and had their mess rooms filled with liquor and every vessel laden with it. So I think the Secretary of the Navy is entitled to great credit for that.

He is entitled to great credit for the movement to open the door to men in the Navy along certain lines of instruction so they can spend some of their time acquiring a little learning that we are all craving. He has revised the laws and rules of the Navy as to the punishment of deserters, and removed from men the infamy and criminality of penitentiary service for desertion in many cases. For these things he ought to be characterized as a real progressive Secretary of the Navy.

Now, I want to mention just one other matter. We have heard a good deal said about the trusts and about men using various opportunities to supply the Navy for graft and all of that. There is more or less truth in that, no doubt. But I want to call attention to the fact that there is over in New York a commission on industrial relations asking questions of representatives of the great interests of this country that is doing more to revise and modify the conditions as between the great interests and the average citizen of this country—the working classes and others—than any other man or any other agency has been able to do in a generation.

I heard them ask Mr. John D. Rockefeller, jr., the other day a series of questions, and I tell you that that commission, with Mr. Walsh as chairman, is accomplishing a wonderful task. He led Mr. Rockefeller through a series of questions and demonstrated before this commission and those that were listening there and those who read the proceedings that Mr. Rockefeller was entirely incompetent to serve as a director.

It has been demonstrated in these hearings that Mr. Rockefeller has certain high-sounding principles which are very good. Mr. Rockefeller really believes in a certain high standard of idealism, as I am convinced; but when he was compelled to analyze those views in the light of certain facts, which he has set forth before the commission in response to the queries of Mr. Walsh, his ideals seemed to vanish for want of support by his acts. He was searched as to his views on all features of the labor problem, as to unions, and the rights of the workers. He soon demonstrated a weakness in execution and an ignorance as to the problems concerning the workers in the Colorado Fuel & Iron Co. that made plain his incompetence and the rank injustice associated with absentee landlordism over such areas as were involved in this Colorado case.

It was admitted by Mr. Rockefeller that one Mr. Ivy was receiving \$1,000 a month to produce publicity to send out to the public on the Colorado situation. One of the things Mr. Ivy was doing was to send to the Members of this House a bulletin at regular intervals on the strike out there. One of his bulletins told of how much salary the labor leaders were getting. In cases of political corruption on the part of Colorado Fuel & Iron Co. operators Mr. Rockefeller did not know that he would vote to discharge such operators. In cases of compensation to injured workmen Mr. Rockefeller was ignorant as to what

amount should be paid. Every phase was considered in the questions. No legal objections were offered or could be offered. The interrelation existing between Rockefeller profits and Rockefeller philanthropy was demonstrated. I heartily commend the work of Mr. Walsh and his associates. They are accomplishing more than anyone has the slightest idea of at this time.

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman has expired.

Mr. BRYAN had leave to extend his remarks in the Record.

Mr. HENSLEY. Mr. Chairman, I yield 30 minutes to the gentleman from Virginia [Mr. SAUNDERS].

[Mr. SAUNDERS addressed the committee. See Appendix.]

Mr. BROWNING. Mr. Chairman, I yield 20 minutes to the gentleman from Ohio [Mr. FESS].

Mr. FESS. Mr. Chairman, war is a horrible thing to contemplate; it never comes as a rule by choice or option of the participants, and the results are not what the people who go into it expect. People can be very certain and positive in their insistence that there is no symptom of war anywhere, and yet, like a clap of thunder out of a cloudless sky, it breaks, and you are in war when you do not expect it. The history of most wars is but a comment upon this fact. Even in Congress, in 1814, could have been heard assurances that we were out of danger at the very time the Capitol was soon to be burned.

I appreciate the position that the distinguished Member from Virginia [Mr. SAUNDERS] has taken. I never have heard him speak that he did not edify the House; he speaks from a full mind and from conviction. I do think, however, that his conclusions are not altogether warranted to-night. I am not sure that unpreparedness, as he would have us believe, prevented the war in 1895 with England, and that preparedness had nothing to do with preventing it in 1867 with France in connection with Mexico. It seems to me the answer would be true of both cases if it was true in one.

But, Mr. Chairman, I did not rise to speak on that line. Remembering this day, January 29, I wish the membership of the House would think with me a few minutes upon the life of an Ohioan of whom we all are proud and whose memory is celebrated to-day throughout all the country. I refer to Ohio's great son, William McKinley. [Applause.]

Before entering upon that, however, let me remind the House, since war possibilities and defense have occupied the House, that we have had a few wars in our history, always bad in the cost of life and treasure, but usually with results that were commendable. The first great war of vast importance to us was the French and Indian War, known as the Seven Years' War in Europe. The results to our Nation we do not yet appreciate, for that was the war that made it possible for this country to be the virgin soil of Anglo-Saxon democracy, rather than a Latin ecclesiasticism. It was not a conflict between two nations, but between two systems. It was settled at that time that here was to be planted the experiment of self-government based upon a free state, free church, and free school. But nobody could have believed in 1763, when the treaty of peace was signed and our country had but two and a half million people, that by 1915 we would be a Nation of English-speaking people double in population of that of any other nation speaking the language. No wonder that Lord Salisbury, in substance, said 16 months before he died, had it not been for the un wisdom of the mother country the capital of the British Empire might to-day be on the American Continent. Of course we are glad the mistake was made, for I do not think that this young Republic ever could have reached the plane under any other form of government that it has under its own. While it is true that in 1763 the treaty of peace finally decided that this was to be the birthplace of Anglo-Saxon democracy, the foundation had attached to it certain elements under which we could not progress. There was a modified system of feudalism; also the system of hereditary government with life tenure in office; also the system of primogeniture; also the system of entailed estate. While we say that the cause of the Revolutionary War was taxation without representation, that does not cover all of it.

The real cause of that war was these effete systems which obtained in the mother country and which she wanted to fasten upon this country, while the immediate cause was as stated. We went to war to free ourselves from these customs which could not be consistent with our ideas, and from 1775 until 1781 we fought the battles of independence in the Revolutionary War, with the result that the Republic, which had been born in 1763 by the first treaty of Paris, was given a new lease of life, when we started the real Republic in 1783 under the second treaty of Paris, 20 years after the first treaty of Paris. From

that on until 1812 we had a period of wondrous growth, but in that year, after 5,000 American citizens had been impressed into the British Navy—I do not speak in the spirit of anger or criticism of Great Britain—but after those 5,000 had been impressed in the English Navy we went to war, covering years of dispute over England's contention on the right of search, the second war for independence, and ended it in 1815 a really great Nation before the eyes of the world. We should here remember that our Nation, differentiated by climate, soil, and occupation, and by what follows these differences, started two civilizations in this Republic, the one beginning with the cavalier on the James in Virginia and the other with the Puritan in Massachusetts, which ran in parallel columns in the western course of empire until finally the wave of southern civilization struck the rock of northern civilization, when our country went into the most dreadful vortex that is known to man—in the Civil War. One side was fighting for a principle of constitutional supremacy, born in the North out of natural conditions, while the other side was fighting for the rights of the States, born in the South out of conditions of nature. The one seemed to be embodied in the Hamiltonian theory of government, while the other in the Jeffersonian theory, and I hope that there is not a man on this or the other side of the aisle who can not see that without the Hamiltonian theory the Jeffersonian policy would not have been of value, and without the Jeffersonian theory the Hamiltonian policy would not have been profitable to the Nation. You can not have a nation builded as is ours with power or authority as one of the pillars and liberty as the other; you can not have a modern democracy built of a safe foundation without both of these fundamentals are recognized and represented.

The arch of the American Government is builded upon these two fundamental policies. One is power, authority, order in government embodied in national prerogative. That is Hamiltonian. The other is liberty, rights of the individual under government, and the rights of the State. That is Jeffersonian. Weaken one of these pillars that support the arch and you weaken the arch. We must preserve the Jeffersonian and we must have the Hamiltonian. We must preserve authority in the Nation and we must have the rights in the States. We must make a sharp distinction between the principle of State rights and State sovereignty. Dangerous would it be for this Nation if we ever forget the rights of the States. Dangerous would it be for this Nation if we should ever forget the prerogatives of the Nation. State rights must be maintained, State sovereignty must be surrendered. The State must maintain its rights in all matters pertaining to it that do not interfere with the Nation. The Nation must maintain its prerogatives in matters pertaining to all the States. We had a difference. That difference was fought out ultimately and settled, not that the Nation was to be wholly Hamiltonian, and not that it was to be wholly Jeffersonian, but it was to be a combination of the two. The contest between the two theories will continue. Our system keeps it alive, but never to be carried beyond debate. We see the Federal authority extended over the States to-day in wonderful fashion, but, strange to me, it is more on the Democratic side of the House than on the Republican side of the House. I think that I can say this without being offensive to the Democrats here, that I might say it is due to the fact that the party in power is always aggressive, always loose constructionists, always extending national authority, for no administration will willingly suffer embarrassment by refusing to do what seems to be the duty of the hour simply to maintain a position of consistency, even though it might seem a little stretch of the authority of the Nation. The party that is out of power is likely to become strict instead of loose in its construction, although loose constructionists when it is in power. The war closed in 1865. The results were world-wide in significance. The Nation was one in law, but there was a sore left, as might have been suspected. Four years of bloody strife would leave some sores hard to heal, even on both sides. One should not be surprised over such results. In 1898, on the 15th day of February, an incident occurred down here in Habana Harbor when 266 of our boys went down in the muddy waters of that bay. The morning after I walked the streets of a university town as a professor and noted in the countenances of citizens the promise of the tragedy of war to come. I spoke to the students as they gathered in front of one of the college buildings. They were wild. The sense of a national wrong was dominant, as the Nation's honor was at stake. They wanted to form companies; they wanted to call upon the governor of my State. In a word, they wanted to go to war. The most majestic figure—at least, one of the most majestic figures—our country has produced was the man at that time in the White House. He stood from February 15 until April 19,

from the day the *Maine* was blown up to the day when the declaration of war was made, like a majestic oak upon which the storm was beating. How he pleaded with the people of the country to suspend judgment, not to go into war; and yet, in spite of all influences against it, we went into war.

