

CONFIRMATIONS

Executive nominations confirmed by the Senate July 2 (legislative day of June 27), 1953:

MUNICIPAL COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

Leonard P. Walsh, of the District of Columbia, to be Chief Judge of the Municipal Court for the District of Columbia.

Edward A. Beard, of the District of Columbia, to be an Associate Judge of the Municipal Court for the District of Columbia.

Mildred Emily Reeves, of the District of Columbia, to be an Associate Judge of the Municipal Court for the District of Columbia.

IN THE ARMY

Maj. Gen. Cortlandt Van Rensselaer Schuyler, O14905, Army of the United States (brigadier general, U. S. Army), for appointment as Chief of Staff, Supreme Headquarters, Allied Powers, Europe, with rank of lieutenant general, and as lieutenant general in the Army of the United States, under the provisions of sections 504 and 515 of the Officer Personnel Act of 1947.

WITHDRAWAL

Executive nomination withdrawn from the Senate July 2 (legislative day of June 27), 1953:

OFFICE OF PRICE STABILIZATION

Joseph H. Freehill, Director of the Office of Price Stabilization.

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

THURSDAY, JULY 2, 1953

The House met at 10 o'clock a. m.

Rev. John Donaho, minister, First Methodist Church, Corpus Christi, Tex., offered the following prayer:

Eternal God, our Father, we lift our hearts unto Thee in gratitude for the potential freedom that Thou hast given to all mankind.

Grant unto these who represent the people of our Nation a new consciousness of Thy creative power. May their minds be sensitive to truth. May courage and integrity possess them. May confidence undergird them. May they seek and find justice tempered by mercy, righteousness tempered by humility, conviction tempered by understanding.

Grant unto all of us the vision of citizenship in Thy kingdom. Strengthen our faith that we may assume the calculated risk involved in progress.

To Thee be honor and glory, world without end. Amen.

The Journal of the proceedings of yesterday was read and approved.

MESSAGE FROM THE SENATE

A message from the Senate, by Mr. Carrell, one of its clerks, announced that the Senate had passed, with an amendment in which the concurrence of the House is requested, a bill of the House of the following title:

H. R. 5710. An act to amend further the Mutual Security Act of 1951, as amended, and for other purposes.

The message also announced that the Senate insists upon its amendment to the foregoing bill, requests a conference

with the House on the disagreeing votes of the two Houses thereon, and appoints Mr. WILEY, Mr. SMITH of New Jersey, Mr. HICKENLOOPER, Mr. KNOWLAND, Mr. GEORGE, Mr. GREEN, and Mr. SPARKMAN to be the conferees on the part of the Senate.

CALL OF THE HOUSE

Mr. SMITH of Wisconsin. Mr. Speaker, I make the point of order that a quorum is not present.

The SPEAKER. Obviously a quorum is not present.

Mr. TABER. Mr. Speaker, I move a call of the House.

A call of the House was ordered.

The Clerk called the roll, and the following Members failed to answer to their names:

[Roll No. 74]

Bentley	Gathings	O'Konski
Bonner	Hale	Phillips
Brooks, La.	Hart	Rayburn
Celler	Heller	Reed, Ill.
Colmer	Hillelson	Regan
Condon	Hinshaw	Richards
Curtis, Mass.	Hoffman, Mich.	Rivers
Dawson, Ill.	James	Shafer
Dies	Kearney	Sheehan
Dingell	Lucas	Smith, Kans.
Dolliver	McVey	Teague
Durham	Mack, Ill.	Vursell
Ellsworth	Miller, N. Y.	Wigglesworth
Engle	Morrison	Wilson, Ind.
Fogarty	Moulder	Wolcott
Gamble	O'Brien, Ill.	

The SPEAKER. On this rollcall 374 Members have answered to their names, a quorum.

By unanimous consent, further proceedings under the call were dispensed with.

COMMITTEE ON AGRICULTURE

Mr. HOPE. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that the Committee on Agriculture may have until midnight tonight to file a report on H. R. 4353.

The SPEAKER. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Kansas?

There was no objection.

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AND RELATED INDEPENDENT AGENCIES APPROPRIATION BILL, 1954

Mr. SCRIVNER. Mr. Speaker, I move that the House resolve itself into the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union for the further consideration of the bill (H. R. 5969) making appropriations for the Department of Defense and related independent agencies for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1954, and for other purposes.

The motion was agreed to.

Accordingly the House resolved itself into the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union for the further consideration of the bill H. R. 5969, with Mr. ALLEN of Illinois in the chair. The Clerk read the title of the bill.

The CHAIRMAN. When the Committee rose on yesterday the Clerk had read down to and including line 3 on page 8 of the bill.

Mr. SUTTON. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike out the last word.

Mr. Chairman, this morning I received a telegram from the Nashville Banner, of Nashville, Tenn., quoting an article

they had received from the PIO at Fort Campbell, Ky. This telegram was printed in full in the Nashville Banner yesterday. After receiving this telegram this morning I received three long-distance telephone calls from my district in Tennessee, from mothers whose sons had been drafted and are now in Korea, complaining about such activity by the Army.

The telegram is as follows:

The following story printed as received from Fort Campbell PIO:

"FORT CAMPBELL, July 1.—Candlelight, soft music, and Dubonnet decor will introduce Major William R. Finks to Fort Campbell officers and their ladies.

"Officially titled secretary of officers' clubs, Major Finks has the job of facelifting the country club and main officers' club. His first project is the Dubonnet room which grandly opens tomorrow evening. Gift cocktails will accompany the Dubonnet room's debut and coupled with its elaborate menu. The opening is guaranteed to please. "The New York supper club atmosphere will not interfere with the room's utility for cafeteria styled breakfast and lunch will be served at the appropriate hours.

"Thusly, does Major Finks and the main officers' club manager, Capt. Charles D. Baker, tee off on a general plan of renovation. The Mardi Gras bar of the main club is next on the list. The plans include interior decoration and nightly small combo music. With the bar's completion, Major Finks will move to the ballroom and the talk is of week-end dances set in original decorations.

"The major has a background of Army shows and entertainment. His plans for the Fort Campbell clubs are ambitious, but formulated to please and entertain. A 2-weeks booking of Mr. Music, presently the star of Nashville's Plantation Club, is an example of his efforts to these ends."

BANNER STATE DESK.

That article appeared in the Nashville Banner. It is a press release from the public information officer at Fort Campbell, Ky. A large part of Fort Campbell, Ky., is in my district in the State of Tennessee. As I say, I received three long-distance calls from my district, from mothers who have boys in Korea who were drafted and are now over there fighting. Mr. Chairman, I do not know how much of the money in this appropriation bill goes to pay majors and captains and colonels who are carrying on activities of this kind—I do not know. The members of the Committee on Appropriations do know. If perchance in this appropriation bill we are providing money to pay the salaries of people who are in the Army just to improve cocktail lounges, Dubonnet decor, and install Mardi Gras bars, while other boys are in Korea fighting, I think we should cut this appropriation. However, I think the reduction should be left to the appropriate committee, and the Committee on Appropriations, I am sure, has studied this matter. I agree with those three mothers—I do not like to see a major in the Army designated only to carry on the building up of an officers' club with free cocktails and carrying out such tactics as set out in the press release. I hope this Committee on Appropriations will cut out, and has cut out, the paying of officers' salaries in such cases.

Mr. FORD. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. SUTTON. I yield.

Mr. FORD. In answer to the gentleman from Tennessee, first, I believe, there is a legitimate objection to the inclusion of funds for public information officers along the line of releases that the gentleman has indicated.

Mr. SUTTON. That is right.

Mr. FORD. For the gentleman's information, our subcommittee unanimously has agreed to close down the Fort Slocum Public Information Training School so that we are not training people to issue press releases of that sort and press releases of a related nature.

Secondly, I do not think we can condone nor do I believe we should condone the assignment of officers for functions such as the gentleman has described.

Mr. SUTTON. I agree and I hope the committee will do something about it.

Mr. SIKES. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. SUTTON. I yield.

Mr. SIKES. I think the gentleman from Tennessee is to be commended for calling this situation to the attention of the House. Secondly, we should put first things first. We are in a war in Korea, which has not been won. As a matter of fact, now we appear to be losing that war. We certainly want no part of the kind of thing that the gentleman has described. The committee should realize that the renovation of these club quarters that the gentleman has told us about comes from nonappropriated funds. It is not money that the Congress appropriates for that purpose. But a person is in charge of the place and the work is being done from those funds. I do not think we want anything like that.

Mr. SUTTON. I thank the gentleman and I agree with him wholeheartedly.

Mr. SHORT. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike out the last word.

(Mr. SHORT asked and was given permission to proceed for 5 additional minutes and to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. SHORT. Mr. Chairman, this is by far the largest appropriation bill which will be voted upon at this session of the Congress. Further, I want to congratulate this subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations under the leadership of the distinguished gentleman from Massachusetts [Mr. WIGGLESWORTH], who, we are sorry, is ill as a result of the hard work entailed in studying these matters. I congratulate the gentleman from Kansas [Mr. SCRIVNER] who is the acting chairman of the subcommittee and those members of the committee on both sides of the aisle. I happen to know something of the patience and perseverance and diligence and hard work of these men who have spent weeks and months on this most difficult subject. On the whole, I think they have done a splendid job. The first thing I would impress upon the membership of the House is how terribly big our Defense Department really is.

When the new Secretary of Defense, Mr. Charles Wilson, paid me a courtesy call at my office following his confirmation by the Senate, I told him I felt flattered and highly honored to have him call on me, and that I considered we were fortunate in having a man of his broad business experience, the head of

perhaps the largest industrial concern on the face of the earth, employing 486,000 people and doing an annual volume of business of almost \$7 billion, to head this most difficult Department of Defense that drove one man to jump out the window, another to resign, and his last predecessor to go out feeling that he had been hog-tied and hamstrung in many respects.

Mr. Chairman, the Department of Defense, as I told the Secretary, is really the biggest business on earth. I said to him, "You have been the head of General Motors, but that is really just peanuts. You are now the head of a business that employs not 486,000 people but almost 5,000,000 people; 3½ million in the armed services, 1,280,000 civilians; more civilians employed by that single Department of Defense than all of the other departments in the President's Cabinet. State, Treasury, Post Office, Interior, Commerce, Labor—all combined, they do not employ as many civilians as the single Department of Defense. And in addition to those civilians, there are 3½ million of the military. So it is a staggering establishment not only in the personnel but in the amount of funds expended."

Last year the Department of Defense spent \$3 billion more than the 19 largest, most powerful corporations in the country. Think of it—not only General Motors but Ford and Chrysler, U. S. Steel, Bethlehem Steel, Monsanto, Du Pont, International Harvester—I called the roll, and the Secretary of Defense himself was a little shocked at the words that came from this Ozark hillbilly, a jenny driver, down near the Arkansas line.

I said, "You have been dealing in peanuts. You are really in big business now, Mr. Secretary. Last year we spent almost two-thirds of all the taxpayers' money, 66 cents out of every dollar, for defense."

So it is a huge, staggering Department, not only from the standpoint of the money spent but the number of people employed.

These men on this subcommittee have had to wrestle with this problem. We realize that as long as there is unrest abroad and there are aggressors in the world, this Nation, out of sheer self-defense and the necessity for survival, must remain strong on land, sea, and in the air, regardless of the cost. Onerous as is the burden, high as are the taxes, great as is the load we are carrying to maintain a strong national defense and to make the security of this Nation sure, I think the American people are willing to dig deep into their pockets, sacrifice and suffer, as long as they feel that they are getting their money's worth.

But you cannot measure the defense of any nation in terms of dollars. You have got to measure it in the number of planes, the number of men, of ships, of guns. Of course, Soviet Russia has many more of these weapons of war and more men than we have. But we know that she does not expend nearly as much money, because most of what she gets is at a nominal price and by slave labor.

So, in judging our national defense, do not be led astray by the amount of money that is spent. The significant

thing is, Are we getting our money's worth?

I think that by wise management, by honest administration, we can cut expenditures without seriously impairing our national defense. And when you talk of national defense, do not think merely of ships and tanks and guns and planes. I want to say that the first line of defense of any nation is its financial solvency.

And what does President Eisenhower want? He wants security, but he wants security with solvency, because he knows that a bankrupt nation never licked anybody and it never will.

You can talk to Eisenhower, Marshall, MacArthur, or Bradley; you can talk to Nimitz, King, and Halsey; you can talk to Vandegrift, Cates, or Shepherd; or Spaatz, Kenny, Doolittle, all your generals and admirals will tell you that notwithstanding the heroic sacrifices and the gallant fighting men on land, sea, and in the air, that the thing after all that won World War II was America's industrial might and productive capacity.

It was in our mines, on our farms, in our factories and forests where we produced the food and the fiber to feed and clothe 12 million men and women in our own armed services as well as our civilian population, and help our allies; it was our factories, our industrial might, our mines, and the productive capacity that produced the sinews of war.

When you speak of national defense it can never be stronger than the productive capacity necessary to maintain it, and you have got to have a strong, healthy domestic economy. Military might cannot exist apart from economic strength. You have got to consider these two things together; they are one and inseparable. I certainly, as chairman of the Armed Services Committee charged with the responsibility to a great degree for the security of my country want to see us strong and invincible in every respect.

The few mornings I have been down to the White House I sat there and looked at President Eisenhower. I could almost weep. On his right is the Secretary of the Treasury, George Humphrey, and the Director of the Budget, Joe Dodge, who are doing everything in their power to cut this Government's expenses, to stop this vicious spiral of inflation, to hold down the cost of living, to balance the budget, to restore some purchasing power to the dollar. I know the pressure the President is under from the right. Then on the left you will find another group of men who want to spend more, and more, and more; and then you will run into rivalry between the different branches of the armed services.

For my own part I think that General Eisenhower is just a human being. After all, I would not claim infallibility for him, and I think he would be the last to claim it for himself. But if he does not know our military needs, he knows nothing and has no business being Commander in Chief of the United States. I know what the President wants; he wants a strong and happy America; he wants to avoid both extremes of those who want to spend too much and those

who want to spend too little. He wants to find the Aristotelian golden mean between the two extremes of bringing about some balance, some equilibrium between military might and economic power.

We all know that it was Lenin who said that this capitalist America would eventually and inevitably spend herself into bankruptcy. We know that it was Joseph Stalin, Malenkov, Voroshilov, Bulganin, and Kaganovich in the Kremlin today who are hoping that the United States will spend itself into bankruptcy. As long as they can engage us in costly wars, siphoning off the wealth of this country in economic and military aid to every nation on earth; bleed us white as far as our resources are concerned; sap our strength by piping out the oil, hewing down the forests, by depleting our mineral deposits; then if Russia can just continue to have America overextend herself and expend herself beyond hope of recovery, she is hoping for an economic collapse, a depression with widespread unemployment, with dissension among our people. Then, using the same technique that Adolf Schickelgruber, the Austrian paperhanger used, she will begin her psychological penetration. Next, subversive infiltration.

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from Missouri has expired.

Mr. COLE of Missouri. Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent that the gentleman from Missouri may proceed for 10 additional minutes.

Mr. SHORT. Two will be sufficient. I thank the membership for being so gracious and generous, but two will be sufficient.

The CHAIRMAN. Without objection, the gentleman may proceed for 2 additional minutes.

There was no objection.

Mr. SHORT. One and all, you are very gracious. This is the only time I have taken on this bill.

With the exception of 1 or 2 things I think it is a splendid bill. I am a little worried about cutting down the flying pay to 48 hours a year.

I think of Charlie McDonald and Johnny Meyer, I think of these boys who have served with greatest distinction and I do not think these boys would be alive today if they could not have kept themselves in good trim. The gentleman from Mississippi [Mr. WILLIAMS] brought this point out yesterday. I think we can work it out satisfactorily. I hope so.

Then there is an amendment that should be offered to section 631. I merely offer these interpolations for whatever they may be worth. But let me finish the thought I was on.

These men in the Kremlin are hoping that America will knock herself out by her own profligacy. We can spend ourselves into bankruptcy. A nation is no different from an individual. It cannot continue forever spending more money than it takes in without getting into serious difficulty. God help us to exercise intelligence, reason, and good sense when we consider this bill. Who can say we have been niggardly when the Congress, since the outbreak of the Korean war, has voted one hundred and fifty thousand million dollars for our national de-

fense, and with this \$34 billion-plus budget that the committee has brought in—I had hoped we might keep it at the size of the revised budget but it is only \$1,300,000,000 less, this present budget of \$34 billion, plus the carryover, will give us \$92 billion from yesterday to spend during this coming fiscal year, the present fiscal year 1954. Of course, only a little less than half of it, \$43 billion, can possibly be spent. Each Department, if you please, will have more money than it can appropriately, wisely, and profitably spend in the length of time they have to spend it.

Let us keep ourselves militarily strong, but let us realize that that military might must be based upon economic strength, that the two go together. Let us not defeat ourselves from within. I plead with the membership of this House to accept this bill as it has been brought in by the Subcommittee on Appropriations involving our national defense after many weeks, yes, several months, of long, hard, arduous, and patriotic consideration.

Mr. McCORMACK. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike out the requisite number of words and ask unanimous consent to proceed for 5 additional minutes.

The CHAIRMAN. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Massachusetts?

There was no objection.

Mr. McCORMACK. Mr. Chairman, I have listened with a great deal of interest to my friend from Missouri, not only because I like him but because he is chairman of one of the most important committees of the Congress, the Committee on the Armed Services, to which the people of the country look for the legislative enactments that will assure either a powerful national defense, a medium or a weak national defense.

There is much to what the gentleman said that nobody takes issue with. We all recognize the importance of the economic strength of our Nation in connection with our military strength. Let me observe for the benefit of my friend that his administration inherited the most prosperous situation that this country has ever enjoyed when they took over the Government on January 20, with no unemployment. If unemployment or a recession comes it might result from inept leadership in connection with interest rates. Such publications as the New York Times and the Wall Street Journal have expressed serious doubt about the policies of the present administration in connection with the increase in interest rates alone.

What is involved here is a difference of one-billion-some-odd-million dollars. Everyone who has taken the floor to oppose the 143-air-wing suggestion voted for it within the last year and a half. Within the last year and a half they voted for appropriations to build up our Air Force to 143 wings. Now, they take the opposite position. Why the change?

I was for it a year and a half ago and I am for it now. My friend from Missouri, as I remember, voted for it a year and a half ago.

Mr. SHORT. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. McCORMACK. I yield to the gentleman from Missouri.

Mr. SHORT. The gentleman from Missouri is still for it. We are not abandoning the 143 wings. We are building up to it, but we are doing it gradually, in an orderly and effective manner.

Mr. McCORMACK. Does my friend favor a stretchout that will bring it about in 1958, possibly 1959?

Mr. SHORT. In the present circumstances we want planes with combat effectiveness.

Mr. McCORMACK. All right. The gentleman has answered my question. The chairman of the Committee on Armed Services tells this country that now he favors a stretchout in the build-up of our 143 Air Force wing to 1958 or 1959.

Mr. SHORT. Now the gentleman is putting words in the mouth of the gentleman from Missouri.

Mr. McCORMACK. I beg the gentleman's pardon.

Mr. SHORT. The gentleman is putting words in my mouth.

Mr. McCORMACK. Well now, the gentleman from Massachusetts never intentionally put words into anybody's mouth.

Mr. SHORT. The gentleman from Missouri would much prefer to have 100 good fighting combat planes, with trained personnel, than to have 500 with parts that cannot be used and that would be ineffective.

Mr. McCORMACK. All right. That is a very smart observation, but it is contrary to the facts. It is amusing to me to read in the paper about Secretary Wilson and the present administration talking about actually having a 120-air-wing group. The buildup that has already taken place since January 20 and is going to take place in our Air Force during this year, 1954, and that is all due to what took place in 1951, 1952, and 1953 before the Republicans took over. How do you suppose these planes are coming out of the production line? Overnight? They started 2 years ago. The money had to be appropriated. We took the responsibility. They are coming out of the production line now, and instead of one party trying to claim credit for it, when they got it started 10, 15, and 20 months ago, we ought to give everybody credit.

Now, there is a billion one hundred-odd million dollars difference, and here with 435 Members, honest, sincere men and women, there is an honest difference of opinion. I know my friend from Missouri would like to see a 143-air-wing group by middle 1954 if he could. I know that, and I know that by 1955 my friend from Kansas, Mr. SCRIVNER, would.

Mr. SCRIVNER. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. McCORMACK. I yield to the gentleman from Kansas, since I mentioned the gentleman's name.

Mr. SCRIVNER. Sure, if it were possible. Let me make one point clear.

Mr. McCORMACK. Of course it is possible; that is the difference.

Mr. SCRIVNER. It is not possible, and I do not want to go into some of the facts at this time, but here is what I would like to say.

Mr. McCORMACK. All right, except by reason of delays, it would be possible early in 1956.

Mr. SCRIVNER. What I was going to point out is the fact that the committee has recognized and pointed out and suggested that we are getting all of combat planes for 143 wings with 1953 and prior years money. There has been no argument about that.

Mr. McCORMACK. The gentleman cannot drive down into the minds of people that you are cutting out this appropriation and you are going to get the same results. You are talking about lead time. There is some mystery. How much is the lead time reduced? Mr. Wilson was with General Motors. He helped to make the lead time. Can he make better lead time as Secretary of Defense than he could when he was president of General Motors, or chairman of the board, whatever he was? He was the head of it. Does that mean to say that his company had a longer lead time when the Democrats were in control than they can get while the Republicans are in control? If that is so then he is taking the position of showing that he was trying to delay under the Democrats, and deliberately so. But, I do not take that position and I do not say that he does.

Now, my friends, there is a difference of one billion one hundred odd million dollars. Why can we not get together on that? Why cannot both sides get together on that?

Mr. TABER. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. McCORMACK. Of course I yield.

Mr. TABER. The increase that is going to be proposed here, the Vandenberg program, is entirely in noncombat planes, and we do not need them, and that is why they are not carried in the budget.

Mr. McCORMACK. Well, now, the gentleman from New York talks about the Vandenberg plan.

Mr. TABER. I have it here.

Mr. McCORMACK. Just a minute. It is the Joint Chiefs of Staff plan.

Mr. TABER. No.

Mr. McCORMACK. Wait a minute. The Joint Chiefs of Staff agreed upon a 143 air wing group in 1950. It was agreed upon after 20 months of consideration by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. And one of the main considerations that brought about this decision was the sudden knowledge learned about that time that the Communists (Soviet Union) had developed the A-bomb. That was not something idly arrived at. They considered the 165 or 168 air wing group. Then they considered 150-odd. They finally resolved on a 143 air wing group. Then in the last Congress when the appropriations were not made for it the Senate put them into the bill. We had a dramatic fight in this House when it came back to this body and we put into the bill the appropriations to bring about a 143 air wing group by middle 1955.

If you want to take a chance, you can, but I do not want to take a chance. I am not talking as a Democrat. I am talking as an American. My friend, who is the chairman of the Committee on Armed Services, ought to be trying to

bring about harmony. His best support will be the Democratic Members of the House. The best support that President Eisenhower has on national defense and foreign affairs is not going to be his own party, it is going to be the Democratic Party. Your own party is split.

We talk about a billion-one-hundred and-some-odd-million dollars to build up speedily a 143-air-wing group. The increase in the interest rate of three-quarters of 1 percent, the arbitrary increase in the interest rate on the long-term indebtedness alone, when they are all refinanced, as they will have to be, will cost the taxpayers of this country \$525 million or more a year in interest. That was one move that is not at all necessary. It was an arbitrary increase, not responsive at all to the law of supply and demand. You raise the interest rate from 2½ percent to 3¼ percent. You are going to apply it to all the long-term issues, and that will cost \$525 million a year more in interest. Also, the interest is increased on every private loan, the interest is increased on every State, county, and city loan, and the interest is increased on mortgages for everybody, not for a year but for 20 to 30 years, the term of the bond or the mortgage. Here we are talking about \$1,100,000,000, that will assure the speedy building up of a 143-air-wing group, and they are talking about that cost when it concerns the security of the United States of America.

We have behind the Iron Curtain manifestations of a breakdown. This is the time to take advantage of it, to send a message to the world, those outside the Iron Curtain and those behind the Iron Curtain, that America is going to be strong, that if we are going to err in our judgment we are going to err on the side of strength rather than on the side of weakness.

Mr. GROSS. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike out the last word.

Mr. Chairman, there will be no politics in my remarks unless injected by someone else.

I do not know whether there is any money in this particular bill on a direct appropriation basis for the hauling of pets back and forth across the Atlantic, but indirectly we are spending a substantial amount of money in this connection. Not so long ago there came into my hands the following:

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY,
MILITARY SEA TRANSPORTATION
SERVICE, ATLANTIC AREA,
58th Street and 1st Avenue,
Brooklyn, N. Y.

COMSTSLANTAREA INSTRUCTION 4600.2
From: Commander, Military Sea Transportation Service, Atlantic Area.

Subject: Investigation of deaths of pets occurring in MSTSLANTAREA Ships; procedure for.

I am quoting only excerpts:

1. Purpose. To establish a procedure for investigating deaths which occur among pets while they are being transported in MSTSLANTAREA ships.

a. Appointment of an informal board of investigation.

Here is what happens when a pet dies aboard ship at sea, a military transport:

(1) Immediately, upon being informed that a pet has died COMILDEPT, when assigned, shall appoint an informal board to

conduct a preliminary investigation of the circumstances attending its death. Boards appointed by a COMILDEPT shall consist of three commissioned naval officers. On ships having no COMILDEPT assigned, masters shall appoint a board consisting of three licensed civilian marine officers. When available, an officer of the Medical Corps or the Army Veterinary Corps shall be appointed as a member. The junior officer shall act as recorder.

c. Disposition of pets at sea: (1) Masters shall cause the body or bodies of pets that have died while at sea from unknown causes to be wrapped securely in heavy wrapping paper and placed in a suitable box with close-fitting cover, to be retained on board under refrigeration (at a temperature of 32 degrees to 38 degrees F.) until the ship's arrival in port. Bodies of pets that have died as a result of clearly defined accident shall be properly disposed of at sea.

Mr. DAWSON of Utah. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. GROSS. It is a pleasure to yield to my friend from Utah.

Mr. DAWSON of Utah. I can appreciate the concern that the owners of these pets would have over the death of a pet. I am wondering if there is anything there with regard to notifying them if such a death takes place.

Mr. GROSS. I thank the gentleman for his question. The answer is under report of death by message, we find the following:

(1) The master shall report deaths of pets when occurring and appointment of an informal board of investigation to COMSTSLANTAREA by deferred radio message.

Mr. HAYS of Ohio. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. GROSS. I yield.

Mr. HAYS of Ohio. Will the gentleman tell us the date of that communication?

Mr. GROSS. The date of the communication is October 1952.

Mr. HAYS of Ohio. I thought it was pretty old—I just wanted to make sure.

Mr. GROSS. I am sure the gentleman understands that like many other instructions or regulations issued during the Truman administration it often takes time to bring them to light.

The next item is format of report of formal investigation. It is as follows:

4. Format of report of an informal investigation:

a. The format shall be in letter form to COMSTSLANTAREA. The first paragraph should set out a chronological history of the investigation, viz:

(1) The subject matter of the investigation—event, time, and place.

(2) The date that the board was appointed and the members.

(3) The date that the board met to investigate the matter.

(4) The persons that were interrogated and the date of each testimony.

b. The second paragraph shall include all findings of fact and shall set out clearly the causes and circumstances of the event as determined by the board. This paragraph shall include a report of the disposition of the deceased pet.

c. The third paragraph shall set forth any recommendations of the board to correct any conditions that they have discovered in this investigation. If there shall be more than one recommendation, they shall be listed and numbered.

Mr. TABER. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. GROSS. I yield to the chairman of the Appropriations Committee.

Mr. TABER. Do they pay as much attention as that if a child should die?

Mr. GROSS. I am not sure of that procedure, sir.

It seems to be the old story in the Navy: "If it moves, salute it; if it stands still, paint it; and if it has to be written, make nine copies in triplicate." The Committee on Armed Services or the Committee on Appropriations should investigate this matter with a view to ending it promptly.

Obviously, this ridiculous procedure calls for the time and services of many military personnel at an unreasonable and unnecessary cost to the taxpayers.

I like dogs, cats, and other pets as well as anyone else, but in view of the terrific drain on the taxpayers for the support of purely military functions, I am sure it is only logical that those who desire to take pets on overseas missions or bring them to their homes in this country be compelled to ship them on commercial vessels and at commercial rates.

Let us put a stop to this business and at the earliest date.

Following is the verbatim copy of the instructions:

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY,
MILITARY SEA TRANSPORTATION
SERVICE, ATLANTIC AREA,
58TH STREET AND 1ST AVENUE,
Brooklyn, N. Y., October 27, 1952.

COMSTSLANTAREA INSTRUCTION 4600.2

From: Commander, Military Sea Transportation Service, Atlantic Area.

To: Distribution list.

Subject: Investigation of deaths of pets occurring in MSTSLANTAREA ships; procedure for.

Reference: (a) COMSTSLANTAREA instruction 4600.1A.

Enclosure: (1) Pet transportation conditions and agreement (3ND-MSTSA-391 (Rev. 6/52)).

1. Purpose: To establish a procedure for investigating deaths which occur among pets while they are being transported in MSTSLANTAREA ships.

2. Procedure: When, in the opinion of the ship's medical officer or, in the case of cargo ships, in the opinion of the master, death from unknown causes (not as a result of accident) occurs among pets while they are being carried in MSTSLANTAREA ships, the following procedures shall be carried out:

a. Appointment of an informal board of investigation:

(1) Immediately, upon being informed that a pet has died COMILDEPT, when assigned, shall appoint an informal board to conduct a preliminary investigation of the circumstances attending its death. Boards appointed by a COMILDEPT shall consist of 3 commissioned naval officers. On ships having no COMILDEPT assigned, masters shall appoint a board consisting of 3 licensed civilian marine officers. When available, an officer of the Medical Corps or the Army Veterinary Corps shall be appointed as a member. The junior officer shall act as recorder.

(2) When a report of death among pets while in transit is received by COMSTSLANTAREA, the Director, Medical Division shall nominate a medical officer from headquarters personnel to serve as an informal board of one to investigate the circumstances attending the death(s).

b. Report of death by message: (1) The master shall report deaths of pets when occurring and appointment of an informal

board of investigation to COMSTSLANTAREA by deferred radio message.

c. Disposition of pets at sea: (1) Masters shall cause the body or bodies of pets that have died while at sea from unknown causes to be wrapped securely in heavy wrapping paper and placed in a suitable box with close-fitting cover, to be retained on board under refrigeration (at a temperature of 32° to 38° F.) until the ship's arrival in port. Bodies of pets that have died as a result of a clearly defined accident shall be properly disposed of at sea.

d. Post mortem examination of pets: (1) On ships carrying medical officers an autopsy may be performed if, in the opinion of the senior medical officer, such procedure is considered practicable. Arrangements will be made by COMSTSLANTAREA through the port authorities for the accomplishment of a post mortem examination of the deceased pet(s) upon arrival in port, and a request will be made of the examining activity by COMSTSLANTAREA for prompt forwarding of a report of the findings to the ship concerned and COMSTSLANTAREA.

3. Duties of the informal boards of investigation:

a. The informal board of investigation appointed from shipboard personnel shall:

(1) Convene as soon as practical after the death(s) have occurred.

(2) Conduct an investigation and report upon the circumstances surrounding the death(s). This shall include housing of the animals during their entire voyage; temperatures to which they have been exposed; symptoms of illness or discomfort reported as having been observed among the affected animal(s) and unaffected animals; their dietary habits; frequency and consistency of discharges of fecal waste; nervousness or irritability factors which may have been exhibited by the animals; attention to duty and apparent familiarity with their duties in case of the personnel assigned to the care of the animals; medication given and the animal's reaction to treatment; exercise periods observed; sanitation and cleaning routines conducted in and around the animal's quarters; and any other factors which may have bearing on the death of the animal(s). In the report animals shall be referenced by shipping number and the date of death shall be noted.

b. The Headquarters medical officer appointed to conduct an informal investigation shall:

(1) Meet the ship upon arrival in the port of New York.

(2) Make arrangements well in advance of the ship's arrival with the port veterinarian, NYPE, to have a member of the Veterinary Corps accompany him. The port veterinarian shall be requested to conduct and report upon a post-mortem examination of the bodies of all animals returned under refrigeration as soon as practicable.

(3) Review the findings of the shipboard informal boards of investigation and, when necessary, further investigate the circumstances attending the death(s) while in transit.

(4) Render a prompt report of his findings and those of the port veterinarian to COMSTSLANTAREA and make recommendations for the correction of any deficiencies in the care of the animals which may have been discovered during the course of his investigation.

(5) Upon completion of findings, the Headquarters Medical Officer appointed as an informal board of one shall, by letter report, notify the owner(s) of the probable cause(s) of death. In preparing this letter he shall use reference (a) and enclosure (1) as a guide. The investigations conducted in accordance with this instruction shall in nowise indicate to the owner that MSTSLANTAREA has assumed responsibility for the injury or loss of the pet(s) and that the purpose of the investigations constitutes an attempt to find

only the facts in order to preclude recurrence in the shipment of other animals.

4. Format of report of an informal investigation:

a. The format shall be in letter form to COMSTSLANTAREA. The first paragraph should set out a chronological history of the investigation, viz.,

(1) The subject matter of the investigation—event, time and place.

(2) The date that the board was appointed and the members.

(3) The date that the board met to investigate the matter.

(4) The persons that were interrogated and the date of each testimony.

b. The second paragraph shall include all findings of fact and shall set out clearly the causes and circumstances of the event as determined by the board. This paragraph shall include a report of the disposition of the deceased pet.

c. The third paragraph shall set forth any recommendations of the board to correct any conditions that they have discovered in this investigation. If there shall be more than one recommendation, they shall be listed and numbered.

d. It is not necessary that this report be extensive, but it must be enough to give a clear report to the reader of all the facts involved. Inclusion of testimony by witnesses is not required. Substance of such testimony shall be contained in paragraph 2 of the report.

5. Disposition of pets on arrival in port: a. Bodies of animals returned to the port of New York shall be disposed of after post-mortem examination in accordance with the desires of the animal owners or, if infected with a communicable disease or a suspected communicable disease, in accordance with the instructions of USPHS and the port veterinarian.

6. Precautionary measures: a. When a highly contagious disease of serious, but not necessarily fatal consequence occurs in epidemic proportion among pets aboard ship, the Senior Medical Officer, or the Master when no medical officer is on board, shall make a letter report to COMSTSLANTAREA. COMSTSLANTAREA Medical Officer shall then notify Cargo Division that the ship is not to be nominated to carry pets for a period of 30 days after pets are off-loaded.

b. In addition to the foregoing, it shall be the Master's responsibility to ensure that areas occupied by pets are thoroughly scrubbed and disinfected upon completion of each voyage immediately after all pets are off-loaded.

J. M. WILL.

Authenticated:

M. VEY,

Head, Mail and Records Branch.

Distribution: COMSTS and all MSTSLANTAREA commanders; all MSTSLANTAREA Offices; COMILDEPTS—Passenger Ships (LANTAREA); masters, passenger ships (LANTAREA); masters, cargo ships (LANTAREA); commanding officers, commissioned ships (LANTAREA); CG NYPE.

Mr. DORN of South Carolina. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike out the last word.

Mr. Chairman, I listened with a great deal of interest a few moments ago to my distinguished friend, and chairman of the Armed Forces Committee, the gentleman from Missouri [Mr. SHORT]. Over the past few years, it has been seldom that I have found myself differing very much with the gentleman. However, I remember a telephone call in the early part of 1951 from a great American, the minority leader of the other body, the late Kenneth Wherry. He called me on the telephone one morning and personally asked that I come over and wit-

ness before a joint committee meeting of the Foreign Affairs Committee and the Armed Forces Committee of the other body. I remember going to a prior meeting in his office. At that meeting were Gen. Carl Spaatz, and Alexander P. De Seversky. Herbert Hoover could not be there at this particular meeting because of ill health, but he had previously made his position crystal clear. We went before that committee at the personal request of this fine leader of the great Republican Party in the other body as witnesses for adequate national air strength. I remember the testimony as given there. General Spaatz said, "We need at least 243 groups," which was the air strength of this country at the close of World War II. He advocated an immediate buildup. He said the situation was imperative, and advocated an immediate buildup to that strength.

I wonder what has come over the great Republican Party. I understood at that time Senator Taft and others on that side of the Capitol, and the gentleman from Missouri [Mr. Short] were very much in favor of building up adequate air strength in this country. They felt that was the only thing which would prevent the onward march of the ruthless Communist forces. So I wonder today why this great party on the other side of the aisle has completely reversed the position of such a short while ago.