Mr. BAILEY. Will the gentleman yield?

Mr. FESS. Yes.

Mr. BAILEY. Does the gentleman think the country would have insisted on war had it known as much as the President of the United States knew at that time, that Spain had yielded every point in all the demands made?

Mr. FESS. It only demonstrates the heroic passion, which may be fickle, of our public life as expressed in public opinion.

Mr. BAILEY. The people knew nothing of that.

Mr. FESS. You do not mean the public was not pressing the President upon this occasion?

Mr. BAILEY. The public was pressing him. The public did not know of the facts.

Mr. FESS. I thought you meant that it was not. I happen to know that the President of the United States did not want war—was doing all he could to prevent it; but it came, and it came like other wars will come, when we do not expect it.

Mr. HENSLEY. Will the gentleman yield right there?

Mr. FESS. Yes.

Mr. HENSLEY. This insistence upon the part of the people for war was after the blowing up of the *Maine*, was it not?

Mr. FESS. Most of it.

Mr. HENSLEY. Have you ever contemplated what the future of this country would have been if the *Maine* had not been in the harbor of Habana at that time?

Mr. FESS. Do you mean if we had taken all our vessels off the sea?

Mr. HENSLEY. That was not the question. The gentleman understands that the *Maine* was lying right there in the harbor of Habana.

Mr. FESS. Yes; and the *Viscaya* was up in New York Harbor.

Mr. HENSLEY. And if the *Maine* had not been there, but had been at Hampton Roads at that particular time, have you contemplated what the history of the country would have been?

Mr. FESS. I do not want to enter upon that, but I will say to the gentleman from Missouri that he has suggested a thing that he ought not to have suggested. Probably I ought not to say what is in my mind, suggested by the interruption, but if in times of war we purchase ships of governments that are belligerent and put our flag upon them and send them across the sea and one of them is sunk, what will follow? In such a contingency it will be a bluecoat that is being attacked, and how long can you maintain the people of this country in a peaceful attitude if a thing of that kind would occur?

Mr. DECKER. Mr. Chairman—

Mr. FESS. I did not mean to inject that question, but it is worthy the consideration of those who see no possibility of war, especially at this moment.

Mr. DECKER. Well, you got it in.

Mr. FESS. It is in. Brother HENSLEY brought it in.

Mr. DECKER. I want to ask if the gentleman does not know that when we buy a ship either from a neutral nation or a belligerent nation, with the flag of this country on that ship, and that ship sails just the same as any other ship owned by a private individual, and along with that ship does not go the sovereignty of this country, that the people of this country are no more apt to take an interest in that private ship, because we do own only a small part of it, than if it was a ship of some powerful Ship Trust that would afterwards try to stir up a war and protect their own property if the ship was sunk?

Mr. FESS. My friend from Missouri may make the American people believe that what he has said here he believes will prevent trouble, but he will have a task on his hands to prove to the people that if the Government of the United States owns the vessel foreign powers do not fire upon the majesty of the Government if they fire upon that vessel. [Applause.]

Mr. DECKER. You mean to be understood that you are not willing to trust the intelligence of the American people in a war?

Mr. FESS. I mean to say that my friend from Missouri would be one of the first citizens to fire up quickly when the honor of the Nation was attacked, and you do not differ in that from the mass of our citizens.

Mr. DECKER. I do not want to take up your time, but I want to say that "the gentleman from Missouri" would not be any quicker to rise in defense of a ship owned by all the people than he would be to rise up against the defense of a ship owned by one American citizen.

Mr. FESS. When an attack is made upon all the people by not only attacking property belonging to them but their honor

symbolized by the flag of their Nation, it is a little more serious than when made on one person or upon the property of a person or corporation.

Mr. DECKER. Why?

Mr. FESS. I do not wish to be discourteous—

Mr. DECKER. I beg your pardon.

Mr. FESS. I have pretty nearly forgotten where you took me,

Mr. HENSLEY. We had you down at Habana, Cuba.

Mr. FESS. You will allow me to resume the consideration of the question before us.

Mr. SAUNDERS. Will the gentleman from Ohio allow me to suggest an answer to the query of the gentleman from Missouri?

Mr. FESS. I am afraid you will embarrass me.

Mr. SAUNDERS. Oh, no. I was going to say that when our flag is fired upon it is a very different proposition than when an American is killed by some Canadian fishermen, which happened a few days ago.

Mr. FESS. Your observation is most timely and true. Now, Mr. Chairman, why I rose was to call attention at this time of stress and storm to the attitude of McKinley, whose birth is celebrated to-day, upon war and his part in that of 1898. You say it was not so terrible. War is always terrible. It is nothing if it is not horrible. The President was not in favor of it. He had his reasons. He had in his life tasted war. He knew its probable consequences. He feared it might apply the match that would involve the world. He did what he could to prevent it at the cost of many friends and expense of virulent criticism from both Democrat and Republican, and it is the finest example that I know of the danger of this Nation going into war before it knows what it is doing, and I do not believe that my good friend from Virginia [Mr. SAUNDERS] is altogether right when he says that there is no possibility of our being involved at the time when all Europe is in war itself. I am afraid that that might be used as an occasion for war.

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from Ohio has expired.

Mr. BROWNING. Mr. Chairman, I yield to the gentleman five minutes more.

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from Ohio is recognized for five minutes more.

Mr. SAUNDERS. Does the gentleman think—

Mr. FESS. I regret I can not yield further. I am sorry.

Mr. SAUNDERS. I yielded to my friend.

Mr. FESS. Well, I will yield to the gentleman.

Mr. SAUNDERS. Do you not think that the nations that are now embroiled would hardly care to take on an additional adversary?

Mr. FESS. Well, I am of the opinion that some of them who are very seriously embroiled would like to have us on their side. [Applause.] There are two sides, you know. Each combatant would be glad to see us involved; if they could get us to take sides, it would be to their advantage.

Mr. BARKLEY. The gentleman does not think that going to war with us will get us on their side, does he?

Mr. FESS. Mr. Chairman, I want to ask the Democratic side of this House to think with me just a moment as to whether the war of 1898, bad as it was, did not have a result that paid for all that it cost? I do not extol war. Far from me to do so. But this war had one great result. Senator Dolliver related to President McKinley the desire of Gen. Wheeler to go to Cuba. The President at first declined on the ground that the general was old. "He is a good citizen. He can do more for the United States at home here in Congress than he can by going down there and being shot at and killed." And when Senator Dolliver, then a Member of this House, carried that message to Gen. Joe Wheeler, the general seemed not pleased with the statement that he ought to stay here and represent his section of country in this trouble. "For," he said, "I do not need to be here. No man needs to be here to represent my section of the country in this trouble," making it clear that there was no hesitancy whatever, when the trouble was coming, from any section of the country. The President was touched by the story of the general's wish to fight under the flag against which he had fought in 1861 and commissioned him. When Gov. Gen. Weyler said that the first thing he would do would be to land troops in Florida, where he would be met by people of the Southland, who would join him in a march upon the Capital, you remember that the mayor of New York City laconically announced that "when you are ready to do it let me know, and I will send the policemen of New York City down there to arrest all who come over for trespassing on American soil."

The statement was an insult that the governor general offered to our great Nation, and when the crucial point came, and

war was declared, what happened? More troops in proportion to the population came from the section that the governor general referred to than came from the northern section; and we saw how the grandson of Robert E. Lee marched with the grandson of Gen. Ulysses S. Grant against a foreign enemy. And if there was not any other single result of the war with Spain, here is one that I think all will agree was the great reward. The sore that was kept somewhat open by unkind utterances in the press and on the rostrum was healed, it seems to me, entirely, because we were fighting a common enemy.

If that was not enough, the incident that occurred in Buffalo soon after was. After the President had finished one of his greatest speeches, in which he said "Our greatness is not in war, our greatness is in peace; it is not in discord, it is in accord," and then was receiving the men and women who wanted to shake his hand. In the group there appeared one with his hand bandaged, as if it were injured; and we are told that the President, looking upon him, had upon his face an expression of pity. But while he took the President's hand in one hand, he pressed the trigger with the other, and fired two shots in quick succession, and the President fell into the arms of those who were about him. Do you remember what he said as he saw the men clamoring for the life of the poor wretch who had committed the deed? "Let nobody hurt him; let nobody hurt him." And as they took him down the street to Mr. Millburn's home he said, "Be careful how you break the news to Mrs. McKinley."

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from Ohio has again expired.

Mr. BROWNING. Mr. Chairman, I yield to the gentleman three minutes longer.

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from Ohio is recognized for three additional minutes.

Mr. FESS. When Dr. Mann, the surgeon, said, "Mr. President, we are going to operate upon you; the delay cost the life of one of our Presidents; we will not let it cost you your life." He replied, "You know best." And you all remember how from that fatal day until the end hope rose and fell with the passing hours. How well we all remember the story how, as they were about to apply the instruments, when they noticed the lips of the injured man moving, Dr. Mann, thinking it might be a dying message, pressed his ear to the lips of the President and heard his words, "Nearer, my God, to Thee; nearer to Thee." The hand of the doctor was almost palsied. He waited a moment and noticed the patient's lips again moving; he pressed his ear again and heard the words, "Angels to beckon me nearer to Thee." After days of suffering, and when at last the fatal moment had come, and when it appeared he had gone into his last sleep, his wife was taken away into an adjoining room. By the administration of oxygen he was revived. When he looked about, as if for her, she was brought back to him. To her he said: "Do not worry. It is better for us both. Good-by, all. God's will be done."

And President McKinley, who was born 72 years ago to-day, died, as he lived, one of the most beautiful and representative spirits America ever knew; and in these hours of war I think it is well for us to think of the man who tried to prevent war. [Applause.]

Among the lessons of his life we should consider, his policies for the Nation at this moment are of greatest importance. It is fitting to contrast his policies with those now in vogue.

As one nation is distinguished from another by various movements which distinctly mark each, so one generation in each nation is distinguished from another by the leadership it develops. The present day and leadership stands in sharp contrast from the last generation, with Ohio's most beloved son at the helm. In that day the dominant impulse was achievement. It had become a national passion. McKinley embodied in the best sense this national passion. He had devoted his time and had dedicated his talents to the Nation's largest possibilities in accomplishment. In this he best represented the inspiration not only of America's youth but of youthful America. What Emerson predicted for the individual, McKinley planned for the Nation. His passion was to see the United States absolutely independent of all the rest of the world in its productive ability. He religiously believed that duty demanded America first, just as life demands safety first. He contended that wise policy would develop all the Nation's natural resources, investing American capital, and the employment of American labor rather than going to Europe for goods. His slogan was, "Open our mills to American workmen, not our markets to European-labor-made goods." His philosophy plants tin mills in America, not in Wales; it invests American capital, not European; it

employs American labor, not foreign; it maintains a standard of living wage, not Europe's pauper hire.

McKinley's policy would manufacture in this country not only all the sugar we consume but much used by other countries, and at a price less than that paid to foreign producers. Under the fostering care of the McKinley theory our Nation has grown until it is now one and three-quarters times wealthier than the next wealthiest country on the globe. It has now double the railroad mileage of any two European countries. It has two-fifths of all the banking resources of the globe, including our own resources. We produce 40 per cent of all the pig iron in the world, 25 per cent of wheat, 60 per cent of coal, 70 per cent of corn, 65 per cent of cotton. It has the largest per capita circulation of all other countries. Its citizens, great and small, have larger deposits in savings banks than any other country. It has the happiest people on earth; better fed, better clothed, better housed, better educated; most public spirited of all the peoples of earth.

Only now and then do this people suffer an epidemic, caused by a spirit of unrest, due to an independence born of Republican prosperity. Twice since the advent of the party of Lincoln, Grant, Garfield, and McKinley has the Democratic Party afflicted the Nation by its free-trade propaganda—once in 1893–1897 and again in 1913–1916, 20 years later. Note the deadly parallel. In 1890, with the country enjoying great prosperity, capital fully invested, labor fully employed, the law bearing McKinley's name was placed upon the statute books. The cheap demagogue took the front of the stage and held sway until at the very height of the Nation's trade relations Cleveland was elected. The Wilson bill followed as an attack upon the employer of labor and in the pretended interest of the wage earner. The cheap propagandist attempted to assault the business integrity of the Nation's producers and at the same time promised to benefit the wage earner. He proposed to buy Europe's product at Europe's price without either displacing the American laborer whom he placed in competition with Europe's labor or even reducing his wage to the level of his competing wage earner in Europe. While few were so oblivious to the laws of production as to have faith in such promise, enough gave it credence to permit the experiment. What followed? Read the record. It is brief but complete. Democratic success at the polls. Tariff for revenue only, the Wilson bill. American markets open to Europeans. Cheap goods—American mills closed. Capital in hiding—labor out of employment—business generally paralyzed. Imports increasing, exports decreasing, buying more, selling less—balance of trade against us—gold going out of the country, deficiency in the Treasury—issue of bonds, suffering among the poor, soup houses installed by municipal authority, bread lines maintained by charity. Within three years loss to the country billions of treasure. In the face of such calamity quickly following upon the heels of universal progress under protection, the people called for a leader. Out of the masses came our hero. The honor belonged to the city of Canton to produce him.

Notwithstanding the hue and cry of the populistic nostrum vendor under the leadership of the present Secretary of State, who promised a cure-all in the famous 16-to-1 prescription, the people had been under the spell of the theorists long enough. They turned to the party of protection under the leadership of America's greatest protectionist, buried free coinage of silver together with the fatuous 16-to-1 pretense, and followed McKinley in the inauguration of the country's greatest era of prosperity.

For nearly 20 years the Nation has swept on in its marvels of growth to the point where it had reached the acme of greatness, where every man could find a market for what he had to sell, whether it was the product of the farm, the mine, the manufactory, or whether it was his capital or his labor—all found a ready market. Such states of prosperity produce more or less of independence. Hence the demagogic appeals find a hearing. The party of free trade, seeking an issue, admits a general prosperity but demands a "new freedom," whatever that means. I need not remind of how they succeeded. It is enough to say that the minority party slipped into power in both legislative and executive branches of the Government. When you read the record since 1913 you will think you are reading from a history of Cleveland's days. Democratic success at the polls; the Underwood bill; imports increasing, exports decreasing, American mills closing, American industries paralyzed, American labor out of employment, balance of trade against us until war-ridden Europe had to be fed; gold going out of the country; deficiency in the Treasury in spite of war tax; suffering universal in the cities; soup houses again in-

stalled; bread lines the longest in our history. And all this in the fact of the promise that no legitimate business will be hurt. When these assaults were being made threats were heard from Mr. UNDERWOOD and Secretary Redfield that any firm that reduced its output or slowed down would be investigated. Instead we now hear of the Socialist proposition that a Federal employment bureau must be created to find work for the unemployed. There is one employment bureau that we can afford to employ—American industry. President Wilson's psychological remedies will deceive no one.

As the people 20 years ago refused to be misled by political propagandists and returned to a protective tariff as a permanent remedy, so this year they refused to be caught up by high-sounding phrasing of "new freedom," "emancipation of business," "constitution of peace," and "watchful waiting," and again turned to the party committed to the principle of protection.

It is difficult to understand the credulity that could see in the European war distress to American industry. It is the one only item to save us from the blighting effects of a bill that not only paralyzed our home industries but suggested the iniquitous stamp tax as a remedy, which at best can be but temporary. The war, in the extent that it disturbs European production, annuls foreign competition with our labor, the very purpose of a protective tariff. In that degree it leaves the American market to be supplied by our own producers and loudly calls us to the foreign market, now unsupplied by the European producer, whose ability is arrested if not destroyed.

The recent election proved that the people of this country could not be deluded by such appeals, and they registered their protest in no uncertain tone. It is not the mere cutting down of a Democratic majority in the House from 145 to 30, but the nearness with which that majority came to being turned into a minority. The elements which prevented it will not be present in 1916. The work begun in 1914 will be completed by 1916. The policies of Wilson will give way to those of McKinley.

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from Ohio has again expired.

Mr. BROWNING. Mr. Chairman, I yield two minutes to the gentleman from Minnesota [Mr. MANAHAN].

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from Minnesota [Mr. MANAHAN] is recognized for two minutes.

Mr. MANAHAN. Mr. Chairman, I was very glad to have the allotment of time which I expected to use in the discussion of this bill taken by my eloquent colleague from Ohio [Mr. FESS]. It seems to me that after hearing such a clear and philosophic discussion as he has given us it would be a discord to enter into a detailed comment upon this bill. I would not feel justified in doing it, even if time permitted.

However, let me say here that I am opposed to war and the spirit of war. Great armies and great navies create a warlike spirit in a people, and therefore I oppose great Army and great Navy appropriations. The taxpayers' money can be spent for better purposes. It is foolish to say that preparation for war averts war. It rather invites it. Look at Europe. What is the cause of the war hell now raging in Europe? The fault does not lie with the masses of the people of any country. The greed for property and lust for power of the great leaders of all the nations built the great armies and navies with which they first frightened and now destroy each other. Jealousy and hate are born of greed for wealth and lust for the land of other men. Shall we, as a Nation, yield to that same base avarice that has wrecked the civilization of Europe and brought hopeless woe upon her helpless millions? Shall we foster the spirit of war? If so, let us build great battleships and organize great armies.

Is there no danger in the spirit we foster? This talk of trade and profits, these schemes of capturing commerce lost by warring nations, this marketing while half the world lies bleeding and broken, may be business and may be legal, but it does not look good to me. It is more cold-blooded than stealing from the dead, for it takes food and drink from the wounded while they suffer. To what bottomless depravity does greed drive men and women? Some of us are so low and base that we rejoice in this cruel war, because it makes our profits larger. God help us.

But what shall be said of us as a nation, if for the profit and gain of greedy men we add to war's horrors and increase its roll of dead? What shall be said of our honesty as a Government if we take sides while pretending to be fair and neutral? Dare we pray for peace, like hypocrites, while we trade for profits in the hellish weapons of war?

ARE WE OUR BROTHERS' KEEPERS?

To hand weapons to angry, quarreling men is to invite the brand of Cain. To sell guns for gain to warring nations is

adding avarice to the crimes of lust and murder, and men who will do it are akin to demons without any of the decent instincts of the brute creation. But what shall we say of our Government, representing us all, if it permits great, brutal corporations to sell shot and shell and hellish guns without limit to England and Russia and their allies when they know that Germany and Austria can not even buy our life-giving bread and meat? If that be neutral, neutrality has two faces, and both are false. If that be international law, international law books should be burned for the benefit of cold-blooded, international lawyers who quibble while trades thrive on widows' hearts and tears. But selling arms and munitions of war to the allies under present conditions is anything but neutral. It is unfair. It is un-Christian. It is greedy. It is base and un-Christian, greedy and unfair; it is murdering for money.

We are told that it would be an unfriendly act to refuse to sell war material to England. Therefore we must permit England to violate the plainest principles of international law by stopping our ships and taking our cargoes of food sent to starving women and children in Germany, and we must at the same time keep on manufacturing and selling to England guns and powder with which to shoot us later, if, forsooth, she should conclude to take our ships as well as our cargoes, and in case we resist. Is our Government afraid of the English Navy or is it because too many of us now in office are deep in our secret hearts in favor of England and against Germany, while we profess to stand on neutral ground?