I remember also the 80th Congress. I am not one of those who went all over this country lambasting the 80th Congress. I think much constructive legislation came out of the 80th Congress, including the 70-group Air Force, which I supported and which many of us on this side of the aisle supported. I do believe that had the President of the United States not impounded the money appropriated by the 80th Congress for a 70-group Air Force there would not have been any Korean war. I believe if the President had backed up that authorization of Congress and immediately launched into a great air program and let the world know that America was going to put its emphasis on the great strategic concept of airpower, there would not have been any Korea. The American people, Mr. Majority Leader, went along with the 80th Congress. They approved your action. They do not understand the action of your great party today. We are not putting the proper emphasis on an overwhelming, strategic air command. You know what the question is here today. You cannot meet on the ground the 502 infantry divisions of Soviet Russia and her satellites. That is what the question is here today. America cannot send ground troops all over the world with any hope of success. We simply do not have the manpower. I am pleading here, as I have pleaded for the last 7 or 8 years, for a greater emphasis on air supremacy. America can build and maintain air superiority indefinitely. It would be power for peace and security.

We have the science and mass production. We have men who can make the best pilots in the world.

We have the technical know-how. I remember what General Koller of the

German Army said in 1945. He said that the nation that controls the air will dominate the sealanes of the world. The nation that controls the air will dominate the land masses of the world. He said for the next 100 years America can dominate the world through a great strategic Air Force. That is what the Republican Party has stood for these many years, and I am asking the question today, Why is it that they are departing from this program and the strategic concepts of Herbert Hoover, Bob Taft, the late Kenneth Wherry, a great American who fought in the traditions of William E. Borah and other great leaders?

Mr. SCRIVNER. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. DORN of South Carolina. I yield.

Mr. SCRIVNER. If the gentleman had been here during all the debate yesterday, he would have heard many things, including the one specific fact that there is no abandonment of the 143-wing goal during this present interim, to see what we have and what we do not have and what we are going to do with it.

Mr. DORN of South Carolina. I can assure the distinguished gentleman I was here yesterday as the record will indicate. I only wish there was no abandonment of the 143-group Air Force.

Mr. SCRIVNER. The gentleman has known me for quite some time, and I am sure I have never said or done anything to cause him to feel that I was not telling the truth. We have so stated in the report.

Mr. DORN of South Carolina. You have done a wonderful job in this House. I have the highest regard for the gentleman, as he well knows; but I do think that possibly the gentleman can be wrong about the air program which will affect the defenses of this whole free world.

Mr. SIKES. Mr. Chairman—

The CHAIRMAN. For what purpose does the gentleman from Florida rise?

Mr. SIKES. Mr. Chairman, I ask that the Clerk read.

The CHAIRMAN. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Florida?

Mr. GAVIN. Mr. Chairman, I object, and rise in opposition to the pro forma amendment.

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from Pennsylvania is recognized.

Mr. GAVIN. Mr. Chairman, I want to compliment the committee on turning in a very satisfactory bill. I am surprised that my good friend from Florida would make such a request at this time in view of the fact that the committee consumed most of the 6 or 7 hours of debate yesterday and this is the first opportunity the Members have had to say anything.

Mr. SIKES. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield for just a moment?

Mr. GAVIN. Please permit me to continue. I have only 5 minutes. I just want to say that I listened with a great deal of interest to my good friend the gentleman from Missouri [Mr. Short]. He tried to point out that this appropriation is for approximately \$34 billion, and with accumulated, authorized but unexpended, appropriations there will be

ninety-two billions or ninety-two thousand millions for the defense program. That is quite a considerable sum of money. There will be ninety-two billion or ninety-two thousand million to take care of our defense program for the next 2 years and a half; and I believe I am correct when I say that with unexpended balances and the appropriation in this bill there is thirty-seven billion or more setup for the Air Force. May I ask the gentleman from Kansas what approximately is the total that the Air Force will have for the next 2 years?

Mr. SCRIVNER. Over \$40 billion.

Mr. GAVIN. Over forty billions. That is a lot of money to spend in the next couple of years, so let us not be too alarmed that the Air Force will not have sufficient money. I do want to call attention to my good friend the gentleman from Massachusetts, JOHN McCORMACK—I do not see him here—and he is my friend, a friend whom I admire very much. He spoke about security. I am glad to see that he is concerned about security as we all are. Now, if I recall correctly, in 1949 the Armed Services Committee, of which I am a member, made a recommendation of \$17 billion for the year 1949-50. That budget was cut back by the administration about 2 months before Korea to around \$13 billion. That was a cut at the wrong time and place. The administration at that time had suddenly become economy minded.

While we are talking about security now it is regrettable that some of the membership were not more concerned about security at that time, because I recall that my very good and able friend, one of the greatest Secretaries of Defense this Nation has ever had, the late Secretary of Defense Jimmy Forrestal, was replaced by Louis Johnson, and the budget was cut back from \$17 billion to \$13 billion; and the 70 air group money was impounded, and the 70 air group was cut back from 70 to 48.

Mr. McCORMACK. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. GAVIN. Not at this time as I have but a few minutes.

Mr. McCORMACK. Did not the gentleman mention my name?

Mr. GAVIN. Will the gentleman secure for me additional time?

Mr. McCORMACK. I never refused to yield to a man whose name I mentioned.

Mr. GAVIN. Nor can I refuse to yield to my friend from Massachusetts.

Mr. McCORMACK. I just wanted to observe that I remember that the gentleman fought the cut. So did I.

Mr. GAVIN. I am glad to hear my friend say that.

Mr. McCORMACK. And at that time I was leader, too. I fought it. I am consistent.

Mr. GAVIN. The gentleman is right. I know his position on matters of this nature. He has always been for building a great national defense. I just want to refresh the memories of some on the other side who are concerned about cuts.

Mr. McCORMACK. But I was concerned.

Mr. GAVIN. I know the gentleman was. I wish everybody on the gentleman's side had been more concerned at that time, for we would have been further ahead than we are today. The cuts that were made at the time set us back, certainly held back our defense program buildup.

There has been talk here about holding back the Air Force and I note in the press the attacks on Mr. Wilson and demanding his resignation. Is this a form of cooperation with the President at a critical time? Mr. Wilson is a great civic patriot as far as I am concerned. He laid aside the tools of business to come to Washington to take on a tough job, and it is a terrific job—I will get to that later if I have time—but to me he is turning in a magnificent performance and deserves our hearty commendations and thanks rather than our censure. Now let me return to the 1949 program. The budget was curtailed from seventeen billion to thirteen billion 2 months before Korea. They cut back the 70-group Air Force to 48; the carrier was canceled; the fleet was mothballed; Admiral Denfeld was let out; they cut back the ground forces; they cut back the Navy Air Force; and then the first thing you know we moved into Korea. We had little to fight with, as you well know. We had but few tanks and bazookas and we were almost pushed back into the sea at Pusan in the early part of the war, the most embarrassing and humiliating incident that ever occurred in this great Nation's history.

Let me now direct my remarks to my good friend, the gentleman from Texas [Mr. MAHON]. I listened to him yesterday at great length. He is very much concerned now.

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from Pennsylvania has expired.

(By unanimous consent, Mr. GAVIN was allowed to proceed for 5 additional minutes.)

Mr. GAVIN. Mr. Chairman, the gentleman from Texas [Mr. MAHON] yesterday dramatized our security and asked what would happen or what would befall this Nation unless we increased this budget appropriation a billion dollars even though the Air Force has forty billion to spend in the next 2 years. He went on to point out the fears that exist and ultimately what may befall our country. I carefully listened to him yesterday and I am gratified to know he has changed his thinking since 1950 and reversed his position.

Now, listen to what the gentleman from Texas [Mr. MAHON] had to say on April 4, 1950, when he had a colloquy with my very good friend, one of the most distinguished and able Members of the House with some 30 or more years of service and experience behind him on the Naval Affairs and Armed Services Committee, the gentleman from Georgia [Mr. VINSON]. Mr. VINSON at that time was making a vigorous protest against cuts in the defense appropriations. He was for increasing and building up our military strength at the most critical time in the life of the Nation and he was right as time has proved.

Here is what Mr. MAHON said at that time:

Well, that was the request we made of the Joint Chiefs and the Secretary of Defense some time ago. This committee will not, if we are supported, let our air power wither on the vine.

It might be pointed out that one of the significant things General Eisenhower said was that we cannot have national defense by hysteria. While he points out that he never saw this bill, or the final budget, he can speak generally and authoritatively in military matters, but not with complete accuracy, not having read the details of the program. Repeating, one of the most important things he said was, "Gentlemen, we cannot have national defense by hysteria." He decried hysteria.

It has been my observation, and I say this in all kindness, that about the time we have our military bill each year on the floor, the flying saucers begin to sail across the western horizon and the unidentified submarines flit to and fro in the Pacific waters and even our friends come out and say in the headlines of the press, and I quote, "Russia is planning a new Pearl Harbor," and things of that nature. I am glad to be warned, and it is true we are faced with a grave peril, Mr. Chairman, but I say to you that Eisenhower was never more everlastingly correct than when he said: "We cannot have legislation by hysteria, that we must not underrate the enemy, neither should we overrate the enemy."

What is the potential threat to Washington, D. C., today? The Russian airpower. How many heavy bombers does Russia have? None; not one. How many medium bombers does Russia have? About 300, maybe 400. How many do we have? Hundreds and hundreds and hundreds. Russia has a few of the B-29 type. Of course, a nation with three or four hundred bombers in making an attack is going to get some of them through and that would be gravely serious in an atomic war, but if we had, instead of 5,000 bombers 50,000 bombers, an enemy could still penetrate our defenses to some extent. So while we do not want to underestimate the potential enemy, we do not want to overrate him, either.

And, at that time let me say we did not overrate him either as subsequent events have proved.

Now, I want to say I do not think we are underestimating him now when this great Nation of ours, even with a debt of \$267 billion hanging over the heads of the American taxpayers, is willing to set up appropriations, with the accumulated stockpile and authorizations, and unexpended sums, of some \$92 billion. Why, the industrial productivity of the country cannot absorb that kind of a spending program for military equipment in the next 2½ or 3 years, and many changes may take place in military equipment or weapons.

So, I think we are well set up. This appropriation bill should be left as it is because President Eisenhower has said that he is satisfied with it. The President is schooled in the art and technique of warfare and in international affairs, and there is no question but what he should know, and if President Eisenhower is satisfied, we should be satisfied.

Mr. MAHON. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike out the last word.

Mr. Chairman, it has been most refreshing to listen to the able gentleman from Pennsylvania [Mr. GAVIN] attempt to mimic me on the floor of the House. The gentleman is most artistic. I had

never known before that I had appeared with such grace and eloquence as the gentleman has demonstrated. I note, however, that the gentleman, in the waving of his arms and the raising of his voice, indicated some hysteria himself. But, generally speaking, I can find no fault with this man, the gentleman from Pennsylvania.

I regret that I do not recall at the moment the exact phraseology which I used in a speech in the House in 1950. However, I wish to say again and add with increased emphasis that I agree with President Eisenhower on the dangers of legislation by hysteria.

The gentleman from Pennsylvania has quoted from a speech which I made in 1950. I made the speech in the House, as I recall it, about 3 months before the outbreak of the Korean war. I was speaking about the \$14 billion military budget which was before us at that time.

Let me point out, as I did in 1950, that General Eisenhower was reasonably well satisfied with the defense budget, the relatively small \$14 billion defense budget upon which we were operating just prior to the outbreak of the Korean war. However, General Eisenhower suggested in the spring of 1950 that the budget should be increased by \$1,500,000,000 and his recommendation was followed. My point is that General Eisenhower and the Congress were somewhat satisfied just 2 months before the Korean war began with an inadequate defense budget. Future events proved us to have been wrong in 1950. At that time we were of course, considering economic demands along with military considerations, and, to some extent, we are required to do the same thing today. As I said yesterday, I yield to no one in my admiration and respect for the President. What I have said is not to discredit him or anyone else. I am simply trying to demonstrate the inability of any human being to accurately foresee future developments.

General Eisenhower could not, I could not, and the gentleman from Pennsylvania could not foresee the future on April 25, 1950. By the same token, I dare say that our able President and our Members of Congress cannot now foresee what the future holds.

The gentleman from Pennsylvania has pointed out that General Eisenhower is satisfied with the present budget. Our effort here today is not to make a drastic change in it. However, since we were mistaken in 1950, we could be mistaken in 1953. That is what I am trying to say.

There is another angle to this thing which has not been brought to the fore. When General Eisenhower was advocating the \$15 billion budget—it was frequently known as the Eisenhower budget because he had done so much of the spade work on it—it was not known with certainty that the Soviets had in production the atomic bomb, which threatens us today. Moreover, the words that were spoken in 1950 must be taken into consideration in connection with facts as they existed in 1950. I repeat that we should not legislate by hysteria; that we should not overrate the enemy; that we should not underrate the enemy. We should calmly provide, in my judgment, in this bill today, substantially the

budget figure of about \$35 billion which was submitted by the President. The amendment which I will offer will not increase the bill above General Eisenhower's figure.

Mr. SCRIVNER. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. MAHON. I yield to the gentleman from Kansas, my distinguished chairman.

Mr. SCRIVNER. I want to point out that among others who could not foresee what was going to happen on the 25th of June 1950, were the Joint Chiefs of Staff, one of whom is the present lately retired General Vandenberg.

Mr. MAHON. The gentleman is correct. Nobody can foresee the future.

Mr. SCRIVNER. They did not know 24 hours before it happened that it was going to come.

Mr. MAHON. No; we do not blame anybody for it. It is on an exemplification of the fact that no one can now look on the troubled horizon of our world and tell us what will happen tomorrow. That is the reason I am a little more in favor of a stronger defense program than the gentleman from Kansas.

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from Texas has expired.

Mr. McCORMACK. Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent that the gentleman be permitted to proceed for 5 additional minutes.

Mr. NICHOLSON. Reserving the right to object, Mr. Chairman, I just want to say that we were here yesterday 6½ hours, and a great many of us did not have an opportunity to say anything then. While I shall not object to the gentleman's having 5 additional minutes, he has had at least an hour, and the rest of us cannot get 5 minutes. I withdraw my reservation of the right to object.

The CHAIRMAN. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Massachusetts?

There was no objection.

Mr. GAVIN. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. MAHON. The gentleman from Pennsylvania declined to yield to me, but inasmuch as I myself am not in a state of hysteria, I am able to yield to my friend from Pennsylvania.

Mr. GAVIN. A moment ago the gentleman referred to the \$15 billion as the Eisenhower budget.

Mr. MAHON. Yes, the hearings will to some extent, so show.

Mr. GAVIN. This is what the gentleman said at that time:

While he points out that he never saw this bill or the final budget, he can speak generally and authoritatively on military matters, but not with complete accuracy, not having read the details of the program.

So the gentleman charges it with being an Eisenhower budget.

Mr. MAHON. The gentleman has quoted me out of context. He is not giving the correct picture. If the gentleman will read the hearings, General Eisenhower was the Acting Chief of Staff and an adviser during a part of the time the budget was in the making in 1949 and 1950. That is the time when the plan was made. General Eisenhower was doing his duty at Columbia University at the time the budget was actually

received. He came down and testified before the Senate committee on about April 25, 1950, or thereafter, and said of the revised budget in a letter which I read into the RECORD yesterday:

This is precisely what I think should be done at this time.

I presume he did that after some study of the budget. Of course General Eisenhower did not work out the details of the budget in 1949 and 1950 and he could not be charged with responsibility for it. I do not expect infallibility on the part of General Eisenhower or the gentleman from Pennsylvania, nor do I claim it for myself.

Mr. GAVIN. But the gentleman referred to it a few minutes ago as the Eisenhower budget.

Mr. MAHON. It was at times referred to as the Eisenhower budget because in the Pentagon discussions the recommendations of General Eisenhower had great weight.

Mr. GAVIN. If the gentleman agrees that Eisenhower was a man of recognized ability and experience and well qualified to recommend at that time, why does the gentleman differ with him now?

Mr. MAHON. I still generally agree with the President. He is certainly well qualified to recommend at this time and he was qualified to make recommendations in 1950. My amendment does not increase the President's budget; it merely calls for an adjustment in the application of \$1,175,000,000 in a \$34 billion bill in order that the Congress may express its will in building up the Air Force more rapidly. The Congress does not need to be a rubber stamp. We do not need to be straight-jacketed. President Eisenhower would be the last man on earth to deny to the gentleman from Pennsylvania the right to have his ideas and his opinions with respect to legislation pending in the Congress.

Mr. Chairman, I must decline to yield further. I have yielded at great length and I think with some degree of patience to the gentleman. I will have more to say when the amendments are presented.

Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time.

Mr. HAYS of Ohio. Mr. Chairman, I rise in opposition to the pro forma amendment.

Mr. Chairman, I think all of us can agree that while there may be an honest difference of opinion about the amount of money we should spend for air power, the committee has worked long and hard and the Congress is meeting before this holiday to settle this matter in which all of us are deeply and vitally interested. But I had experiences sometimes when we were in the majority that some of the appointed officials who do not have to go back to their constituents and explain their actions put us in an embarrassing position. I want to commiserate a little with the majority today. I want to read to you a dispatch which just came over the wire. It is dated Watertown, N. Y. Secretary Dulles has "forgotten the Korean situation for the Fourth of July weekend. Dulles, who will spend the holiday at his main Duck Island home at the eastern end of Lake Ontario, arrived yesterday aboard an Army plane.

He told reporters he did not want to talk about the Korean situation."

The Congress has not forgotten the Korean situation. We are here, as a lay group, if you please, trying to figure out how much to appropriate and how much we need to take care of this Korean situation and other situations which may arise. But Secretary Dulles has gone away and forgotten it, in his own words, for the weekend. I would not object to that too much, but I understand that he has only spent about 30 days since he has been Secretary of State down here at his office. He has been going away to forget something all the time, and so far as I am concerned, if he will stay away for weeks, we all could forget him probably, and that would not be too bad, because I think a lot of his thinking while he is away forgetting things is about how he is going to make the American people swallow his idea of recognition of Communist China because he is going to propose that to us one of these days.

I just want to say further, I have heard a lot of arguments about this and a lot about who is at fault in the Korean situation and who is not at fault. I do not point the finger at any person because I do not think any of us had the foresight to see that situation was going to arise, but I do think we all know that the boys who are over there fighting in Korea are not going to forget about it over the Fourth of July weekend, and maybe it will be better if Mr. Dulles came back here to Washington and tried to straighten out that situation so that they could forget about it.

Mr. DEVEREUX. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike out the last word.

Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of the appropriation bill. I would like to remind the membership that it was just a few days ago when the question on the Reorganization Plan No. 6 came before us. Any number of Members stood up and supported that reorganization plan primarily on the ground that General Eisenhower was the best qualified person to present this plan because it concerned military affairs. I personally took objection to that as you may or may not know. I took the position that it was not a purely military matter. The situation we have before us today, in my humble opinion, is certainly a military matter. You Members who supported that Reorganization Plan No. 6 the other day said there was nobody better qualified to evaluate a military situation than our President. Today any number of people are getting up here and pitting their judgment against the person whom they supported just a week ago, because of his background and ability to evaluate and come to a conclusion on a question which is purely military. I, for one, am going to support the President in his recommendations on this bill.

Mr. MILLER of Maryland. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. DEVEREUX. I yield to the gentleman from Maryland.

Mr. MILLER of Maryland. As I understood the remarks of one of the distinguished members of the Armed Services Committee yesterday, the gentleman from Illinois [Mr. PRICE], he said that it was his considered opinion that

we have now a second-rate Air Force. What is the view of the gentleman from Maryland with respect to the present strength of the Air Force, insofar as it compares with other air forces in the world?

Mr. DEVEREUX. I will say to the gentleman from Maryland that I have not been privy to the councils of the higher echelons. I think it is a terrible admission for us to make, if that thought is true, that we have a second-rate Air Force. But I do not believe there can be any doubt whatsoever that the Congress has given ample funds in the past few years to build up a really strong Air Force. I believe they are working toward it. We must realize that the Air Force is a very young service. They have undoubtedly made many mistakes, they are suffering from growing pains but I believe that as we go along with a sound program, such as is now presented in this appropriation bill, they will come out, if they are not now, as one of the finest air forces in the world.

Mr. PRICE. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield to me, since my name has been brought into the discussion?

Mr. MILLER of Maryland. The gentleman from Maryland [Mr. DEVEREUX] has yielded to me and I would like to finish this one question, if I may.

Does not the gentleman think that there is a little hysteria here in assuming that we have a second-rate air force, after the record that our Air Force has made, not only in World War II but only the day before yesterday, when they shot down 15 enemy jets without a loss?

Mr. DEVEREUX. I believe there is a great deal of hysteria.

Mr. PRICE. Since my name has been brought into the discussion, will the gentleman yield to me?

Mr. DEVEREUX. I did not bring the gentleman's name into the discussion.

Mr. PRICE. The gentleman from Maryland [Mr. MILLER] was referring to me, as having made a statement, but it was not the statement that I had made. I did not say that we had a second-rate Air Force. I think we have a good Air Force. The men in the Air Force are the finest fighting men you can find in the world. I said that at the present time we had the second best Air Force and that because of actions such as that taken here now, reducing appropriations to that Air Force. I say that we need the best Air Force in the world, and we want the best Air Force in the world. We have the men who are capable of making it the best Air Force in the world, if we do not hamper them and if we continue to build up the Air Force. We will then have the best Air Force in the world in a very short time.

I would like to point out to the gentleman from Maryland [Mr. MILLER] that we do not now have the Air Force that we had in World War II.

Mr. DEVEREUX. And I do not believe that numerically the potential enemy has the air force that it had during the last war. However, as I have said before, I am not in a position to know exactly what the potential enemy has today. So it is rather difficult to make a comparison. And I do not believe that many of the people here on

the floor of the House have that information at hand.

Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time.

Mr. SIEMINSKI. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike out the last word.

Mr. Chairman, unless evidence to the contrary is presented during this debate, I believe a squaring up to the situation will give us the 143 air wings quicker than otherwise. It is my intention to back up the disclosures reported in executive session of the Appropriations Committee the other day on the problem of the Air Force.

I want to suggest, though, in the interest of performing a possible service to the Air Force, that it pull its own rip cord and instead of talking only about the Air Force, it start talking about the strategic, the tactical, and the logistical branches of its own set-up. If it starts talking about strategy, and tactics, and logistics it will get more support in this House and there is going to be less confusion.

We all remember, it is within our memory, that it was the strategic air force of Hitler that hit Warsaw but did not knock the Polish people out. It was Pearl Harbor that woke us up. It did not knock us out—again strategic. It was the battle of Britain—Hitler's fliers came over London. It did not knock the British out; it just woke them up. And we in Korea, the enemy has not thrown any air at us in 3 years. We have thrown lots at them. They are not knocked out, and neither are we.

When you talk about air power, I want to hear something about strategy and tactics and logistics, something about fire power, something about support of the ground troops.

How the world thrilled in World War II when planes went over in a thousand-plane wave to attack and hit the enemy, spitting out lead to back up the boys on the ground with their bayonets. That is what you want to hear about when you talk about air force—what fire power do they have, how many guns do they carry? Mothers want to know what support their boys are getting on the ground.

Mr. BENTSEN. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. SIEMINSKI. I yield.

Mr. BENTSEN. I would like to point out that in the discussion yesterday one of the things that was shown where one of the specific cuts was made was on transport planes, and I agreed with the chairman of the committee that that was something that should not be done because it should begin to help keep up the Army's mobility.

Mr. SIEMINSKI. Sir, I cannot go back to my folks back home talking about wings any more than I can talk about budgets to people who want bread on the table, who want jobs, who want health.

When you talk about wings I want to know how much fire power is going to come out of those guns. This is a fire power bill. What is going to happen when the guns go off? How much lead are you going to be able to spit out of those guns, and lead is the one thing we want to be able to spit out when it comes to tactics.

Mr. BENTSEN. I thought the gentleman wanted to talk tactical air.

Mr. SIEMINSKI. I did, and I am talking tactical air. Tactical air is how those planes will operate and what will come out of those guns. You can use boats, as they used them at Dunkerque, to save men, but when the enemy aircraft come at you you have got to shoot guns, you have got to shoot real stuff at them. That to me is tactics.

Mr. JAVITS. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike out the last word.

Mr. LYLE. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield for a parliamentary inquiry?

Mr. JAVITS. I yield to the gentleman from Texas.

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman will state his inquiry.

Mr. LYLE. What amendment is pending?

The CHAIRMAN. Pro forma amendments.

Mr. SCRIVNER. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman from New York yield?

Mr. JAVITS. Certainly.

Mr. SCRIVNER. I suggest, inasmuch as there seems to be a desire to get on with the bill—while I do not like to limit debate, there is no actionable amendment pending—I wonder if we might reach some agreement as to time so that the Clerk may proceed to read the bill. I ask unanimous consent that all debate on these pro forma amendments end in 10 minutes.

The CHAIRMAN. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Kansas.

Mr. YORTY. Mr. Chairman, I object, unless I can be allowed at least 5 minutes. I have been on my feet ever since we met seeking recognition.

The CHAIRMAN. Objection is heard.

Mr. JAVITS. Mr. Chairman, it is my intention to support the administration on this bill, and I rise only because I think there are two reasons for that which have not been covered in the debate which I would like to bring to the attention of the House.

First, we are not legislating on this bill in a vacuum because this is not the only appropriation which covers the security and defense of the United States.

The Secretary of State has testified that he is presenting to the country a package for the security of the country. That package consists of appropriations for the Armed Forces which we are here to discuss today. It also consists of appropriations for the Armed Forces and for strengthening of our allies in the struggle for freedom, which we discussed and passed here the other day to the extent of about \$5 billion. It consists also of appropriations for the education, information, and similar services of the United States; it consists also of appropriations which we will consider for the establishment of bases and military structures around the world. This is the package which the administration presents to us. Every element of that package is vital to the security of the United States. That is point 1, and I think very important for all of us to consider.

Let us note, too, that the opposition to the acceptance of the administration's

program is mixed and there is a grave danger that a mixed opposition often defeats a desirable measure for reasons inherently antagonistic one to the other. There are those here who consider themselves special friends of the Air Force and of airpower, also there are those here who believe in every way against foreign aid and against any international position by the United States. They are marshaled on the same side. So I ask you, when you listen to these arguments—and, of course, there is the usual political business which we are all accustomed to of trying to build up a case so that, if anything goes wrong, the other side can be blamed for it—remember those are the three categories of arguments which are here. I think those who are listening here with an ear single to the interests of our country had better be very clear in separating the impact of these arguments and the sources from which they come.

One final point. My colleague, General DEVEREUX, of Maryland, mentioned the fact that many Members argued here for the President's armed services reorganization plan and are now contradicting themselves and arguing that his military judgment is not what they said it was the other day.

This is not only true here in the Congress, but must be considered also in terms of the country. The country elected Dwight D. Eisenhower last November for a salient reason. The country felt that in this particular international situation it would be secure with him, it could trust his judgment and it could trust his judgment particularly on the way America should marshal its resources for the purpose of preserving its own security and for the defense of the free world.

Now, President Eisenhower presents a complete program to us in every feature of our important national life, foreign aid as well as armed services. Now we are arguing such a short time after the mandate from the American people over giving him a vote of confidence on this specific issue. This is his great skill. If we do not give him a vote of confidence here I do not think we are keeping faith with the job which we all undertook in backing the President in whom the country reposed so much confidence so far as this particular issue is concerned.

I think he is entitled to a full opportunity to make good with this package, which is the administration package, not only this bill but the other measures to which I have referred.

I for one shall support the President. I believe he is entitled to the overwhelming support of the House regardless of party.

Mr. SHEPPARD. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. JAVITS. I yield to the gentleman from California.

Mr. SHEPPARD. May I ask the gentleman, in accordance with the statement just made, I can only conclude the gentleman would not approve of the billion three hundred million plus that the Congress proposes to reduce the budget?

Mr. JAVITS. That is true. I will vote against every committee cut of the administration's proposal to the Congress. I am going to offer an amend-

ment to restore the research and development programs. The President needs the backing of the Congress just as he got the backing of the country last November.

Mr. SHEPPARD. I want to compliment the gentleman on his stand.

Mr. BENTSEN. Mr. Chairman, the remarks I made on this subject yesterday in Committee were inadvertently omitted. I ask unanimous consent that they be included at this point in the RECORD.

The CHAIRMAN. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Texas?

There was no objection.

Mr. SIKES. Mr. Chairman, I yield 10 minutes to the gentleman from Texas [Mr. BENTSEN].

Mr. BENTSEN. Mr. Chairman, Secretary of Defense Wilson pointed out recently:

We believe that national security and national solvency are mutually dependent. The arms program should be reexamined in the light of economic capabilities.

If we are to defend ourselves successfully against Communist aggression, then we must walk an economic-military tightrope.

Up to this point then, it is difficult to quarrel with the administration's plan for reducing Government expenditures. They have clearly recognized that in order to reduce taxes, we must first cut down on Government spending. I agree with the civilian Secretary of Defense setting the limit of what our Nation's economy can afford for defense, but I sharply disagree with his making the tactical apportionment of the funds contrary to the recommendations of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and without even consulting with the military expert in command of the service which bears almost the entire brunt of the cut.

It is comparable to a businessman involved in a lawsuit who has retained the most experienced attorneys in the country and after setting the fee then not only does not follow their advice in the trying of the case, but does not even consult them.

I can see no good reason why we should take almost all of this cut out of the Air Force. I have heard no reasonable explanation why the Air Force should be cut \$5.1 billion when the total military budget is to be cut \$5.2 billion.

Secretary Wilson himself has stated that he recognizes the predominant importance of airpower for our Nation's security. After all, this is simply a matter of common sense. We know that the Communist nations have a total of between 8 and 11 million men in uniform. We know that the Soviet Army itself has 175 divisions compared to our 20. We know that the Communist nations have tremendous manpower reserves which can be called up in case of war. It is clear that even if we wanted to, we would be unable to match the Communists on a man-for-man basis. Even if every mother's son in America had to be drafted, we would be unable to match the swarming hordes of the Asiatic nations.

Our strategy then must take full advantage of our industrial and economic strength, and of our technical know-

how. We must exploit this advantage so that if war is forced upon us, we can choose our own battlefield. We must not allow ourselves to be drawn into a traditional type of warfare on the ground in which we would surely be overwhelmed.

If we are to exploit our advantage, if we are to lead from strength rather than from weakness, it is axiomatic that we must place primary emphasis on our Nation's airpower. If we are to take full advantage of our atomic achievements, we must not shackle the best means of delivering our atomic weapons.

I do not subscribe to the theory of talking tough and carrying a little stick.

Wilson says he doubts Russia will have enough A-bombs to attack us in 1954. But General Bradley says they do. So does General Vandenberg. The Civil Defense Administration 5 months ago said Russia could A-bomb 89 United States cities now, causing 11 million casualties.

Generals Vandenberg, Twining, and Ridgway have said that airpower is our greatest weakness.

We must create an Air Force whose atomic capability is such that it will deter any reasonable dictator from aggression. Since dictators are not always reasonable men, we must create a combat-ready force which will be able to make immediate retaliatory action and give us sufficient time to mobilize our country's vast potential resources for war.

This the present budget fails to do.

If our efforts to rearm come in time and Russia thereby lacks the courage to attack us, there are those who will never let us hear the end of it. What! All that spending and no war? Like the wife who kept complaining at her husband because he bought a fire extinguisher and they had not had a fire yet.

But it is better to have the strength and not need it, than to need it and not have it.

I do not question Mr. Wilson's sincerity in thinking that the budget provides for a better Air Force. In this case, however, it appears he has simply made a mistake. He has preempted the field of the military experts. He has presented this budget to the Congress without taking advantage of the expert military advice at his disposal. In fact, General Vandenberg has testified that as late as March the Joint Chiefs of Staff stated that "any reduction of the program of 143 wings to be attained as soon as practicable after fiscal year 1954 would increase the risk to the national security beyond the dictates of national prudence."

We know the Soviet has the atomic bomb and planes adequate to deliver it. Why the abandonment of the goal of a strong Air Force, which is our only arm of immediate retaliatory striking power?

Modern weapons have annihilated space and time as bulwarks of defense. To me it seems to make sense to listen to military experts when we are confronted with a purely military problem such as apportionments of military expenditures. I can think of no one better qualified to evaluate the military adequacy of our airpower than the Air Force Chief of Staff, backed up by the other Chiefs of

Staff. Thus, when it comes to a choice between Mr. Wilson's opinion and the Joint Chiefs of Staff's opinion on a military question, I do not see how we can reasonably ignore the military recommendation.

A stretchout to 1957 means we have deliberately delayed the date when our strength will entitle us to some feeling of security.

Weapons which are merely drawn upon the drafting board are of no use in the event of attack. Unfinished armaments do not insure that our defenses will be strong enough should the enemy attack. Our present actual strength is always the important item. The greatest industrial establishment on earth will be of little avail if it cannot be defended.

During the last war Germany was far ahead of us in research on jet aircraft. Toward the end of the war they had even commenced the construction of factories to build those jets that could have wiped us from the skies in our outmoded planes.

But they did not do it. Why? Because they never achieved sufficient production. Because we knew the location of those factories and bombed them out of existence without the jet planes available to defend them.

Blueprints have never yet stopped an aggressor, and never will.

The Air Force insists that its military personnel ceiling must be increased even if they are not to achieve the 143-wing strength until the middle of 1957. Their need for personnel is based in part on the recognition of the fact that there is a lead time in the training of personnel as well as a lead time in the procurement of aircraft. The Air Force insists that additional bases are necessary for effective operations. If the Air Force is to achieve the desired combat flying efficiency, additional money is needed for maintenance and operations. Since the program already has been stretched out, General Vandenberg's request for additional funds for maintenance and operation is logically less than that originally requested.

This request for appropriations brings out another point which I think needs emphasizing.

Some people have alleged that military people are never satisfied with the money they are given, that they are always out for all the money they can get. The Air Force's action in this present controversy clearly shows that this is not the case in this instance. First of all, the Air Force, on its own initiative, recommended reductions from the Truman budget of about \$1.6 billion. This was a result of their recognition of production slippages and their adoption of a more conservative policy on the introduction of new aircraft into quantity production.

Furthermore, after the Air Force was given time to study the budget which Mr. Wilson had submitted to the Congress, they recognized the wisdom of some of his proposals. They are not asking that we appropriate the amount of money originally contained in the Truman budget, but they are asking for about a billion and a half dollars more than provided by Mr. Wilson's. This is the additional amount which the Air Force feels it can efficiently spend in

building toward a force of 143 wings. This hardly indicates that the Air Force is out to get all the money it possibly can.

But stop-and-go defense is what costs real money, yet here we find this budget resulting in cancellation of aircraft contracts with the resulting damage payments to contractors. Today we are paying for the Louis Johnson era. Let us learn and profit from the mistakes of that policy rather than adding to them.

As a result of the controversy on the Air Force budget, the problem of waste has again been highlighted. Department of Defense officials have gone to some lengths to point out that waste exists in Air Force operations and planning. They have left the implication that the Air Force budget can be reduced because there is so much waste involved in it.

I am sure that there are many areas in which the Air Force could be more efficient. I sincerely doubt, however, that wasteful operation is a monopoly of the Air Force. I am sure that the Army and the Navy, as well as the Air Force, have inefficient operations. Why, then, should we take it all out on the Air Force?

The Air Force, on its own initiative, attempted to reduce its manpower requirements. The Air Force had first figured that 1,700,000 men would be needed for a 143-wing Air Force. By exercising stringent manpower economy and stringent controls, the Air Force reduced this number by a half million men. Apparently we are now going to penalize them for being economical by reducing this ceiling by another 200,000 men.

I am in favor of the overall cut for defense proposed by the Secretary of Defense. I do not feel, however, that the Secretary of Defense is qualified to set the tactical apportionment of forces without consulting the Joint Chiefs of Staff. I do not feel that previous military decisions should be ignored unless they have been supplanted by a new military evaluation. Maybe military people do not understand economics, but when military problems are at issue, the Secretary of Defense should consult these men who have spent their lives in the military service.

I believe that men who have heard a shot fired in anger, who have worn this country's uniform, know the most about tactical apportionment of military funds.

The present budget shows a trend of returning to the old theory of balanced defense. We are going back to the theory that by giving the three services the same amount, we can stop squabbling among the services. A well-balanced defense does not mean that we should provide the same amount of money for each service any more than a balanced diet means we should eat equal amounts of meat, potatoes, and vegetables. What we need are people with the courage to spend the money where it will do the most good.

Both the Army and the Navy are very close to the force levels corresponding to the 143-wing Air Force. The Air Force, on the other hand, has much further to go since it started from a much lower level. Since there has not yet been a new military evaluation of the force

levels, it does not make sense to arbitrarily stop the Air Force from continuing to build toward 143 wings. The Air Force has stated that an increase of \$1.435 billion would permit it to build toward 143 wings by 1957. In view of the existing strength of the Army and the Navy, it appears that apportionate amounts of the 5 billion cut could have been made from their budget without stopping them from reaching their force levels by 1957. The budget would then have been based on interim goals which would have made it possible for all the services to reach the final force levels if those are reaffirmed by the new Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Let us hope that future budgets presented to Congress will adequately reflect the expert opinions of the military as well as the expert advice of the civilian heads. Then we will truly be able to say that our national military policy is based both on economy and security.

Mr. SCRIVNER. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. BENTSEN. I yield.

Mr. SCRIVNER. I think you will find that these matters have been discussed, and that Secretary Wilson has discussed them with some of his advisers—military advisers. Perhaps he has not taken General Vandenberg's advice, but he has told us that the Joint Chiefs of Staff were all represented at every meeting of the National Security Council where these matters were thoroughly discussed, and as you heard the President's letter, that has been done for the last 3 months.

Mr. BENTSEN. Yes, I am sure there has been a great deal of discussion after the opposition arose as to this particular cut.

Mr. TABER. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. BENTSEN. I yield.

Mr. TABER. Does the gentleman believe that the addition of transport planes is going to increase the national defense. You know that is all that General Vandenberg was talking about.

Mr. BENTSEN. Permit me to answer the gentleman on that. I do not agree that transport planes was all Vandenberg talked about but even on the question of transport planes, I would say that today mobility of the Army is of primary importance. I know that these transport planes can be utilized for that purpose. I know one of the chief objections of Air Force critics has been that the Air Force has not paid enough attention to the tactical support of the armies and their mobility. Here we find that very thing that would help them in the transportation of our Armed Forces being deleted. Yes, I do think it deeply hurts our defense program.

Mr. YORTY. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. BENTSEN. I yield.

Mr. YORTY. I just want to say to the gentleman on the point as to whether or not the Joint Chiefs were consulted by Secretary Wilson, I think the record is perfectly clear that they were not. General Vandenberg made that statement and so did General Twining. In addition to that, General Vandenberg testified that when he attended the Security Council meeting and when the

overall figure was finally decided upon for the military budget, it was not even broken down into categories and he did not even know how much of a cut the Air Force, the Army or the Navy was taking. It was simply an overall figure, and the breakdown was apparently done later by Mr. McNeil while Mr. Wilson was in Europe.

Mr. BENTSEN. I thank the gentleman.

Mr. MAHON's amendment will allow us to remain within the limits of the overall defense budget set by Secretary Wilson while at the same time helping us approach the force levels recommended by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. It means better defense with economy remaining an integral part of the defense budget. It is the expertise of both military and civilian authorities. It provides the balance rod as we walk this economic-military tightrope.

Mr. HOLIFIELD. Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent to extend my remarks at this point in the RECORD.

The CHAIRMAN. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from California?

There was no objection.

THE CONFORMING AIR FORCE AND GENERAL VANDENBERG'S RECOMMENDATION

Mr. HOLIFIELD. Mr. Chairman, the Air Force was given a very belated chance to express its thought on the budget cut proposed by Secretary Wilson, but it made an earnest, a laudable and it seems to me a wholly successful effort to conform to the wishes of the Secretary and accept a cut in its initial budget.

The proposed cut of \$5.1 billion made by Secretary Wilson in the original Air Force budget of \$16.8 billion came as a surprise to the Air Force. The Secretary presented it to Congress in spite of the warning of the Joint Chiefs of Staff of the continuing threat to American security. The Air Force had had no opportunity to express an opinion of the effect of such cuts on Air Force operations, or to defend the 143-wing program.

On request of certain Members of the Senate, General Vandenberg was asked to make a professional military adjustment of the Air Force budget to Secretary Wilson's proposed cut. General Vandenberg transmitted to the Chairman of the Senate Appropriations Committee, a figure which he contends is the lowest possible at this late date to permit continuation of the 143-wing program. The estimate, General Vandenberg pointed out, resulted from deferment of appropriations for every item than can possibly be deferred to the next fiscal year. The estimate takes into consideration the lead-time changes proposed by Secretary Wilson, and recognizes and adjusts to restrictions on personnel ceiling and public works funds ordered by the Defense Department.

In other words, the Air Force accepted the rules and regulations laid down by the Department of Defense even though it questioned the judiciousness of such rules. So far from being individualistic and behaving like a prima donna among the services, the Air Force revealed itself as conforming and objective in compliance with the wishes of the Secretary of Defense, and adapting them by pro-

fessional analysis to realistic conclusions, based on past experience.

Out of this experience the Air Force has asserted that the Wilson budget would not give the wings Secretary Wilson has claimed on the time schedule he has set forth. Secretary Wilson said that his budget would give the Air Force 114 wings by the end of fiscal year 1954, and 120 wings by the end of fiscal year 1955. The Air Force states that the Wilson budget would permit only 110 wings by the end of fiscal year 1954 and 115 wings by the end of fiscal year 1955. The 120-wing "interim goal" set by Secretary Wilson could not be achieved, the Air Force says, until the end of fiscal year 1956.

On the other hand, the Air Force proposes a budget that would permit achievement of the Secretary's interim goal of 120 wings by the end of fiscal year 1955, but if supported by adequate appropriations in later years would permit achievement of 136 wings by the end of fiscal year 1955, 141 wings by the end of fiscal year 1956, and 143 wings by the end of fiscal year 1957.

Secretary Wilson has not accepted this proposed adjustment to his budget, realistic as it is. On the other hand, he has dismissed it with a gesture of disdain. But the gesture is anything but a courteous recognition of the desire of the Air Force to cooperate and conform, and to effect that great compromise between defense requirements and budget burdens that a democracy requires.

Secretary Wilson, more by this subsequent refusal than by his initial proposal, has indicated that he is prepared to tell the Air Force that it doesn't know how to operate airpower.

If this Congress follows the Wilson lead and makes the appropriations requested in the Wilson budget, it too will be falling into the error of discrediting the service itself has established to give air security to the United States.

Mr. Chairman, by now we all know that when the Secretary of Defense prepared the budget now being considered by Congress, it was without consultation with the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The Chief of Staff of the Air Force was given no opportunity to comment on the cut proposed in the Air Force budget until he was requested to do so by the chairman of the Senate Committee on Appropriations. In proposing restoration of certain items cut by the Department of Defense General Vandenberg displayed a commendable willingness to go along with Secretary Wilson, and accept a number of the cuts proposed.

What may be called the substitute budget presented by General Vandenberg accepts the fact that limitations established since January have already delayed the achievement of 143 wings until the end of fiscal year 1957. Since such a stretchout affects all segments of the program, the Air Force does not ask for restoration of the program as originally established. Time lost cannot be regained. It would be futile and fantastic to try to recapture it.

On the other hand, the Air Force accepts Mr. Wilson's positive statement that lead time can be reduced, and that he knows how to reduce it. The Air

Force has tried consistently to reduce lead time. It has achieved some success in reduction. If Mr. Wilson can accomplish a greater reduction, the Air Force welcomes it. And the Air Force has adjusted its budget to this promise by the Secretary of Defense.

The Air Force likewise accepts a stretchout in research and development, though with considerable misgivings. Research can be postponed, but only at the risk of having it accomplished elsewhere. Science knows no national boundaries. The spirit of science permeates the atmosphere. A hundred years ago, ether was discovered separately but almost simultaneously in Massachusetts and Georgia. Men experimenting in a new and challenging field like nuclear physics must out of self-interest exchange ideas. No Rosenbergs or Fuchs are necessary to help another nation achieve what we ourselves are seeking, though they may hasten the achievement. We may indeed postpone research, and delay development—but we do so as a calculated risk.

The Air Force also accepts Secretary Wilson's cut in training aircraft and other types of support aircraft. Training can be accomplished in many ways. I heard once of a successful pianist who as a child practiced on a phony keyboard painted on a piece of lumber. No sound of music came from the board, but the child learned the finger exercises that are fundamental to piano technique. The Air Force can do without some of the training aircraft it asked for. There may be delays in training, as a result; there may be casualties and a letdown in efficiency. But the Air Force accepts the cancellation. In this way also the Air Force goes along with the Secretary of Defense in effecting economies.

Finally the Air Force accepts the Secretary's decision to eliminate combat reserve aircraft designed to replace wartime losses for a very short period of combat. If we became involved in war, we would require more aircraft to meet attrition than we could hope to keep in reserve. It would be necessary then to speed up production, cut down on lead time, and increase output. The Air Force accepts the elimination of combat reserve aircraft from the fiscal year 1954 budget as realistic.

Mr. Chairman, it seems to me that the adjusted Air Force budget presented by General Vandenberg represents compliance with the spirit of the Wilson budget. Between two opposite points of view there must always be compromise. General Vandenberg has made a proposal which puts the burden of compromise on the Air Force, and which makes it easy for Secretary Wilson to accept.

To me personally, Mr. Chairman, the difference between \$0 billion and \$1.4 billion is very great indeed, because to me a billion dollars is a great deal of money. But in the defense budget the difference between \$0 billion and \$1.4 billion is not very great. As the gentleman from Illinois pointed out a few days ago, that is a difference of only 5 cents out of the tax dollar appropriated for defense. And in terms of defense, of lives saved, of war avoided, of peace secured, it is nothing at all.

With compromise made so easy, at so cheap a figure as \$1.4 billion, it would seem in the interest of national defense for Secretary Wilson to accept the compromise. Under his budget, the Air Force would be granted \$11.7 billion anyway. The Air Force asks for only \$1.4 billion in addition.

I think it would do much to restore public confidence in Secretary Wilson for him to accept the restoration of that amount to his budget. And I think it would make the citizens, whose money is being appropriated, feel additionally secure to know that there was harmony in the Defense Department.

Security and harmony together are worth a good deal more than the whole defense budget. And they are absolutely essential to the national morale.

Mr. YORTY. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike out the requisite number of words.

Mr. Chairman, we have heard the word "hysteria" used around here a great deal. It just seems to me it would be better if we did act from a little more sense of urgency. We are in the middle of an unresolved war. It is most shocking that at this time, even for psychological reason that we should announce to the world that we are actually cutting down the strength of the United States armed services, particularly the Air Force.

I asked for this time because I wanted to talk for a moment about these supporting units that the gentleman from New York says are not necessary.

In the report which the Air Force originally made showing what these cuts would do to them they made the following statements:

In addition to the reduction of 23 wings, it will be necessary to eliminate from the flying support units of the Air Force 4 wings, 11 groups, 47 squadrons, and 2 flights. Included in this reduction are such units as MATS squadrons, Air Rescue squadrons, air reconnaissance groups, assault wings, and liaison squadrons. Also eliminated are 89 nonflying logistical support units. In addition to these reductions of major forces and supporting units, the manpower limitations make it necessary to reduce further manning standards in all elements of the Air Force, except the combat groups.

So, I think for a moment it would be worthwhile to see just what these supporting units do and whether or not they are important to the Air Force as a fighting unit.

The flying support units that have been eliminated from present programs are a necessary part of the Air Force. These include the following:

MATS squadrons representing the air logistic capability to deploy SAC and provide rapid supply and reinforcement to Army and Air Force units in the field. An example where this type of operation had historic impact was in the air supply of Patton's Third Army during the dash across France.

Air rescue groups. The Air Force is ferrying a large number of jet aircraft each month across the Atlantic. The cut-back in air rescue groups means that the Air Force cannot adequately cover this vital flight route and other areas. The Air Force acts as a global Coast Guard in its air search and rescue service, taking care of civilian and military

aircraft that may find themselves in trouble. An example is the Navion that went down in the vicinity of Salisbury, Md., on June 12, 1953. Another is the commercial air liner that crashed in the jungle in Colombia last year which was located by USAF air search and rescue service that dropped the doctors, medicine, etc., and made the rescue possible.

Several assault groups, some equipped with fixed wing aircraft and some with helicopters. The C-123's were part of this program. This eliminates the ability to perform an assault transport service for the Army in the combat zone as well as reducing general airlift capabilities. Is the Army now going to procure similar aircraft and establish similar units under Army programs in order to continue the function? This is not known. If the Army does do this, there is no saving; indeed there is a greater expense. If the Army does not, the function is lost.

Several squadrons for aerial refueling of our SAC units. This cuts range. The Air Force will have the planes but some of them won't be able to fly the distances needed.

Several air evacuation squadrons. Do existing facilities insure that air evacuation as accomplished during the Korean war will be available in hostilities which may later occur? The air evacuation of wounded is performed for all services—Army, Navy, Air and Marines.

Mapping and charting squadrons. These units utilize modern methods of aerial photographic mapmaking for the benefit of both the Army and the Air Force. They are important for the purpose of getting accurate up to date maps for combat areas and for potential combat areas. There are large parts of the world for which accurate, up-to-date maps do not exist in the United States. The photographic mapmaking process is a rapid one, usable in circumstances where ground survey would be impossible or would involve intolerable delay. Success of military operations can depend on the right maps.

Long-range weather reconnaissance squadrons. These are designed to determine the weather at points of the globe where these provide the only means of knowledge. This has obvious importance for military operations, particularly air operations. It is also important to the civilian population as a means of forecasting weather in the United States.

Tow target squadrons. These units are used to provide targets for Army AA fire. In the absence of these the Army's ability to perform its AA function in air defense of the United States is bound to be reduced.

Nonflying units that have been eliminated include the following:

Several aircraft control and warning radar installations planned for the polar approaches. The elimination of these obviously reduces the warning net designed to detect enemy approach.

Several photographic squadrons. These are trained to process rapidly reconnaissance photographs so that reconnaissance activities can be productive.

Various communications units, the elimination of which reduces the assur-

ance that in the event of hostilities communications between vital areas could be maintained.

A large number of logistic units. These are very difficult for some to understand, but to any military man in any service they are of the utmost importance. Any service can operate only on the basis of its supply. The elimination of these units will cause fewer flying hours and less training in peacetime. In wartime they will produce less effective units, operating at a lower rate and for a shorter period. These can be cut out, and they give the appearance of economy; but what this means is that the combat units you are buying are worth only a percentage of what they would be worth if they had proper logistic support. It is the old numbers racket—"Build up the numbers regardless of their effectiveness." This is the kind of attitude that produces a show-window Air Force.

To the casual reader the reduction in supporting units in the Air Force is little more than a statistic and a technical term. Examination shows, however, that this reduction means much more in terms of defense of the United States. It means that our ability to return sick and wounded from the overseas areas of Europe and Korea is seriously reduced and in the event of war it would not be possible to speedily return our military men of all services to proper medical facilities and the best medical care.

This reduction means that we cannot move our Strategic Air Command into the bases that we have planned to use in the event of war. The Strategic Air Command cannot move and then fight with its bombers alone. The reduction in transport units makes it impossible for them to carry out existing plans.

Aerial refueling units have been eliminated. This has the effect of removing the service station upon which these forces depend for longer range, greater effectiveness and greater protection to our forces and to the United States.

Rescue facilities have been seriously curtailed. This means our airmen lost or forced down in the areas over which they must operate in both peace and war will have less chance of survival.

This reduction means far fewer planes for our airborne forces with the result that they must go to battle by truck, by rail or by boat in an era when speed and flexibility are vital to successful defense. It reduces our ability to reinforce or to carry our soldiers into the battle.

This reduction in support units means less defense for the United States, fewer radar stations guarding the border approaches, gaps in our defense and less early warning of enemy attack.

While the forces that have been reduced are called supporting units, they have a direct effect on our defense and on the services that we can render our military men. The present budget requires the Air Force to cut; it was a difficult decision to eliminate these so-called supporting units which mean so much to our defense. The only alternative is to make further cuts in already reduced combat units. And this is unacceptable. Taking the combat planes and leaving out other elements is merely a trick to fool the American people.

Mr. SCRIVNER. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. YORTY. I yield to the gentleman from Kansas.

Mr. SCRIVNER. Would the gentleman benefit me with the citation he has read? I listened to the hearings, and I did not hear that.

Mr. YORTY. I read from an analysis of what these eliminated units do, based on the report that I received from the Air Force.

Mr. SCRIVNER. I am surprised at that showing. I listened to the Air Force testimony, and I did not get that information.

Mr. YORTY. As a further example of the need for support units I know myself that a battle can turn on whether or not you have accurate maps. In New Guinea we were handicapped severely because we did not have accurate maps of the areas, and we had to map them during the course of hostilities. If we had had them ahead of time, it would have saved many lives.

Mr. JOHNSON. Is the gentleman talking about existing units that will be eliminated if this billion dollars is not appropriated, or is he talking about future units that might be placed in various parts of the world?

Mr. YORTY. I am talking about units that will be eliminated if we cut back from the 143-wing program to the 120-wing program.

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from California has expired.

(Mr. YORTY asked and was given permission to proceed for 3 additional minutes.)

Mr. YORTY. I have tried to outline to you what they are doing in order to say that they are not cutting combat planes. They propose to go ahead and take the combat planes that were ordered several years ago. They are not going to have the previously planned wings to put them in, so they are shunting off these first-line aircraft into Air Reserve and National Guard units that were already taken into consideration when the 143-wing program was announced; but because they want to say they are not cutting combat planes, they are cutting out these vital support units which affect very greatly the ability of the Air Force to perform its mission.

In other words, what they are trying to do, in order to cover up the drastic effect of these cuts, is to set up a show-window Air Force that will look good in combat planes but will not have the other components to make it a really effective fighting force.

I still believe the United States should have and can afford to have the biggest and best Air Force in the world. I agree wholeheartedly with the Hearst newspapers, who have said that any other kind of an Air Force is not economy. They have said we ought to have an Air Force that will insure peace if possible and victory if necessary. We are not going to have that kind of Air Force unless we go back as speedily as possible to the 143-wing program. I think it is a shame and a disgrace that in the midst of a war we are delaying the program. Mr. Wilson's obstructions have already made it impossible to meet the original

goal. His obstructions have stretched it out no matter what we do. He has taken it out of our power to get back to the 143-wing program at the earliest possible date when we should have had it. But let us not countenance any further delay. Let us get the kind of Air Force which we ought to have.

Mr. ZABLOCKI. Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent to extend my remarks at this point in the RECORD.

The CHAIRMAN. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Wisconsin?

There was no objection.

ADEQUATE DEFENSES ARE VITAL

Mr. ZABLOCKI. Mr. Chairman, in the interests of the security of our Nation, I feel that it is my duty to rise and voice my strong and earnest objection to the serious cuts made in the funds for the Armed Forces, particularly for the Air Force.

For the past 2 months, I have carefully studied the reasons advanced by administration spokesmen, and then by the Appropriations Committee, for the severe curtailment of our defense budget. I want to note at the outset that I am just as anxious as any member of this body to see Federal expenditures kept down to a minimum, and the Federal budget balanced. But I cannot see how we can—with a clear conscience—jeopardize our national security for the sake of attaining those goals. And in all the arguments brought forward in support of this crippled budget, there is nothing that would convince me that we are not risking our national safety for the sake of saving money.

I fully concur with the President's view that total military protection is unattainable. No matter how much we spend on our national defense, we will not thereby eliminate all danger of war destruction. But we ought to seek adequate defenses. The legislation before us does not appear to make adequate defense possible.

It would take much too long to comment on the entire defense budget. Therefore I want to concentrate on its most obvious weakness—the proposed reduction of the end strength of the Air Force from 143 wings to 120 wings or less.

This retreat in air power is a paradox. Up to now the majority party has been demanding more air power. The administration spokesmen have been trying to assure us that we will get more air power, faster, and for less money. Yet the fact remains that under the proposed budget we will not attain the programed 143-wing strength certainly not by 1955 and possibly not by 1957. We may attain it some years later, but in 1955 we will probably have only 120 wings. And 120 wings certainly do not have as much power, and do not offer us as much security, as 143 wings.

Mr. Chairman, in the fall of 1951, the National Security Council adopted the recommendations of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and of the Secretary of Defense Robert Lovett, and approved a 143-wing goal for the Air Force. It was generally admitted that such a force was the minimum needed to carry out the primary

missions of our air power. These missions are threefold:

In the first place, to maintain an adequate atomic striking force as our principal shield against Soviet aggression;

Secondly, to give us the necessary and needed defense of the continental United States;

And, thirdly, to provide air support to our own forces and those of our NATO allies.

In the judgment of our best military men, the fulfillment of these three missions will require not less than 126 combat air wings, and 17 wings equipped with troop-carrier aircraft and air transports to back up and give the necessary mobility to the combat wings.

I want to make this clear: this 143-wing objective represented the combined result of many judgments by both military experts and civilian officials. There was no cushion or safety factor in this estimate. One hundred and forty-three-wing Air Force was considered as the minimum necessary to give us a reasonable assurance of security.

The factors on which the above estimate was based have not changed much since the new administration took over the reins of our Government. In fact, with the continual rapid growth of the Soviet air power, the situation may have become more critical than it was 2 years, or 1 year ago. Let us look at the facts.

At the present time, about one-third of our air power is reportedly engaged in the Far East. Our Air Force has made a good record there. Yet, despite these factors, it is alleged we are not strong enough in Korea to cope with the Chinese, and North Korean, and Russian Communists should they decide to send their planes over our territory instead of limiting themselves to purely defensive missions.

In Europe, according to testimony recently submitted by General Ridgway and General Gruenther, our air power is the weakest link in our defense. Reinforcements are greatly in need.

Here at home, our air defense system is at present estimated to be capable of stopping at most only 30 percent of a potential Soviet atomic striking force.

Now we should bear these facts in mind. We should also remember the recent testimony of the Secretary of Defense Wilson, of other administration spokesmen, and of men like General Vandenberg who should know what they are talking about when they say that our present defenses are inadequate. Mr. Wilson himself recently stated before a congressional committee that he found no evidence that the threat and danger to the free world has appreciably lessened. He also said that our state of preparedness is considerably short of what it should be, and pointed out that of the 103 wings which the Air Force has activated so far, 10 have not yet been provided with their planned quotas of combat aircraft.

Under those circumstances, I do not feel that the proposed stretchout in the buildup of our air power is in the national interest. I earnestly urge the membership of this body to give serious consideration to at least this one vital

portion of the defense budget and to restore the funds necessary to carry out the programed attainment of a 143-wing Air Force by 1955.

Mr. SCRIVNER. Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent that all debate on this section and all amendments thereto close in 5 minutes.

The CHAIRMAN. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Kansas?

There was no objection.

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Illinois [Mr. PRICE].

THE RUSSIAN AIR FORCE IS A FACT

Mr. PRICE. Mr. Chairman, we have known for years now that the Russians are capable of dropping atomic bombs on American cities, and that their stockpile of these weapons is growing. We know also that the Russian Air Force, with several thousands of jet fighters already in operation, is now concentrating on building bombers with which they could launch an atomic attack against this country as well as against our allies.

Neither we nor our allies have an adequate defense against the huge Russian Air Force, and we all know it. We also know that only a superior air force can offer the kind of protection we need today, and that we may need even more desperately tomorrow. We know that the only counterthreat we have today against the massive Russian Army and Air Force is the atomic-bombing capability of our own long-range Air Force. But our long-range bombers are largely obsolete leftovers from World War II. Our short-range Air Force is small, is still engaged in Korea, and is outnumbered many times by the Russian tactical air force. Moreover, we have yet to build a respectable air-defense system either for our allies or for our own country.

The program to bring the Air Force up to date and to increase its combat strength by about 50 percent was just getting under way when Secretary Wilson called a halt. He himself admitted, last May, that we had only 103 wings of the 143-wing program activated, and that only 93 of them were combat-ready. It was only a few days later that he said all we should have was 120.

But the Air Force has never said that a 143-wing Air Force was all that would be needed to fight and win a war. Neither have the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The 143-wing Air Force is a minimum Air Force for peace. In all-out war a 143-wing Air Force would be partially used up in a very few months, and it could not be replaced for several years even if, by some miracle, our industries escaped serious damage. But we cannot achieve the 143-wing Air Force for defense against war unless we stop this bickering and get along.

Even the 143-wing Air Force was a compromise, a compromise made almost 2 years ago. It was a compromise achieved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, after the Air Force had presented its own program for 155 wings. Incidentally, the Air Force program was closer by 2 wings than the Joint Chiefs of Staff program was to the 150-wing Air Force former Senator Lodge, of Massachusetts, said we should have. The Senator, as a

leader of his party, presumably expressed his party's views on the importance of airpower.

But compromise or not, without the 143-wing Air Force, our whole strategy makes no sense at all. We have no right to ship American soldiers to Europe and Asia where they are hopelessly outnumbered without providing an Air Force just as fast as we can, that would at least be able to hold its own against the Russian air force.

The truce in Korea may be signed, and again it may not. But whether it is signed or not, we need Air Force in Korea to protect the troops who, as Secretary Wilson said, cannot come home for at least 6 months. Either we have to bring our men home and try to protect them here, or build an Air Force to protect them and support them where they are. We cannot protect them without airpower.

What I say, I say not out of fear, but because it is commonsense. Even if our cities were immune to air attack, and they certainly are not, we would still have to have an Air Force capable of challenging the Russian air force. Without such an Air Force we cannot protect ourselves and certainly we could offer no real protection or assistance to our allies or to our troops overseas.

I sympathize completely with all efforts to save money. But in an effort to save a little money we are in danger of losing everything. Let us not be deceived by Russian promises and propaganda; and let us not deceive ourselves about the fact of the Russian air force.

This is still a time when action is more important than talk. We need to get on with the job.

Mr. Chairman, there has been a great deal said about a balanced budget being the first line of defense. I look forward to when we can have a balanced budget in this country. The budget is a pretty big volume, 6 or 7 inches thick. It is a pretty heavy weapon, but I cannot foresee the time when we can arm our troops with these books instead of planes and guns. I do not believe we can defeat future enemies by throwing budget books at them. They will provide a poor defense.

In all this discussion about what we can afford and what we cannot afford in the way of airpower, there is 1 fact that we dare not forget for 1 minute. The fact is that Russia has the biggest air force in the world. I made that statement yesterday and I repeat it today. I think it cannot be successfully contradicted.

Mr. NICHOLSON. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. PRICE. I yield to the gentleman from Massachusetts.

Mr. NICHOLSON. I do not know whether Russia has one plane or what, and I am wondering where the gentleman gets his information.

Mr. PRICE. I can say to my friend that I have some very reliable information. I think if the House understood the real situation there would be no hesitancy on the part of every Member in supporting the amendment the gentleman from Texas [Mr. MAHON] will offer. The truth of the situation is that we

have gone down in our airpower since World War II and the Russians have gone steadily forward, until today they have the largest air force in the world. We should recognize that fact.

Mr. JOHNSON. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. PRICE. I yield to the gentleman from California.

Mr. JOHNSON. Is it not a fact that while the Soviets have the largest air force in numbers our Air Force is far superior in quality? For instance, in the long-range bombers the best the Soviets have is the B-29's, which we consider obsolete today for effective long-range bombing.

Mr. PRICE. That is no longer true. They have a far better jet air force than we now have, both in fighters and bombers.

Mr. JOHNSON. The information I have is that it is a fact that they do not have planes comparable to the B-36. They have B-29 bombers, which are now a second-rate plane.

Mr. PRICE. The gentleman is partly right on that situation, but they have a new jet bomber that is threatening our air superiority. The Soviets have a decided edge in the field of light bombers. They have hundreds of twin-jet light bombers. By contrast, we have none assigned to combat units. We still have more long-range bombers than the Soviets, but they have more than enough for an all-out atomic attack against the United States. I think we should be aware of that fact. We should never underestimate or underrate a potential enemy. So I think you underestimate the airpower of the Soviet when you support these unwarranted cuts in airpower.

Mr. JOHNSON. Of course, the gentleman knows that the one thing you have to have in air warfare is the most modern type of plane. France had the greatest air force in Europe in 1940.

Mr. PRICE. That is exactly the reason I am going to support the amendment to be offered by the gentleman from Texas [Mr. MAHON], because we have been lagging behind Russia in the production of the most modern types of airplanes, and if it had not been for the rude awakening we got at Korea, we would probably be still further behind.

Mr. JOHNSON. In Korea, we have a 15 to 1 superiority over the jets of the Russians. We also have a great jet bomber. You will remember, and the gentleman is a well-informed man, I know that, in 1940 France had the biggest air force in Europe and it just toppled over like ducks in a shooting gallery because the planes were outmoded and obsolete.

Mr. PRICE. I am trying to point out to the gentleman that Russia is not standing still. Russia is producing every day. Speaking of Korea, I invite your attention to the remark of Major Jabarra, one of our jet aces with 14 MIG's to his credit—"Give me a MIG and I'll fly circles around the F-86." So let us not underrate our opponents.

Mr. JOHNSON. We are not standing still either, but are merely making our Air Force more combat worthy.

Mr. PRICE. Russia is advancing in her air force, and if we continue to

stretch out our airpower program every year, we will be further and further behind. The gentleman is a member of the Committee on Armed Services. He knows that the 143-wing program was justified before our committee. I did not hear anybody in our committee challenge the military leaders when they testified in favor of the 143-wing program 2 or 3 years ago. But each year we come here and stretch out the program 1 more year and then 1 more year. When are we ever going to get down to business and make certain that we do have a No. 1 Air Force? We cannot continue to guess about this thing.

Mr. JOHNSON. The point is that the Air Force is trying to readjust its program so that we will have first-class planes next year, and we will gradually build up to the 143-wing Air Force with planes that are up to date. We will get that in time.

Mr. PRICE. I say that the best way to readjust our Air Force is to supply it with the best planes possible every year—this year and next year, and keep on supplying them with the best planes that we have from year to year.

Mr. JOHNSON. That is exactly the program that they are trying to carry through.

Mr. PRICE. I do not agree. They ask us to wait each year until a new look is taken. Every year a new look. Every year a stretchout and a delay in reaching a minimum level of airpower necessary for security. I would say to the gentleman that Secretary Wilson, while he may use that argument when it comes to buying planes for our Air Force, does not advocate to the buyer of an automobile that he not buy the 1953 model because General Motors is coming out with a new model in 1954, does he?

The Clerk read as follows:

RESERVE PERSONNEL REQUIREMENTS

For pay, allowances, clothing, subsistence, transportation, travel and related expenses, as authorized by law, for personnel of the Army Reserve while on active duty undergoing Reserve training or while performing drills or equivalent duty, and for members of the Reserve Officers' Training Corps; subsistence for members of the Army Reserve for drills of 8 or more hours duration in any 1 calendar day; \$85,500,000.

Mr. MILLER of Maryland. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike out the last word.

Mr. Chairman, I am taking these few minutes to make clear a matter which appears in the report. You will note in the present bill there is a cut of some \$17,409,000 in the allowances for Reserve personnel requirements. The committee, and certainly I do personally, want to make very clear the fact that our committee is in full sympathy with the problems of the civilian component sections of our Armed Forces, and we believe that a strong reserve program is highly desirable. We have no intention of attempting to retard its development by reducing the appropriation.

However, the facts are these: The Reserves had something over \$40 million appropriated in 1953 or on hand available from prior years that they could not spend in the last fiscal year because the program had not developed as they and we would have liked it to develop. Actually, this year we are appropriating \$85,-

500,000 for personnel of the Army Reserves which, although it is below what was requested, is in the considered judgment of the committee sufficient. Unless we get a break for the better, that is more money than they will be able to effectively spend this year.

Again may I call attention to what is stated on page 25 of the report, as follows:

In the event that this policy should prove productive of additional manpower and the estimated goals be reached at an early stage, the committee would be willing to undertake consideration of a supplemental fund request.

Personally, because I believe the Reserve National Guard program is one of the most economical ways to keep our defenses strong, I sincerely hope that the Army Reserve program will work out and that more money will be needed.

I take this time to emphasize that we do not have any intention of doing anything that might make it appear that we are out of sympathy with the Reserve program.

Mr. JOHNSON. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. MILLER of Maryland. I yield to the gentleman from California.

Mr. JOHNSON. I appreciate the remarks the gentleman made about the civilian components. At the present time we are trying to write a realistic Reserve bill that will put the Reserves, in their qualifications and in their benefits, equal to the Regulars. I am glad to hear the gentleman say that in event this program is worked out the Appropriations Committee will be glad to give them whatever money they need.

Mr. MILLER of Maryland. I am glad to hear that your great committee is working on that. There is much work that needs to be done. I am confident that as the program gets going there will be no trouble about the Appropriations Committee providing additional funds.

Mr. JOHNSON. I appreciate that comment. We have had exhaustive hearings already, and we are about to rewrite the bill, and I hope we may be able to bring the bill to the House soon.

Mr. YATES. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment, which I send to the desk.

The Clerk read as follows:

Amendment offered by Mr. YATES: On page 12, line 5, strike out "\$85,500,000" and insert "\$87,337,000."

Mr. YATES. Mr. Chairman, I want first to commend the committee upon its splendid job in fixing the appropriations for the Department of the Army. Ordinarily, I would not move to change any of its recommendations, but I believe that the program to which my amendment applies is of such importance that it deserves further consideration. We have heard a great deal of discussion this morning about the number of planes for our Air Force, and it is well that this subject should engage our attention because of its urgency to the security of our Nation. Yet it is equally, if not more important, that we concern ourselves as well with the men in our Armed Forces and with the training of our men. That is the purpose of my amendment, to protect the program of training our

high-school students through the Junior Reserve Officer Training Corps.

The high-school ROTC program has been an excellent one. Year after year it has given good, fundamental military training to more than 66,000 boys a year on the average, throughout our Nation. The schools were satisfied with it, the boys were satisfied with it and presumably the Armed Forces were satisfied with it. Yet last year, for some unaccountable reason, the Army began the progressive destruction of the high-school ROTC program, an action which in my opinion was unfortunate, unnecessary, and unwarranted. It demonstrates a deplorable lack of judgment on the part of the Army.

On January 1, 1952, the Army had assigned 383 officers and 799 enlisted men as instructors under the program. The total cost to the Army for the year was \$4,436,000. This year the number of instructors has been cut by the Army to 212 officers and 504 enlisted men, a cut of almost 40 percent. It has requested only the sum of \$2,599,000, which has been allowed in full by the subcommittee.

Last year the blow fell without warning on the high schools in the city of Chicago when the Army removed 87.5 percent of the officers who had been assigned to the high-school training program. The enlisted personnel was cut by 55.4 percent. In response to the deluge of protests that followed its action, the Army increased to some degree the number of its instructors, but the revised numbers included 64.5 percent fewer officers and 53.5 percent fewer enlisted men than the Army had previously maintained. For example, Lane Technical High School, an institution in Chicago which maintained a ROTC unit of 700 boys, was given 1 sergeant by the Army to carry on all of its work.

It is not that the Army does not believe the program is a good one. Take a look at page 418 of the hearings. Mr. SIKES, a member of the subcommittee, is interrogating the witness, General Milton, as follows:

Mr. SIKES. Do you feel that you are getting value received for the money that is being spent for the junior ROTC work?

General MILTON. We think that military training at the high-school level has value but we do believe that we ought to delineate between training at the high-school level and training at the college level, and what we are proposing to do is to put all of our junior units in exactly the same basket and give them all the same credit, if any.

Mr. SIKES. I agree with that. General MILTON. At the high-school level. Mr. SIKES. What is your interpretation of value? Is it value to the boy or value to the country?

General MILTON. It is both, sir. From the standpoint of citizenship training, there is no better training in the world than high-school military training.

Yet the Army wants to cut this program.

Mr. SIKES. The average youngster today needs the discipline that he gets in military training. What other value is it?

General MILTON. To the boy, I think it is of inestimable value. I think it teaches him the discipline that is so necessary.

Mr. SIKES. We are agreed on that. What other values are there?

General MILTON. From the country's standpoint, they are potential noncommissioned officers. When they go into the draft they have a little edge on those who have not had the training.

And yet the Army wants to cut this program.

Let me read you the unsolicited letter of a boy who has been through the ROTC program in Chicago and is now assigned to Fort Bragg, N. C., where he is a sergeant. The letter says:

FORT BRAGG, N. C., October 31, 1952.

COL. ARTHUR L. WARREN,
Professor of Military Science and
Tactics, Chicago Public High
Schools, Chicago, Ill.

DEAR SIR: Since I graduated from Bowen High School in June 1950, I've been following the doings of the RO in the Tribune. I read where the Army plans to cut the military instructors and just had to sound off.

I want to say I believe the ROTC was the best military training I had. While in school, I joined the National Guard (and of course) it could never even approach the ROTC in weapons training, drill and command, and any other military subject.

Since I've been in the Army, and the airborne, I haven't seen a group of men drill as good as our old picked platoon. I even compare the NCO's to my old military instructor, M. Sgt. Frank Marnul. Even while I was an assistant instructor down at Benning on the small arms committee, I never did encounter an instructor that had the military bearing or knowledge and appearance of Sergeant Marnul. I realize that a school's RO unit is only as good as the military instructors and even if you do have one good man at each school, he couldn't possibly do a halfway effective job with the cadets.