At the beginning of this war my sympathies for France and Belgium were profoundly stirred by the published reports of the desolation wrought upon the people of those countries, but it was not long before I learned the deeper meaning of the awful tragedy and that fundamentally both sides were at fault and equally at fault in permitting the spirit of greed and imperialism to shape their courses. All deserved sympathy in equal degree, for all were reaping the bitter fruit of avarice and selfishness. They were, as nations, equally sick and equally mistaken, because they had permitted blind leaders to guide them and had forgotten the justice, fraternity, and statesmanship that Christ had taught in Judea.

We have in this country many men and women who came from Germany and Austria, whose hearts beat in sympathy with their struggling countrymen and who naturally grieve to see the Government of this land of their adoption and which they love with brave devotion lending itself to the service by indirection of the enemies of their fatherland. Our fellow citizens of German and Austrian blood are among our very best. They are loyal and devoted to the Stars and Stripes and to all that our flag stands for in nationhood and in honor. They are peace-loving, justice-loving, home-loving men and women. They are Americans with all their might and all their hopes, and as Americans they have the right, for the sake of America herself and for the sake of humanity, to join with all the rest of us who think more of human beings, of broken hearts, and tears, than we do of trade and profits, in demanding that our Government should stop the sale of munitions of war to any of the nations at war. To demand it in the name of God.

Mr. FESS. I ask unanimous consent that I may revise my remarks.

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from Ohio asks unanimous consent to revise his remarks. Is there objection?

There was no objection.

Mr. HENSLEY. Mr. Chairman, the naval bill under consideration carries \$148,589,786.88, \$4,000,000 more than the bill carried in 1914. In 1913 the bill carried \$140,800,000, which was \$4,100,000 less than the bill carried last year, and in 1912 the bill reported from this committee carried \$123,000,000, which was over \$17,000,000 less than the bill in 1913. The naval appropriation bill has been increased from year to year since 1897, when it carried only \$3,003,224.03, over \$100,000,000 less than the bill now carries. Since 1899 up to the present time, a period of 16 years, we have spent on our Navy \$1,645,000,186, which represents about 50 per cent of the total volume of money in circulation in this country on the 1st of January last. It is stated that we are now spending each year on account of past wars and in preparation for wars which we all trust may never come about 70 per cent of our total revenues from every source, leaving only about 30 per cent of our revenues to be expended on the account of all the other multitude of purposes for which government is organized—for courts, for education, for public improvements, for the advancement of commerce, for agriculture, and for numerous other purposes. During the last 16 years—since 1899—Germany has spent on her navy \$1,237,915,960. For this same period of time we have spent over \$400,000,000 on our Navy more than has Germany. It is, therefore, plain that Congress has not starved the Navy. Is it fair that more than 50

per cent of the total revenues derived from all productive efforts throughout the country should be converted or perverted for destructive purposes?

If our Navy is no stronger than some gentlemen on the floor of this House would have you believe it is, then I insist that there should be an inquiry to ascertain the responsibility for the reckless expenditure of these enormous sums of money; and following the ascertainment of that fact, if it is a fact, as charged, that our Navy is inadequate, those who are responsible for this criminal waste in the disbursement of these vast sums should be held personally responsible. These same gentlemen who insist that we are wholly unprepared and that we would be entirely helpless to defend our country against an invading enemy attempt by comparison to show that our Navy is inferior to the navy of Germany. Some of the gentlemen in the Navy Department, under whose direction and supervision these vast sums are expended, profess to believe the same thing. If this is true, then these gentlemen in the Navy Department owe the American people an explanation. It certainly is an unfavorable admission on their part; and if our Navy is really inadequate, to authorize additional battleships will not promote the efficiency, as has been demonstrated by the present European conflict. It is not the battleships of Germany that has kept back the great combined fleet of England and France.

But, Mr. Chairman, as I have heretofore stated, these vast sums are appropriated from year to year without any regard to the real needs of our Navy, sacrificing the very thing in which these gentlemen appear to have such a deep interest—the adequacy of the Navy. The theory has been urged that preparedness in a military way on the part of a nation was a guaranty against war. This theory has been exploded by the European war, and if this Congress authorizes additional battleships another reason must be assigned therefor.

Many people heretofore believed the argument that preparedness prevented war, but since the naval bill was before Congress last year we have had some lessons taught us, one of which is that the doctrine of preparedness in a military way on the part of a nation as an insurance against war and a guaranty of peace is fallacious and silly. I did not believe this doctrine heretofore any more than I believe it to-day. I believed then, as I believe to-day, that preparedness on the part of a nation, like preparedness on the part of an individual, is not only calculated, but is most certain, to incite trouble and bring it about. History does not record an instance where a nation has been better prepared for war than was Germany at the outbreak of hostilities in the present European conflict. Did preparedness on the part of Germany insure peace? Not by any means. Preparedness on the part of each and all the nations involved in this titanic struggle produced, naturally enough, a feeling of apprehension, a feeling of nervousness. Each nation was alarmed over the prepared state of all the other nations, and when the first overt act was committed by one of the nations the other nations were seized with fear, and, all nations being prepared, the campaign of slaughter was precipitated throughout continental Europe. We all recall very clearly how Germany called out to Russia to quit mobilizing. The tension at that time throughout Europe was high, but Russia did not reply to the demand of Germany excepting to keep her hand on her weapon. Germany, figuratively speaking, said: "I have an automatic in my pocket; I am prepared"; and in that way, just as individuals frequently do, the weapons were drawn, the fatal shot was fired, and now all Europe is staggering from the effect of a campaign of carnage and murder, the greatest war since the dawn of creation.

Dr. David Starr Jordan a few Sundays ago, in a lecture here in Washington, declared that he was so certain that this conflagration would break out in Europe that 18 months prior to actual hostilities he went to Europe and, going from country to country, he studied conditions which, as he saw them, rendered escape from war impossible. He unhesitatingly checks the responsibility of this war up to the military people, and says that preparedness on the part of nations will as certainly eventuate in war, as certain as will two trains collide when running on parallel tracks at the same rate of speed, the tracks converging at a given point; in other words, that there is no means of escape. There was a time when individuals carried upon their person concealed weapons. It was an approved practice, and frequently men, because of trivial differences, were called upon the field of honor, and their lives went out, where nothing was involved. It was regarded as most honorable and courageous on the part of those who acted in this fashion. We know to-day that it requires more courage not to fight than it does to fight. We know to-day that it is cowardice on the part of an individual that prompts him to carry concealed weapons. The people of the Nation, when

public sentiment was properly aroused, succeeded in stamping out the last vestige of this criminal practice, and I hope and pray that at the conclusion of the present conflict in Europe mankind will be wise enough and courageous enough to turn away from this barbaric practice that prevails in Europe to-day, and that reason may be enthroned and the criminal slaughter of men, women, and children may be averted forever thereafter. But I was asked a few days ago, "Would you have this Nation recede and go backward from the place she now holds in the catalogue of nations and become a China?" I answer the question, "No"; but the difference between our state of civilization and the civilization of China is not the difference based upon gunpowder and deadly instruments of warfare, and to me it seems so silly for anyone to so construe it.

It has been said that the future and the destiny of Europe in the last week of July was in the hands of a group of men numbering not over 50, and that what they did was never known to their respective nations in any detail until after the fell Rubicon had been crossed and a world war had been precipitated. Do you suppose that those nations engaged in this present war, if they could be restored to their former state before this war broke out, would be as ready to take the fatal step now, seeing and appreciating just what their experiences would be, as they were at the beginning last summer? Do you not believe that these 50 men would desire that others should share some of the responsibility of this world's tragedy? Do you suppose, even if those responsible for this war were ready to take this grave step, that you could marshal the millions of men upon the field of slaughter to-day? In other words, do you not suppose that if one should have gone to Europe before this war broke out, and had called out in trumpet tones to those countries that you wanted so many millions of men of Germany, so many millions of men of Russia, so many millions of men of France and of England; that you wanted the very flower of the country, the kind of men by whom the race should be perpetuated—that they would have asked you for what purpose? And do you suppose, if you had advised them that you wanted these people, together with billions of property to be destroyed, simply to entail upon the children yet unborn an indebtedness the burden of which will bow their forms to the grave, that those countries would have responded? And what more is involved in this struggle? Who brought it about? What good purpose will it serve when those countries are devastated? Mr. Chairman, as I see it, it is all the result of this mad, nonsensical, idiotic rivalry that has existed for many years between the nations of the world to excel each other in armament. On a former occasion I declared that the militarists of a nation feed upon their own appetites.

I described the appetites of the militarists as a great chasm, as a great opening into which we pour millions of money annually, and that the larger the amount we pour into it the larger becomes the cavity and the more insolent it becomes when it returns for increased appropriations. Mr. Chairman, if we authorize the building of one, two, or three battleships per year the other nations would authorize a like number, and at the end of the year our positions would, relatively speaking, remain the same. It is a beautiful system of rivalry which inures to the benefit of the great supply concerns and ship-building concerns. At all times there is an interchange of ideas with reference to improvements in the navies. Our Navy will steam out from Hampton Roads with an admiral and the very flower of the Navy officering the fleet and it will visit the different ports of the world. No sooner does the fleet reach a foreign port and has cast anchor until the boats are lowered and other boats come to meet the steamers and the representatives of the foreign nations are brought aboard these great dreadnaughts. These representatives are taken on board and every courtesy is extended to them. They are assured by the treatment they receive that they are among their friends, and only incidentally are the great engines of death pointed out to them and they are told, not in so many words, but practically, that while our relations with you and your country are friendly, we desire to call your attention to our state of preparedness, so that you will know exactly what we can do to you in case of hostilities. Nor does that end the perniciousness of this practice. When the fleet has made its rounds and returns to this country it all results in what? Ere long those countries visited respond to the spirit that is disseminated and to suggestions which have been made, and those countries authorize additional increases, and then at once the representatives of this great establishment here rush to the Committee on Naval Affairs of the House and of the Senate and they point with apparent apprehension to the actions of these other nations in making increases, and then, with all the eloquence of which they are capable, they appeal to the committee to respond with increases. Nor does this tell it all.