Sir, I only wish every kid would realize how much RO would help him in the Armed Forces in this day and age. I took some ribbing when I was in the RO but now I have the last laugh on everybody. The training I got in the good old junior ROTC was the best yet as far as I'm concerned. It was as good as the infantry school in many ways, and better in some.

I do hope that something can be done to keep the ROTC at its maximum efficiency. Maybe sometime in my military career, I can have the honor of being chosen to take a part in its training program.

Respectfully yours,

Sgt. JOSEPH E. HYZY,

RA 26338186, Company C., 325 Air-
borne Infantry Regiment, 82d Air-
borne Division.

The Army likes the program, the students like the program—what about the school system? The Chicago schools heartily endorse the program. Let me read to you the letter dated May 7, 1953, which I received from Mr. Herold C. Hunt, general superintendent of schools of the city of Chicago, which shows what he thinks about the program:

BOARD OF EDUCATION,
CITY OF CHICAGO,
Chicago, Ill., May 7, 1953.

HON. SIDNEY R. YATES,
Member of Congress, House of Repre-
sentatives, Washington, D. C.

DEAR CONGRESSMAN YATES: I have had your letter of April 28 before me and have considered what might be said briefly. Actually, the many reasons for a restoration of our ROTC instructor personnel to the former levels are so many and so involved as to defy brevity. I have therefore covered the situation at some length so that you may be adequately informed and attach a less voluminous summary for reader reference.

The authorization of personnel to the ROTC of the Chicago high schools, which in-

cludes 33 high schools, a central coordinating office for the officer in charge and an ROTC supply, where supplies, equipment, and training aids are received, stored, issued, and accounted for, included up to last summer 31 officers and 74 enlisted men. With this group and under the direction of the experienced colonel in charge, who constantly pushed his personnel to their limiting capacities, we had an unprecedented successful school year 1951-52. However, for the year 1951-52, as for several preceding years, the board of officers making the annual Federal inspection, a group of officers experienced with the junior ROTC, recommended that to adequately conduct a prescribed 3-year course of instruction, additional instructors were even then necessary in order that three instructors might be available in the schools to meet the three different year classes during those extensive periods when indoor classroom instruction was scheduled and made necessary because of the weather, which precludes outdoor instruction so much of the year in this area. For the outdoor and formation drills for the experience of cadet officers and noncommissioned officers in the most important subject of leadership, drill, and command, it is obvious that instruction groups for any given instruction period should be complete tactical units, i. e., battalion, companies, or platoons so that a proper distribution of ranks and grades could be present if adequate experience in leadership and command was to be had. This requires scheduling students of all 3-year groups for such periods. At the time of the last inspection in June 1952 there were 10 schools with but 2 instructors and there would have been 6 more except for a temporary overstrength due to early arrival of replacement personnel while those leaving were still here. In consequence, the proper authorization for the Chicago schools as reflected by the experienced officers of the board of inspectors should even have been 16 sergeants greater, not less as has since resulted.

Without warning last summer the Army suddenly proposed to reduce our ROTC instructor group, already short of the recommendations of the experienced inspectors, by 87.5 percent of its officers and 55.4 percent of its sergeant-instructors. This was ostensibly due to staff additional senior ROTC units in many small colleges, allegedly to produce more commissioned officers. However, this was noted as being at a time when the press and service journals carried reports from the Army of an excess of officers and many were reported as being discharged to civilian life. Coincidentally, the majority of the officer candidate schools, from which all but two officers presently on this detail were appointed, were closed or enrollments greatly restricted after the establishment of these new units.

The cutback of last summer was according to a so-called formula which subsequently proved to be inadequate and ill-planned from the beginning. This formula was later, December 16, 1952, superseded by another formula under which we are now operating to a degree. While based on very different criteria, both formulas have proven inadequate to provide the instructors needed for an adequate program.

The present formula provides to the Army area commander 1 officer per 500 students or fraction thereof and 1 noncommissioned officer per 200 students or fraction thereof enrolled in junior ROTC. For Chicago the resulting apportionment made by the Fifth Army commander from this latest allocation has been a reduction of 64.5 percent of officers and 53.5 percent of enlisted men from the authorization of last year which your bill proposed to restore.

With the evident thought that the present authorization, established December 16, 1952, of officers and enlisted men was insufficient to maintain the ROTC units, the commanding general, Fifth Army, eventually discontinued the withdrawal of personnel and

this school system and others locally have continued to operate with somewhat more than the authorization under the new formula. Due to the normal return of officers to civil life and in spite of the above action, our officer personnel has gradually reached that of the new formula, though our sergeant-instructors are currently 36.4 percent above that provided by the December 16 formula. Even in the face of this present excess of personnel above the provisions of the new formula, the Chicago schools have 18 high-school units with but a single sergeant-instructor—a most unsatisfactory condition.

While we are operating as best we can in an effort to approach the standards of last year these demands upon the remaining personnel cannot be continuous. A further deep concern is the inevitable loss of last year's experienced personnel and their eventual replacement with inexperienced and progressively more unreliable individuals. As the Korean situation has progressed the reliable noncommissioned officers of the past who remained on these school details for considerable periods are gone, many to be commissioned officers. The recent replacements, essentially from Korea, are in general younger, less reliable, and less stable. Always, since there is no prior training school for replacements, we have been able to team up new personnel with the older and experienced individuals for inservice training. It has in the past required 6 or 8 months and preferably a school cycle of a year before new personnel could be considered fully effective. Under this scheme the 2-year rotation policy barely permitted assigned personnel a year of full contribution. The present reduction in personnel under the so-called formula will provide for but one sergeant in practically every Chicago school. There will be no associates to bolster the less effective individuals and those who are still learning their jobs and no one with them in their schools to give the inservice training to new personnel. Noncommissioned officers coming from the Army, regardless of their individual merits, are not and should not be expected to be readymade teachers. Sergeants assigned in the past have rarely had more than a high-school education and often hardly that. Our other high-school teachers, except a limited few specialists, are required to have masters degrees and extensive training in education.

Another definite deficiency in the new formula providing but one sergeant for almost all schools is the fact that inevitable situations will require his absence from his school. There will remain no one to carry on his instructions which would have to be abandoned until his return. There is no slack in the system and no substitutes in the case of military instructors as provided for all other teachers. Illness of the sergeant, required dental attendance, emergencies at home, appearances at traffic court, and so forth, all must interrupt instructions. As examples, we have had a broken neck and a broken back among the causes of long-time absences this past year.

In the operation of the so-called formula there are other features mitigating against the larger ROTC units, the multiple units having several schools, such as Chicago, Los Angeles, Detroit, Kansas City, and so forth, ROTC units of a single school are provided an officer and a sergeant even though their enrollment be far less than 500 cadets. In a multiple unit provision is made for but one lone sergeant unless it is an unusually large unit of which there is but one in Chicago. Our situation here is that we now have a lone sergeant in 18 schools and upon full application of the formula this will be the case in probably 31 or 32 schools. Further, while the officer present in a one-unit school system is present at all times to give the necessary supervision and to handle the limited administrative requirements for the two individuals at the school, inadequate provision is made for the very impor-

tant supervision and none is made for the administrative requirements and the training directives, and so forth, required to coordinate widely separated schools covering large cities such as in Chicago where the thirty-three high schools are distributed over the city's area of 211 square miles.

In the consideration of a restoration of the number of instructors thought must be given to the fact that this should be accomplished at the earliest. While the disintegrating effect of the extensive partial reduction already effected is evident, restoration could yet be effected after a reasonable time. However, were present conditions to be long continued and especially were the full operation of the formula to be made effective for any considerable period, eventual restoration of the ROTC units to their former level of accomplishment and acceptance would probably be difficult and slow. What is now threatened is the status attained by our ROTC units over a period of almost 40 years. This is a psychological matter and cannot be turned off and on like the flow from a faucet. Once torn down, its buildup can be expected to be difficult. I have intended above to present the development of the present personnel situation which though bad is not by any means that to be expected should the present so-called formula be made fully effective, and so continued for some period.

Under present conditions we have had to organize our classes to permit emphasis on leadership, drill, and command. In consequence we have had to restrict and curtail instruction in the understaffed school units in classroom subjects to that which could be handled personally by 1 instructor in the eighteen 1-instructor schools. This has meant extensively combining the instruction of several year-groups rather than the instruction under a progressive 3-year course as should be the case. This will also mean much repetition of the prior year's work to cadets in succeeding years. A resulting drop in the level of attainment and interest can be expected.

Rifle marksmanship, which is regarded as of great importance in military training, must also inevitably suffer as limited range facilities and present excessive demands upon his time permit the lone military instructor inadequate time for the necessary supervised firing of many cadets, every round of which he must personally control in the interests of safety. The time available for ROTC rifle teams and competition will likewise be curtailed.

Present conditions have made necessary the use of older cadets (cadet officers and noncommissioned officers) as instructors. While we have always used cadets to instruct in a limited group of appropriate subjects such as leadership, drill, and command, weapons and their care, etc., this has always been under the direct supervision and in the presence of the regular instructor. This system cannot well be extended to meet a deficiency in assigned instructors for several reasons. First, the time which cadets can give to the ROTC, is definitely limited by the other demands of the curriculum and their other activities. Then, too, the quality of cadet instruction could not be expected to be the standards required in formal classroom subjects, such as military hygiene and first aid, map reading, tactics, etc., as distinguished from drill and like subjects. With but one instructor, it would be impossible for him to be present and to supervise instruction in classwork in three different year-groups. Secondly, of primary consideration is the matter of accreditation.

The Chicago schools cannot permit the instructor force, in military subjects, or otherwise to prejudice any schools' accreditation by falling below the standards required by the North Central Association of College and Secondary Schools and the State of Illinois.

Military training in the Chicago school system started almost 40 years ago. It pre-

cedes the establishment of the ROTC itself by several years. It was a contribution by Chicago to national defense at that time and to the general national preparedness which was then so lacking. The Chicago schools have always supported the idea of the ROTC and have felt that the ROTC in turn has contributed much to the young men receiving its training. We feel that the training received, in addition to its military value to the national defense and to the individual in his present almost inevitable future service, has contributed much to the character, leadership, and general good citizenship of those receiving it, and has benefited materially those schools where it is offered.

To reduce the instructor personnel below that of the past cannot but injure the instruction offered. Where past instruction has been that essentially offered as basic instruction in the Army and supplemented by summer camp for firing of service weapons and maneuvers over open terrain, it might well be considered as the full equivalent for UMT credit and at great savings to the Government for rations, quarters, and other costs; the present limiting of instructor personnel will reduce the scope and quality of instruction to a point of somewhat doubtful value as military instruction.

Further, that this curtailed instruction will continue to be acceptable as the equivalent of the first year of college ROTC for those continuing with college ROTC or as satisfying the 2 years required military science for those in future attending colleges where military science is required and the student is unable or does not desire to pursue the ROTC college course is also probably more than doubtful.

Another, and possibly more important, facet is that students will not be attracted to an ROTC course which is considered inadequate or unacceptable. With so many in the present communities, fathers, brothers, etc., who have had basic training, nothing which is materially less will have standing and acceptability. Again, while the ROTC instruction under past conditions has been an asset to the schools in which it is offered, there is the present fear on the part of responsible school principals that to continue under the present curtailed instructor personnel may result in the ROTC becoming a liability in the school rather than an asset.

While the Chicago schools do not have the facilities to follow the life of its students after their graduation, there are available figures compiled shortly after January 1943. It was reported at that time that there were 4,381 former Chicago ROTC cadets then in the services. Since male high-school graduates may expect to be drafted or deferred temporarily due to enrollment in a college ROTC unit, it may be assumed that currently the 6,000 ROTC cadets of the Chicago schools are carrying their training and experience in leadership into the services and to the benefit of the national defense. Letters received from these former cadets by our military instructors indicate that they have been preferred for early promotion and in appropriate cases for officer candidate school, thereby contributing materially to the noncommissioned and officer leadership in the services. An available copy of one such unsolicited letter is attached. In many cases graduates have written back for copies of their records of military training upon the presentation of which they report their unit commanders were to appoint them as corporals. Many of our graduates on the basis of their training here have returned from Korea as master sergeants. Former cadets have written to our instructors thanking them and saying that the training received from those instructors had saved their lives in Korea.

The above will give some idea of our opinion of the value of past ROTC training and its evaluation by the former students. While the board of education has long supported and continues to support the pro-

gram of military instruction in the Chicago schools, it is my opinion, and I am sure it is shared by the board, that we cannot reduce instruction now through curtailment of instructors to the point where we will offer instruction of which we cannot feel proud, which we feel is inadequate, and which might threaten in any way our accreditation.

That there may be no misconception as to the fine type of worthwhile young men who receive the ROTC training in Chicago's schools, I have at hand and am pleased, and proud, to inclose a picture recently made covering the presentation of commissions and warrants to the cadet officers and cadet noncommissioned officers of our city cadet corps staff, the overall cadet staff selected by competitive examination from the 33 schools in the city. I regret that my absence from the city did not permit me this year the pleasure of honoring these young men and of being in the picture—but I am, indeed, proud of every one of them.

We do sincerely appreciate all that you are doing to save our ROTC and to restore the instructor and supervisory personnel to the effective levels of last year.

Sincerely yours,

HAROLD C. HUNT,
General Superintendent of Schools.

In addition to the letter received from Mr. Hunt, I have received many letters from high-school principals expressing support of the program and urging that the action of the Army be rescinded and the program restored to full strength.

The veterans organizations, too, are concerned about what the Army is doing. On September 13, 1952, the American Legion called the matter to my attention and since that time I have been trying to get the Department of the Army to restore a reasonable number of instructors to the program, but to no avail. I am attaching to my remarks the letter which I received from Elliodor M. Libonati, chairman of the Americanism Commission of the American Legion, Department of Illinois, dated September 13, 1952, together with the resolution passed by the Department Executive Committee on October 3, 1952, which shows how seriously that organization views what is occurring to the training program in the Illinois high schools:

THE AMERICAN LEGION,
DEPARTMENT OF ILLINOIS,
AMERICANISM COMMISSION,

September 13, 1952.

HON. SIDNEY R. YATES,
House of Representatives,
Washington, D. C.

DEAR SIR: I am writing you relative to a situation presently threatening the existence of ROTC in Chicago schools and in schools throughout the country.

The Army has issued an order reducing the instruction group by 87.5 percent of its officers and 55.4 percent of its instructor-sergeants. The new instructions provided for but 1 sergeant in each school and for a total of 4 officers, 1 to each 10 schools. (This would have the effect of requiring a single sergeant to attempt to instruct and supervise issues of uniforms and arms to over 700 cadets at Lane Technical High School—an impossible task here and even impracticable in smaller school units of 300 cadets—and to reducing the supervisors from 5 to 2 at a time, when the need for supervision would be greatest.)

The present orders are further inequitable in two respects: No reductions are made in personnel for college units nor for military school units (which are also junior units) and which, incidentally, are operated for profit. For these schools past authorizations

for personnel have been and are far more generous than for public high school units.

Secondly, an unfair and inequitable distinction is made between school systems having multiple units (several high schools such as Chicago) wherein each school receives but one sergeant and school systems having a single high school, wherein the school receives both an officer and a sergeant, i. e., twice as many instructors and one of greater experience. The single unit school also has 100 percent immediate supervision by an officer whereas the multiple school with few officers and considerable distances between schools can have only very infrequent and inadequate supervision at the best.

The order creating the above situation originates within the Department of the Army, Office of the Adjutant General, entitled "Activation of ROTC Units for School Year 1952," date June 11, 1952, and is paragraph 7 of that letter, addressed among others, to "Commanding Generals, Continental Armies."

In the initial issuance of the orders above, the general superintendent of schools, Chicago, addressed commanding general, Fifth Army, a lengthy communication setting forth the destructive effects of the order and seeking relief. The commanding general, Fifth Army (then Maj. Gen. A. C. Smith) agreed that he personally believed an increase necessary and would bring the matter to the attention of the Department of the Army. Subsequent information was to the effect that favorable action was not had from the Department of the Army. However, the commanding general, Fifth Army, was still considering some measure of relief. Subsequently, the Chicago high schools are now in receipt of instructions cutting the ROTC personnel to 4 officers and 33 enlisted men, the wholly insufficient numbers reported above.

For the 33 ROTC units in the Chicago high schools, a rock-bottom minimum of 7 officers and 39 enlisted men is absolutely necessary, though 16 officers and 63 enlisted men are considered minimum to carry out in any reasonable degree the instructions which has been offered. If carried out to completion, the present orders will have the effect of reducing the military personnel in each individual school as shown below.

It is recommended that the offending provisions of the letter cited above be withdrawn by the Department of the Army and the past personnel authorizations be reestablished before irreparable harm is done to the existing units, some of which were established over 35 years ago, and 29 of the 33 were honor units in 1952.

In your district, Lane and Waller High Schools are affected. Under the present arrangement, these schools will have 1 sergeant each, while last year Lane had 1 major, 1 captain, and 8 sergeants commanding the detachment of 705 students; and Waller had 1 captain and 2 sergeants commanding 108 students.

We of the American Legion are tremendously interested in ROTC, the importance of which, in particular good citizenship and basic training in the military, I need not attempt to impress you with.

I am sorry that my letter has been so lengthy, but I felt you should have the facts.

We of the Legion would appreciate it very much if you would interest yourself in this situation.

I believe that you should render a protest to the Secretary of the Army relative to this matter, with a view to securing either a revocation of the order or some amelioration of the situation.

Sincerely yours,

ELLIODOR M. LIBONATI.

"Whereas the Department of the Army has taken arbitrary action destructive to the junior ROTC through the withdrawal of essential instructor personnel, whereby 87.5 percent of the officers in the Chicago high schools and 55.4 percent of the instructor sergeants are being withdrawn; and

"Whereas these junior units have for almost 40 years contributed to the strengthening of the national defense and have provided thousands of young men with essential military training; and

"Whereas the need for adequate defense and military knowledge was never greater; and

"Whereas the draft will this year call into the services in large numbers young men but recently completing the junior ROTC course; and

"Whereas these young men from the junior ROTC will furnish the initial natural leadership in drafted groups and subsequently in the officer candidate schools: Therefore, be it

Resolved by the American Legion, That we protest the administrative order of the Army which weakens the effectiveness of the junior ROTC and urge the Secretary of the Army, Frank Pace, Jr., to countermand the administrative order heretofore issued and restore immediately the instructor personnel, which has been withdrawn; be it further

Resolved, That a copy of this resolution be sent to Frank Pace, Jr., Secretary of the Army, together with a protest of the department commander, Perce F. Brautigam, for his concurrent action here, and be it further

Resolved, That a copy of this resolution be sent to the two Illinois Senators, PAUL DOUGLAS and EVERETT M. DIRKSEN, in Congress, and all the Representatives in the State of Illinois, for their attention and action."

LEONARD W. ESPER,
Department Adjutant.

Mr. Chairman, there are 66,000 high-school students in the ROTC program today. Sixty-six thousand boys are receiving training which would be of inestimable value to them if and when they enter military service in their later years, either through the draft or voluntary enlistment. The Army says that it considers its college ROTC program of greater value. Perhaps that is true from the Army's viewpoint, but what happens to the boys who never go to college? Are they to be deprived of additional military skill because they are unable to attend institutions of higher learning? The Army's views are persuasive but are not necessarily decisive. We want our boys to be as well trained as they can possibly be, and if they want to supplement the training they receive in later years when they enter the Armed Forces, by the preliminary program offered through the high schools, they should be given the opportunity to do so. It is the untrained soldier who is handicapped in military life, not the over-trained one.

If the Army is permitted to cripple this program by assignment of not enough instructors, it is certain that teaching must necessarily be inadequate and the training must necessarily be inferior.

Mr. Chairman, I urge the adoption of my amendment.

Mr. JONAS of Illinois. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. YATES. I yield to the gentleman from Illinois.

Mr. JONAS of Illinois. Can the gentleman inform us as to any information he has about what investigation was made that resulted in this cutback by

the committee on this matter and related matters?

Mr. YATES. The committee has granted all of the funds requested for this program. It is the fault of the Army, not the committee. The Army is the agency that cut down the program.

Mr. JONAS of Illinois. Did anyone appear before the committee on behalf of the ROTC?

Mr. YATES. General Milton appeared on behalf of all the Reserve components and on page 418 he stated that it is a worthwhile program to the students and to the Army both.

Mr. JONAS of Illinois. The gentleman knows that many patriotic organizations are supporting him?

Mr. YATES. The American Legion is the one that called this to my attention, just as it called it to the attention of every Member of the House from Illinois, as well as the Senators. That organization is backing my amendment 100 percent.

Mr. FORD. Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent that all debate on this paragraph and all amendments thereto close in 10 minutes, the last 5 minutes to be reserved to the committee.

The CHAIRMAN. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Michigan?

There was no objection.

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Missouri [Mr. CURTIS].

Mr. CURTIS of Missouri. Mr. Chairman, I rise at this time to commend the gentleman from Illinois for bringing this matter to the attention of the committee. I am not in agreement with his amendment because I do not think giving the Army additional money will in any way solve the problem. In other words, if they are out to wreck the high school ROTC program, they are going to wreck it as they have done already, in my opinion, without authority. I am particularly happy that this matter has been brought to the attention of the House so that the Members can realize what has been going on.

May I also say that the Brownson UMT substitute for the Vinson plan was the plan that the American Legion had for many years advocated. This was really an extension of the high school ROTC program and would have cost the country about one-tenth of what the Vinson UMT plan cost.

In the hearings and in the debate on the floor on UMT it was brought out how the Army in the past had commended the high school ROTC program as being one of great value and as being worthwhile. I suspect there is a real ulterior motive in the Army without authority abandoning this great program which if augmented instead of cut back would be of so much value to the country.

There is another factor I want to bring to the attention of the Members and it is one which I think is very serious.

We voted down the Vinson UMT bill last year, and as I analyze the Army procurement program of manpower in their present program, particularly with reference to vocational education, it looks like the Army is going ahead with the Vinson UMT plan in spite of the fact that the Congress of the United States

The following resolution was passed by the department executive committee of the Department of Illinois, the American Legion, at their meeting held in Bloomington, Ill., October 3, 1952.

refused to go along. In digging into this vocational education program I find that the military are setting up vocational schools all over the country, although facilities already exist in our public school systems, our private vocational schools, and our industrial schools. It is complete duplication and a costly duplication. The military are not educators or trainers and they ought to get out of the business except that which pertains strictly to military training.

Mr. YATES. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. CURTIS of Missouri. I yield to the gentleman from Illinois.

Mr. YATES. Does not the gentleman feel that this may be the first step in the Army drive for UMT again?

Mr. CURTIS of Missouri. I certainly do, and I again want to commend the gentleman for bringing the matter up, although I cannot agree with going along for more money.

Mr. YATES. The reason for my asking for additional funds is the fact that had I sought to do it any other way, it would be subject to a point of order.

Mr. CURTIS of Missouri. I appreciate that.

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Illinois [Mr. PRICE].

Mr. PRICE. Mr. Chairman, I endorse the amendment offered by the gentleman from Illinois. I think the junior ROTC is a definite asset to our Military Establishment and a wonderful training organization for high-school boys. I do not believe that any Member of this House wants to see the junior ROTC disturbed in any manner. I am certain that there are few Members of the House who knew that there was a step afoot to eventually destroy this program.

Mr. SHORT. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. PRICE. I yield to the gentleman from Missouri, our distinguished committee chairman.

Mr. SHORT. I want to simply say, Mr. Chairman, that I am heartily in accord with the amendment offered by the gentleman from Illinois [Mr. YATES]. I think it has much merit. If the armed services had paid attention to carry out the clear intent of the Congress relative to the ROTC and our Reserve forces, there would not be this continuous drive for UMT.

Mr. PRICE. I thank the gentleman from Missouri, my distinguished chairman.

Mr. JONAS of Illinois. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. PRICE. I yield to the gentleman from Illinois.

Mr. JONAS of Illinois. I want to commend the gentleman from Illinois for the sound and sensible stand he is taking on this issue. Probably we who come from the larger areas, like the city of Chicago, where we have great institutions of learning, and who are going to have a great many ROTC units, realize more than they do in any other section of the country the necessity for maintaining the original personnel instead of cutting them down like they have done in this bill. I support the amendment.

Mr. YATES. Emphasizing what the gentleman from Illinois said, Lane Tech-

nical High School in Chicago has an ROTC unit of 700 students, and under the revised Army program today there is one sergeant in charge of that magnificent establishment. I think this amendment must be approved.

Mr. PRICE. I think the gentleman from Illinois is absolutely right. I hope the amendment offered by the gentleman from Illinois [Mr. YATES] will be adopted.

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from Illinois has expired.

Mr. DOYLE. Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent to extend my remarks at this point in the Record.

The CHAIRMAN. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from California?

There was no objection.

Mr. DOYLE. Mr. Chairman, because I have personally observed the great benefits accruing to the boys who had the opportunity to be trained in ROTC units in several high schools in California, together with the fact that I have personally observed over a term of years great resulting benefits from the presence and activities of ROTC units in the same high schools to the community at large; and, because such result to the individual concerned as well as to the total high school populations and to the communities involved, naturally resulted in great good to our Nation, I therefore, gladly support the amendment of the distinguished gentleman from Illinois [Mr. YATES].

Why any segment of our total Military Establishment would these days, seek to cut down the number of ROTC units in our high schools, when they have so recently strenuously advocated universal military training, appears to me inconsistent and poorly conceived. Granting that they have said that they do not have trained officers to allocate to these ROTC units, yet, Mr. Chairman, I ask if there is any more important segment of our male youth population to be trained in a preliminary way, as is that segment of youth which is in the last 2 years of our senior high schools? But, because the Army has apparently taken their present position to delete a considerable number of high school ROTC's for the reasons that they claim they cannot spare the number of suitable trained officers for such work, I believe it is in the interest of our national security and defense that we add this \$2 million to the budget so that our Defense Department can obtain either Active or Reserve Army personnel to furnish this strategic and essential training supervision for these American lads.

I am pleased to see that my distinguished Armed Services Committee chairman, the gentleman from Missouri [Mr. SHORT] on the Republican side of this House, also advocates this increase as represented by the Yates amendment.

May I again urge that these high school ROTC units are very essential and very valuable in the total scheme of our national military preparation, for our own national defense against Communist military aggression when and if it comes.

Now, Mr. Chairman, may I relate that I also regret that there are not more of the 1,400 junior and senior colleges in the United States who have the benefits

of the college ROTC units. There are only about 450 American junior and senior colleges, I am informed, which do have the ROTC units.

Being fully aware as I am, that the policy of the present administration recites that it does not authorize the establishment of ROTC units in junior colleges for the reason, it is said, that they do not have sufficient money nor personnel to establish these units in the total number of 1,400 colleges not now having them, I also emphasize in this connection, Mr. Chairman, that here again in my judgment, is a very serious error; as it relates to our total national defense and security against any potential military aggressor.

I understand that about 50 percent of the students graduating from junior colleges in the United States continue on to undertake studies in our senior colleges and that about only 40 percent who attend senior college actually graduate. This and other factors, I recognize, may be a serious attrition percentage, between the freshmen who enter the senior college grades and those who graduate therefrom. Naturally, therefore, the Department of the Army now claims that its policy of not establishing ROTC units in junior colleges is justified.

Again, Mr. Chairman, I urge and emphasize that it be duly recognized, that it is ultimately far better to have students in our senior high schools and in our junior and senior colleges obtain as much of their military training as possible at the time they are in their respective high school or college grades or in connection with their usual high school and college attendance. This policy, even though it may cost considerable more money in the long run, I believe is sensible and sound.

Time does not permit me here this morning to state that there is, of course, a serious impact upon educational institutions which do not have an ROTC unit as compared with those that do. So I recommend that as our Military Establishment proceeds in consideration of its basic policy that it review the same as relates to ROTC units in our senior high schools and also in our junior and senior college educational institutions. Let us not miss the boat in these areas of looking after our national defense.

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Michigan [Mr. FORD].

Mr. FORD. Mr. Chairman, in my statement in opposition to the amendment offered by the gentleman from Illinois, I do not mean to cast any disparaging remarks concerning the junior ROTC program. It is simply a practical matter—where do we get the most results for the money spent. The Army has in its overall reserve program four different component programs. They have the regular reserve program, they have the senior college program, they have the first 2-year-college program, and then they have the junior- or high-school program.

The Army under the present strength setup has just so many officers and enlisted men they can assign to this type of a program, and the Army has to make a decision as to whether or not they get the most value out of assigning these

people to the regular reserve program, which is an important part of our reserve-training setup, or whether they should assign their training personnel, officers and enlisted men, to a high-school-student group.

It is the considered opinion of the Army that they get more value for the defense of the country out of the assignment of their training personnel to the reserve program as such, the senior-college program and the first 2-year-college program. They feel they must assign their officer and enlisted strength to those particular programs.

The Army has its problem. They have so many officers and so many enlisted men. The Congress demands that they keep up their combat strength. If you do that, you have to have some reductions along the line elsewhere. We believe, based on the Army's presentation, that if they make the proper allocations we can get adequate officer and enlisted personnel in these various junior-high-school programs.

I have talked with the gentleman from Illinois about it, and I think that the Army has unfairly treated the city of Chicago in the allocation of the officers and enlisted men to this program. I have assured him, as he well knows, that I will work with him in trying to get from the Army a more realistic assignment. If we approach it that way, rather than adding dollars, I think we can achieve success.

One more thing. There is a technical objection to the gentleman's amendment. Actually this place in the bill is not the proper place for more money for more officers and enlisted men for this program. The pay of the Army is in the first paragraph of the Department of the Army section, so that in reality this amendment should come in the part relating to military personnel, Army.

In closing, let me reemphasize and reiterate one point. The Army feels, as we brought out in the testimony on page 417, that the Army is not getting the maximum value out of this program. The Army supplies the personnel for the training, the Army pays the bill, but a large percentage of those who get the training eventually go into the Navy or into the Air Force. The Army believes that this should be a servicewide supported program and not a charge against the Army as such.

Mr. YATES. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. FORD. I yield to the gentleman from Illinois.

Mr. YATES. With reference to what the gentleman has stated about the Army position that its college programs are more important, we know there are many high-school boys who do not go to college and they should be given the opportunity to have additional training, such as that offered by the high-school ROTC program. Second, when the Army talks about the fact that it does not have sufficient personnel, let me refer the gentleman to the Army Times of September 27, 1952—I think the gentleman from Florida spoke about it yesterday—which stated that the Army is cutting back its OCS schools so that the Army itself is

depriving itself of the officers who could logically go into this program.

Mr. FORD. We are cutting back our OCS programs because we now have an even flow of officers coming from our various training programs. We have built up to where we can actually produce officers at the required rate.

In conclusion, let me say again that the Army feels that in this program they are not getting the best value for the dollar expended, when you compare it with the regular Reserve Corps, when you compare it with the college Reserve training program, and when you compare it with the first 2-year-college-training program.

Mr. Chairman, I urge the defeat of the amendment offered by the gentleman from Illinois.

The CHAIRMAN. The question is on the amendment offered by the gentleman from Illinois [Mr. YATES].

The question was taken; and on a division (demanded by Mr. YATES) there were—ayes 29, noes 76.

So the amendment was rejected.

The Clerk read as follows:

RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT, ARMY

For necessary expenses of basic and applied scientific research, evaluation, and development, including maintenance, rehabilitation, lease and operation of facilities and equipment, not otherwise provided for; \$345 million, to remain available until expended.

Mr. NELSON. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment.

The Clerk read as follows:

Amendment offered by Mr. NELSON: On page 13, line 19, at the end of the sentence add the following new sentence to the paragraph: "No part of any funds herein appropriated shall be used to maintain or aid in maintaining a tire-testing facility for any of the technical services of the Army at any place within or without the continental limits of the United States either directly or in collaboration with any other department or agency of the Government or with any private concern."

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from Maine [Mr. NELSON] is recognized in support of his amendment.

Mr. FORD. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. NELSON. I yield.

Mr. FORD. I have consulted with the gentleman from Maine, and I think he has also consulted with the ranking minority Member, the distinguished gentleman from Texas. Inasmuch as this amendment conforms to the committee recommendation as expressed on page 27 of the committee report, we have no objection to the inclusion of this language in the bill.

Mr. NELSON. I thank the gentleman from Michigan.

Mr. Chairman, I offer this amendment on behalf of the gentleman from Ohio [Mr. Hess], who is chairman of the Subcommittee on Defense Activities of the Committee on Armed Services.

This committee has without much fanfare been devoting a great deal of time to investigations of various phases of procurement by each branch of the armed services in an effort to eliminate waste and extravagance.

Some time ago it completed an investigation of a tire-testing station at

Camp Bullis, Tex., which has been operated by the Army in conjunction with the Reconstruction Finance Corporation. The operation of this station cost over \$2 million in 1953 and was estimated to cost more in 1954. The tests conducted at this station exactly duplicate similar tests conducted by private industry on tires furnished to the Army and to the Government, whose performance is guaranteed by the private industry furnishing them. But as is usual, it is not a duplication but an embellishment. Where a private manufacturer for similar test purposes employs 99 people, the Government at Camp Bullis was employing 284.

Upon recommendation of our subcommittee, the Appropriations Committee, on page 27 of its report directs that the Army cease using appropriated funds for this purpose. It is the thought of our subcommittee that the Army should be specifically directed by law not to use any of its funds for this purpose, either at Camp Bullis or anywhere else within or outside the continental United States. It is for this purpose that the amendment is offered.

The CHAIRMAN. The question is on the amendment offered by the gentleman from Maine [Mr. NELSON].

The amendment was agreed to.

Mr. JAVITS. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment.

The Clerk read as follows:

Amendment offered by Mr. JAVITS: On page 13, line 18, strike out "\$345,000,000" and insert "\$370,000,000."

Mr. JAVITS. Mr. Chairman, my amendment proposes to restore to the bill the amount requested by the administration in its revised 1954 budget for research and development on the part of the Army. Mr. Chairman, in order to economize on the time of the House, I would like to say that if this amendment should carry, I would propose to offer similar amendments to other sections of the bill which relate to research and development in order to restore those amounts to the amounts for that purpose requested by the administration. It would in total mean a restoration of \$107,400,000 which is the aggregate of the amounts cut by the committee in the items for the Army, Navy, and Air Force, and would result in restoring the bill in respect to research and development to the budget amounts requested by the administration.

Mr. Chairman, the fundamental argument in this is twofold. First, we are all thoroughly aware of the critical importance of the whole research and development program to the future of our country in terms of our own national security. This, too, is one area in which the rivalry is tremendous between ourselves and the Soviet Union and in which we have to be extremely alert and do an outstanding job.

Mr. Chairman, when one looks at the various projects—and I have tried to read into the situation—which are being worked on by the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force, and find that they include, among many other major headings, guided missiles, surface to surface in the Army; guided missiles for defense

and attack in the Air Force; rockets of various kinds in the Army; combat armor in the Army; treatment of casualties in the ground forces; and, of course, innovations in the whole field of jet-propelled aircraft one realizes the critical importance of this whole situation.

My amendment, Mr. Chairman, involves a fundamental question of policy. It is perfectly true that the committee could differ with the administration upon what it will allow in this highly important field of research and development. I may say the administration itself cut \$270 million out of the aggregate research and development program for all of the armed services from the amount recommended by the Truman administration—cut it down from one billion and seven hundred plus millions of dollars to \$1,500,000,000 in round figures. The committee will tell you, and it is quite true, that there are indirect items contained in this appropriation bill which will make the aggregate figure for research and development roughly \$2 billion. The committee has cut items of approximately \$910 million, which can be identified in the bill, by \$107 million, so you have something over a 10-percent cut in the bill in the specific research and development items. I think this involves the fundamental principle for those of us who have decided we will go ahead and back the administration in its complete package for the national security of the country, that we should stand up for the administration's program to the letter, and, therefore, restore the items of the administration's request which have been stricken out, such as this one.

If we are going to take the arguments as to the administration's position in respect to the cut of the aircraft figures, then let us at least stick by the administration in all of its recommendations as to what it thinks is necessary on research and development. If you want the administration to carry the responsibility of its budget requests, give it the authority.

This is the first instance, so far in this bill, where the House is being asked to restore a figure to exactly what the administration asked for in its so-called 1954 version.

I should like to read what the Chairman of the Research and Development Board, which handles the coordination and advisory end of this program for all of the armed services, had to say. He is Dr. Whitman, a very distinguished scientist, and a leader in this whole field; and, as I say, the head of the Research and Development Board of the Defense Administration.

Based upon full consideration of the evaluation of the threat of foreign aggression, it is my conviction that we can secure technical superiority in weapons and techniques in order to offset the great numerical superiority of our probable enemies, and from my knowledge of the research and development programs for military purposes, I sincerely believe that any marked reduction in the research and development fund would gravely compromise the security of the Nation.

I emphasize those words, "would gravely compromise the security of the Nation."

When you look at the committee report and see why the committee made the cuts—and we understand the anatomy of committees in this House only too well—they made the cuts apparently because their general reaction was that the item ought to be cut down somewhat. They say so in practically so many words on page 26 of the committee report under the heading "Research and Development" relating to the Army. This is what they say:

The committee recommendation is based on a number of general reactions obtained during the hearings on this item.

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman has expired.

Mr. JAVITS. I ask unanimous consent, Mr. Chairman, to proceed for 1 additional minute.

Mr. SCRIVNER. Mr. Chairman, I dislike very much to do it, but I am constrained to object.

The CHAIRMAN. Objection is heard.

Mr. JAVITS. The amount involved in the last amendment adopted as to tire testing was only \$500,000 so that we should not be confined by that on the amendment I offer.

Mr. FORD. Mr. Chairman, I rise in opposition to the amendment.

The gentleman from New York [Mr. JAVITS] has offered an amendment to increase the funds to be appropriated for research and development for the Department of the Army. If you will listen for a minute you will see the sound reasons why our subcommittee did take such action in making the recommendation of \$345 million for research and development for the Army for the fiscal year 1954.

As of June 30, 1953, the research and development program for the Department of the Army will have \$39,875,000 which they have not obligated, much less spent. This figure of \$39,875,000, which they have not obligated as of June 30, does carry over into the fiscal year 1954. That figure was not anticipated to be as large at the time the revised budget was submitted to the Congress.

In addition to the unobligated funds, the research and development program for the Department of the Army has \$437 million unexpended. That is considerably more than the figure they requested for the fiscal year 1954.

I repeat again two figures: The research and development program, Department of the Army, has unobligated \$39,875,000; and they have unexpended \$437 million.

Our committee during the testimony on this program was presented with an excellent group of witnesses by General Nichols and his staff. They did an outstanding job in explaining to the subcommittee what the research and development program of the Department of the Army was trying to do. Not one member of our committee wants to hurt or harm in any way whatsoever any of the worthwhile research and development programs.

We cut the program only 6.8 percent, and our reductions are explained in the

committee report. But let me give you several specific examples. I refer to page 1546 of the committee hearings where the gentleman from Florida [Mr. SIKES] brought this point up and I am quoting:

Mr. SIKES. Here is something from the personnel research section of the research and development progress report under subtask 5 entitled, "A Method for Synthesis of Factor Analysis Studies." It states here:

"The technique of factor analysis is a widely used and important research tool aimed at giving a better understanding of the underlying abilities that personnel tests measure. In the area of test construction and administration, the method of factor analysis can be used to answer the question: How many traits, or abilities—or for convenience, factors—are measured by a given test or set of tests? Such information is used in improving the effectiveness of tests and test batteries. To date the technique of factor analysis has been developed to produce this information for the tests used in only one study at a time."

I repeat that our committee felt that the research and development program of the Department of the Army could do away with some of this kind of research.

Mr. SIKES. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. FORD. I yield.

Mr. SIKES. It is perfectly all right for the gentleman to quote me as saying that I still do not know what it means.

Mr. FORD. It was the consensus of the other members of the committee along with the gentleman from Florida that we did not understand the explanation.

Mr. JAVITS. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. FORD. I yield.

Mr. JAVITS. Will the gentleman say it is a standard of judgment for the Congress on research and development that the committee must understand the project before it can approve it?

Mr. FORD. We think they ought to be able to supply the committee with some kind of an explanation that ordinary people can understand.

Mr. JAVITS. I think that is normally true; but at the same time I do not think that in a highly technical research and development program you can set as a standard of judgment the proposition that nonscientists should understand a scientific subject.

Mr. FORD. Mr. Chairman I urge the defeat of the amendment.

The CHAIRMAN. The question is on the amendment offered by the gentleman from New York [Mr. JAVITS].

The amendment was rejected.

Mr. SCRIVNER. Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent that title III of the bill be considered as read and be open to amendment at any point.

The CHAIRMAN. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Kansas?

There was no objection.

The CHAIRMAN. Is there amendment to title III?

Mr. KING of California. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike out the last word.

Mr. Chairman, I wish to address myself briefly to a portion of House Report

No. 680 from the Committee on Appropriations on Department of Defense appropriation bill for 1954, the item promotion of rifle practice on page 27.

It is encouraging to note the committee recommends an appropriation of \$100,000 for National Board purposes.

The committee further reports, however, that—

It is the sense of the committee that the National Board should spare no effort in attempting to make available .22 caliber ammunition to the junior rifle clubs, and should, in fact, do its utmost to encourage the junior clubs.

The committee is to be commended for recognizing the importance of promotion of rifle practice among the juniors. However, since there is no appropriation for purchase of ammunition, which stocks are virtually exhausted, it is not understood how the National Board will be able to carry out this expressed sense of the committee.

As was pointed out by several witnesses appearing before the committee, the amount of \$100,000 will provide the administrative machinery whereby essential equipment such as rifles, target carriers, range accessories, and so forth, can be loaned to civilian clubs enrolled in the program, and ammunition and marksmanship materials can be sold to those citizens who implement the program at the local level—sales which, incidentally, have averaged over a million dollars annually for the past several years.

I cannot overemphasize the importance of this \$100,000 item. It provides the means to enable a small group of patriotic citizens to spend their own money in direct support of national defense and to keep alive an agency of the utmost importance to the defense of this Nation. However, it does not provide the \$80,000 necessary to purchase 10 million rounds of .22 caliber ammunition for issue to juniors engaged in this training.

Should the thousands of patriotic citizens giving of their time and facilities also be expected to furnish all the ammunition for training these juniors? Or are we to make the youngsters buy all of their own? Have no fear. I can assure my colleagues that any ammunition issued for juniors under this program is used for training and reports are made on its expenditure. I, therefore, urge upon the House the necessity of providing some money for ammunition so the National Board can carry out the sense of the committee.

I quote again from the committee report:

The senior rifle clubs, deprived of a partial potential membership by the Selective Service Act, are more and more composed of the "hobby shooters," generally older persons and more able to provide their own necessities. Services for this older group may well be abandoned in favor of concentration on the age group 12 to 18 years wherein basic elements of the handling of arms must still be taught.

I fail to see how the statement "senior rifle clubs, deprived of a partial potential membership by the Selective Service Act" is a statement related to fact.

It is well known that the million young men entering service every year are replaced in the civilian community by the million who come out of service each

year. Let us not get our facts mixed. The Selective Service Act has nothing to do with the potential of senior rifle club activities except as those who have left service are, in ever-increasing numbers, engaging in marksmanship training in an effort to improve their proficiency while they retain a Reserve obligation.

As for the statement that the senior rifle clubs are "more and more composed of 'hobby shooters'"—no matter what you label it, hobby or not, that trained shooter is a man prepared to spring to defense of his country in war either in military uniform or if over military age as a member of State militia, or as an instructor of others.

The seniors are the strength and foundation of any junior program. To say that services for the senior group may well be abandoned in favor of concentration on the age group 12 to 18, is to deny the importance of maintaining marksmanship proficiency to all able-bodied citizens. The National Defense Act of 1916 and the 1924 law authorized and provided in part for "instruction of able-bodied citizens of the United States in marksmanship."

Several witnesses before the committee appealed for fiscal authority for transfer of surplus service ammunition to the National Board in likelihood of an early Korea truce. When an armistice takes place it is inevitable there will be in the long pipeline of supply considerable excess service ammunition. Since all services are now on cost-accounting system there is needed a legislative or fiscal authority to enable transfer of surplus ammunition to National Board uses.

There is so much to be gained in preparation of our citizens for defense of our country at such a small cost that I urge upon the House a favorable consideration of the comments here made on the committee report.

The CHAIRMAN. If there are no further amendments to title III, the Clerk will read.

Mr. SCRIVNER. Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent that title IV be considered read and open to amendment at any point.

The CHAIRMAN. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Kansas?

There was no objection.

Mr. BENNETT of Florida. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment.

The Clerk read as follows:

Amendment offered by Mr. BENNETT of Florida: Page 16, line 8, after the first semicolon, strike out "\$63,300,000" and insert "\$65,970,000."

Mr. BENNETT of Florida. Mr. Chairman, constituents of mine have written to me protesting the approximately 60-percent cut in the Naval Reserve program for the nonpaid Reserve personnel in the Navy. The funds involved provide for short, active duty, training periods. If this amendment is agreed to, it is my understanding that the Navy's program in this for the current year will be reestablished instead of being cut 60 percent.

As I understand it, the request of the Navy was for 10,800 officers and 4,000 enlisted men, while the grant given by the Bureau of the Budget was for 4,025

officers and 1,490 enlisted men. That is the situation in men. In dollars, the cut could be restored by adding \$2,670,000 to the amount allowed in this bill, \$1,262,682, to make a total of \$4,932,682.

Mr. SHEPPARD. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. BENNETT of Florida. I yield to the gentleman from California.

Mr. SHEPPARD. Is it not a fact that what the gentleman is referring to is a subject matter which was deleted from the bill by the Bureau of the Budget. It was not before the committee considering the bill and the committee now presenting the bill?

Mr. BENNETT of Florida. It is my understanding that this cut was made by the Bureau of the Budget, not by the committee.

Mr. Chairman, in reference to the Naval Reserve program it seems to me when we have these men who are willing to give their time and effort without pay to themselves they should be encouraged rather than discouraged. The major attraction for them, in many cases, is the fact that they get this period of training cruises, of 14 days of active duty every year, in the Naval Reserve. It seems to me that it is false economy to cut this money out of the bill, a cut which is drastic, so far as the nonpaid Naval Reserve is concerned. If we could have such a popular training program in the Army and in the Air Force I think we would certainly jump at the opportunity to see it established as an attraction for an adequate training of all Reserves.

It seems to me false economy to discard these thousands of officers and enlisted men in the Naval Reserve program simply on the theory of a little economy which cuts out these cruises and training periods.

My amendment would put the money back into the bill so that we will know that the program will continue as it is now with regard to these nonpaid enlisted men and officers in the Naval Reserve program.

Mr. OSTERTAG. Mr. Chairman, I rise in opposition to the amendment offered by the gentleman from Florida [Mr. BENNETT].

Mr. Chairman, I desire to point out that the committee was very sympathetic, very interested and very cooperative in approaching what appeared to be the military policy in providing for a strong Reserve. I would like to point out the language of our report, in that the committee has allowed \$63,300,000 for military personnel, Naval Reserve, an increase of \$1,330,000 over the January budget and about \$5,393,000 more than the estimated obligations of last year. This increase has been granted. In view of the importance of the Reserves to the adequate manning of the Navy in time of mobilization insofar as numbers are concerned, the bill provides for an increase from 140,000 to 152,000 men by June of 1954, and it is in line with the ultimate goal of 277,000. In addition to Naval Reserve I would like to point out that the Marine Corps Reserve calls for a build-up from 20,000 to 33,000 by June of 1954. These are pay units, of course.

Mr. BENNETT of Florida. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. OSTERTAG. I yield to the gentleman from Florida.

Mr. BENNETT of Florida. I want to draw that distinction. The figures the gentleman refers to are for the pay and not the nonpay group to which this amendment refers.

Mr. OSTERTAG. The amendment that the gentleman from Florida has offered was not recommended in the budget by the Department of the Navy. What we have provided for is a strong Naval Reserve in line with the general policy.

Mr. BENNETT of Florida. Of course, it was not recommended by the Navy, because the Navy's hands are tied. On the other hand, it was not denied by the Navy. Once the administration decision has been made about the budget, the Navy has no right to come in and make recommendations, as the gentleman well knows. Their hands are tied. After they were turned down by the administration they were again turned down by reason of the fact that their hands were tied.

Mr. OSTERTAG. The gentleman is referring to both administrations, the Truman administration and the present administration?

Mr. BENNETT of Florida. I am not making any issue as between which administration.

Mr. OSTERTAG. I am not either except to point out that the administrations, past and present, have never presented a program along the line the gentleman's amendment calls for.

Mr. BENNETT of Florida. That may be, but it is a sad mistake to cut this money.

The CHAIRMAN. The question is on the amendment offered by the gentleman from Florida [Mr. BENNETT].

The amendment was rejected.

Mr. SHEPPARD. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike out the last word.

Mr. Chairman, with specific reference to the gentleman from Kansas [Mr. SCRIVNER] and the gentleman from New York [Mr. OSTERTAG] in order to avoid going into the general provisions of the bill as reflected on page 42, and I think is apropos under title 4, I would like to call your attention to section 618. Under the interpretations that have presently been given by the Office of the Secretary of Defense, it is indicated that they are about, if they have not already done so in some instances, to issue instructions to include an interpretation under section 618 that it would include patients. Of course, during the entire discussion of the bill "patients" was not included in the concept of the committee when section 618 was considered.

Mr. SCRIVNER. Mr. Chairman, if the gentleman will yield, that is correct. There was never any question about hospital patients being affected by this section; none whatsoever. The gentleman's interpretation is correct.

Mr. SHEPPARD. The reason why I am not offering an amendment to clarify this situation is because we were advised if the intent of Congress was clearly expressed on the floor, that the Department of Defense would not interpret section 618 to include patients.

Mr. SCRIVNER. Patients are not included, because it was not intended that they should be.

Mr. SHEPPARD. I thank the gentleman and this should remove any doubt that patients were included and clearly express the will of Congress.

Mr. OSTERTAG. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. SHEPPARD. I yield to the gentleman from New York.

Mr. OSTERTAG. I, too, want to concur in the point the gentleman from California [Mr. SHEPPARD] has made and concur in what the gentleman from Kansas [Mr. SCRIVNER] has said, that it was not the intent of the committee and we did not believe that such an interpretation would be put upon the language of the report. Therefore, if it is clear now, we can assume that the administration will carry out that intent.

Mr. SHEPPARD. I have that assurance.

Mr. OSTERTAG. Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent to extend my remarks at this point in the RECORD.

The CHAIRMAN. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from New York?

There was no objection.

Mr. OSTERTAG. Mr. Chairman, in order that the record may be clear, I should like to say just a few words about an item of \$135,000 the committee eliminated from the appropriation service-wide operations for a proposed Office of Analysis and Review. As stated in the report, we felt that this office would be another layer of personnel superimposed on those already functioning in review of the budget requirements in the Navy and the Office of the Secretary of Defense.

The Secretary of the Navy has expressed some concern that the language of the committee report flatly denies the Navy the opportunity to establish this review group which would be in his office and report directly to him. While the committee still has serious doubts about the matter, and in any event does not believe added funds should be granted, if the Secretary nevertheless feels strongly that the office should be established, the committee is not inclined to object to a reprogramming of funds otherwise available to cover minimum necessary expenses.

Mr. SCRIVNER. Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent that title V, relating to the Department of the Air Force, be considered as read, and that amendments be in order to that title at any point.

The CHAIRMAN. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Kansas?

There was no objection.

Mr. MAHON. Mr. Chairman, I have a series of four amendments which provide for an increase in the Air Force figures by \$1,175,000,000. I have at the Clerk's desk four separate amendments. I also have at the Clerk's desk one consolidated amendment, which would carry out the so-called Vandenberg program for accelerating the Air Force buildup. I ask unanimous consent that all four of those amendments be considered en bloc.

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman can offer all four amendments as one amendment.

Mr. MAHON. I offer the consolidated amendment which changes the figures in four places in the bill. I do not know whether that is entirely agreeable to the majority.

Mr. SCRIVNER. Inasmuch as the entire section has now been considered as read, I can see no objection. I think it should be realized that we are considering four amendments instead of just one, and we should govern ourselves accordingly.

May I make one inquiry of the gentleman from Texas. I have not had time to do the arithmetic. Do these four amendments include the increases as suggested by General Vandenberg?

Mr. MAHON. They do.

Mr. PASSMAN. Mr. Chairman, I move that the Committee do now rise, and on that I demand tellers.

Tellers were ordered, and the Chairman appointed as tellers Mr. SCRIVNER and Mr. MAHON.

The Committee divided; and the tellers reported that there were—ayes 7, noes 114.

So the motion was rejected.

Mr. MAHON. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment.

The Clerk read as follows:

Amendment offered by Mr. MAHON:
Aircraft and related procurement: On page 27, line 13, strike out the symbol and figures "\$3,495,000,000" and insert in lieu thereof the following: "\$3,848,000,000."

Major procurement other than aircraft: Page 27, line 18, strike out "\$600,000,000" and insert in lieu thereof "\$650,000,000."

Maintenance and operation: Page 29, line 8, strike out "\$3,050,000,000" and insert in lieu thereof "\$3,650,000,000."

Military personnel requirements: Page 31, line 10, strike out "\$3,270,000,000" and insert in lieu thereof "\$3,442,000,000."

Mr. MAHON. Mr. Chairman, in a word, the amendment which I have offered represents the minimum requirements of the Air Force to continue as rapidly, as reasonably possible, toward the achievement of the 143-wing program as determined by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Under the program before us in the revised budget estimate, we would have, at the beginning of 1956, 120 wings. This amendment provides that by June 30, 1957, a 143-wing program would be achieved. The component parts of this amendment are well outlined on pages 694 and 695 of the hearings. There is explained on those pages by the technicians of the Air Force precisely what each increase in appropriation would provide. I invite your attention to that portion of the Air Force hearings.

Mr. Chairman, when I was a small lad I recall seeing a motto on the wall of a country home. The words of that motto have lain dormant in my mind for years, but as this controversy has waged in the House they have come back to my memory. Those words were—

For when the One Great Scorer comes to write against your name
He marks not that you lost or won, but how you played the game.

I think the House of Representatives is the greatest legislative body in the world, and I think the Members of the House yesterday acquitted themselves with dignity and with strength in discussing the

major issue in this bill. I think the country has reason to be proud of the Congress for abstaining from personalities, and debating this great and far-reaching question strictly on the basis of the merits of the case. That is where we must keep this battle pitched today. I had rather lose in a cause that will one day be vindicated than to win in a cause that will one day be repudiated.

This issue before us today is far-reaching in its consequences, and each Member will have the opportunity to stand and be counted on one side or the other. Those who are on one side will be just as sincere and honest as those on the other side will be. Let us lay that down as fundamental.

I could chide in good humor some of my colleagues who oppose this amendment and who are members of the committee. We had weeks and weeks of hearings, and about 4,000 pages of the hearings were printed. The issue was discussed at great length in the hearings, but it seems that those who were determined to oppose this amendment were not willing to trust themselves to the tender mercies of the House, based upon a printed record which had been developed over weeks of hearings. They have undoubtedly been resting somewhat upon an uneasy pillow.

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from Texas has expired.

Mr. MAHON. Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent to proceed for 10 additional minutes.

The CHAIRMAN. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Texas?

There was no objection.

Mr. MAHON. So those fine and sincere opponents of my amendment ran up the distress signal on yesterday and called on the President in the White House for relief. The letter of the President was read to us yesterday. It was a fine, dignified letter. In my judgment, no man in America, or in the free world for that matter, would applaud any more sincerely the efforts of Members of Congress to express their views and do what, in their judgment, is best for the country, than President Eisenhower in the White House. I think if he had the opportunity to make a rubber stamp out of the 83d Congress he would refuse to do so. I think he wants every Member of Congress to follow his own judgment, based upon the facts and circumstances, and he does not want the Congress of the United States placed in a straitjacket. Every man is entitled to his views, and that goes for the Congress as well as for the executive branch of the Government.

This budget, as was pointed out yesterday, generally speaking, was devised and contrived in the Pentagon, as the budget always is, chiefly this time by our civilian officials, but with some assistance, of course, from the military officials. That fact is brought out crystal clear on page 390 of the defense hearings, and I quote the record:

Mr. MAHON. Who made the decision, whose idea was it that we make a defense cut of \$5 billion in the Air Force? Was that done by the civilians in the Pentagon?

Deputy Defense Secretary KYES. I think I can answer that one. I was the most sur-

prised man in the Pentagon when I found that was the result.

Mr. MAHON. Did the Bureau of the Budget suggest the \$5 billion cut in the Air Force? Secretary WILSON. No, sir.

Mr. MAHON. Did the President suggest it? Secretary WILSON. No, sir.

Mr. MAHON. Did the Bureau of the Budget alter materially the recommendations of the Pentagon?

Secretary WILSON. No.

I skip a few lines here which are not material.

This request for new money which is really what we are talking about here today, was worked out in the Pentagon.

That is not inconsistent with other things that have been said on both sides of the aisle. There is no blinking the fact that our Chief Executive, whom we all honor and admire, was trying to bring down the expenses of the Government, a very laudable objective; and the effort was made to balance the budget at first, and it was seen that that was not possible. Then the word was passed down: "See if you can make a \$5 billion cut in the Department of Defense and help us that much toward balancing the budget." There is nothing improper or dishonorable about that; it was a laudable undertaking to bring the budget into balance if possible. Then the decision was worked out, generally speaking, in the Pentagon that the \$5 billion cut would be taken out of the Air Force and President Eisenhower submitted the budget that way. It was not he who originated the idea that the great cut be made in the Air Force. Yet he adopted the budget and is familiar with the budget; there is no doubt about that. He is a man of great capacity and understanding, and he is endorsing the budget. Let us not try to place the President in a wrong position; he is doing what he thinks is best for the country. I applaud him for following his best judgment and I merely ask the same right for Members of Congress.

Yes; I also applaud the attitude of Congress in trying to maintain its own integrity and in seeking to represent its own viewpoint. That has been done not only by Chairman REED but by many other Republican Members of the House. We somehow have a way in the House of Representatives—and praise the Lord for it—of standing on our two feet and voting our own convictions. When we have done that, we can sleep at night, but if we become totally subservient to any person or to any group, democracy is dead.

If, of course, the Department of Defense does not spend the money we cannot compel officials to do so, but here we are offering to make it available to them in order that they can proceed more rapidly toward the objective of a 143-wing Air Force program. We have done our duty and expressed our hopes. We may be wholly wrong. History may prove—and I hope it does prove—that I will have to eat my own words in the future and that out ahead of us is peace, understanding, no war, and no necessity for large military programs.

That may possibly be what the future holds. We must do the best we can under the facts and circumstances as

they confront us today. As for me, I think the future looks pretty grim, and I am not willing to play partisan politics with national defense or retard the well-ordered, planned, and approved buildup of the United States Air Force.

The budget before us cuts down our objective of a 10,000 per year pilot training program to 7,200 per year. Those who vote for the amendment which I have offered vote for training 10,000 pilots a year rather than 7,200.

In the Pentagon, since the first of the year, our aircraft-production program has been altered, and if you will turn to page 870 of the hearings, you will observe that 1,900 planes have been eliminated. Some of those planes have proved not to be good, but I would prefer that adequate funds be appropriated in order to continue our air buildup of the best approved type planes in view of the fact that we are outnumbered in some very important fields of airpower.

Secretary Wilson's revised program for the Air Force eliminates some of those planes eliminated by cancellations and readjustments of previous programs. Twelve hundred of them are eliminated by the reduction in the current budget. There are those who favor such a drastic course, but I am not one of them.

Another significant thing in this is that while the Department of Defense officials knew something about what was going on in the slowdown of our military buildup, the facts are unrefuted that the Joint Chiefs of Staff were never called together and asked for a composite opinion as to what should be done. I quote again the following from the testimony of General Vandenberg, a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

Question. Did the Air Force or its Chief of Staff approve the reduction of the Air Force to an interim goal of 120 wings?

Answer. The Air Force did not, and I did not.

Question. Have the Joint Chiefs of Staff approved a reduction of the Air Force program from 143 wings to 120 wings, either on an interim or any other basis?

Answer. They have not. As recently as March 1953 the Joint Chiefs of Staff stated to the Secretary of Defense that any reduction of the program of 143 wings to be attained as soon as practicable after fiscal year 1954 would increase the risk to national security beyond the dictates of national prudence.

Question. Are there any strategic factors which either reduce the Soviet threat below what it was when the 143-wing program was established or which reduce the air forces required to meet that threat?

Answer. There are no such factors known to me.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff in 1951, after the atomic bomb had been exploded in the Soviet Union, had a long series of meetings and stated at that time that our war plan required a minimum of 143 wings, 21 air divisions, 408 combatant ships. The Army and Navy have achieved approximately their objective but the Air Force is only within 60 percent of its objective. And the Air Force part of the program is the most sensitive and important of all. It represents the greatest deterrent to global war.

The only difference insofar as my amendment is concerned is that there are those who want to go more rapidly

toward our important air-power objective and there are those, on the other hand, who think we can afford to take a slower approach and rely for an interim period on a weaker Air Force.

Let me approach the issue in a little less formal way.

A few years ago I heard the teenagers singing a song which caught my fancy:

You've got to accentuate the positive, eliminate the negative, latch on to the affirmative, don't mess with Mr. In Between.

I am one of those who is not willing to mess around with Mr. In Between, with a slowdown interim program, if you please. I want the affirmative program to go forward at the earliest possible date.

This is not a political issue. I condemn the Democratic administration and my own party for not having gone forward more rapidly on this air-power program in the past. By the same token I condemn Secretary Wilson's interim program of delay. There is no partisanship about this thing to me. I think today of the boys in Korea and I remember that stern face of General Van Fleet when he was before the committee.

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from Texas has again expired.

(On request of Mr. HARRIS, and by unanimous consent, Mr. MAHON was given 5 additional minutes.)

Mr. MAHON. Mr. Chairman, General Van Fleet sat there in our committee room giving his testimony, by which I was deeply moved. I asked him:

What is your advice?

He was fresh from the horrible battlefields of Korea. I asked:

What is your advice based upon your experience as to what this committee should do toward providing funds?

Here is what General Van Fleet said:

I will answer that very frankly and tell you I am disgusted with the luxury of America and the paucity of preparedness.

That is what he said. He stated further:

I express my views as an American who pays a lot of taxes, and I am still willing to pay taxes to put America in better shape for my children and grandchildren.

That is the reason I am offering this amendment today, because I believe, if adopted, it will place us in a better position in the cold war which encircles the globe and in the hot war in Korea, where American boys are dying today. That is the whole point.

I am just wondering how the boys in Korea would vote today on the issue of greater military strength. No, I am not wondering. I know.

Now, there are those who say that I said on a previous occasion that we should not have legislation by hysteria. I stand by that statement and I repeat it. I also say we should not have legislation which indicates that Congress is forgetting the men in the fighting area of Korea and around the world, and their loved ones here in this country, who need a Military Establishment which is sufficiently strong to bring this hot war to an end and to win the initiative for the

Western World in the globe-encircling cold war. That is the high level on which I approach this situation and I think that is the level from which we must approach it. We cannot bankrupt this country, as the President pointed out so ably and well. We should not now fully mobilize, that is true; we would not be in favor of it; nor can we let the partisans of the various services distort our defense needs. We just need to face the facts of life in this matter and follow what we said we were for last year and the year before and what the Joint Chiefs of Staff said they were for on March 5, 1953, the 143-wing airpower program.

Mr. SCRIVNER. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. MAHON. I yield to the gentleman from Kansas.

Mr. SCRIVNER. I cannot recall, but perhaps the gentleman can point out in the testimony, where it was ever said by anybody that this program would take one single solitary plane out of Korea.

Mr. MAHON. If I made any such implication, it was not intended. The gentleman knows I have not.

Mr. SCRIVNER. That is the inference I gained.

Mr. MAHON. I just said that the new program cuts out 1,900 aircraft from the strength of the American Air Force, by cancellation and reevaluation of other programs, budget cuts, and otherwise. I cite page 870 of the Air Force hearings—the figures are not in dispute.

We must take into consideration the economic aspects of this question, my friends, in all calmness and quiet deliberation. This amendment will keep the President's budget intact with my amendment we will still be below the President's budget. Why should we not exercise our rights and duties as the elected representatives of the people. Poor little Congress cannot we have the right and the courage to change a few figures that have been sent down to us by the Bureau of the Budget. Why can we not exercise our judgment if we are worthy of our hire? If my amendment is adopted we will still be under the figure which the President said in his budget message was the amount of money required for national defense. We have made some readjustments which we have a perfect right to do, whether we are right or whether we are wrong. I have no patience with those who will hide behind the cloak of the President, whom we all respect, on the one hand, and then cut his defense budget by \$1.3 billion. We were sent here to use our judgment, and I propose to do just that. I am pleased that those of us who are supporting an economy program, and I am, can rest assured that if my amendment is adopted the bill will still be below the President's budget.

In my judgment the duty of those who want a stronger voice on the part of our Nation for peace and stability is clear. Yet let no one be over persuaded. Each Member is responsible for his own vote.

Mr. HALLECK. Mr. Chairman, I rise in opposition to the amendment.

Mr. Chairman, the gentleman from Texas always makes an eloquent speech, but I could not find much in what he had

to say in justification for his amendment. It was more difficult for me to understand his profession of respect for the ability and knowledge and capacity of our great President, Mr. Eisenhower, and then at the same time take such violent issue with him as to the adequacy of the amount provided by the committee for the Air Force.

Mr. SCRIVNER. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. HALLECK. I yield to the gentleman from Kansas.

Mr. SCRIVNER. I would like to point out that the gentleman from Texas did not question the wisdom of the President in the funds that he provided for the Army and the Navy.

Mr. HALLECK. Well, as I say, it has seemed to me somewhat inconsistent, to say the least.

Mr. MAHON. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. HALLECK. I yield to the gentleman from Texas.

Mr. MAHON. Permit me to say that I do think the President's budget was too drastically cut in reference to those services.

Mr. HALLECK. Apparently the President does not think so, because he has written a letter under date of June 30 indicating his approval of this committee action.

It does seem to me that if you have that degree of confidence in him and those around him that has been expressed here so many times you might say, "Well, this bill is all right."

I have listened to a speech or two which tried to make it appear, it seemed to me, that the Republican Party is not for national defense. Certainly no insinuation or statement such as that will stand up, because through all the years we have been for a strong, adequate national defense.

Mr. MAHON. I wish to say that I fully agree with the gentleman that the Republican Members of Congress are strong for national defense.

Mr. HALLECK. I appreciate that. I did not mean to indicate that the gentleman from Texas so said.

Some suggestions have been made to me that this controversy may not have helped our position in the world. Let me just say that if such an end result as that has been brought about, it has in considerable measure, been brought about by what I consider highly intemperate, inflammatory statements that were made principally by Members on that side of the aisle and others who started at the outset to criticize and to excoriate the administration for this proposed cut, with demands, almost before the first words were spoken, that Secretary of Defense Wilson, one of the very ablest men ever to be in that position, resign. I say that does not contribute anything to the standing of the country or the support of our Government.

I do not think it contributed anything here for the acting minority leader to refer to the great prosperity that we Republicans inherited when we took over in the administration and in the Congress. If one wanted to talk about inheritances, one might say, "Yes, we

have inherited the biggest debt that any nation ever had. We have the biggest spending and the highest taxes. Yes, and we have inherited a hot war and a cold war, and the necessity is put to us of appropriating upwards of \$34 billion to carry on in the hot and the cold wars."

Now let us get down to the proposition that is before us. Of course, if one argued for the maximum of security for the Nation militarily he would say, "Let us go on a complete all-out mobilization. Let us shoot the works. Let us shut down all the automobile factories in Detroit, as we did in World War II, and put them to the production of war goods. Let us regiment everybody. Let us go all the way. That is the maximum."

We all know that if we went that far the end results could be completely disastrous for this country because, as you go that far, or to a position closely approximating it, you get to the point where you break down the strength of the Nation at home.

If you get to that point, what are you going to do if you do not have a war? Are you going to war anyway?

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from Indiana has expired.

Mr. HALLECK. Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent to proceed for 5 additional minutes.

The CHAIRMAN. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Indiana?

There was no objection.

Mr. HALLECK. This is the great controversy in this bill, and as far as I know, the only one. It has been discussed here for hours and hours and hours. I do not know whether I am adding anything to the consideration, but I feel compelled to say something. I do hope, and I certainly do not want to transgress myself, that we can go on and conclude with this amendment and the consideration of the bill.

Mr. HARRIS. Mr. Chairman, if the gentleman will yield at this point, and I do not like to interrupt him, but I think it is very important to consider this point in connection with this amendment.

As I recall, in 1948 the President of the United States requested funds for a 48-group Air Force. The Congress of the United States gave to the President funds for a 70-group Air Force. The President of the United States did not see fit, as I recall, to utilize those funds for a 70-group Air Force. What could the gentleman tell us, if anything, with reference to the attitude of the present administration should these additional funds be appropriated that it has not requested?

Mr. HALLECK. Should they?

Mr. HARRIS. Yes.

Mr. HALLECK. Why, the President's letter, which has been read here and which is in the RECORD, makes it very clear and is evidence of the fact that the President and his administration are satisfied with these funds here provided in the bill. I have spoken of this all-out total mobilization. No one is arguing for that. The question then is, What

balance do we strike between total mobilization and the necessities of our situation here at home? That is the important phase to consider. Before we consider that particular matter of balance, I think it is also necessary that we figure the balance between the armed services themselves. We all know of the competitive bidding that is constantly carried on for more and more of the taxpayers' dollar between the services, and some argue that we ought to appropriate enough for each of the armed services to completely defend the country without regard to the efforts of any other part of the service. I say the administration in its recommendations here has undertaken to bring about that sort of a reasonable balance between the different branches of the Armed Forces. Likewise, I think the administration and this great committee who have brought this bill to us has undertaken to balance the necessities of our security against armed aggression; and also the necessities of our situation at home.

Mr. MASON. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. HALLECK. I yield.

Mr. MASON. Does the gentleman know of any man in the world who is better qualified to adjust the jealousies and arguments between the Armed Forces of our Nation than the President of the United States?

Mr. HALLECK. So far as I am concerned, I think he is the outstanding man in the country, and I am very happy that in these critical times we have a man of his training, experience, and background as President of the United States.

Mr. Chairman, I heard President Eisenhower make a report in the Congressional Library when he returned from Europe. He made a statement which made a deep impression on me, and which to me is still a guiding light. He said the Armed Forces of the country are but the cutting edge of a great tool—the cutting edge of a great machine, and that great machine is the great productive enterprise capacity of the United States of America. What a tragedy it is going to be if we appropriate untold billions and billions of dollars and by appropriating too much, lose the very freedom that we seek to preserve for ourselves and our posterity—and lose that without firing another shot outside of Korea. I know there is concern on the part of many people about the fact that we are spending too much money. We hear it on every hand. It is evident in the cries of the people for tax relief. They say, "Keep your expenditures down." But I am sure no one wants to do that at the expense of our national security. At the same time there must be a reasonable balance and a reasonable determination of what is in the best interests of our country.

I think we have that reasonable balance. I know that this is a responsibility. I sensed some of the undertones in the speeches of the gentleman from Texas and others that one day we may regret this vote. Well, if the third world

war comes, and certainly I hope it does not, but if it does I suppose those of us who oppose this amendment will be accused of having sold the country down the river. I still hear about that little vote concerning the harbor improvements at Guam—and, of course, that did not have anything to do with what happened at Pearl Harbor. But here again all I can do is to approach this on the basis of my responsibility as I see it.

What I am getting at is that I think plenty of money has been provided here for the Air Force. I think it is all that they can use and use well. I think it does achieve a measure of balance. I know some people would hope that we could have an Air Force that would prevent the first bomb even from being dropped on Detroit or Chicago or Pittsburgh or Washington. We are told that no definite assurance can be given of that, but the gentleman from New Jersey [Mr. SIEMINSKI], in his very able speech, pointed out something that we ought to remember, when he said that surely, our planes blasted German cities in World War II; and it was claimed that they were wiped out. And then in 2 or 3 weeks they had to go back again with the Air Force because, somehow or other, they got going and they had twice as much production coming out as they had before. Of course, no one blow is going to render this country helpless. You can knock off the roof of a lot of these machines, and then they will get the debris out of the way and continue producing the products they had been making.

I went over to the Union Station when that train forgot to stop and went on into the station. Such a scene of destruction and devastation I never saw, and as I looked at it I thought, my goodness, it will be months before they ever get that straightened out. I went back in 2 days and you would not have known that there had been a locomotive and a couple of cars in the Union Station. It is true they were cutting the engine up down in the basement, but business was going on as usual.

As we consider the whole matter, the matter of balance, may I say again, in conclusion, that this new team under President Eisenhower is intent on giving the people of this country a dollar's worth of defense for every taxpayer's dollar that they spend. They have come up with this as a balanced program, a balance between the services and a balance between the services and our economy. And that being true, I sincerely hope that those of you who profess great confidence in the President, and in those around him, will support us in our opposition to this amendment, because opposition to this amendment is the Eisenhower program.

Mr. HRUSKA. Mr. Chairman, I rise in opposition to the amendment, and I ask unanimous consent to proceed for 5 additional minutes.

The CHAIRMAN. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Nebraska?

There was no objection.

Mr. HRUSKA. Mr. Chairman, we have been told that it would be well not to err on the side of weakness; if we are going to err we should err on the side of strength. We have been told that it is not well to hide behind the cloak of our President, and we should not have patience with those who do. We have been told that we should not suffer these cuts to be made in an Air Force budget that is down to a point where the cuts are more than enough.