The same class of profit-sharing individuals who are present here at every session of Congress and who are disseminating this sort of spirit throughout the nations by means of the press, these men who are urging by every means within their power that we increase the armament of this country, are present in those other nations urging them to make additional increases; and let me say here and now, Mr. Chairman, that if we had a Navy to-day twice the size of the one that we have, if no nation on the face of the earth could float a navy comparable with ours, even then, without regard to the tax burden on the masses of the people, or even the adequacy of the Navy, they would urge increases with the same vehemence and earnestness that they are to-day. Can you hope to satiate their appetites? Never, so long as the world stands. I favor an adequate Navy for defensive purposes, and for defensive purposes only, but I refuse to let those who get a profit out of the increases be the judges of what constitutes an adequate Navy.

I have maintained all the time that the state of preparedness on the part of a nation determined its degree of aggression. In other words, that if a nation was thoroughly prepared her rights would not be predicated upon equity and justice, but would be based entirely upon the country's ability to enforce those rights because of her state of preparedness. In this connection I desire to quote from the testimony of an admiral in the Navy at the hearings before our committee at the last session:

Mr. WITHERSPOON. Do nations fight to maintain their rights without any reference to whether they are as powerful or less powerful?

Admiral VREELAND. I think the aggressor is generally the more powerful nation, because he thinks there is something to gain by warring, and the other party to the contest is forced into it.

Mr. WITHERSPOON. The aggressor, according to your idea, would go into war because he thought that he could win in the war; is that your idea?

Admiral VREELAND. He would not become the aggressor if he were sure of defeat.

Mr. FARR. Will the gentleman yield?

Mr. HENSLEY. I intend to take only a few minutes to make a little statement.

Mr. FARR. The gentleman quoted Admiral Vreeland a little while ago.

Mr. HENSLEY. Very well, I will yield.

Mr. FARR. Will the gentleman state what Admiral Vreeland said in regard to the number of wars that we have had because of unpreparedness?

Mr. JOHNSON of South Carolina. That was a mere opinion.

Mr. HENSLEY. That was a mere opinion and I shall not enter into that. I have not the time nor the disposition.

And further in this connection in support of the position I took I inquired of the admiral if the Navy that this country had during the Cleveland administration would in any sense compare with the navy that Great Britain had at that time, and he answered me that it would not. I then asked him how he accounted for the fact that Great Britain acceded to our position concerning the Venezuelan dispute. He answered me that the concession of Great Britain to this country was not contingent upon the size of our Navy; that Great Britain took her time and that when she saw that our position was a just one she acceded to it, but that if we had had a stronger Navy we could have been more aggressive and insistent, but, gentlemen, a part of that statement did not remain in the hearings after his testimony was audited. Statesmanship, based upon common sense and not militarism based upon a tax-burdened people, is what we need. Secretary Bryan when delivering the conclusion of this Government upon the California alien-land proposition, was asked, "Mr. Secretary, is this your last word?" The Secretary replied, "Baron Chinda, there is no last word between friends." If Secretary Bryan does nothing more to distinguish himself during his administration as Secretary of State, that alone is sufficient to add luster to his administration.

But, Mr. Chairman, if all these considerations should be dismissed at this time, if it is our purpose to ignore the great blood-bought opportunity that is being presented to us now to bring about an agreement between all the nations for disarmament at the conclusion of this war, if we fail to recognize the opportunity that is presented to this great Nation and refuse to appropriate a dollar toward the attainment of that cap-sheaf of all statesmanship, but stand upon the inhuman, uncivilized, and barbaric premise that a nation is only considered valuable and partial according to her state of preparedness and her ability to enforce her demands, even then it is a criminal waste at this time to appropriate the people's money for additional battleships without knowing what the conclusion of this great war in Europe shall bring forth.

The war in Europe has demonstrated that it is not the dreadnaughts which constitute the fighting efficiency of the Navy. The great combined fleets of England and France are impotent because Germany will not come out from behind her mines and

forts and wage an unequal battle against superior numbers. The submarine has so thoroughly demonstrated its superiority over the battleship that it is reported that England has instructed her officers "to steam away from the vicinity of submarines at full speed, even if it is necessary to abandon a torpedoed sister ship and its drowning crew to their own fate." Is there anyone in this body who has not discovered that it is not the dreadnaughts of Germany that prevented the battleships of Great Britain from approaching their ports, but that it is the submarines, it is the mines, it is the air craft of Germany that has prevented the allies from approaching her ports. But suppose that this war had demonstrated that battleships are the best engines of defense, which is contrary to the facts, even then we would not need additional battleships now, for the reason that at the conclusion of the present foreign war all European countries will not only be indisposed, for at least years to come, to become embroiled in another war, but it will be a physical impossibility for any of such nations to carry on another war. And further, it was admitted before our committee, that no European nation would, under any circumstances, think of sending as much as 50 per cent of her naval strength against us; and that, as a matter of fact, the aggressive nation should have a naval force 50 per cent stronger than the defensive navy, which means that one of our battleships would be equal to four battleships of a foreign navy sent against us. The situation that is presented to any thinking individual by this war in Europe makes him apprehensive as to whether this shall be a war of extermination. Yes; one side or the other will be victorious, but I am afraid there will be few left to celebrate, and certainly they will not hunger and thirst for more wars right soon. Everyone appreciates the fact, as these European nations weaken each other, that from a military standpoint, relatively, we become stronger. Our Navy is much stronger to-day, for instance, on that account; and by the time this war is ended who can tell but what we may have the strongest Navy in the world? Up to the present time, so far as reported, the loss of the various nations has been as follows:

List of men-of-war lost by belligerents from July 1, 1914, to Jan. 1, 1915.

[NOTE.—Does not include "interned" vessels.]

Type.	Number.	Name.	Tons.
ENGLAND.			
Battleships.....	3	Andacious..... Bulwark..... Formidable.....	24,000 15,000 15,000
Armored cruisers.....	3	A boukir..... Cressy..... Hogue.....	12,000 12,000 12,000
Cruisers.....	3	Hawke..... Good Hope..... Monmouth.....	7,350 14,100 9,800
Light cruisers.....	4	Amphion..... Pathfinder..... Pegasus..... Hermes.....	3,300 2,940 2,135 5,600
Auxiliary cruisers.....	2	Oceanic..... Rohilla.....	17,274 7,409
Torpedo gunboats.....	2	Niger..... Speedy.....	810 810
Destroyers.....	2	Bulfinch..... Name not given ¹	370
Submarines.....	3	2,000
Mine sweepers and trawlers.....	11	(²)
Training ship.....	1	Fishguard II.....
GERMANY.			
Armored cruisers.....	3	York..... Scharnhorst..... Gneisenau.....	9,350 11,420 11,420
Protected cruisers.....	8	Ariadne..... Koeln..... Mainz..... Hela..... Konigsberg..... Emden..... Leipzig..... Nurnberg.....	2,618 4,280 4,280 2,003 3,348 3,592 3,200 3,296
Small cruiser.....	1	Madgeburg.....	4,478
Auxiliary cruisers.....	11	Kaiser Wilhelm der Grosse ³ Cap Trafalgar ⁴ Comet..... Itolo ⁴ Rhios ⁴ Bethania ⁴ Markomannia ⁴ Spreewald ⁴ Graecia ⁴ Ophelia ⁴ Soden ⁴	18,710 18,710 977 290 150 7,548 4,505 3,899 2,753 1,153 1,150
Gunboats.....	8	Cormoran..... Iltis..... Jaguar.....	1,604 886 886

¹Ran ashore off Scottish coast.

²5, tonnage unknown; 6, tonnage, 1,301 tons.

³Sunk

⁴Captured.

List of war ships lost—Continued.

Type.	Number.	Name.	Tons.
GERMANY—continued.			
Gunboats—Continued.			
		Tiger.....	886
		Luchs.....	886
		Möwe.....	640
		Hedwig von Wissman.....	300
		Planet.....	640
Destroyers.....	9		3,953
Submarines.....	2		900
Mine layers.....	3		2,163
		Konigen Louise.....	
		Rufin.....	
		Name unknown ¹	
Battle cruiser.....		Goeben ²	22,635
Light cruiser.....		Breslau ²	4,478
RUSSIA.			
Armored cruiser.....	1	Pallada.....	7,775
Cruiser.....	1	Zhemtchug.....	3,130
Auxiliary cruiser.....	1	Frut.....	5,440
Gunboat.....	1	Donnetz.....	1,224
FRANCE.			
Gunboat.....	1	Zelée.....	636
Destroyers.....	3		298
		Mousquet.....	97
		347.....	97
		348.....	97
Submarine.....	1	Curtie.....	392
JAPAN.			
Cruiser.....	1	Takachiho.....	3,700
Destroyer.....	1		380
Torpedo boat.....	1		82
Special service.....	2		424
TURKEY.			
Battleship.....	1	Mussudveh.....	10,000
Gunboat.....	1	Burak Reis.....	502
AUSTRIA.			
Cruisers.....	2		3,937
		Kaiserin Elizabeth.....	2,264
		Zenta.....	433
Monitor.....	1	Temes.....	78
Torpedo boat.....	1		
Training ship.....	1	Beethoven.....	

¹ Captured off Havre disguised as French collier. ² Sold to Turkey.

And, furthermore, we should wait until after the close of this war before building additional battleships in order that we may in the construction of battleships if, indeed, it is then desirable or imperative, avail ourselves of all the lessons taught by this war.

We have just passed the centennial anniversary of the treaty of Ghent, a period of 100 years of peace with Great Britain, and we are living along by the side of the citizens of that country in perfect peace and harmony. We have never had a serious quarrel with Germany in our whole history. People from every country on earth have been pouring in here since this Nation was born, going into that great crucible out of which has come a type of manhood and womanhood the peer of any in the world. It seems to me that there is not only no excuse for authorizing additional battleships now, but that we should not place the stamp of approval upon this great carnage in Europe by going forward at this time.