We have been asked why we have completely reversed our position from the 143-wing program which we approved here in previous Congresses, and now we are taking steps to wreck that Air Force and to wreck that program.

I think it might be well if we discard that type of generality in favor of discussing the amendment proper. We should first bear in mind that no one is advocating here a cut in the Air Force. No one here is advocating an Air Force but what will be stronger 6 months from now than it is now, much stronger than that 12 months later, and progressively on.

In essence, the modified 120-wing program is simply this. It is simply that we are taking out of that 143-wing program certain wings which do not bear on combat strength, and we are deferring those noncombat wings in favor of an early execution of that portion of the 143-wing program consisting of combat wings. That is what is being done, and that is why it is being done. One hundred and twenty wing interim goal. In the meantime there will be a complete restudy of the situation by the new Joint Chiefs of Staff. It will be submitted in December and acted upon by this Congress in its new appropriations actions. It should also be said that all of the 143 wings, with the exception of the B-66's, are provided for in 1953 and prior appropriations. The only reason for asking moneys here is for the purpose of further modernizing additional combat wings. The planes going into the combat wings which are being formed now are being paid for out of appropriations for 1953 and prior money.

As to whether or not the 143-wing plane force is abandoned, I quote from Secretary Talbott's testimony:

I do not for 1 moment consider that we have abandoned the 143-wing Air Force.

He further states:

The reduction in our request for funds in fiscal year 1954 will not change delivery schedules of bomber, fighter, and reconnaissance aircraft, nor will it prevent our carrying out the 143-wing aircraft program in these categories if appropriate reorders of production items are executed by July 1954. I am satisfied that it is now practical to reduce reorder lead times in most of our combat aircraft, and doing so permits the elimination of many aircraft heretofore procured for purchase from 1954 funds.

Now, getting down to the amendment itself—I think it was quite observable in

the argument so far made up until this time that we have had no discussion about the basis of the allocation of this \$1,175,000,000, and I propose to overcome that deficiency right now.

First, aircraft. In the proposed amendment a request for \$353 million on an item in which there is presently ready for obligation and ready for expenditure a total of \$23,157,000,000. There will be a carryover into 1955 of \$16,157,000,000 after the next 12 months of expenditures have been executed. If the amount of \$353 million requested by the Vandenberg amendment for that purpose is allowed, the rate of expenditure we will experience in the next 12 months will result in that additional authority lasting for an additional 20 spending days.

If the additional 447 airlift and support aircraft stated by Vandenberg as required are found to be necessary in that finance period, they can be financed, says Secretary Wilson, by reducing further finance lead time in the aircraft-funding program.

I tell you right now that while General Vandenberg is eminent in his own field this is not necessarily true as to the field of production and finance. Secretary Wilson, in my judgment and in the judgment of many, is preeminent in that field.

Mr. SCRIVNER. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. HRUSKA. I yield.

Mr. SCRIVNER. I also point out that if some of these contracts are to be canceled which are now being discussed that will give funds that can be deobligated and add still further funds for the procurement of new craft.

Mr. HRUSKA. That is right, and 10 days ago we witnessed the cancellation of a contract which fell in that category.

The next major item is "Major procurement other than aircraft," where request is made for \$50 million. On that score we have in the January budget a request for \$900 million. That has been cut to \$600 million. In the January budget no carryover funds were considered whatsoever. Since that time \$340 million has been uncovered in the carryover fund. Add the \$600 million which is in the budget to the \$340 million in the carryover and we have available for this major procurement item as virtually new authority the sum of \$940 million, which is \$40 million more than what the January budget contained. Hence the \$50 million addition recommended by General Vandenberg is not necessary.

The next item is military construction. General Vandenberg wants \$260 million more for this purpose. We have presently, as of June 30, 1953, unobligated in 1953 and prior-year funds a total of \$1,641,000,000, plus obligated funds of \$987 million, making a total of over \$2,628,000,000 available for expenditure for the construction of air bases and military construction for the Air Force. Now, then, we have an amount of money, \$1,641,000,000, which was not even obligated on June 30. For anyone to come here and say he wants \$260 million more

so that it only adds to that already on hand and unobligated, then one wonders what useful purpose can be served thereby.

It might be said that there was a freeze order in February. It might also be said that the funds, of which \$1,641,000,000 is a part, were appropriated last July, so there was time to obligate those funds if there had been an effort made to do so and if the need is as urgent and pressing as now represented.

As to maintenance and operation, the request is made for \$600 million for that account. I might direct your attention to page 49 in the report wherein the spares and spare parts account is discussed. The bulk of those spares and spare parts is found either in maintenance and operation or aircraft procurement.

In brief, since July 1, 1950, here is the history of that spares account: A total of \$12,700,000,000 has been appropriated for the spares and spare parts account, initial spares as well as subsequent spares. Out of \$12,700,000,000, which takes us up to June 30, 1954, a total of only \$1,700,000,000 will have been spent by June 30 of next year, so that we have a carryover, Mr. Chairman, in that spares account of \$11 billion as of that time. Yet there is a request for additional funds.

I ask, Why do we need additional funds when the only result will be to add to already excessive advance financing.

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from Nebraska has expired. (On request of Mr. SCRIVNER, and by unanimous consent, Mr. HRUSKA was given 3 additional minutes.)

Mr. HRUSKA. Mr. Chairman, in conclusion, as I said yesterday, it seems to me that we have here two approaches to this entire subject. There are two basic concepts involved here. One concept is founded on the idea that there is one day against which we must plan by way of air preparedness. That is the concept that General Vandenberg had because he said in his testimony on June 12 about an air force:

We are talking about an air force as of a day that we must be ready to meet the Soviet Air Force in order to avoid disaster—a day.

Anyone can pick any day they want to. My date is 1954.

General Eisenhower, on the other hand, in discussing this budget says:

The essence of the change is this. We reject the idea that we must build up to a maximum attainable strength for some specific date theoretically fixed for a specified time in the future. Defense is not a matter of maximum strength for a single date. It is a matter of adequate protection to be projected as far into the future as the actions and apparent purposes of others may compel us.

Mr. Chairman, here is a matter of major policy to be decided. Is that not what we are called upon to decide today, not loyalty to the President, but adoption of major policy from two choices, one coming from the military and one from civil authorities.

Mr. Chairman, I repeat what I said yesterday. I firmly believe that America has not yet reached the place where we are willing to repudiate the civilian authority, duly constituted and residing in the executive branch, in favor of the military on this kind of situation.

Mr. SCRIVNER. Mr. Chairman, I rise in opposition to the amendment and ask unanimous consent to proceed for 5 additional minutes.

The CHAIRMAN. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Kansas?

There was no objection.

Mr. SCRIVNER. Mr. Chairman, I wonder if we can reach any agreement as to time. Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent that all debate on this amendment and all amendments there-to close at 3:15.

The CHAIRMAN. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Kansas?

There was no objection.

Mr. SCRIVNER. Mr. Chairman, in the more than 10 years that I have now been a Member of the House, I have never, at any time, as far as I can recall, ever called any personal attention to myself. Those of you who have read the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD know what my military service has been. Following my military service for more than 30 years as a member of the American Legion, as post commander, and past department commander I have advocated a strong and adequate defense, and I am today doing that very same thing. This is not weakening the national defense at all. It is an attempt to give you an even better and stronger defense than you have today by far.

I would point out that some of those who have been quoted as authorities, General Vandenberg, General Bradley, and General Eisenhower when he was Chief of Staff, stated emphatically it was not the job of the Chief of Staff to discuss dollars in the budget, yet General Vandenberg is attempting to do that very thing. All three of them said it was the province of the civilians, it was the province of the Secretary of Defense, it was the province of the National Security Board, it was the province of the President to say how much should be budgeted for all agencies, including national defense.

You can rest assured of one thing, and you can tell every boy in Korea, that this is not taking one combat plane away from them.

Let us look at some of the figures General Vandenberg has submitted. They are General Vandenberg's figures, they are not the figures of the Air Force. The Air Force supported this budget.

He wants more money for maintenance and operations, \$600 million. We cut this appropriation. We should have cut it much more. Yet when you sit down and check his calculations, or whoever made them for him, you will find that flying hours as figured in the bill were rated at \$376 per flying hour for maintenance and operation, but when you check the request here for an

additional 1,200,000 hours for \$600 million, that makes it cost us \$500 an hour for these added hours. So how reliable are his figures?

Then he comes down to military personnel. He wants \$172 million more. If you sit down and figure, as we have in the committee, you will find that for the number of men in the Air Force, 970,000, the appropriation provides \$3,371 for each, but to add this \$172 million for the men he wants raises that cost to \$4,586, or an increase of almost 30 percent. So how good are those figures?

We heard something said yesterday, much to my amazement, about our having a second-class or a second-rate Air Force. If it is, who has been the Chief of Staff that gave us a second-class Air Force? It is the General Vandenberg upon whom they now rely.

If you will read the RECORD, you will see that the gentleman from Texas expresses shock at the disclosures that were made about our Air Force. Ten wings of the present 106 wings do not have any combat planes. If you knew how many were rated 33 percent or less combat ready, or if you knew how many were rated 66 percent or less combat ready, you would realize the common-sense approach we are taking here to make these 120 wings fully manned, fully equipped with the latest planes, and ready to go. You cannot drop a bomb, you cannot stop a bomber, with a paper wing. It is not the number of wings, it is the number of planes that you can get into the air to defend your own country and get over military targets. This program will give you more planes and better manned planes than you have today or would have under the proposed 143-wing program.

Somebody referred to a showcase or show-window Air Force. No; it is not. We have a good one, and it is going to be better a year from now. This program will give you 120 solid wings upon which you then can move to build to 143 if the conference of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the President recommends it. I give you my word that after they have studied this, if they say more than 120 wings are needed, they will get my support for that program, and I am sure they will get support from every Mem-

ber of Congress. The choice before you today is simply stated. Are you going to follow the advice and recommendations contained in this budget as established by President Eisenhower, who without doubt is today's outstanding military expert in all its phases? He is the man who led our troops to victory in World War II in Europe. He is the man upon whose experience and sound judgment the American public have placed their confidence for the future. He is the man upon whom they put their resounding stamp of approval last November. Or are you going to follow the advice and request and plea of General Vandenberg?

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair recognizes the gentleman from California [Mr. YOUNGER].

Mr. YOUNGER. Mr. Chairman, I do not come before you as an expert. I do rise in opposition to this amendment because I have tried to find out what is meant by this mythical number of 143 air wings. Recently you heard the program Youth Wants To Know. General Vandenberg was on that program, and the youth asked him the question: "How many planes are in a wing?" He came back with the answer, and said he was surprised that there was a general lack of information on that question. His answer was, "Any number of planes which a man can command in the air." That was his answer. Any number of planes which a man can command in the air. What if we had the same relationship in the Infantry and we had the same number of soldiers that a man can command in the field? You would not have any commands at all, because one man can command a great many more than another. That is not all. I have statistics here, and I am going to insert them in the RECORD. Dating from 1951, there have been 8 different guesses of the Air Force as to how many men are required in an air wing, and it ranges from 11,158 down to 7,043. There is no question but that these are mythical numbers that we are talking about. By their own figures, they do not apply to the protection of our country and to the number of effective combat planes that we need.

How many men does the Air Force need?

The guesses	In men	In wings	Men/wing
Guess 1: The pre-1951 authorization.....	1.06 million.....	95.....	11,158
Guess 2: The 1951 Air Force long-range proposal.....	1.7 million.....	143 by 1954.....	11,111
Guess 3: 1951 revision approved by President and Joint Chiefs and supported by Air Force.....	1.2 million.....do.....	8,462
Guess 4: Truman budget submitted to 83d Cong.....	1.061 million.....	133 by 1954.....	7,977
	1.14 million.....	143 by 1955.....	7,956
	1.155 million.....	143 by 1956.....	8,076
Guess 5: Present Air Force strength.....	980,000.....	106 (in being).....	8,481
Guess 6: Wilson cuts presented to 83d Cong.....	960,000.....	110 by 1954.....	8,727
	915,000.....	115 by 1955.....	7,956
— and as revised.....	900,000.....do.....	7,043
	(No figure).....	120 by 1956.....
Guess 7: Air Force estimate of minimum needs for Wilson's 120 wings by 1956.....	965,000.....do.....	8,042
Guess 8: Vandenberg's compromise presented to Senate Appropriations Committee, June 15, 1953.....	1,035 million.....	120 by mid-1954.....	8,625

Source: Wilson testimony, Vandenberg testimony, USAF statements in CONGRESSIONAL RECORD, and Aviation Week, whose alleged but now-unconfirmed source is USAF.

*Air Force money, men, and airplanes,
1946 to present*

Year	Appropriations		Expenditures		Aircraft on hand		Personnel (active, military)
	(Aircraft and related only)		Combat	Total			
	Millions	Millions					
1946..	\$393.2	\$370.7	26,077	44,782	455,515		
1947..	477.5	370.7	17,186	30,035	305,827		
1948..	1,641.6	630.6	13,118	23,814	387,730		
1949..	731.2	601.6	9,031	20,068	419,347		
1950..	1,656.9	1,269.1	8,004	17,222	411,277		
1951..	8,114	1,393	8,159	17,337	788,381		
1952..	11,882	4,000	-----	1 (20,000)	* 973,474		
1953..	12,685	6,000	-----	2 (22,000)	* 980,000		

¹ Includes 16,000 active inventory and 4,000 active. No details available.

² Does not include 9,787 engineers in Army uniform but paid by the Air Force.

³ Unspecified round figure given by Wilson in hearings. No details available.

⁴ Estimated.

Sources:

Appropriations and expenditures—Defense Department and Aviation Week, Mar. 2, 1953, p. 47.

Aircraft on hand—Legislative Reference Service and Aviation Week, Mar. 2, 1953, p. 4507, who both give USAF for source. But USAF now declines to confirm.

Military personnel—Air Force Desk, Press Branch, Office, Secretary of Defense.

Not only that, but this matter of piling appropriations upon appropriations only leads to waste. Let me look at the figures here. In 1948, the Congress appropriated \$1,641,000,000 to the Air Force, and it was not until 1951 that they were able to spend that amount of money. In 1951, they appropriated \$8,114,000,000 for the Air Force, and up until 1953 they have only been able to spend \$6 billion in any one year. I ask you if that is an intelligent way to appropriate, by piling appropriation upon appropriation, which only leads to waste—and I do not care to what department of Government it is given—when we pass that kind of an appropriation, it will only lead to waste.

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Wisconsin [Mr. DAVIS].

Mr. DAVIS of Wisconsin. Mr. Chairman, I rise in opposition to the Mahon amendment.

On the 18th of February last, one of the most experienced Members of this House, at least experienced in handling military appropriations, had this advice to give to the new civilian team that was placed in charge of our Defense Establishment. These are some of the words that he used:

They must not permit themselves to become the captives of the admirals and the generals, and yet they must not ignore sound military advice.

The problem is cutting military spending without reducing military strength. If I were to write an open letter from the floor of the House this afternoon to the Secretary of Defense and his businessmen associates, I would say to them: When you are convinced that economies can be made, national defense promoted, and the taxpayer served, do not let anyone, not even the top brass in the Pentagon, the admirals and the generals, dissuade you. In other words, in the language of the current song: Don't Let the Stars Get in Your Eyes. Our plea is that you do a job for the taxpayer and the American people on the defense budget.

The man who gave us those sage words of advice in February is the man who is the author of this amendment today, the man who is not now willing for us to take the advice of the civilian chiefs in the Defense Department who have submitted this budget to us. Instead, he would take the advice of one of the generals that he says we should not let his stars get in our eyes, General Vandenberg.

Mr. MAHON. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. DAVIS of Wisconsin. I have only 3 minutes. I cannot yield.

Mr. Chairman, I do not yield. I hope this interruption will not be taken out of my time.

No one here will contest General Vandenberg's ability as a combat leader, but I think any of you who have served on committees where his testimony has been given can fairly say that he does not qualify as an expert witness on matters of personnel, on matters of procurement, on matters of materiel, or on matters of administration. I am satisfied that these civilian leaders who have jumped into this breach to attempt to save some money for the American taxpayers, and give us a good defense at the same time, are better qualified to serve as expert witnesses than is General Vandenberg.

In one sentence I would say they are better prepared to turn our dollars into tools of defense than is this one general.

Just this morning we completed testimony on the Air Force military construction program for 1954.

We heard, as the final witness, Mr. Frank Creedon, the retiring Director of Installations in the Office of the Secretary of Defense. Frank Creedon is a man for whom our subcommittee has gained great respect. He does not happen to be a member of the new civilian team in the Defense Department. He told us, as a holdover expert on construction, how he had turned down a request for new Air Force public works authorizations because the Air Force needed to digest what they already had authorized.

Now General Vandenberg recommended, at the same time he made the recommendations on which the Mahon amendment is based, that the Air Force have an additional \$260 million for military construction.

I think that Mr. Creedon's words on military construction apply to the other items in General Vandenberg's recommendations for more money. The Air Force should have an opportunity to digest the billions they have.

This is not a case of less dollars for less defense. It is instead, I am convinced, a case of more real tangible defense with less money.

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Georgia [Mr. WHEELER].

(Mr. WILLIAMS of Mississippi by unanimous consent granted the time allotted to him to the gentleman from Georgia [Mr. WHEELER].)

Mr. MAHON. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. WHEELER. I yield to the gentleman from Texas.

Mr. MAHON. I want to thank the gentleman from Wisconsin [Mr. DAVIS], for making reference to my remarks of a few weeks ago that we do not want to let the stars get in our eyes. We do not want to let the stars get in our eyes, but we do want to get the 143 wings in the skies, and that is the objective of the Mahon amendment.

Mr. WHEELER. Mr. Chairman, I have hesitated to take the floor of the House on this subject. In the first place, I do not qualify as a military expert. I do not qualify as a budget expert. I have the most intense regard for the wisdom and sincerity of the people who are serving on this committee. But as I have heard the debate on the particular issue involved instantly, I have detected the ghost of one Billy Mitchell roaming through these hallways. I do not know how many planes you need to accomplish the purpose we all seek. I do not know what the division should be as between tactical and strategic planes. I do have a considered opinion that if you are going to have peripheral wars throughout the world you might well justify emphasis on the tactical. I for one hope we can find some way out of our present muddled international situation which will not require us to fight peripheral wars requiring tactical planes.

As I have already said, I am not an expert; I am not even a war hero. I served 4 years in the Air Force, half of which time was spent teaching glider pilots infantry tactics. I am this kind of war hero: I enlisted to keep from getting drafted; I stayed there 4 years because they would not let me get out any quicker; and I did what they told me to do while I was there because I was scared not to. That is the kind of war hero I am, so I cannot even qualify on that score.

But a few weeks back as I stood on a barren hillside out in the State of Nevada and saw an atomic bomb tested I wondered what shape Germany would be in today if instead of dropping those thousands of tons of traditional trinitrotoluene bombs we had dropped bombs of even the size that I saw tested. My contemplation of that possibility was completely staggered when I received expert testimony to the effect that the bomb I saw tested was a pigmy compared to the awful potential capacity of those that can be dropped.

I think you have got too much money in this bill, from a layman's standpoint. I am not up here asking that you spend more money in addition to the total provided in the bill, but I am impressed with the idea that you could command the skies whenever and wherever in the world a situation might require such command if proper emphasis were placed on the economical spending of even less money than you propose in the bill as reported if most of the money is spent on the strategic air force. You know as I do that we lost thousands of men

in the Pacific in the last war needlessly. Why? Simply because ground-groveling generals and barnacle-bound admirals refused to listen to Billy Mitchell in 1925. Those people who discredited Billy Mitchell were still thinking in the time-honored concepts composed of paeans of praise sung to such men as John Paul Jones as he threw the sails of his galleons to the breeze. And I do not mean to discredit John Paul Jones; he was a hero without peer in his day, using the weapons that were available to him. The greatest general, in my opinion, that was developed in World War II in the division-versus-division concept was a man by the name of Patton. He was the ultimate expert in the use of the tools that the situation at that time required. But, are you going to propose to fight Russia on the land mass of Eurasia somewhere on a division-versus-division basis? No. You say we are going to have airpower, tactical airpower taking off from sinkable airbases. That is what you propose. As far as I am concerned, I should like to see most of these funds spent on a transcontinental, strategic Air Force for our only chance for safety and victory in any future war lies in our ability to command the sky anywhere in the world.

It is not my purpose to discredit any of the other fine branches of the service. They have all rendered gallant service to this country and will continue to do so. But that to which I make reference is a matter of mission and capacity to perform the mission under circumstances inherent in this modern atomic age of transcontinental travel. If we were capable of fielding twice as many ground force divisions as we are now and floating twice as much naval tonnage of all types as we now have, there would still be the necessity of engaging the enemy within range of our destructive capacity. The Navy would attempt this effort of engaging the foe but would be limited by its very nature to tactical engagement and the same is true of the ground forces. Therefore, I feel that the age of emphasis on either ground or naval forces is past.

With the admitted awful destructiveness of the atomic weapons, on which we have depended largely to deter aggression by the enemy for the past 6 years and on which we must depend to destroy the enemy in any future conflict, being capable of delivery only by a strong strategic air force, I feel strongly that we should devote our major emphasis to the building of a strategic air force capable of attaining and maintaining control of the sky anywhere in the world. It is in the full implementation of this emphasis wherein our only hope for a peaceful world lies and wherein our only hope of victory lies should peace elude the grasp of mankind's future existence.

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Texas [Mr. KILDAY].

(By unanimous consent, the time allotted to Mr. PRICE was given to Mr. KILDAY.)

Mr. KILDAY. Mr. Chairman, I think we ought to get one thing perfectly straight, and that is that the addition of \$1,175,000,000 will not produce an additional airplane in the fiscal year 1954. Likewise, if we should eliminate from

the bill all of the money which the committee has recommended for airplane procurement, we would still get the same number of planes in 1954.

What does that mean? It means that the money to pay for the planes coming to us in 1954 was appropriated in some year past; the gentleman from Nebraska said 1953 or before. The "before" is correct in almost every instance, I can assure you. So that this money was appropriated in 1952, 1951, or perhaps 1950 and carried forward in other appropriation bills.

Unless we add here the money which will keep the program going on a long-range basis we are going to pay for it in the lack of delivery of planes in 1955, 1956, or 1957. The issue here, though stated in money, is not money. The issue here is air wings, whether we shall continue our goal of 143 air wings, which every military man has certified to be the absolute minimum, or whether we are going to drop back to 120 wings because civilians in the Department of Defense say so, and I might say they are able men but inexperienced in matters military and thoroughly without experience in matters of strategy or tactics.

The question of the number of wings to which we are aiming involves the procurement of aircraft. But it also involves the training of personnel, not only pilots, navigators, and people of that kind, but your electronics men, your mechanics, your radiomen, your radarmen, and all of that. We have been building toward 143.

If you do not adopt this amendment the Congress has said: We have abandoned the 143-wing program, we have cut back to 120 wings. Then you go throughout the Air Force and you cut back on all of the personnel, all of the material that you were going to acquire, from 143 wings to 120 wings.

We see what happened in 1948 when a Democratic President quite stubbornly refused to follow what the Congress had recommended, based upon recommendations of military men. You see what happened when Korea came 2 years later.

From the experience I have had in my relatively short service here, I would certainly advise my friends of this House not to be taken in by the arguments that are being made here today, such arguments that this is the Air Force budget and that General Vandenberg is the only one who proposes this amendment. General Vandenberg was the only man retiring. He was the only one in position to speak. Of course, men still on active duty had to go along with the budget that was directed to be formulated by them under the letter from the Director of the Budget, Mr. Dodge.

We should do here exactly what we did in 1948 when the gentleman from New York [Mr. TABER] after bitter debate and long consideration as to whether we should aim toward 70 groups in the Air Force, offered the amendment for \$822 million additional. It then became the obligation of the administration to either obligate the funds or not. If they did not obligate them, to assume the responsibility for not having done so.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff, the President tells us, are to reevaluate the military program. There is, therefore, no

objection in the world to the passage of this amendment making available within the Treasury of the United States adequate funds to continue the gradual buildup to 143 wings. Should they decide that 143 wings are not necessary the funds will remain in the Treasury. If they find anything in addition to 120 is the minimum for the safety of the United States, the money is available for them to spend. The President is under no compulsion to spend these funds. I do not take any stock in this thing that it is any reflection to say that the administration might not spend all of the money made available by the Congress.

I sincerely hope that in the welfare of our Nation and its security this amendment will be adopted.

(Mr. STAGGERS asked and was given permission to yield the time allotted him to Mr. YORTY.)

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair recognizes the gentleman from California [Mr. YORTY].

Mr. YORTY. Mr. Chairman, I have been convinced from the very start that this budget was based not upon security but upon financial considerations, and I think Mr. Talbot more or less bore that out in his testimony before the committee which, incidentally, did a hard, conscientious job in working over this budget.

In answer to a question by the gentleman from Kansas [Mr. SCRIVNER], in which he used the usual argument about backing up the President, and the President knows the most about this and would not endanger our security, Mr. Talbot said, "Certainly not, but you must bear in mind his advisers on what the expenditures were to be." In other words, the Secretary of the Air Force was not convinced that the cut was based upon the President's judgment as to security. He evidently felt it was based upon financial considerations and was urged on the President by his financial advisers.

I think you must look at the problem realistically, forgetting about dollars as such for the moment because dollars only represent the proportion of the total production of the country that is diverted into military channels. Is there anybody who can say that we are devoting today the maximum production we can afford for the security of this Nation? I think it is obvious that we can afford to produce the kind of an Air Force we need. They keep repeating that no combat planes are being eliminated. As I tried to point out a while ago, combat planes are only part of the Air Force. The supporting units are also necessary to give it ability to fight and meet emergencies. It is simply a trick to say that none of the combat planes are being eliminated. Of course this is because the planes are ordered and coming off the line in spite of the ridiculous Wilson restrictions. Because the planes are coming off the line and some of the wing organizations are being eliminated, the planes are being sent to National Guard wings instead of Regular Air Force wings. This is inviting the same situation we had previously when we had to call back the same boys who had fought a war and send them to Korea, while the younger men, who should

have been trained in the interim, were not in shape to go there. The Republicans are cutting down the pilot and other training programs. For that reason you are not going to have the younger boys trained and ready for service if needed. You will have to go back into the factories and the professional services and industries of America and send the same boys back, not just those who fought in World War II, you will have to call back the ones who fought in World War II and also in Korea. I regard this as a most unfair thing to do. This is one of the calculated risks that is involved in this budget, which is a financial budget and not a security budget.

Let me call your attention to the fact that Secretary Wilson said that he believed General Vandenberg had a right to say we needed the 143-wing program because, as Wilson said, "there is no testimony or evidence to the contrary, and I am not claiming that there is." So, what was the cut based upon? Not upon testimony or evidence.

Mr. Chairman, I believe all the services should be treated fairly. I believe the Air Force had to take the brunt of the cut. There were cuts in the budgets of the other services, although they are not damaged nearly so much.

If you look at the committee report you will see that there is included in the budget a third *Forrestal* class carrier. I favor the carrier program. I believe in naval aviation, but not, of course, as a substitute for adequate land-based airpower. I want to point out to you that when Mr. Wilson was asked at a press conference on May 12 if the third carrier was in the program, he said, "I think it is. Whatever was in it before is in it still." He did not even know it was in his budget, and yet it represents the main element in a very expensive weapons system. He did not evaluate it. He did not, in fact, evaluate any of this program. He just took the word of the Assistant Secretary, Admiral McNeil. According to his own testimony, Admiral McNeil got some figures for him. Secretary Wilson said that when he got back from Europe he looked them over quickly and approved them. Now the significant point is this: Last year the committee refused to put the second *Forrestal* carrier in the budget, and I was one of those who tried to put it back in. They refused to report a bill with a second carrier in it, and yet this year, when they are supposedly insisting on greater economies, they put the third *Forrestal* in and cut the Air Force down. When the gentleman from Georgia [Mr. VINSON] introduced a bill last year to specifically authorize a second and third *Forrestal* class carrier, two members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff reported against it—the Department of the Army and the Department of the Air Force. The Army pointed out—and I have their report here—that the first was to be a prototype. They said that it had not been completed or tested, and that after it was completed and tested more could be authorized if needed. Therefore, the Department of the Army was opposed to building more until the first could be completed. The Department of the Air Force suggested that if strategic conditions changed and the Joint Chiefs of

Staff felt a second or third was needed, they would reconsider their position, but they were against the authorization at the time.

So we are going ahead and spending money through the action of this committee on a program the Joint Chiefs are against without even submitting it to them, and we are refusing to appropriate the money for a program which both the Congress and the Joint Chiefs have approved and which they say is necessary in the interests of national security.

When Secretary Wilson was asked if he was going to hold up starting the third *Forrestal* carrier in order to take this so-called new look, he said, "I don't have to. They can't build them that fast." The truth of the matter is that they can commit the money for the third *Forrestal* carrier very fast, and, of course, they will commit the money for it. So the new look is not going to defer these other weapons systems. This new look is only going to be used to try to justify cutting down the Air Force. Incidentally, I ask anybody, what is the logic of putting all these restrictions on the Air Force and throwing the whole program out of gear without even waiting for the new look instead of going ahead with the program in the meantime so as not to lose irreplaceable time?

We have the most powerful Navy in the world now. We want to keep it that way. But the Navy does not have the deterrent effect on the Soviets that the Air Force does, and the Air Force is not as large as Russia's. Why are we cutting down the Air Force which needs strengthening badly while continuing to make stronger a service that is already stronger than its counterpart possessed by the Soviets. This does not make sense.

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Alabama [Mr. ROBERTS].

(Mr. BATTLE asked and was given permission to yield the time allotted to him to Mr. ROBERTS.)

Mr. ROBERTS. Mr. Chairman, I hesitate to take the well of this House in support of this amendment because I realize that this matter has been studied by this distinguished committee, and this committee has had facts which perhaps other Members of the House have not had at hand. However, I think this matter is so important to the security of our country and to the security of civilization itself that every Member of this House should be intensely interested in this debate.

The distinguished gentleman from Kansas yesterday, I believe, said we could well afford to go along with this cut. I am not sure that I am quoting him correctly, and it is up to him, of course, to correct me if I am wrong, but I think he said we could do so because we had Almighty God on our side. I think we all believe in the Almighty and the Christian concept, but I prefer to take the attitude the late beloved Will Rogers had. He said that when he saw a picture of the Pilgrim Fathers at prayer they usually had their muskets by their sides, and the reason they had the muskets was that they wanted to be sure they got what they prayed for. That is the attitude I am taking with reference to this matter.

Mr. SCRIVNER. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield? He misquoted me, and I am sure he does not want to do that.

Mr. ROBERTS. I yield to the gentleman from Kansas.

Mr. SCRIVNER. I pray that Almighty God is on our side, but what I said was that I have an abiding faith in the divine providence that has always guided and guarded this Nation.

Mr. ROBERTS. I share the views of the gentleman on that. I am sorry if I misquoted him.

I do not believe that it has been true in the House but I do know that in the other body it has been pretty much of a nonpartisan debate. One of the distinguished Senators on the majority side over there, who has taken a great deal of interest in this debate from the very beginning and who has been very effective, I think, in her opposition to the cut seems to believe that reduction of the budget is taking precedence over national security in the air. Her position may be pointed up by the following question:

Is this appropriation bill cut to fit military objectives or budget objectives?

Senator MARGARET CHASE SMITH put her finger on the Pentagon double talk when she asked Secretary Wilson:

How can you cut more than \$5 billion from the Air Force appropriations, cut back the Air Force's strength to 114 wings, and still say that the Air Force will be more powerful in 1954 than if the original plan had been followed of building a 143-wing Air Force by 1954?

The proposed reduction in funds for the Air Force means the abandonment of the 143-wing goal. A goal which the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended. A goal which all of the services considered necessary to the security of the United States. There were four principal events on which the recommendation of the 143-wing goal was based.

First was the explosion of the atomic bomb by the Soviet Union in September 1949.

Second was the invasion of South Korea in June 1950, followed by the entrance of the Chinese Communist armies.

Third was the commitment of American troops for the defense of Western Europe.

Fourth was the calculation by the Joint Chiefs of Staff that by the middle of 1954 the Soviet Union will be able to launch an all-out atomic attack against the United States.

General Hoyt Vandenberg has testified:

The size and composition of the proposed force was based on an examination of all factors such as the buildup of our own atomic stockpile, the improvements to be expected in our own weapons and in the enemy's weapons, and the expected size, nature, and disposition of Communist military forces. There have been no significant or unexpected changes in weapons development or in forces since the decision was made. I know of no change in the strategy which the 143-wing Air Force was designed to enable us to carry out. Nor do I know of any alternate strategy designed to protect the security of the United States and its people which would not require an equal or greater Air Force than the 143-wing force toward which we have been building for 2 years.

General Twining, Eisenhower's own choice for Chief of Staff of the Air Force testified before the Senate Armed Services Committee—when his nomination was being considered—that he was convinced that 143 air wings were essential to the national security.

In acting upon this proposed Air Force appropriation cut, let us keep in mind what the Soviet Union is doing. A study made by Fortune Magazine shows that—

Since the end of World War II the Soviet aircraft industry has produced about 40,000 military aircraft—about twice the estimated United States total during the period. The Soviet Air Force have about 20,000 aircraft in organized units and another 20,000 in reserve. They control also an expanding satellite pool of air power, entirely Soviet equipped, of which the Red Chinese Air Force is the most powerful, with about 2,500 aircraft.

Compare these figures with the total United States military air strength of about 10,000 in organized units, and little reserve.

The Soviet aircraft industry though operating well below capacity is producing 10,000 aircraft a year. The United States aircraft industry produced only 9,000 aircraft in 1952. The prospect for 1953 is estimated at about 11,000.

Secretary Wilson has said that part of this cut in funds can be made up by reducing the lead time. There is no doubt everyone would like to cut lead time but is that possible? Aviation Week said:

The Pentagon may order aircraft with an 18-month lead-time schedule, but this will do nothing to speed up manufacture of critical components (fire control equipment, landing gears, and electronic devices) and so reduce actual lead time.

Although the Wright brothers of this country invented the first airplane, during World War I few American planes ever got into the fight because volume production was not reached until the last months of the war. The people learned then that it takes time to build an industry to a mammoth size and that time cannot be purchased by even the biggest treasury in the world.

Gentlemen, let us learn from our mistakes, let us not repeat them. Let us vote for a second-to-none Air Force, not a second best.

Mr. BATTLE. Mr. Chairman, it is with a great deal of feeling that I rise in support of the Mahon amendment. Crippling our Air Force for future operations is unthinkable. The committee, as I understand it, cut \$1,300,000,000 off of the Eisenhower defense budget. The Mahon amendment would restore only a part of this cut. The President's budget is the very minimum that I am willing to support here today for our Armed Forces. I sincerely feel that more drastic cuts at this time may very well jeopardize the security of America in a few years.

Mr. Chairman, our defense depends upon a military team composed of the Army, Air Force, Navy, and Marines. Weakening the Air Force, or any branch of the services, weakens the whole team. We need strength today and not weakness.

I sincerely hope this House in its wisdom will not cut below the Eisenhower budget, because our great leader, one of the finest soldiers in history, has presented an absolute minimum in requested funds for the military defense of our country. I hope the Mahon amendment will be adopted.

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair recognizes the gentleman from California [Mr. Hiestand].

(By unanimous consent, the time allotted to Mr. OLIVER P. BOLTON was granted to Mr. Hiestand.)

Mr. Hiestand. Mr. Chairman, we have these 2 days heard long and detailed and very able remarks on this subject from both sides of the aisle. Much has been said that it is just as well not to repeat, and I do not intend to take the full time allotted to me. I do think we, however, should have our eyes on the main issue. Just what is the main issue as seen from both sides of the aisle? We have both expressed the avowed intent to balance this budget and to help in balancing future budgets. The issue, as I see it, is are we going to back up the administration budget to help balance that budget whether it is the Vandenberg budget or the Joint Chiefs of Staff budget or whatever it might be? We must make this choice. We have available under the carryover amount plus the amount allotted and recommended by the committee \$92 billion to spend for the military this year. Ninety-two billion dollars is far more than can possibly be spent, and far more than can possibly be spent in another year at the rate that has been explained of \$43 billion per year. If we oppose this amendment, we are speaking in behalf of backing the administration, backing the civilian control rather than the military control. Those who vote in favor of the amendment are voting against the idea of trying to balance the budget. It is just as simple as that. Those who are against the amendment are voting in favor of trying to balance the budget, and the balancing of the budget is the most important thing this or any Congress has to do, because it builds a solid base for national defense and for national solidarity.

Mr. LANDRUM. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. Hiestand. I yield to the gentleman from Georgia.

Mr. LANDRUM. Does the gentleman mean to tell the Congress and the country that the most important thing before this House today is the balancing of the budget, more important than providing for the common defense of all of our people? Is that what the gentleman has just said?