I would be glad to see at least a million of dollars carried in this bill to promote peace, to bring about international disarmament at the conclusion of this horrible slaughter of men—one million for peace and one hundred and forty-eight million dollars for war! We should let the word go forth from this great Nation that we have the courage and manhood to do right in the midst of difficulties.

I shall ask leave to print the following letter from Lord Bryce, of England, addressed to Dr. Eliot, as follows:

Most persons in this country, speaking of England, including all those who work for peace, agree with you in deploring the vast armaments which European States have been piling up, and will hope with you that after this war they may be reduced, and safely reduced, to slender dimensions. Their existence is a constant menace to peace. They foster that spirit of militarism which has brought these horrors on the world, for they create in the great countries of the Continent a large and powerful military and naval caste which lives for war, talks and writes incessantly of war, and glorifies war as a thing good in itself.

Splendid letter, stating the situation clearly and nobly. Why can we not see it in this light and act accordingly.

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from Kentucky is recognized for 17 minutes.

[Mr. BARKLEY addressed the committee. See Appendix.]

Mr. BROWNING. Mr. Chairman, I yield two minutes to the gentleman from Oregon [Mr. SINNOTT].

Mr. SINNOTT. Mr. Chairman, I do not care to take up the time of the House this evening, the hour being so late, and so I will ask unanimous consent to extend my remarks in the Record on the question of the civil service.

The CHAIRMAN. Is there objection?

There was no objection.

Mr. PADGETT. Mr. Chairman, I move that the committee do now rise.

Mr. HENSLEY. Mr. Chairman, I have some time left, and I promised the gentleman from Pennsylvania [Mr. BAILEY] that I would yield him 10 minutes.

Mr. PADGETT. Then I withdraw the motion.

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from Pennsylvania is recognized for 10 minutes.

Mr. BAILEY. Mr. Chairman, I have neither the ability nor the disposition to discuss this measure from the technical or professional standpoint. If we are to accept the theory upon which it is drawn, there is really an end of the discussion, for it can not be doubted that the great committee which is responsible for it, and which stands behind it with what it evidently regards as an unassailable array of facts, has done its duty in accordance with those facts in fullest measure.

But I refuse to accept the theory.

I refuse to believe that any such preparation for war as it implies is necessary or even excusable.

I refuse to believe that we are promoting peace and national safety by spending almost \$150,000,000 on the Naval Establishment.

And I refuse to believe that anything in recent history has afforded justification for the notion that nations insure themselves against bloodshed and red ruin by what has come to be known as "preparedness."

In my judgment the committee has made an inglorious surrender to jingoism. It has knuckled to that noisy propaganda to which the President so recently paid his respects while addressing the Congress of the United States in this historic hall.

It is said in some quarters—

Remarked President Wilson in his annual message read before both Houses—

that we are not prepared for war. What is meant by being prepared? Is it meant that we are not ready on brief notice to put a nation in the field; a nation of men trained to arms? Of course we are not ready to do that; and we shall never be in time of peace so long as we retain our present political principles and institutions. And what is it that it is suggested we should be prepared to do? To defend ourselves against attack? We have always found means to do that, and we shall find them whenever it is necessary without calling our people away from their necessary tasks to render compulsory military service in times of peace. * * * We are at peace with all the world. No one who speaks counsel, based on fact or drawn from a just and candid interpretation of realities, can say that there is reason to fear that from any quarter our independence or the integrity of our territory is threatened. * * * We are not jealous of rivalry in the fields of commerce, or of any other peaceful achievement. We mean to live our own lives as we will; but we mean to let live. We are indeed a true friend to all the nations of the world, because we threaten none, covet the possessions of none, desire the overthrow of none. Our friendship can be accepted and is accepted without reservation, because it is offered in a spirit and for a purpose which no one need ever question or suspect. Therein lies our greatness.

But not in the estimation of the framers of the bill before us. Our greatness, as viewed by the proponents of this measure, lies in the floating fortresses which we have or design to build. It lies in the great guns which we have mounted upon these steel monsters of the deep. It lies in the caliber and the range of those guns. It lies in the fleetness of the great fighting machines which constitute our Naval Establishment.

If lies in battleships and destroyers, in submarines and floating mines, in all the paraphernalia of aggression which modern science, perverted to devilish purposes, has invented or developed. "We are champions of peace and of concord," says our great President. But who will believe us, in view of the concrete evidence supplied by this monstrous diversion of the people's substance into the enginery of destruction? Who will believe that we are indeed the champions of peace and of concord when we are straining the credit of the Nation in a mad competition for naval supremacy? Who will accept the views of President Wilson and his reassuring words when the Congress of the United States goes deliberately about belying them in a fashion so cynical and so unashamed?

Mr. Chairman, the country, owing to the unparalleled conflict across the seas, is facing what it has not before faced in many years. It is facing a huge and menacing deficit in the public revenues. According to estimates made by the highest authorities in the Government, this shortage in revenue will approximate \$80,000,000. It may run beyond that great figure. Our customs receipts have enormously declined as a direct and inevitable consequence of the war. This decline would have been realized even had the tariff remained in force which the Democrats found in operation when they succeeded to the control of government. There never was before such complete exclusion of foreign competition with home industries as we have to-day. It is all but absolute. Protectionists in their wildest dreams never had in contemplation any such interference with com-

merce as war has effected. They never sought by any audacity of legislation so utter an embargo on foreign goods as we have had during the last six months. Yet, are they happy? Far from it. Never before were they more critical, more captious, more uncandid in dealing with the facts or less amenable to reason and common sense in considering cause and effect.

With a tenacity worthy of a better cause they stick to it that the Underwood tariff and not the war has depleted our revenues at the ports of entry. With calm disdain of the facts they ignore the circumstance that imports of dutiable goods have practically ceased, not on account of anything a Democratic Congress has done, but by reason of the disjointed condition of commerce resulting from the great struggle among nations.

This bill disregards the state of the Public Treasury as it disregards the state of the world at this moment as a result of the very "preparedness" which it is designed to afford the United States. It is drawn, not according to our means, but to fit the excitement of gentlemen who have wrought themselves up to a wonderful pitch of apprehension over imaginary foes. It is not a bill for national defense, because no one is threatening us. It is a bill for national aggression, because it can mean nothing else in the absence of danger from without. It is not a protective measure or a preventive measure, since we have seen that warships do not protect nor do dreadnaughts ward off trouble. On the contrary, we have seen in the light of battle flames covering half of Europe that they are a provocative of war, a certain incentive to strife, a constant and irresistible temptation to the exercise of force.

Mr. Chairman, in speaking on this floor last year on this general subject of preparedness I ventured to urge that we should learn to think in terms of peace rather than in those of war. It seems to me that we dwell altogether too much on the idea that some day we are going to run into trouble. Was not that the besetting weakness of the old-time bad man of the border? Was it not his practice to go loaded? And was it not his invariable fate either to kill some one or to be killed himself? Did the knife in his belt or the gun in his hip pocket ever really avert the trouble of which he was apprehensive? Did they not, in fact, stand as a guaranty that sooner or later he would come up with it and either die with his boots on or see to it that the other fellow did?

It is one of the melancholy results of the jingoistic agitation in which the gentleman from Massachusetts [Mr. GARDNER] has borne so conspicuous a part that it has inflamed the school children of the land with his own mistaken zeal for military expansion. All over the country boys and girls who ought to be thinking the thoughts of peace and dreaming of a future unvexed by war's alarms are engrossed in the literature of "preparedness" and steeped in the idea that patriotism means sword thrust and shrieking shell. Yet the highest patriotism is that which keeps the peace. The highest patriotism is that which appeals to reason and brotherly love and Christian forbearance rather than to the arbitrament of arms. He is no patriot who stirs racial prejudice, national jealousy, or commercial rivalry into flames of hatred. He is no patriot who teaches the youth of the land that it is more glorious to die for one's country than to live for it. The patriotism of a Franklin or of a Jefferson shines with a finer radiance than that of the fire eater who conjures with the sword and makes a fetish of the flag. We need patriotism, but not that sort which expresses itself in drum beats and bugle blasts. The patriotism we need is the patriotism which in the still small voice speaks to us of the golden rule and of the Sermon on the Mount.

Mr. Chairman, I am sincerely and unaffectedly sorry that a Democratic Congress is to become responsible for this monstrous appeal to force, for it is such an appeal and nothing else. We may gloss the fact over as we will, yet it remains a fact. It emphasizes an abandonment on our part of a traditional policy. It gives fresh notice to the world that we are of it in its suspicions and its turmoils and that what concerns it concerns us. This preparation of ours serves notice on it that it must watch its steps lest it trespass on forbidden ground. The pretense that this is not so is too flimsy to deceive anyone. All the peoples of the earth read in our busy augmentation of physical force a definite change of policy, a policy Democrats most justly denounced, only to adopt it themselves when the big stick dropped from the hand which had so long and so vigorously brandished it in the face of civilization.

When I became a Member of this body it was with the hope that I might have some small part in changing this policy for a better. I had hoped that my party and its leaders would set their faces against the doctrine of force. I had hoped and believed that they would set a new high mark of economy in public expenditures and in the encouragement of international dis-

armament. But here we find them outdoing even the Republicans in jingoistic enterprise and in profligate preparations for anticipated trouble which we infallibly invite by the preparation. And we may well pause to ask ourselves what the judgment of our countrymen and of posterity will be.

The CHAIRMAN. The Clerk will read.

The Clerk read as follows:

Be it enacted, etc., That the following sums be, and they are hereby, appropriated, to be paid out of any money in the Treasury not otherwise appropriated, for the naval service of the Government for the year ending June 30, 1916, and for other purposes.

Mr. PADGETT. Mr. Chairman, I move that the committee do now rise.

The motion was agreed to.

Accordingly the committee rose; and Mr. SAUNDERS having assumed the chair as Speaker pro tempore, Mr. HAY, Chairman of the Committee of the Whole House on the state of the Union, reported that that committee had had under consideration the bill H. R. 20975, the naval appropriation bill, and had come to no resolution thereon.

LEAVE OF ABSENCE.

By unanimous consent, leave of absence was granted as follows:

To Mr. GILL for one week, on account of death in his family.

To Mr. MORGAN of Louisiana, indefinitely, on account of illness in his family.

ADJOURNMENT.

Mr. PADGETT. Mr. Speaker, I move that the House do now adjourn.

The motion was agreed to; accordingly (at 10 o'clock and 58 minutes p. m.) the House, under its previous order, adjourned until 11 o'clock a. m. Saturday, January 30, 1915.

EXECUTIVE COMMUNICATIONS, ETC.

Under clause 2 of Rule XXIV, executive communications were taken from the Speaker's table and referred as follows:

1. Letter from the Acting Secretary of the Treasury, transmitting copy of a communication of the Secretary of War, submitting supplemental estimate of appropriations for the service of the War Department for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1916 (H. Doc. No. 1529); to the Committee on Appropriations and ordered to be printed.

2. Letter from the Acting Secretary of Labor, transmitting list of papers in the Department of Labor of no use in the transaction of current business and having no permanent or historical value (H. Doc. No. 1530); to the Committee on Disposition of Useless Executive Papers and ordered to be printed.

3. Letter from the Secretary of the Treasury, transmitting report showing the number of documents received and distributed by the Treasury Department during the calendar year ended December 31, 1914, together with the number remaining on hand January 1, 1915 (H. Doc. No. 1531); to the Committee on Printing and ordered to be printed.

REPORTS OF COMMITTEES ON PUBLIC BILLS AND RESOLUTIONS.

Under clause 2 of Rule XIII, bills and resolutions were severally reported from committees, delivered to the Clerk, and referred to the several calendars therein named, as follows:

Mr. TEN EYCK, from the Committee on the Library, to which was referred the concurrent resolution (S. Con. Res. 28) accepting the statue of George Washington Glick, presented by the State of Kansas, and tendering thanks of Congress therefor, reported the same without amendment, accompanied by a report (No. 1337), which said concurrent resolution and report were referred to the House Calendar.

Mr. FERRIS, from the Committee on the Public Lands, to which was referred the bill (S. 5734) to extend the provisions of an act entitled "An act to provide for an enlarged homestead," approved February 19, 1909, to the State of Kansas, reported the same without amendment, accompanied by a report (No. 1338), which said bill and report were referred to the Committee of the Whole House on the state of the Union.

PUBLIC BILLS, RESOLUTIONS, AND MEMORIALS.

Under clause 3 of Rule XXII, bills, resolutions, and memorials were introduced and severally referred as follows:

By Mr. NEELY of West Virginia: A bill (H. R. 21237) to incorporate the Seventh-Day Baptist General Conference; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

By Mr. HAYES: A bill (H. R. 21238) to suspend the requirements of law as to annual assessments and final proof under

certain conditions; to the Committee on Irrigation of Arid Lands.

By Mr. J. R. KNOWLAND: A bill (H. R. 21239) to increase the limit of cost of the site of a Federal building at Oakland, Cal.; to the Committee on Public Buildings and Grounds.

By Mr. MANAHAN: Joint resolution (H. J. Res. 411) for the appointment of a joint committee to investigate the fluctuations and control of the price of wheat and flour and the methods and practices of doing business on grain and cotton exchanges, and for other purposes; to the Committee on Rules.

By Mr. ANDERSON: Resolution (H. Res. 715) requiring the Attorney General to make an investigation of the prices of cattle and hogs and other farm products; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

PRIVATE BILLS AND RESOLUTIONS.

Under clause 1 of Rule XXII, private bills and resolutions were introduced and severally referred as follows:

By Mr. CLAYPOOL: A bill (H. R. 21240) to remove the charge of desertion from the military record of David Hart; to the Committee on Military Affairs.

By Mr. COOPER: A bill (H. R. 21241) granting an increase of pension to George D. Hart; to the Committee on Invalid Pensions.

By Mr. FAIRCHILD: A bill (H. R. 21242) granting an increase of pension to Henry Peckham; to the Committee on Invalid Pensions.

By Mr. GUERNSEY: A bill (H. R. 21243) granting an increase of pension to Henry O. Nickerson; to the Committee on Invalid Pensions.

Also, a bill (H. R. 21244) granting an increase of pension to Oliver C. Smith; to the Committee on Invalid Pensions.

By Mr. HAMILTON of New York: A bill (H. R. 21245) granting an increase of pension to John Groat; to the Committee on Invalid Pensions.

Also, a bill (H. R. 21246) granting an increase of pension to Joseph H. Steel; to the Committee on Invalid Pensions.

By Mr. HAWLEY: A bill (H. R. 21247) granting an increase of pension to Peter A. Bender; to the Committee on Invalid Pensions.

By Mr. KETTNER: A bill (H. R. 21248) for the relief of Cyrus F. Goddard; to the Committee on Claims.

By Mr. LONERGAN: A bill (H. R. 21249) granting a pension to Matilda Myer; to the Committee on Pensions.

By Mr. NEELY of West Virginia: A bill (H. R. 21250) for the relief of Henry Borman; to the Committee on Military Affairs.

By Mr. SELLS: A bill (H. R. 21251) granting an increase of pension to John F. Hatley; to the Committee on Invalid Pensions.

Also, a bill (H. R. 21252) granting an increase of pension to William C. Ward; to the Committee on Invalid Pensions.

By Mr. SAMUEL W. SMITH: A bill (H. R. 21253) for the relief of Mary H. Marshall; to the Committee on War Claims.

By Mr. STEPHENS of California: A bill (H. R. 21254) granting an increase of pension to Viola R. Brackett; to the Committee on Invalid Pensions.

By Mr. STONE: A bill (H. R. 21255) granting a pension to Agatha Litchfield; to the Committee on Invalid Pensions.

By Mr. BRUCKNER: A bill (H. R. 21256) granting an increase of pension to William H. Terwilliger; to the Committee on Invalid Pensions.

PETITIONS, ETC.

Under clause 1 of Rule XXII, petitions and papers were laid on the Clerk's desk and referred as follows:

By Mr. ALLEN: Petition of Polish Alliance, Branch No. 19, Cincinnati, Ohio, protesting against restriction of immigration; to the Committee on Immigration and Naturalization.

Also, memorial of Ohio Cannery Association, approving adoption of the "most-favored nation" clause in tariff legislation; to the Committee on Ways and Means.

By Mr. ASHBROOK: Petition of Pattern Makers' League of North America, favoring the passage of the Smith-Burnett immigration bill; to the Committee on Immigration and Naturalization.

Also, petition of F. H. Smalley and 15 other citizens of Jeromesville, Ohio, protesting against legislation prohibiting the Government from printing stamped envelopes; to the Committee on the Post Office and Post Roads.

Also, petition of Penton Publishing Co., of Cleveland, Ohio, protesting against the passage of the Government shipping bill; to the Committee on the Merchant Marine and Fisheries.

By Mr. BAILEY: Petition of John Sobuskee Society, Croyl Township, Pa., protesting against passage of the immigration bill (H. R. 6060); to the Committee on Immigration and Naturalization.

Also, petitions of S. A. Nelson, Patton; Will Dunmire, Johnstown; and C. P. Campbell, Duncansville, all in the State of Pennsylvania, protesting against the Fitzgerald amendment to the Post Office appropriation bill, relative to freedom of the press; to the Committee on the Post Office and Post Roads.

By Mr. BARTHOLDT: Petitions of Men's Society of Central Verein and Young Men's Society of Central Verein, of Florissant; Catholic Knights of America, branch 400, of Kirkwood; branch 240, of Manchester; branch 309, branch 407, branch 552, branch 556, branch 847, branch 950, branch 1025, branch 1042, branch 1048, and branch 1052, of St. Louis; Thomas F. Golden, George G. Ernst, E. L. Ryan, L. L. Ryan, C. A. Watson, G. Fieberger, also of St. Louis, all in the State of Missouri, praying to give the President authority to take steps to protect the sisters and Catholic priests in Mexico and protesting against the publication called the Menace; to the Committee on the Post Office and Post Roads.

Also, petitions of Stadtverband German-American Alliance, of Watertown, Wis.; William H. Tatge, Arnold H. Ehle, and Louis Brahmstadt, of Chicago, Ill.; Gottlieb Traut, of Rosebud, Mo.; Anton Streicher, Louis Streicher, and William Streicher, of Wellston, Mo.; Joe Diem, of Webster Groves, Mo.; and A. A. Weber, Glencoe, Mo., favoring a bill providing for the prohibition of the manufacture and sale of arms and munitions of war for the belligerent nations of Europe; to the Committee on Foreign Affairs.

Also, petitions of 51 citizens of St. Louis, Mo., favoring a bill providing for the prohibition of the manufacture and sale of arms and munitions of war for the belligerent nations of Europe; to the Committee on Foreign Affairs.

Also, petitions of citizens of Mankato and vicinity, of Minnesota; Catholic Union State League of Missouri, of St. Louis, Mo.; citizens of Quincy, Cal.; mass meeting of citizens of Pittsburgh, Pa.; Young Men's Sodality of Florissant, Mo.; Western Catholic Union State League, of St. Louis County, Mo.; and German Theater Society, of St. Louis, Mo., in favor of a bill providing for the prohibition of the manufacture and sale of arms and munitions of war for the belligerent nations of Europe; to the Committee on Foreign Affairs.

By Mr. BEAKES: Petitions of the German Landweher Verein, Jackson; the Vestry of St. Emanuel's Lutheran Church, Ypsilanti; Leonard Hasley and 22 citizens of Maybee, all in the State of Michigan, protesting against the shipment of arms to foreign countries; to the Committee on Foreign Affairs.