Mr. Hiestand. I thank the gentleman for his question. I believe that the most important thing in our national defense is a basic economic soundness. That is part and parcel of balancing the budget.

Mr. JOHNSON. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. Hiestand. I yield to the gentleman from California.

Mr. JOHNSON. Also, in connection with what the gentleman has just said about the President, we should read the important sentence in that letter which

states that this is not a static Air Force and is not intended to be so. It is intended to be one that will fit the present and which can be changed to fit any future condition or emergency.

Mr. Hiestand. I thank the gentleman from California.

Mr. BATES. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. Hiestand. I yield to the gentleman from Massachusetts.

Mr. BATES. The question of economics in this matter has been brought out. I would like to direct the gentleman's attention, and also the attention of the House, to the remarks I made a few moments ago that today we are spending money overseas, in certain countries which were great and mighty at one time, militarily and economically, but today they have dissipated their wealth to such an extent that they cannot even afford to defend themselves. We do not want that condition to come to this country.

Mr. Hiestand. I thank the gentleman for his remarks, for it enforces the idea that the national defense is based upon our economic soundness.

Mr. BATES. I just wanted to make the point that we should not belittle that factor.

Mr. Hiestand. I thank the gentleman.

Mr. BONIN. Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent to extend my remarks at this point in the RECORD.

The CHAIRMAN. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Pennsylvania?

There was no objection.

Mr. BONIN. Mr. Chairman, I am opposed to the amendment offered by the gentleman from Texas [Mr. Mahon]. The purpose of this amendment is to increase the defense budget in the sum of \$1,175,000,000. Article I, section 8, of the Constitution of the United States, among other things, provides, "to raise and support armies, but no appropriation of money to that use shall have a longer term than 2 years."

"To raise and support armies" is a power implied from the grant of the preceding section of the Constitution "to declare war" but it leaves no question as to what department of the Government would do it, the power was expressly conferred upon Congress; for, otherwise, the President, as Commander in Chief might assume to raise armies after Congress had made the declaration of war. The President cannot raise an army, nor can Congress maintain one, by an appropriation, for a longer term than 2 years.

While the Constitution of the United States was undergoing the trial of ratification by State conventions, Alexander Hamilton said in the Federalist:

The legislature of the United States will be obliged by this provision, once every 2 years, to deliberate upon the propriety of keeping a military force on foot: to come to a new resolution on the point; and to declare their sense of the matter by a formal vote in the face of their constituents. They are not at liberty to vest in the Executive Department permanent funds for the support of an Army; if they were even incautious enough to be willing to repose in it so improper a confidence.

As the President cannot raise an army and, as Congress can maintain one for only 2 years—the length of a term of Congress—the possibility of collusion between them is very remote. Anything indicating collusion would be dealt with by the voters who can retire every Member of the House of Representatives and one-third of the Senate every 2 years and putting in those who would respect the popular will. In the Constitutional Convention, there was much opposition to the standing army; but it was felt that that danger would be averted by placing the support of it in Congress and then restricting the power of Congress to make appropriations.

The Defense Department after the present appropriation will have \$92 billion to spend for the security of the United States. This amount cannot and will not be spent in the next 5 years. The pretext under which all this money is appropriated is the usual cry of emergency. I am aware of the unstable world conditions but why should the military branches of our Government make the budget instead of the Congress? It is about time we give the taxpayer a break and not just the brass hats in our Military Establishments. I say defeat this amendment and give the people at home a break.

Mr. BATES. Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent to extend my remarks at this point in the RECORD.

The CHAIRMAN. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Massachusetts?

There was no objection.

Mr. BATES. Mr. Chairman, the question before us today has been a problem of the ages. It will remain with us perhaps through the life of man.

If the situation of this hour found us enveloped in an all-out war, or if we had definite assurance of war at a certain date, we would know what we must do.

Assurances of any kind are not given to us because the only thing of which we appear to be certain is a continued state of uncertainty that may last for many years. If this condition should prevail it would be reckless, indeed, exceedingly foolish, for us to arm to the teeth now, because we cannot later fight a modern war with old weapons, and this is particularly so in the air.

We should also remember that at the end of the long pull we must find ourselves in a position where we have sufficient economic strength so as to be as strong militarily as we could be today. To those who belittle the economic problem here involved, let me suggest to them that our Mutual Assistance Act was passed in an attempt to close the doors of aggression and to protect nations who were once mighty, militarily and economically, but who cannot today afford to defend their homelands.

Who would come to our aid if such should ever be our plight?

Every man and woman in this chamber is interested in the security of our Nation. There are many problems that could invoke a controversy on this bill, but there has been only one serious challenge. That is the request of General Vandenberg to provide an additional \$1,435,000,000 to this bill and which has

been modified by the gentleman from Texas to an increase of \$1,195,000,000. The main difference between the two involves the acquisition and construction of real property, which General Vandenberg estimated at \$260,000,000, and which is to be considered in another bill. The breakdown of the general's figures is as follows:

Aircraft and related procurement consisting of 447 airlift and support aircraft.....	\$353,000,000
Major procurement other than aircraft.....	50,000,000
Acquisition and construction of real property.....	260,000,000
Maintenance and operation.....	600,000,000
Military personnel requirements.....	172,000,000
Total.....	\$1,435,000,000

Our main concern in the air today is to provide bombers to retaliate in the event we are attacked and fighter planes for air defense and tactical use with our troops. These are our primary weapons of the air. Therein lies our combat strength and there is nothing in the proposed suggestion that will give us one additional combat plane. There is no risk in turning this request down. If the proposal was to build to 143 wings this year or next, we would be faced by a serious question, but that is not the issue before us now.

For many years we have been asking the Department of Defense to trim its budget to what is actually needed. We have decried the waste in the Military Establishment. Yet here we are today telling that Department it must take more money than it asked for, and more than the President and the National Security Council request. This amendment should be voted down.

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair recognizes the gentleman from California [Mr. MILLER].

Mr. MILLER of California. Mr. Chairman, to me this is a matter of insurance, and I am willing to pay the premium on the policy for this type of insurance needed to maintain a free and democratic world. There has been a lot of confusion engendered in this issue. I am a little bit tired of hearing about the \$92 billion that it is alleged will be available for the Air Force, money that cannot be spent this year or next year. Surely there is this money available, but we have a long pipeline to fill. There is a long lead time, and you cannot cut that lead time down. Any reduction made at this time will reflect itself 2 or 3 years from now, and if we are going to keep the pipeline full we have to appropriate money each year for that purpose. All we are doing is kidding ourselves and the American people when we say that this money is sufficient to meet the requirements for an air force that is adequate to meet the continuing needs of national defense.

I would like to go back and talk about another time that we neglected to pay the premium on defense insurance policy. Long before I came to Congress I remember there was some controversy about the fortification of the island of Guam. Oh, I know it will be said that money was never asked for that pur-

pose. But \$500,000 was asked to deepen the harbor at Guam, preliminary to fortifying that island. And Congress refused to act. Why? In the name of economy. And what price did we pay for that economy? You estimate it in dollars if you can. You cannot measure our loss in blood, in maimed bodies, distorted minds, and grim death.

I have here a statement from a speech made by Senator TAFT, as reported in the New York Herald of June 1, 1952, just a year ago.

He calls attention to the fact that we talk about air insurance when we talk about an air force, and he calls attention to the fact also that other influences have tried to destroy its influence or to weaken it—the selfish influences of other groups.

Here is what Senator TAFT had to say:

There has been a steady deterioration of our comparative airpower which began while General Eisenhower was Chief of Staff.

Control of the air is the only possible insurance of peace. * * *

The ability of our Air Force to deliver atom bombs on Russia should never be open to question, and today it is being questioned, even by our own experts.

Mr. PRICE. Mr. Chairman, I personally am alarmed by the thought of what is going to happen to our Air Force, not this year or next, but in the following years, if the budget proposed by Secretary Wilson stands now.

Secretary Wilson undoubtedly has a great deal of industrial know-how. He has all but boasted, however, of scientific ignorance. He has said, no doubt partly in an attempt at humor, that he is not interested, as a military project in why potatoes turn brown when they are fried, thereby implying that a great number of Pentagon research problems are just plain silly.

But even as a military project, why potatoes turn brown is a matter of considerable importance. Since early in World War II the Quartermaster Corps Food and Container Institute in Chicago has been trying to find out why potatoes and other fresh foods turn brown and spoil when exposed to air. This "browning reaction," as the scientists call it, is the same chemical process that happens when potatoes are fried. Thus investigating this browning reaction is a matter of extreme importance not only to the Quartermaster Corps but to the whole food industry. It is not silly at all.

If in 1942 there had been a Secretary of Defense and he had shared Mr. Wilson's contempt for pure science, he might have eliminated from the defense budget any atomic research. Fortunately, the President of the United States gave the go-ahead signal, and the United States found itself suddenly in possession of the atomic bomb. The same Secretary of Defense might have pooh-poohed the idea of the proximity fuse as Secretary Wilson has dismissed the idea of an atomic plane, asserting it would be a bum plane. But the major scientific contributions of the last war were the atomic or nuclear bomb, the proximity fuse, microwave radar, and rockets. They were all achieved as the result of pure research. In the beginning of the research, it might have

seemed a little silly to one of Secretary Wilson's persuasion.

Matter cannot be controlled unless it is understood. When pure science discovers why human beings behave as they do, it may prove possible to control them too—and eliminate the necessity for weapons, military budgets, and military services.

It is more than surprising to find the former head of General Motors taking such a cavalier attitude toward science. Many of the big industries spend vast sums on basic research. General Electric does, whether General Motors does or not, and so do Bell Telephone, Westinghouse, and Du Pont. I do not believe any of these companies would support scientific research if it were not profitable for them to do so.

The Air Force and the other armed services have supported basic research not to compete with industry but to supplement research conducted by industry. When General Spaatz made his report to the Secretary of the Air Force on his year as Air Force Chief of Staff, he pointed out that—

Basic research, because of its tremendous scope and its very great value and importance to the commercial life and general welfare of the United States, is primarily a national rather than an Air Force responsibility. Yet the Air Force must exercise the closest coordination possible with basic research organizations, both public and private, in order to realize the maximum military potentialities of their discoveries. The Air Force must also conduct a basic research program of its own in the general fields not covered by other agencies.

General Spaatz certainly envisioned such research as a long-term proposition, not to be undertaken by fits and starts.

Mr. Wilson, however, must be warned that sudden cuts in research and development appropriations will impede the orderly progress of any scientific investigation. Basic research is not something that can be turned on and off like a faucet. It has to have evenness and continuity, and it has to go on no matter what the time lag in payoff.

Secretary Wilson is undoubtedly aware of what blood plasma and penicillin have done in saving lives of our men in Korea. And he surely knows that we did not have jet aircraft when the Germans introduced jet aircraft in November 1944, though fortunately we did have jet aircraft when the Communists introduced Russian-built jets to the Korean war in November 1950. Secretary Wilson has also warned against a letdown in defense, whether we get a truce in Korea or not. But Secretary Wilson apparently is unwilling to support a program that will give us the equivalent of penicillin or jet aircraft, or unspoiled potatoes in the next year—if it comes.

That is why, Mr. Chairman, I say that I am more alarmed by the thought of what is going to happen to our Air Force in the future than what is going to happen immediately. Because if the Wilson budget stands, the research will be cut off now; and there will be no results, because there will have been no research, to which we may look for our defense, if war should come.

And that is why, Mr. Chairman, I am opposed to the Wilson budget, and to the whole philosophy on which it was based.

The first airplane to carry man under its own power is, by today's standards, a fearfully fragile creation. Its two wings were made of wood which were covered by muslin fabric. They were supported by wooden struts and joined by wire. There was no fuselage. The pilot lay prone on the bottom wing next to the engine. Two pusher propellers were geared to the engines by sprockets and chains. Yes, gentlemen, it is difficult to comprehend that the present sleek, powerful aircraft represents less than 50 years progress in aeronautical advancement. However trying it may be to recognize and accept this fact, we are confronted with the inescapable condition that this evolution has been accomplished. I believe it is equally important to appreciate that this tremendous scientific and technological advancement is the direct result of those funds which our country and our citizens have invested in research and development of the aircraft.

In 1946, the masters of the Kremlin stated, "We must have the most powerful air force in the world." These were not idle words. Proof of this fact is found in the current air-power strength of the Soviet Union. Today, the Soviet air force has approximately 20,000 aircraft in combat units. This is more than twice the number in all of our combat units, including Air Force, Navy, and Marines. We know that Russia is frantically engaged in developing and producing newer and better types of aircraft. It is obvious to many that it would be difficult, if not impossible, for our country to match the Soviet air force in the quantity of aircraft. It is equally apparent that we must then do everything in our power to substitute quality for quantity. In this connection, I think it is pertinent for us to consider that our Air Force received approximately \$528 million for research and development in fiscal year 1953. The printed budget for fiscal year 1954 provides \$537 million. The proposed DOD budget requests \$475 million for this function. I think it is startling that in this period when we struggle for our survival, when we are maintaining a larger Air Force, we are being asked to spend \$63 million less for our research and development. This is particularly true when we consider that we have reached that position in technological advancement when each new problem which confronts us is of extreme complexity and requires extremely extensive and expensive research in order that we may find its solution.

If we were to examine this \$63 million reduction, we would find that approximately \$15 million is being withdrawn for projects which are designed to replace weapons systems presently in use on our combat aircraft. We are doing this in spite of the fact that we know that the conventional armament which we now are using is at the best obsolete. An additional \$34 million is being deleted from our technical development area. Approximately \$24 million of this sum was to be used in research and de-

velopment for aircraft and nuclear propulsion. Lastly \$4 million is being cut from funds which are used to operate and equip laboratory and testing facilities. This is a striking paradox which occurs at that moment when we are desperately trying to improve the performance of our jet engines, so that they might equal and perhaps exceed those which our foe is now using in combat.

I believe that it is evident that the lack of funds necessary to maintain real airpower prevented our Air Force from equipping properly with jet aircraft before Korea. However, the foresight of our top Air Force officers in emphasizing research and development during that same period has paid handsome dividends since June of 1950. The record tells us that we have qualitative air supremacy over Russia. The only way in which we can maintain this supremacy is to continue a healthy and aggressive research and development program.

In all of this confusion there is one fundamental certainty. We are making an immense investment in security through airpower. That investment will be only as sound as the adequacy of the continuing scientific research program, without which there is a real danger that our airpower will become second best.

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Ohio [Mr. AYRES].

Mr. AYRES. Mr. Chairman, we have heard it said here today that politics has not entered into this discussion, but I would beg to differ with that statement in view of the speech made by the distinguished acting minority leader. I come from a very highly industrialized district, Summit County, in Ohio. Akron is the county seat. When the votes were counted on November 4, President Eisenhower was proved to be not as popular as they thought he would be: He lost the county by 6,000 votes. In my judgment, the main reason he lost by 6,000 votes in that county was because of the propaganda that had been spread to the effect that you cannot put General Eisenhower in the White House because the only thing on which he is an authority is military problems and there is a lot more to the running of our country than making military decisions.

I am astonished that those in the Democratic organization who spread that propaganda are today found when we have an issue coming before this House on which they admitted he was an authority, that they doubt his judgment.

You cannot make any political gain by criticizing the President's recommendation on military matters, and I feel today that, if the votes were to be counted after an election tomorrow President Eisenhower would carry this highly industrialized district because of the wise military decisions he is making and the ability of this Committee to accept his advice.

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Maryland [Mr. MILLER].

Mr. MILLER of Maryland. Mr. Chairman, there has been some discussion about giving aid and comfort to the enemy by not granting this extra money

for the Air Force. I certainly do not think that it fails to give aid and comfort to the enemy to belittle our present Air Force.

I have heard a great deal of testimony from the experts, and, while everyone is entitled to his own views, yet I think we have a very wonderful Air Force today. While it may not be the biggest in the world, I think it is the strongest. Each of us has a right to his opinion on that score.

But there is one feature of the situation where the Air Force has not distinguished itself: It has hit the target again and again in combat. And, as I said before, I think it is the best in the world as far as delivering blows with telling effect on the enemy is concerned.

The Air Force, however, has not been very successful in handling what is equally important ammunition—the dollars that have been appropriated to carry on its functions. If the Air Force were as skillful in using its dollars as it has been in hitting the target in the field we would have nothing to worry about. I am sure, however, that the administration, this Congress, and the people want to have a new look at our defense setup and we want to strengthen the whole plan. Even if our Air Force is the strongest in the world, we still want to make it stronger, but there is no use in pyramiding waste where it can be avoided.

There is more similarity, Mr. Chairman, between bullets and dollars than you may think at first glance. A bullet or a bomb is no good unless it hits the target; neither is a dollar. We have heard a lot about ammunition shortages and distribution. Ammunition of itself is no good unless you put it in the right place. A dollar is equally important because it supplies ammunition and the means of delivering the ammunition on the enemy. If it is not spent effectively it does not do any good. The Air Force has not been too successful in using its dollars.

Then we are told that because we are taking this new look we have abandoned the 143 wings and have reduced that to 120. One hundred and twenty wings that can fight are better than five hundred and fifty wings that cannot. But let us take a clear look at that situation.

I was rather surprised that some of the proponents of this amendment have referred to the 23 Guard and Reserve wings as show-window stuff. Let me tell you, Mr. Chairman, we have pilots that make up our Guard and our Reserve who are some of the best fighting men this country has ever produced. At the present time they do not have modern planes with which to work.

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from Maryland has expired. (By unanimous consent, the time allotted to Mr. DEVEREUX was given to Mr. MILLER of Maryland.)

Mr. SCRIVNER. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. MILLER of Maryland. I yield to the gentleman from Kansas.

Mr. SCRIVNER. The hearings show that somewhere in the neighborhood of 15 of the aces coming out of Korea were National Guard and Reserve fliers.

Mr. MILLER of Maryland. I think all of us know that the Guard and Reserve pilots, as well as the soldiers, sailors, and marines that make up the Reserves, contain some of the finest fighting men the world has ever seen.

Would you say it is window dressing to put modern equipment in their hands? There seems to be a feeling in certain parts of the Air Force that if we give those planes to the Guard and Reserves they would not be available for strategic or for some offensive action. I can assure you, Mr. Chairman, that if the sad day comes that we are under attack we will need some groups here, some wings here in this country for interceptor work and for the defense of our big industries. Where could we place modern planes better than to have them in the hands of well-trained National Guard and Reserve units who will be at home to defend their fireside?

To call those 23 wings window-dressing stuff, to count them out of the picture, is just as silly as to count out the Navy Air Force which is certainly an important part of the team. I think there is no reason to doubt that our Defense Department knows what it is doing. They are not going to cut down on air strength merely because we did not give it money those best qualified to speak say it does not need.

For that reason I hope we will back up the administration and this committee in its decision on this matter.

Mr. JOHNSON. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. MILLER of Maryland. I yield to the gentleman from California.

Mr. JOHNSON. The role of the National Guard Air Force is to protect the continental United States. No greater supporter of the National Guard Air Force for that purpose is found in the entire Air Force than in General Johnson, the commanding general of the Continental Command of the United States Air Force, who has to do with protecting the land between the shores of America against aggression of a foreign enemy. He has said repeatedly that in the event of trouble he will rely heavily on the National Guard Air Force. The Reserves and National Guard in every war furnish the vast bulk of the combat forces. Incidentally, we have a very good Air National Guard in California that served in Korea. That wing made an excellent record in Korea. I want to compliment the gentleman on his analysis of the situation.

Mr. MILLER of Maryland. Mr. Chairman, quality is what counts—not quantity. Quality can only be produced by the right combination of the best equipment in the hands of the best people we have to handle it.

I hope the pending amendment will be defeated.

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Georgia [Mr. FORRESTER].

Mr. FORRESTER. Mr. Chairman, I must confess that I am a little bit disturbed by some of the arguments I have so constantly heard during this present term of Congress. That is it looks like everything that is brought up here the argument is that President Eisenhower

is for so-and-so and that he has a monopoly on all wisdom. Now, I just simply refuse to buy that and I am sure that the President does also. To tell you the truth, I do not think we are doing the President right to put him in that kind of spot and to put him in that kind of position. He is entitled to your assistance. Every Member of Congress has a responsibility also. As a matter of fact, when we went before the people and asked them to elect us to Congress, we said to them that we were able and were going to assume some responsibility, and I say in this, the gravest time in all human history, it is a little disappointing and it is highly disappointing to see us try to decide these matters upon the opinion of any one man on earth, and I say to you that there is not any one of you who can dispute it. We have never been ready for war in all the history of this country. The day of not being ready has passed, and do not forget it. Never again will you muddle through. If you are too little and too late this time, then it is goodbye civilization. General Arnold made the statement that a second-best air force was just like a second-best poker hand. It is a wonderful hand, but it can never win.

Now I want to tell you another thing. Talk about economy. This is not the place to talk economy. The people of America do not want you to practice economy on the lives of your wives and your children. They are willing to give their all if need be for defense. They are tired of your spending for appeasing minority groups and spending huge sums to set up a social revolution at a time as grave as this, but they know that trifling with our defense courts disaster.

Mr. Chairman, with this observation I am going to be through. We call ourselves leaders of the world. We are right egotistical when we assume that kind of a role, but I say this to you that, if the time comes that you need this Air Force and you do not have it, the people are going to spew you out of their mouths, and rightly so. If war comes, and God grant it does not, but we know it can, and we are found unprepared, and World War II boys and boys of Korea are again taken from their homes as expendables, we will have forfeited our rights of leadership. I yield the responsibility entrusted to me by my people to no person on earth. I owe them, so far as in my power, adequate defense, and I will steadfastly stand for it every step of the way.

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Pennsylvania [Mr. VAN ZANDT].

Mr. VAN ZANDT. Mr. Chairman, I rise to urge the adoption of H. R. 5969, the Department of Defense Appropriation Act, 1954.

As a veteran of several wars, a Reserve officer and a member of the Armed Services Committee, I have consistently worked for and supported a strong defense force for the United States. At the same time, I have firmly supported the principle that the Soviet threat is one that we must be prepared to meet, not just during the next year or two, but possibly for generations.

Accordingly, our defense program must be one that can be supported indefinitely, if need be without imposing such a crushing burden upon the American people that it might destroy the very liberties and qualities that we seek to protect.

President Eisenhower has presented a defense program that meets our needs perfectly, and I urge the support of H. R. 5969 because it provides the funds to carry out this military program.

We have all heard a good deal of misinformation and confused statements concerning the alleged inadequacy of the amounts requested by the Department of Defense in its revised estimates for 1954. Specifically with respect to the funds requested for the Air Force.

The Appropriations Committee was able to eliminate \$1.3 billion of the \$36 billion requested in the revised budget without in any way impairing the defense program submitted by Secretary Wilson and approved by President Eisenhower.

In connection with this action, I should like to quote from the committee's report concerning the adequacy of the appropriations recommended:

It is altogether unreasonable to believe that this or any other nation can in this atomic age provide for 10 percent insurance for its protection against the disaster of an attack. It must be borne in mind that our strength is both military and economic. We must strive to balance minimum defense needs against dangers of unbearable burdens on the economy. We must listen to our military leaders as they present the military needs. On the other hand, our civilian leaders are presumed to have better information on what the Nation can afford—not so much in terms of dollars but in terms of the extent of continuing drains on the Nation's economy. Furthermore, our civilian leaders are the ones to determine the financial requirements for given force and materiel goals. All have one objective—the security of the Nation. Perhaps, as Secretary of Defense Wilson has stated, we may be expecting too much of our military leaders in that they are sometimes supposed to be military strategists, administrators, economists, and financial experts.

This country would be unwise to duplicate the Maginot line and thereby establish a false sense of security, regardless of the defense weapons selected for the purpose. We must keep strong by continuously reappraising our defensive strength in the light of our economic strength and capabilities to maintain a Military Establishment of a given size, not only during fiscal year 1954, but, as matters now stand, perhaps for an indefinite period. With no reflection on the integrity of the military, it might be mentioned that since the outbreak of the Korean war the three services requested of the Office of the Secretary of Defense approximately \$97 billion more than was finally included in budget estimates. Some of the requests naturally overlap from year to year, but the amount does give some idea of the magnitude of the military requirements as they are initially presented by the services.

Attention should also be called to an estimated \$2.6 billion expected to go to certified claims at the end of fiscal year 1954. Most of this sum will undoubtedly be unobligated and represents, for the most part, excessive appropriations during fiscal years 1951 and 1952.

The committee believes that the total amount recommended in the accompanying bill provides adequately for our defensive re-

quirements in light of all currently known factors. The most significant reductions in the printed budget as reflected in the revised estimates represent financing beyond necessary lead time indicated by large cash carryovers. Reductions effected by the committee cover generally (a) estimated unobligated balances in excess of the balances projected for June 30, 1953, at the time the revised estimates were prepared, (b) excessive funding, (c) excessive stocks on hand of certain equipment and material, (d) disclosure of duplication by the services, (e) reprogramming of certain requirements by the services, (f) overly optimistic consumption, (g) disclosure of improper utilization of personnel, (h) restrictions on proficiency flying, and (i) plain mathematical inaccuracies.

At the end of fiscal year 1953, the Department of Defense will have an unexpended balance of \$62.6 billion.

The \$34.4 billion recommended by the Appropriations Committee will make a total of \$97 billion available for expenditure in fiscal year 1954, excluding any amounts subsequently provided for military public works which was not considered in this bill.

Of this, the Air Force will have \$39.5 billion, or approximately 41 percent of the total, with 31 percent available for the Army, 27 percent for the Navy and 1 percent for interdepartmental activities.

Thus, the Air Force will have available for spending approximately 32 percent more than the Army and 51 percent more than the Navy.

It is certainly clear from this relative distribution of funds that first priority is being given to the Air Force.

The military program approved by President Eisenhower, the funds for which are contained in H. R. 5969, was developed after careful consideration of all the factors involved.

I believe we should accept the committee's recommendations and pass the bill as submitted to us.

I urge that there be no further decrease because I believe we can rely on Secretary Wilson to use these funds judiciously and take the necessary steps to place in reserve any funds which prove to be in excess of actual operating needs.

I am aware that there will be pleas for us to increase the amount recommended for the Air Force, on the basis that failure to do so will give us a one-shot or second-best Air Force.

The claims are baseless.

In this connection, we have the recent testimony of Secretary of Defense Charles E. Wilson who, in testifying before the Senate Appropriations Committee, said:

I assure you gentlemen most emphatically that we are not going to have the second-best air force. As long as I am responsible for this Government and to the people of the Nation for the Department of Defense, we are going to continue to have the best air force.

We can rely on that pledge, because it reflects the unyielding determination of President Eisenhower and his entire administration.

And we can rely on this program, because it is one that President Eisenhower personally approves.

We must remember that President Eisenhower's military experience and competence are unchallenged, and that

he commanded air forces during World War II far greater than the world had ever before seen.

We know that the President knows the facts—all the facts—and that he would settle for nothing less than what our security requires.

Consequently, I feel we must accept his judgment, which is reflected in the military program for which the funds are recommended in this bill.

During the past month, there has been extended discussion on the floor concerning the effect of the revised budget on the Air Force.

I will not try to repeat all the facts and refute all the fallacies that were presented during these discussions.

I would like to repeat several key facts, however, which clearly demonstrate the soundness of the Eisenhower program and demolish the argument that this program is niggardly with respect to the Air Force.

In fiscal 1954, the revised budget will produce 114 Air Force wings, and in addition 7 Air National Guard and Air Reserve wings, all equipped with modern aircraft—a total of 121 wings.

Under the Truman budget only 117 modern Air Force wings would have been attained in fiscal 1954, despite the fact that a total of 133 wings were scheduled. No provision was made in the Truman budget for modernizing any Air National Guard or Air Reserve wings.

Of the 117 Air Force wings that would have been attained under the Truman budget, 17 were to be troop-carrier wings.

The revised budget provides for only 12 troop-carrier wings, so that under the revised budget not only will the total number of wings—Air Force, Air National Guard, and Air Reserve—be greater in 1954. But the percentage of combat types will be higher.

By the end of 1955, the revised budget and aircraft production schedules will produce at least 120 Air Force wings and 23 Air National Guard and Air Reserve wings, all equipped with modern aircraft, or a total of at least 143 wings—Air Force, Air National Guard, and Air Reserve.

Under the Truman budget only 137 Air Force wings equipped with modern aircraft were scheduled for this time, and this included 17 troop-carrier wings.

The Truman budget did not contemplate any modernization of Air National Guard and Air Reserve wings in fiscal 1955.

Thus under the revised budget not only will the total number of modern wings—Air Force, Air National Guard, and Air Reserve—by the end of 1955 be greater than under the Truman budget, but the percentage of combat types will also be higher.

Air Force combat aircraft scheduled for delivery in the period from July 1, 1953, to December 31, 1955, are increased by at least 7 percent—75 aircraft—in the budget submitted by President Eisenhower in May, as compared with the January budget of the Truman administration. This is almost enough aircraft to equip a modern fighter wing.

Adjustments have been made in support-type aircraft, which includes trainers, transports, helicopters, and liaison

aircraft, resulting in a reduction of about 850.

This has resulted from changes in requirements—the biggest single change being the deletion by the Air Force of 420 navigational trainers—elimination of duplication and elimination of procurement of special-mission aircraft for VIP's.

As for the Navy and Marine Air arms, there will be no reduction in 1954 or 1955 in combat units.

With a total of 9,941 operating aircraft, they will maintain 16 carrier groups, 15 antisubmarine warfare squadrons, 34 patrol squadrons, and 3 marine wings.

They will absorb a reduction in total operating aircraft amounting to roughly 200 in 1954 and about 500 in 1955.

These will be taken out of support units. Modernization will continue as rapidly as practicable in view of design and development problems being encountered in the newest type of aircraft desired by the Navy.

For example, development problems in connection with the turbo-prop engine is holding up the production of certain new types which it had hoped would be in quantity production by this time.

However, the Navy will still be receiving more than 3,000 new, modern aircraft a year.

On the subject of air defense of the United States, there is no change expected in the number of interceptor wings in the new budget.

There is no reduction either in the budgeting for the radar network either this year.

Under both the new budget and the Truman budget, the same number of antiaircraft battalions are scheduled for both years, with modernization progressing as guided missiles and new equipment become available.

Under aircraft procurement planned in the revised fiscal 1954 budget, the Air Force is scheduled to receive over 2,600 more aircraft from production difficulties for a number of new types desired, the Navy is scheduled to receive 250 more aircraft in fiscal 1954 than during fiscal 1953.

When those difficulties have been overcome, production can be increased.

Under the Truman budget, by 1956 there were scheduled 143 wings, although based on past experience the goal might not have been met.

As far as present considerations are concerned, the Air Force has been told to plan on 120 wings until there has been an opportunity to review the requirements by the Joint Chiefs, the Security Council, and the President.

The results of this review cannot be predicted since there could be 143, 150, or 110 wings, depending on what the review turns up.

Should the review develop the need for additional wings it will be practicable to alter aircraft schedules for 1956 as late as the spring of 1954.

It is contemplated that this review will reexamine the overall strategic concept and reevaluate the weapons of defense and offense in this atomic age.

It must reassess the capabilities of our allies, for their contribution to the combined might of the free world has direct bearing on the size and nature of our own military programs.

This points up the important relationship of the foreign-aid program to our defense budget.

Modern fighter aircraft are now in production in five European countries as well as Canada, which has been manufacturing the American F-86 for some time.

The foreign-aid program has contained substantial funds for offshore procurement of European-made aircraft, with a view toward equipping more NATO wings and helping establish an air industry in those countries that will eventually take care of their own defense needs.

In conclusion, no doubt I find myself like many other Members of Congress disturbed over the inference created by some that the Air Force is being neglected.

I am disturbed because I am in favor of providing an Air Force second to none.

But after digesting a lot of discussion on the subject that appeared in the newspapers and over the radio as well as in the printed hearings on this bill and the committee report, I am convinced that I should accept the judgment of President Eisenhower because the scheduled review of our defense needs to be made by the new Joint Chiefs of Staff is added assurance that the security of this Nation will not be jeopardized at any cost.

THE CHAIRMAN. The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Kentucky [Mr. CHELF].

Mr. CHELF. Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of the Mahon amendment.

Mr. Chairman, I have refrained from saying anything about this bill yesterday and so far today. Yesterday I was trying desperately to make up my mind as to how I would vote. Frankly, I was afraid to vote for the Mahon amendment due to the fact that we now have a staggering debt of some \$272 billion. Yet on the other hand, Mr. Chairman, I was afraid not to vote for this amendment for the simple reason that I did not want to play poker or shoot craps with the security of this country.

I have come to the conclusion that I shall support this amendment. True, it is going to cost us money, but we cannot take chances with our freedom. Back in August 1949, I stated in a speech on the military aid to Atlantic Pact nations: "If we are to err—I prefer to err on the side of preparedness to prevent another war."

I sincerely hope that there will be no misunderstanding of my position today. I am not criticizing President Eisenhower, the administration, the House committee in charge of this legislation, or anybody else. I am merely afraid not to support the Mahon amendment for the following reasons: After World War I we made some sad mistakes. We made a mistake in that we allowed the League of Nations to become scuttled. We sank and decommissioned our ships, we allowed our planes to become obsolete, we allowed our tanks and artillery pieces to

rust away, we authorized the early return of our oversea army. Yes, we disbanded our splendid Army of nearly 3 million fighting men, and before long we had only 75,000 officers and men left. A mere hollow shell of its former strength. It was then that the seeds of World War II were sown by our folly and neglect. Yes, when we abandoned Germany, we allowed the would-be world conquerors to come into power. There came out of World War I mistakes a rug-chewing, paperhanging demagog, named Hitler, who beat the drums, waved the flags, and rallied all of the dissatisfied people, still smarting from their World War I defeat, into an integrated, well-organized army with the avowed purpose to occupy and dominate the entire world. When the war clouds of World War II were gathering, we paid no attention until the storm actually broke. It was only when Czechoslovakia had fallen, Poland was gobbled up, France was beaten to her knees, Britain was tottering on the brink of destruction and despair, that we at long last bestirred or interested ourselves.

Mr. Chairman, then what happened here? Back in 1941 this House finally saw fit to continue and to keep intact our Selective Service Army by only one vote majority. Nobody has ever accused George Washington of being an alarmist. It is true that he made the statement, among others as has been pointed out here that we should keep out of entangling alliances. But, Mr. Chairman, that was in the days of the horse and buggy and the gas lamps. Today, due to aviation, we really live in a small world. You can be in Germany or Russia or any other part of the globe in the time it would take me to get back to my home in Kentucky by automobile. I say to you that when George Washington made the statement, "The most effectual means of preserving the peace is to be prepared for war," is just as true today as it was in 1790. It is as if he had arisen from his tomb to warn us that we must beware of the leadership of Russia.

Mr. Chairman, the Russians are running their factories day and night. They were doing it in 1945 when I was in Moscow, and you can bet your life that they have not stopped since. Russia is therefore preparing for World War III now just as we allowed Hitler and Tojo to prepare for World War II. Why do not we wake up? In 1949 I said on this floor, "Will it take another Pearl Harbor to bring us to our senses?"

I am going to read you a quote from Lenin, who wrote the Russian bible. Lenin says:

We are living not merely in a state, but in a system of states and it is inconceivable that the Soviet Republic should continue for a long period side by side with imperialist (democratic) states. Ultimately one or the other must conquer. * * * Meanwhile, a number of terrible clashes between the Soviet Republic and the bourgeois state is inevitable.

Get that, "Ultimately one or the other must conquer." Now, what do you think of Russia's attitude? She says what she intends to do just as Hitler said what he was going to do in his book entitled

Mein Kampf. Civilization cannot stand world war III.

The buzz bombs, guided missiles, robot planes, B-36's, and the atomic bomb would blot out all civilization throughout the world. Mr. Chairman, the fate of America, the fate of the world is in the balance; it is for these reasons therefore, that I shall support this amendment. God grant another war will never come, but if it does, let us be in a position to "praise the Lord and pass the ammunition," so that the words of that beautiful War II song might prevail everlastingly:

There will be bluebirds over
The white cliffs of Dover;
Tomorrow just you wait and see;
And there will be love and laughter
And peace forever after;
Tomorrow when the world is free.

War is costly business. So is preparation and building up military strength, especially airpower. However, our freedom is worth any sum that it may cost us.

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Michigan [Mr. FORD].

Mr. FORD. Mr. Chairman, under the Eisenhower budget for the Air Force, the personnel and strength for July 1, 1954, will be 960,000. Under the Mahon amendment the end strength of the Air Force on July 1, 1954, will be about 1,035,000.