Also, petition of Chancy W. Rickerd and 96 citizens of Manitou Beach, Mich., urging Congress to invite all nations to join the United States in a world federation; to the Committee on Foreign Affairs.

Also, petition of the Ladies of Luther, Castle No. 1, Auxiliary to Knights of Luther; Oliver Cromwell Castle, No. 3, Jackson, Mich., in opposition to House bill 20644, relative to freedom of the press; to the Committee on the Post Office and Post Roads.

By Mr. CARY: Petition of Ed Marx, Gust Marx, George Laumer, George Balzer, Henry Schwarting, Henry Boll, Frank Kaemph, Frank Weber, and 60 others, all residents of Milwaukee County, Wis., urging and indorsing the passage of House joint resolution 377, to prohibit export of arms; to the Committee on Foreign Affairs.

By Mr. DALE: Petition of the Iron City Central Trades Council, of Pittsburgh, Pa., favoring passage of the immigration bill (H. R. 6060); to the Committee on Immigration and Naturalization.

By Mr. DILLON: Petition of citizens of McCook County and other citizens of South Dakota, protesting against export of war material by United States; to the Committee on Foreign Affairs.

Also, petition of citizens of Brule County, S. Dak., protesting against amendment to the Post Office appropriation bill by Mr. FITZGERALD, of New York, relating to exclusion of certain matters from the mail; to the Committee on the Post Office and Post Roads.

By Mr. DONOVAN: Petition of citizens of Connecticut, favoring House joint resolution 377, to forbid export of arms; to the Committee on Foreign Affairs.

By Mr. EAGAN: Memorial of mass meeting of citizens of Louisiana German-American Alliance, of Los Angeles, Cal., and citizens of Mankato and vicinity, protesting against export of war material by the United States; to the Committee on Foreign Affairs.

Also, memorial of Philadelphia (Pa.) Bourse, protesting against the passage of the ship-purchase bill (H. R. 18666); to the Committee on the Merchant Marine and Fisheries.

By Mr. ESCH: Petition of German-American Alliance, La Crosse, Wis., protesting against export of war material by the United States; to the Committee on Foreign Affairs.

By Mr. GALLIVAN: Petition of Bay State Automobile Association, favoring Adamson bill to eliminate discrimination against motorists; to the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce.

By Mr. GRAHAM of Pennsylvania: Petition of J. S. Louis & Son, of Philadelphia, Pa., favoring an embargo on wheat; to the Committee on Foreign Affairs.

Also, memorial of Philadelphia Bourse, protesting against the passage of the ship-purchase bill (H. R. 18666); to the Committee on the Merchant Marine and Fisheries.

By Mr. JACOWAY: Petitions of S. N. Evans and Mr. and Mrs. Charles F. Roberts, of Little Rock, Ark., protesting against amendment to Post Office appropriation bill relative to freedom of press; to the Committee on the Post Office and Post Roads.

By Mr. KEISTER: Petition of 42 persons of Butler, Pa., favoring the passage of House joint resolution 377, prohibiting the shipment of arms and ammunition to warring nations of Europe; to the Committee on Foreign Affairs.

By Mr. KIESS of Pennsylvania: Evidence in support of House bill 20919, for the relief of Edward H. Dalton; to the Committee on Pensions.

Also, evidence in support of House bill 21048, for the relief of Anna Harleman; to the Committee on Invalid Pensions.

By Mr. McCLELLAN: Petition of Herbert L. Rickard, pastor Presbyterian Church, Hudson, N. Y.; Mrs. O. S. Griffin, county superintendent Mercy Woman's Christian Temperance Union; M. Catherine Allen, Mount Lebanon; Frederick Du Bois, of Highland, N. Y.; urging support and passage at this session of the Palmer-Owen child-labor bill; to the Committee on Labor.

Also, petition of Augustus Kohler and 123 others, of Kingston; Howard Moshier and Frederick Letzner, of Ellenville, N. Y.; favoring prohibition of export of arms, etc., by United States; to the Committee on Foreign Affairs.

Also, petition of Rev. Walter W. Reid and 52 others, of Monticello, N. Y., urging passage of Palmer-Owen bill; to the Committee on Labor.

By Mr. MOORE: Memorial of interdenominational meeting held at Friends' Meeting House, West Philadelphia, Pa., protesting against any increase in the armed strength of the United States; to the Committee on Military Affairs.

By Mr. MORIN (by request): Petition of citizens and organizations of Pennsylvania, favoring embargo on export of arms; to the Committee on Foreign Affairs.

Also (by request), petition of St. Michael's Polish Society, of Pittsburgh, Pa., against restriction of immigration; to the Committee on Immigration and Naturalization.

Also (by request), petition of meeting of Friends, Philadelphia, Pa., against increased appropriations for the Army; to the Committee on Military Affairs.

Also (by request), petition of priests of Scranton (Pa.) diocese and J. J. Curran, of Wilkes-Barre, Pa., against passage through the mails of certain publications; to the Committee on the Post Office and Post Roads.

By Mr. NEELY of West Virginia: Petition of Local Union No. 119, International Brotherhood of Blacksmiths, urging a satisfactory solution of the matter of employing American citizens in the various departments of the work on the Panama Canal in preference to aliens; to the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce.

Also, papers to accompany a bill for relief of Henry Borman; to the Committee on Military Affairs.

By Mr. RAKER: Petition of F. L. Rector, E. A. Stewart, and H. Montgomery, of Summit, Cal., against Fitzgerald amendment to Post Office appropriation bill; to the Committee on the Post Office and Post Roads.

Also, petition of Board of Supervisors of Solano County, Cal., and Women's Civic Club of Eureka, Cal., favoring civil-service retirement; to the Committee on Reform in the Civil Service.

Also, petition of J. Shillinger, D. S. McCarthy, C. F. Merkle, H. E. Sonntag, and E. B. Powers, of Chicago Park; Franz Fritsche, of Sonora; John A. Schroeder and others, of Mariposa, all in the State of California, and citizens of New Orleans, La., against export of arms; to the Committee on Foreign Affairs.

By Mr. REILLY of Connecticut: Petition of the Bridgeport (Conn.) Hardware Manufacturing Corporation and the S. S. Thompson Co., of New Haven, Conn., protesting against the

passage of the ship-purchase bill (H. R. 18666); to the Committee on the Merchant Marine and Fisheries.

Also, memorial of 5,000 persons of the Order of the D. O. H. of Connecticut; Court Schiller, No. 117, F. of A., of Meriden, Conn.; and Windhorst Benevolent Society, of Meriden, protesting against export of arms, etc., by United States; to the Committee on Foreign Affairs.

By Mr. SABATH: Petitions of sundry Polish societies of the State of Illinois, protesting against the passage of the Smith-Burnett immigration bill; to the Committee on Immigration and Naturalization.

By Mr. SCULLY: Petition of citizens of Perth Amboy, N. J., favoring House joint resolution 377, to prohibit export of arms; to the Committee on Foreign Affairs.

Also, petition of Mercer County (N. J.) Branch of American Federation of Catholic Societies, against use of the mails by publication called the Menace; to the Committee on the Post Office and Post Roads.

By Mr. STEPHENS of California: Petition of 150 citizens of Los Angeles, Cal., protesting against Senate bill 6865, prohibiting sale of liquors in District of Columbia; to the Committee on the District of Columbia.

By Mr. STEPHENS of Texas: Memorial of the Memphis (Tex.) Commercial Club, favoring Federal aid in building a national highway from the Gulf of Mexico to Denver, Colo., via Memphis, Tex.; to the Committee on Roads.

By Mr. THACHER: Memorial of board of trustees of the German Baptist Church of Boston, Mass., favoring passage of bill to prohibit export of war material; to the Committee on Foreign Affairs.

By Mr. VOLLMER: Petitions of 880 American citizens for the adoption of House joint resolution 377, to prohibit the export of war material; to the Committee on Foreign Affairs.

By Mr. YOUNG of North Dakota: Memorial of German-American Alliance of Gladstone, N. Dak., favoring resolution to prohibit export of war material; to the Committee on Foreign Affairs.

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES.

SATURDAY, January 30, 1915.

The House was called to order at 11 o'clock a. m. by Mr. UNDERWOOD, as Speaker pro tempore.

The Chaplain, Rev. Henry N. Couden, D. D., offered the following prayer:

O Lord, our Lord, how excellent is Thy name in all the earth, who hast set Thy glory above the heavens.

Help us, we pray Thee, to set our glory above the material, that we may rise out of the eating, drinking, counting man into the realms of the higher values; that truth may be stronger than wealth, nobility of soul than the plaudits of men, righteousness than temporal power; that our souls may touch the Eternal Soul and bring us into perfect harmony with the eternal fitness of things, after the manner of the Christ. And Thine be the praise forever. Amen.

The Journal of the proceedings of yesterday was read and approved.

SEGREGATION OF RACES IN STREET CARS.

Mr. WALTERS. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that I may have three legislative days in which to file a minority report on the bill (H. R. 1718) to require all transportation companies, firms, and persons within the District of Columbia to provide separate accommodations for the white and negro races and to prescribe punishments and penalties for violating its provisions (H. Rept. 1340, pt. 2).

The SPEAKER pro tempore. The gentleman from Pennsylvania [Mr. WALTERS] asks unanimous consent that he may have three legislative days in which to file a minority report on the bill H. R. 1718. Is there objection?

There was no objection.

WILBER H. ESTEY.

Mr. LLOYD. Mr. Speaker, I present the following privileged resolution from the Committee on Accounts.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. The gentleman from Missouri [Mr. LLOYD] presents a privileged resolution from the Committee on Accounts, which the Clerk will report.

The Clerk read as follows:

House resolution 686 (H. Rept. 1339).

Whereas Wilber H. Estey was the clerk of the Hon. Edwin A. Merritt, jr., late a Member of the United States House of Representatives from the thirty-first district of the State of New York, and is not entitled to compensation under the law as such clerk after the death of the said Hon. Edwin A. Merritt, jr.: Therefore be it