On July 7, 1952, the Senate Preparedness Committee, chaired by the distinguished Senator from the State of Texas, LYNDON JOHNSON, made a report on the utilization of manpower. At that time the personnel for the Air Force totaled approximately 973,000. This figure is more than what the Eisenhower Air Force program recommends and less than what the Mahon amendment proposes. Here is what the Johnson Preparedness Committee on page 3 had to say about the manpower utilization by the Air Force:

In the field of manpower, however, our studies have produced a totally different result. Here we have found a high degree of waste—inexcusable waste—and an unconscionable amount of inefficiency. There is no reason why this waste cannot be removed to the benefit both of our defenses and our economic health.

Then the committee had this to say. I repeat this is the report under the jurisdiction of the senior Senator from the State of Texas, an experienced military authority in the Congress. Here is a further comment in this report which was issued last July:

The old Army game of using 5 men to do the work of 1 does not appear to have been discarded when the Air Force divorced the Army.

Then there is another comment by this Preparedness Committee under the jurisdiction of the senior Senator from the State of Texas, the present minority leader of the other body:

For that period—for the period of the international tensions—we must resign ourselves to huge defense budgets. But we must not—we cannot—resign ourselves to budgets so swollen that our economic structure threatens to burst at every seam and

let loose upon our citizenry a floodtide of inflation and bankruptcy.

The sins of the past—the failure of every American to wage a coordinated and ruthless campaign against waste—have caught up with us. Already, there are responsible officials who appear to believe that we have spent so much money already that we do not dare to spend more for weapons that are vitally needed.

The Mahon amendment should be defeated. The personnel requirements under the Eisenhower Air Force program are sound and in accord with observations, comments, and recommendations of the 40th Report of the Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Armed Services. Senator LYNDON B. JOHNSON of Texas, Democrat minority leader in the 83d Congress, was chairman of this group. The other members of the subcommittee were Senator ESTES KEFAUVER, Senator LESTER C. HUNT, Senator JOHN C. STENNIS, Senator STYLES BRIDGES, Senator LEVERETT SALTONSTALL, and Senator WAYNE MORSE. The members of this investigating subcommittee should individually support the Eisenhower Air Force budget for their suggestions are practically identical.

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair recognizes the gentleman from New York [Mr. TABER], the chairman of the committee, to close debate.

Mr. TABER. Mr. Chairman, the gentleman from Michigan has just analyzed one of the items involving \$172 million in this amendment. He has done it magnificently. That item is clearly not needed. There is nothing in this amendment that would bring an increased number of air wings one day earlier. It only provides for transport planes and training planes of which an inventory taken by the Department showed that they had plenty in sight and on order.

This budget was made in this way: In January it was \$16,800,000,000. The Air Force itself, the military end of it, then cut it by \$1,600,000,000. The cut made by the heads of the Departments of the revised budget was only \$3,500,000,000. The plane-construction item would not do any good. The \$600 million additional for maintenance and operation simply allows them to make worse their present record where they have 1½ people doing the work that 1 person ought to do. I know this from going around and seeing it. What is the use of our adding \$1,095,000,000 to this bill when it cannot do any good and it cannot help our national defense? We have had placed in charge of the Air Force and in charge of the Department of Defense the very best business people that the United States could produce. They have gone through this situation, and as a result they have reduced the lead time from approximately 24 months to approximately 16 months on plane construction. That is the average. They are going to give us full-fledged national defense. Let us give them a chance. Do not give them money which they do not need, and which they themselves say they do not need, and which will not produce a single, additional wing for the Air Force. Why should we waste money when it is perfectly apparent that we are just throwing it down the river. I do

not like to approach my responsibility in that way. I hope this House will defeat this amendment and preserve sanity in our Government.

The CHAIRMAN. The question is on the amendment offered by the gentleman from Texas [Mr. MAHON].

The amendment was rejected.

The CHAIRMAN. If there are no further amendments to title V, the Clerk will read.

Mr. TABER. Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent that title VI may be considered as read and open to amendment at any point.

The CHAIRMAN. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from New York?

There was no objection.

Mr. TABER. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike out the last word.

Mr. Chairman, I have asked for this time to pay tribute to the chairman of the Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations for the Department of Defense, Hon. RICHARD WIGGLESWORTH, of Massachusetts.

He was taken sick about 2½ weeks ago and had to go to the hospital. I am glad to say he is now out of the hospital and is recuperating at his place on the north shore.

He has been the most devoted worker I have ever known on this committee, working day and night at his job. I really believe that the strain under which he placed himself and the continuous devotion to his duties and his responsibility caused his sickness. I am glad to report that he seems to be on the way to recovery and I wish him the best of everything.

Mr. MAHON. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. TABER. I yield to the gentleman from Texas.

Mr. MAHON. Mr. Chairman, I wish to concur in the remarks which have just been made by the chairman of the Committee on Appropriations, the gentleman from New York [Mr. TABER], with regard to the No. 2 Republican member of that committee, the gentleman from Massachusetts, DICK WIGGLESWORTH. All members of the committee on this side share those views, I would like to say to the gentleman from New York.

If there has ever been a more devoted patriot in the Congress than DICK WIGGLESWORTH, I cannot identify him at this time. He has worked long hours through the years and he has been a stalwart supporter of the cause of national defense and good government.

We are sorry he cannot be here, but we expect to see him soon and we wish him well.

Mr. NICHOLSON. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. TABER. I yield to the gentleman from Massachusetts.

Mr. NICHOLSON. Mr. Chairman, I want to thank the gentleman from New York and the gentleman from Texas because DICK WIGGLESWORTH does typify old New England and Massachusetts.

Mr. TABER. I thank the gentleman.

The CHAIRMAN. Are there amendments to title VI?

Mr. UTT. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment.

The Clerk read as follows:

Amendment offered by Mr. Urr:
Page 55, after line 12, insert section 646, which reads as follows:

"Sec. 646. None of the funds appropriated by this title may be used in the preparation or prosecution of the pending suit in the United States District Court for the Southern District of California, Southern Division, by the United States of America against Fallbrook Public Utility District, a public service corporation of the State of California, and others."

Page 55, on line 13, strike out "section 646" and insert in lieu thereof "section 647."

Mr. SCRIVNER. Mr. Chairman, the committee will accept the amendment.

The CHAIRMAN. Without objection, the amendment is agreed to.

There was no objection.

Mr. POWELL. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike out the last word.

Mr. Chairman, 9 years ago when I came to this House I introduced an amendment to abolish segregation in the Armed Forces and each time this bill or any bill concerning the Defense Department came up I did likewise. When the Korean conflict began I made a speech saying I would not introduce such an amendment during this conflict. I have introduced each year my bill which this year is H. R. 562, to prohibit race segregation in the Armed Forces of the United States. I appealed to Congressman DEWEY SHORT, chairman of the Committee on Armed Services, for a hearing on this bill. Congressman DEWEY SHORT forwarded to me a letter received from John G. Adams, Acting General Counsel for the Office of the Secretary of Defense, which was received by me on June 24. The following is a copy of that letter:

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: Reference is made to your request for the views of the Department of Defense on H. R. 562, a bill to prohibit race segregation in the Armed Forces of the United States.

The purpose of this bill is stated in its title.

Executive Order 9981, July 26, 1948, declared it to be the policy of the President that there shall be equality of treatment and opportunity for all persons in the armed services without regard to race, color, religion, or national origin, and directed that this "policy shall be put into effect as rapidly as possible, having due regard to the time required to effectuate any necessary changes without impairing efficiency or morale."

The Department of Defense has taken steps to assure compliance with Executive Order 9981, and it is the approved policy of the Department of Defense to provide equality of treatment and opportunity for all members of the Armed Forces.

This policy has been fully implemented in the Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps. In the Army, the gradual assignment of Negro and white personnel to the same unit has progressed from the Far East Command to all major overseas commands. In the continental United States all Army training divisions, military schools, Regular Army divisions and many nondivisional units are integrated. This gradual movement is operating without major difficulties or disruption of military efficiency. While no definite completion date is feasible, the continuation of this process will, within a reasonable time, fully accomplish the purpose of H. R. 562.

In view of the foregoing, it is believed that the enactment of H. R. 562 is unnecessary.

The Bureau of the Budget advised that there is no objection to the submission of this report to the Congress.

It is interesting to note, in the letter from the Acting General Counsel for the Office of the Secretary of Defense, Mr. John G. Adams, that he specifically points out how integration is proceeding in the Army, but says nothing concerning the Navy. He says nothing concerning the Navy because he cannot.

One-half of the Negroes now serving in the United States Navy are serving as mess men, nothing more than man servants to the admiral clique. There is absolutely no excuse for this. It is in absolute defiance of the President's orders. I am bringing this particularly to the attention of President Eisenhower. Intelligent, ambitious Negroes are boycotting the United States Navy because they are not interested in making the world safe for democracy by shining shoes, nor are they interested in fighting communism with frying pans. The last vestige of aristocracy in America is the gold braid of the United States Navy. Generals of the Army no longer have man servants. This is a modernized, 20th-century form of slavery.

In the second place, integration is not proceeding in the Pentagon, among the civilian personnel. Deliberately, definitely, and specifically, all Negroes in the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marines are stopped at the grade-4 level. This is an agreed-upon policy. I must point out that such a policy completely ignores the Civil Service Commission's directives. This must be, and can be changed immediately.

One last criticism: The military does not provide any Reserve Officers' Training Corps for Negroes in three States of the Union—Georgia, Mississippi, and Arkansas. Yet from these States scores of thousands of Negroes are drafted, but none of them with any chance of being commissioned as officers. The result is that there is a shortage today of qualified Negroes for commissioned Army assignments. The military must, therefore, provide immediately ROTC training in these three States.

Finally, I want to point out that we have segregation on the run. A new bill is coming out of my committee—the Committee on Education and Labor—next week, which will give the President of the United States complete power to integrate schools on Army posts. This bill will give this power by virtue of leaving the problem up to the base commander of each Army base.

Within the next few days, a new Executive order will be issued by the White House, dealing with Government-contract compliance. This means that a little FEPC will be set up in all firms doing business with the United States.

These are the kind of secret weapons which will defeat communism at home and abroad.

Mr. SCRIVNER. Mr. Chairman, I offer a committee amendment.

The Clerk read as follows:

Amendment offered by Mr. SCRIVNER: Page 49, line 21, after the word "During" insert "the last quarter of."

The CHAIRMAN. The question is on the committee amendment offered by the gentleman from Kansas.

The committee amendment was agreed to.

LEGISLATIVE PROGRAM FOR NEXT WEEK

Mr. HALLECK. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike out the last word to announce the program for next week because in a very few minutes we will be getting to the voting stage on this bill.

On Monday there will be no business. For Tuesday and the balance of the week, the following bills will be called up:

H. R. 5047, having to do with bonding extension on distilled spirits.

H. R. 5173, Employment Security Administrative and Financing Act of 1953.

H. R. 6049, school construction in federally impacted areas.

H. R. 6078, aid for maintenance and operation of schools in federally impacted areas.

H. R. 4351, having to do with Niagara power development.

H. R. 116, transportation of fireworks in interstate commerce.

Also, if reported and a rule is granted, custom simplification and excess profits tax extension.

I may say that the Consent and Private Calendars will be called on Tuesday, and suspensions, under the unanimous consent request granted yesterday, are in order on Tuesday.

Mr. SCRIVNER. Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent that all debate on title VI and all amendments thereto conclude in 30 minutes.

The CHAIRMAN. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Kansas?

There was no objection.

The CHAIRMAN. The chair recognizes the gentleman from Florida [Mr. MATTHEWS].

Mr. MATTHEWS. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment.

The Clerk read as follows:

Amendment offered by Mr. MATTHEWS: On page 49, line 6, after the word "shipment" insert "For personnel with zero through two dependents, 10,500 pounds for personnel with three dependents, 12,500 pounds for personnel with four dependents, and 14,000 pounds for personnel with five or more dependents."

(Mr. LONG asked and was given permission to yield the time allotted to him to Mr. MATTHEWS.)

Mr. MATTHEWS. Mr. Chairman, I want first of all to thank my colleague, the gentleman from Louisiana [Mr. LONG], and point out to the committee that I sincerely hope they can find it possible to accept this amendment.

Mr. SCRIVNER. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. MATTHEWS. I yield to the gentleman from Kansas.

Mr. SCRIVNER. The committee has never even seen a copy of the gentleman's amendment.

Mr. MATTHEWS. I will explain it to you.

Mr. SCRIVNER. I would like to see a copy so that I can see what it does.

Mr. MATTHEWS. What this amendment does is to add a little more to the

total freight limit that is permitted our personnel in the services. As it is now the maximum amount of freight that can be conveyed at Government expense for a permanent change of status is 9,000 pounds. Now what my amendment does is to base that amount of freight pretty largely on the number of dependents. From 0 to 2 dependents the maximum would be 9,000 pounds, as we have it in the present act, but for 3 dependents it will be extended to 10,500 pounds; for 4 dependents to 12,500 pounds; and for 5 or more dependents a maximum of 14,000 pounds.

Mr. Chairman, the cost involved here will not be very much, but I sincerely believe it is an important morale factor. I can recall when I went into the service I had 1 child and just a Ford full of freight, and when I left 4 years later I had some more children and a freight carload of furniture. When you stop now and think I know you will realize when a personnel change is made, a change from one station to another, 9,000 pounds does not give a serviceman an opportunity to take very much freight. I believe there are great possibilities of savings, and that enough money could be saved to make this change effective and possible. This may seem just a little anticlimatic coming, as it does, after we have discussed the great problems connected with the Air Force, but I know that we are all agreed that the morale of our men is the most important thing we have to think about. I believe this will help their morale. I certainly hope the committee will adopt my amendment.

The CHAIRMAN. The question is on the amendment offered by the gentleman from Florida.

The amendment was rejected.

Mr. WILLIAMS of Mississippi. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment.

The Clerk read as follows:

Amendment offered by Mr. WILLIAMS of Mississippi: On page 48, line 9, strike out all of section 628 and renumber the succeeding sections.

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Kansas [Mr. SCRIVNER].

Mr. SCRIVNER. Mr. Chairman, in response to the gentleman from Mississippi whom we all admire, this matter has been studied for a long time. The gentleman realizes many of the situations that exist, which were described during the general debate yesterday. The Secretary of the Air Force is in sympathy with the goal that we are trying to attain, namely, eliminating the abuses of costly unnecessary flying in the Air Force. They have informed me as of this morning that they have a program which they will submit to the other body as a substitute for this. This amendment should be defeated to let them work out their program.

Mr. PRIEST. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. SCRIVNER. I yield.

Mr. PRIEST. Can the distinguished gentleman tell us where in the record of the hearings we can find the testimony on this particular question?

Mr. SCRIVNER. Flying pay is scattered throughout the testimony.

Mr. PRIEST. Could the gentleman state who recommended this provision?

Mr. SCRIVNER. The committee recommended it. So, Mr. Chairman, I think at this time in view of the situation which has developed, the amendment should be defeated.

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Texas [Mr. BENTSEN].

Mr. BENTSEN. Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of the amendment.

Mr. Chairman, we have already taken care of the quantity of the Air Force by this cut. I have heard a great deal of talk about what we want is quality and not quantity. So I say now, let us hold up the quality of the Air Force. There has been a great deal of talk about the superiority of the kills we have had of Sabres over MIG's. Let me tell you one of the reasons I believe we have had it is because we have had a better training of our men. I do not want to see us have a fair weather Air Force. I want to cite to you the statement of Captain Jarecki, the escaped Polish pilot. This is what he said:

I think there are two reasons why you are shooting down more MIG's in Korea than you are losing Sabres. One is your electronic gunsight, but the foremost reason is the training of your pilots.

I was a pilot in a MIG squadron, and I had less than 150 hours in the air. Of those, 100 hours were in the conventional planes or training units. Then I was assigned to a tactical unit where I got 5 hours in a two-place jet trainer, the training version of the MIG. After I had 40 hours in the MIG, I escaped. I think most of the Red pilots flying in Korea probably have had the same kind of training, and this is no match for our American training.

So I say, let us not make a fair weather Air Force out of this. I do not think that a maximum of 4 hours a month will make a competent pilot, when he has to go on instruments. You do not know what your weather will be. You may start out on a nice, clear day, but the first thing you know you are surrounded by weather and you had better know how to fly on instruments and have had sufficient training. If you lose one, or two, of a few of these expensive airplanes because of insufficient training, you will have lost not only the lives of the pilots but the planes. And in dollars alone you will have lost more than you can save.

Mr. SCRIVNER. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. BENTSEN. I yield to the gentleman from Kansas.

Mr. SCRIVNER. There is not a limitation on training, I might say to the gentleman. These men are already trained. There is no limitation for spending on training.

Mr. BENTSEN. Training is a continuous process.

The CHAIRMAN. The question is on the amendment offered by the gentleman from Mississippi [Mr. WILLIAMS].

The question was taken; and on a division (demanded by Mr. PRICE) there were—ayes 89, noes 105.

Mr. WILLIAMS of Mississippi. Mr. Chairman, I demand tellers.

Tellers were ordered, and the Chairman appointed as tellers Mr. SCRIVNER and Mr. WILLIAMS of Mississippi.

The Committee again divided; and the tellers reported that there were—ayes 115, noes 137.

So the amendment was rejected.

Mr. BARTLETT. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment.

The Clerk read as follows:

Amendment offered by Mr. BARTLETT: On page 52, line 14, after the word "possessions," insert "except Alaska, Hawaii and the Canal Zone."

Mr. FARRINGTON. Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent that I may grant to the Delegate from Alaska my time and that at the conclusion of the remarks I may insert a statement of my own.

The CHAIRMAN. Is there objection to the request of the Delegate from Hawaii?

There was no objection.

Mr. BARTLETT. Mr. Chairman, this amendment does not involve the security of the country, it does not concern the welfare of millions, but it is of vital importance to thousands of loyal Americans living in the Territories.

I seek by my amendment to change section 640, page 52, of the bill. For years Federal workers in the Territories have received a cost-of-living allowance. This section seeks to deny that allowance to Territorial residents recruited in the Territories and working there. It would be more costly instead of less to the Federal Government to do that. This was explained yesterday by the Delegate from Hawaii and myself when we discussed this subject at some length.

I want to make a few brief points.

First, the cost-of-living allowance is not a recruitment device primarily as some Members seem to think. It is a true cost-of-living allowance.

Second, it may be of interest to the committee to learn—it ought to be of interest—that the commanding general of the Alaskan Command, in charge of the military services in Alaska, is exceedingly disturbed by the provisions of section 640 and it is estimated by that command that as many as 50 percent of the classified workers might be lost if this section went into effect. I understand he urges deletion of any such provision relating to Alaska. That should be taken into consideration.

It was my original intention to offer an amendment to strike the whole section. However, I did not do so because it is my understanding no representations have been made from or by Puerto Rico and I am not intimately familiar with the situation in the other possessions. I do know that in Alaska particularly, in Hawaii, and in the Canal Zone, the residents ought to continue to receive this cost-of-living allowance.

Further, I should point out that if these people have to be recruited from the States it is going to cost the Government \$4,000 to take each worker to Alaska and to bring that worker back. The

charge to the Government will be infinitely more than it now is.

Mr. FARRINGTON. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. BARTLETT. I yield to the Delegate from Hawaii.

Mr. FARRINGTON. Is it not true that this amendment involves a vital change in policy in connection with the appointment of Federal personnel in the territorial areas and sets up a double standard of wages, that it is being introduced into this bill without giving the representatives of the territories any opportunity whatsoever to be heard on it. We knew nothing about it until the bill was reported a few days ago.

Mr. BARTLETT. The gentleman has stated the exact truth. We had no opportunity whatever to appear. You and I and others interested knew about this for the first time when the bill was reported. It is my belief that if witnesses had been called as representatives from the executive departments of the Government they would have appeared before the committee in opposition to this section. But we did not know anything about it, as the Delegate from Hawaii has said and we were not given an opportunity to testify.

I hope my amendment will be agreed to.

I desire to quote a radiogram received earlier today from O. F. Benecke, president of the Juneau Chamber of Commerce:

We strongly protest section added Defense Department appropriation bill denying cost of living allowance to Federal employees hired in Alaska. Inconceivable that such discriminatory legislation against resident Federal employees can be favorably considered. No member of this chamber could tolerate such a policy with their employees. Alaska resident Federal employees are citizens of the United States with same general educational background as stateside recruits and in many instances better. They pay same rents, own same type homes, live on same scale and subject to same expense for travel, medical attention, children's education, etc. All wage scales in Alaska are adjusted to greater cost of living here without regard to origin of employees. Believe civil service now has authority to adjust cost-of-living allowance to equitable figure. Policy proposed by amendment would result in resignations of practically all locally recruited Federal employees and their replacement by recruiting or transferring from States so cost-of-living allowance would be paid in addition to tremendous costs for transfer and training new recruits. Effect on economy of Alaska will be very damaging. This appears to be further insistence upon second-class citizenship for Alaskans.

Mr. FARRINGTON. Mr. Chairman, I am strongly in favor of the amendment offered by the Delegate from Alaska.

The Federal Government introduced the practice of paying a differential to civilians in its employ in the Territory of Hawaii, more than 10 years ago. Its original purpose was to induce persons in the States whose services were needed in the war effort to accept employment in Hawaii. The differential was offered originally as an inducement to

these persons to leave their homes at least temporarily for this purpose.

At this time the Federal Government was recruiting tens of thousands of persons, to be employed as civilians in the military establishments, not only from the States, but from among people resident in the Territory of Hawaii itself. Many thousands who had made their homes on the other islands of the Hawaiian group moved to Pearl Harbor, Hickam Field, and other naval and military bases on the island of Oahu to participate in the defense effort.

The result was a double standard of wages.

Men and women, most of them single who had come from the States, were paid 25 percent more for the same work—the same job—than those who had come from homes in Hawaii. The arrangement was obviously so unfair, and caused such widespread discontent and complaint that it was abandoned. The policy was adopted of paying the same wages for the same work, regardless of the origin of the individuals involved.

Following the war the Federal Government decided that payment of the differential could no longer be justified as an inducement for employment in its services in Hawaii. The fact was that many individuals were being removed from the service. It did find however that in order to retain the services of individuals that were very much needed in the Federal Government a differential should be paid on the basis of the difference in the cost of living.

One reason for this is that opportunities for employment in Hawaii for persons with special skills are limited, as the economy of the islands is basically agricultural. Thus men skilled in those trades needed in the certain phases of the Federal Government work could not find employment in Hawaii except with the Federal Government and would leave unless the difference in the cost of living was recognized.

This problem was recognized by Congress in 1948. The Independent Offices Appropriations Act of that year provided for payment of the differential on the basis only of the difference in the cost of living.

The adoption of this system resulted in the reduction in the amount of the differential paid in Hawaii from 25 to 20 percent. About a year ago another investigation was undertaken by the Bureau of Labor Statistics, at the request of the Civil Service Commission, to determine, once more, the difference in the cost of living in Honolulu and in Washington, D. C.

I point this out to show that there is adequate means now available to deal with this problem fairly to both the Government and its employees, and that it is working and working well.

It is a system that is sound from every standpoint. It meets the special requirements that prevail in all outlying areas. Many of them are extremely different. In Alaska, for instance, the cost of living is extremely high. There are, as the Delegate from Alaska pointed

out, two bills pending in Congress providing for payment of a differential far beyond the 25 percent. The situation in Puerto Rico is very different. And what of conditions that prevail in places like Guam, American Samoa, and the trust territory? I doubt if these have been considered in connection with the consideration of the amendment.

The action proposed in this bill would result in the abandonment of a well-established and sound method for dealing with this problem and inevitably create a new and serious problem within the service of the Federal Government in these areas.

This proposed change is grossly unfair because it establishes one standard of wages for those who come in from the States and those whose homes are in the Territories. It would encourage people who desire to live in a place like Hawaii to retain their residence in the States for the simple reason that they would get a substantial increase in pay.

It is a return to the colonial system. It was arrived at without proper consideration and without any notice to the people principally involved. No hearings whatsoever were held. This is unfair.

The way to handle this problem is through the legislative committees involved and by giving those immediately concerned and those best equipped to judge, the opportunity to present their point of view.

We feel that the attempt to achieve this by this method is not proceeding in good faith to the people who have accepted employment under these conditions in the Federal Government in Hawaii, and ask for this if for no other reason, that the amendment proposed by the Delegate from Alaska be adopted.

CANAL ZONE HOSPITAL FACILITIES

Mr. DAVIS of Wisconsin. Mr. Chairman, recent hearings by the Civil Functions Subcommittee of the House Appropriations Committee disclosed gross duplication of hospital facilities in the Canal Zone, not only between the Army and Navy, but between the services and the Canal Zone Government. The subcommittee called this to the attention of the Armed Services Subcommittee and Mr. WIGGLESWORTH confirmed this fact in hearings on the bill now before the House.

A detailed description of the duplication involved is contained in the General Accounting Office Report on Survey of the Health Bureau of the Canal Zone Government, June 30, 1952, which was transmitted to the Appropriations Committee on March 20, 1953.

Briefly, this is the situation. There are four governmental hospitals in the Canal Zone, Coco Solo and Fort Clayton, operated by the Navy and Army respectively and Gorgas and Colon, operated by the Canal Zone Government. Of the four, only Gorgas is equipped and staffed to handle cases requiring major surgery or specialist care. Military cases involving such matters are referred to Gorgas. Shown below are two tables, first, a brief description of each of the hospitals; and, second, the total patient days in the hospitals for fiscal year 1952.

TABLE I.—Government hospitals in the Canal Zone

Agency	Hospital	Location	Capacity (beds)		Beds occupied 1952
			Normal	Emergency	
Navy.....	Coco Solo.....	Atlantic ¹	60	125	50.5
Army.....	Fort Clayton.....	Pacific ²	300	700-750	153
Canal Zone government.....	Gorgas.....	Pacific.....	682	1,170	332
	Colon.....	Atlantic.....	227	270	86
Total.....			1,269	2,165-2,215	621.5

¹ Approximately 3 miles from Colon Hospital.

² Approximately 7 miles from Gorgas Hospital.

³ As of Jan. 16, 1953.

TABLE II.—Patient days, 1952

Navy—Coco Solo.....	17,773
Army—Fort Clayton.....	65,246
Canal Zone Government:	
Gorgas.....	122,224
Colon.....	27,207
Total.....	232,455

The General Accounting Office informs the committee that the total of 232,455 patient days in 1952 represents only 55 percent of the total patient days of Gorgas Hospital in the peak year of 1943 and is less than the normal present capacity of Gorgas.

A brief glance at table I will disclose that the normal capacity of Gorgas—682—is more than sufficient to care for the total hospital needs of Canal Zone residents during 1952.

It was evident to all concerned that 2 of the 4 hospitals were sufficient to meet the needs of all in the Canal Zone. Tentative estimates of the General Accounting Office show savings to be derived from such action to be in the neighborhood of \$2 million annually. Despite flat disagreement to this at first even the Department of Defense now agrees with this position. Steps have been taken to close the hospitals at Fort Clayton and Colon. Current needs will be met by proper use of Coco Solo and Gorgas hospitals. Why this was not done before by the Department is not known, especially since the entire matter has been under study since 1947. The committee trusts, however, that now that the decision has been made there will be no hesitation in its implementation. It is also most desirable that the Department take steps to explore the entire matter of duplication of facilities in the Canal Zone.

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Michigan [Mr. FORD].

Mr. FORD. Mr. Chairman, I rise in opposition to the amendment.

Mr. Chairman, the issue is very simple. Should the Federal Government pay up to 25 percent as a bonus for employment to a person who lives in Hawaii and Alaska, to work for the Federal Government? This provision as included in the bill says that we will not pay the resident of Hawaii, Alaska, or any other Territory or possession a bonus for working for the Federal Government. The policy was basically set up for the recruitment of personnel from the United States to go to these Territories and possessions. If you want to pay a citizen resident of Hawaii and Alaska and other Territories and possessions a bonus for working in their own home area, then you want to vote for the amendment offered by the

Delegate from Alaska. If you want to pay a straight salary to those people who work for the Federal Government in their own Territories or possessions, then vote for the committee bill.

Mr. FARRINGTON. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. FORD. I yield to the Delegate from Hawaii.

Mr. FARRINGTON. What the gentleman is doing is proposing that you pay a bonus to those who come in from the outside.

Mr. FORD. That is right.

Mr. FARRINGTON. But deny it to the people who live there, and that is discriminatory and unfair.

Mr. FORD. When the legislation was originally approved it was based on the necessity of recruiting people from the United States to work in the Territories and possessions. That is not now the case at all and there is no reason why we should pay the citizen residents of these Territories and possessions a bonus.

The CHAIRMAN. The question is on the amendment offered by the Delegate from Alaska [Mr. BARTLETT].

The amendment was rejected.

Mr. BARTLETT. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment.

The Clerk read as follows:

Amendment offered by Mr. BARTLETT: On page 52, line 14, after "possessions" insert, "except Alaska."

Mr. BARTLETT. Mr. Chairman, Alaska is, of course, a Territory with which I am intimately familiar. Is the 25-percent allowance a bonus when the cost of living at Anchorage is 40 percent higher than Seattle, and when the cost of living at Fairbanks is 47 percent above that of Seattle? It is not, and if witnesses could have been brought before the committee from the Civil Service Commission they would have so testified. This is a cost-of-living allowance, and nothing else, and I hope the amendment prevails.

The CHAIRMAN. The question is on the amendment offered by the Delegate from Alaska [Mr. BARTLETT].

The amendment was rejected.

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Florida [Mr. SIKES].

Mr. SIKES. Mr. Chairman, I am somewhat disturbed by the provision in section 622, on page 43 of the bill providing that as much as \$10 million of the amounts received from sale or salvage of scrap shall be available each to the Department of the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force for expenses of transportation, demilitarization, and other preparation. I question the necessity for that allocation of funds.

It is my information that these funds have been used in the past to purchase scrap-processing equipment in a number of instances where it may not have been necessary. There are many persons who feel that there is adequate competitive private small business which is anxious to handle the scrap and in some instances can do so with a greater net return to the Government. They advocate the method followed by most private industry in arranging for more frequent disposal of scrap on a competitive bid, quarterly contract basis. This eliminates much of the storage problem and additional handling costs and gives to the established private small business the chance to do the job. There are those who feel also that the effect of this appropriation is to provide a subsidy to the steel mills.

Mr. SUTTON. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment.

The Clerk read as follows:

Amendment offered by Mr. SUTTON: On page 46, line 10, after "violence", insert the following: "or refuses to answer questions before any committee of Congress regarding his or her membership in or affiliation with such organization on the ground that such testimony may incriminate such person."

Mr. SCRIVNER. Mr. Chairman, a point of order.

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman will state it.

Mr. SCRIVNER. Mr. Chairman, although the committee understands the purpose of the amendment and knows the results it might obtain, we nevertheless feel that the amendment is subject to a point of order, and insist on the point of order that it is legislation on an appropriation bill.

The CHAIRMAN. Does the gentleman from Tennessee desire to be heard on the point of order?

Mr. SUTTON. Mr. Chairman, this is a restriction on an appropriation. I talked with the chairman of the full Committee on Appropriations about this amendment and also talked to the chairman of the subcommittee handling the bill and also the ranking minority member of the subcommittee. I was hopeful they would accept this amendment. To me it is a restriction on an appropriation and is something I believe the entire Congress would be in favor of. I hope the gentleman will withdraw his point of order and let this amendment go into the appropriation bill. I still insist, Mr. Chairman, that it is a restriction.

The CHAIRMAN. In the opinion of the Chair, the amendment offered by the gentleman from Tennessee adds further legislation to that in the bill, and the amendment is not germane to the section to which it is offered. The Chair, therefore, sustains the point of order.

Mr. SUTTON. Mr. Chairman, I hope the Committee on Appropriations will include this amendment in the next appropriation bill they have. A few years ago we did not have the section in the appropriation bill known as section 625, up until 1932. I believe it was put in at that time. Since that time of necessity we have had to put these restrictions in the appropriation bills. At this time,

with so many people refusing to answer the question as to whether or not they are Communists on the ground that it might incriminate them; I hope this provision will be put into all the appropriation bills from now on by the Appropriations Committee so that a point of order cannot be raised against it. To me, anyone who refuses to answer a question as to whether or not he is a Communist on the ground that it might incriminate him is just admitting that he is a Communist. Of course, no one should draw money from the Federal Government who is a Communist or if there is any doubt as to whether or not he is a Communist.

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair wishes to ask whether or not there are any more bona fide amendments.

Mr. SCRIVNER. We have no more amendments on this side, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. If not, the Chair recognizes the gentleman from Wisconsin [Mr. BYRNES].

(Mr. BYRNES of Wisconsin asked and was given permission to take the time allotted to him to Mr. LANTAFF.)

Mr. LANTAFF. Mr. Chairman, I take this time to ask the chairman of the committee a question with reference to the proposed cut in the Air Force budget. The recently announced death list on airbases did not include a base in my home district, the Homestead Airbase. I am wondering whether or not this \$240 million will in any way affect the reactivation of that airbase.

Mr. SCRIVNER. My information is that it will not. There is possibly \$3 billion unobligated in the Air Force. I am informed that the base to which the gentleman refers is not on the death list and will proceed.

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Wisconsin [Mr. DAVIS].

Mr. DAVIS of Wisconsin. Mr. Chairman, I take this time to call the attention of the House to section 631, which appears on page 50, what might be called a revision of what is referred to in the report as the Davis amendment.

You will recall that in the appropriation bill last year a limitation was included on the number of officers and the rank that could be had. Because of some erroneous figuring, it was necessary to revise that, which this House did unanimously. It became Public Law No. 7 of the 83d Congress. I simply take this time not to offer an amendment—which I do not do for several reasons—but to call the attention of the committee to the fact that this law which was unanimously passed by the House in March is now being changed by the addition of 144 Navy captains, 1,342 Navy commanders, and a net of 19 generals in the Air Force. There may be justification for that, but in view of the unanimous action of the House to provide temporary legislation until such time as the Armed Services Committee can fulfill its function of providing legislation on which the House can pass, I doubt the wisdom of permitting that number of increases to take place. Yesterday, while I could not be here because of some subcommittee hearings, objection was taken to handling this matter by means

of an appropriation rider. I can agree with that. The statement was made, and I quote:

I would think after the grievous consequences of the Davis amendment last year that the Members of this body would be getting a little bit sick of it, too.

Mr. Chairman, I submit the grievous part is that such legislation had to be handled by an appropriation rider in the first place.

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Texas [Mr. MAHON].

Mr. MAHON. Mr. Chairman, the House will be interested in knowing the nature of the motion to recommit which will be offered at the proper time from this side of the aisle. The motion will be the same as the amendment offered. It will provide for an increase in the committee bill of \$1,175,000,000 for the more rapid buildup of the Air Force toward the 143 wings. The motion, if adopted, will happily leave the total in the Department of Defense bill well below the President's request for national defense. We will be giving the Department of Defense and the President something less than the sum requested for national defense in the budget estimates. It is true that the Congress will have in its wisdom exercised its right to vary the purposes for which some of the money will be spent. I think that is a true description of what the motion to recommit will involve.

Mr. SCRIVNER. Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent that all Members may be permitted to extend their remarks at this point in the Record.

The CHAIRMAN. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Kansas?

There was no objection.

Mr. PHILBIN. Mr. Chairman, even during World War II it was quite apparent to me that this Nation and the free world would ultimately clash in a great struggle for preservation of our basic concepts of freedom. In a speech I made on this floor in 1943, I pointed out that realignments of policy and alliance would inevitably follow the war and that we as a Nation should take every precaution then not to strengthen potential enemies. Regrettably my views were not accepted and not followed. Instead, we embarked upon appeasement and a soft, conciliatory policy toward the Soviet with what results we can now all appreciate and deplore.

After the war when through diplomatic concessions and aggression the Soviet greatly expanded its territory and sphere of influence, while I worked and spoke for universal reciprocal disarmament and international control of atomic energy, until the Soviet should demonstrate sincerity and good faith by deeds as well as words, I repeatedly urged, in the House Armed Services Committee and in and out of the House, the building of an impregnable national defense on land, sea, and in the air dominated by a mighty aerial striking power capable of almost instantaneous and terrible retaliatory action against an aggressor.

I worked and fought particularly for an overwhelming air force and was the first to introduce a bill calling for 70-

group air strength at a time when we had permitted our air power to be dangerously reduced. From that day to this I have labored for great strength of arms.

The present controversy is just an extension of that issue. It is a conflict between those who favor a 143-group air force, or even a larger one, and those who just as honestly strive for a smaller but what they believe would be an effective force. Frankly, I cannot accept the analysis or the reasoning of the opponents of an increased and stronger air force in this critical period in world affairs.

There is hardly a well-informed, loyal, thoughtful American who does not recognize the great deterrents to Soviet aggression. They are principally two: our large stockpile of atomic bombs and our ability to deliver them speedily and effectively. Our great economic system, with its unmatched efficiency and productivity, the skill of American scientists and working people, the great production by our agriculture of foodstuffs and fibers, the indomitable spirit of the American people—all these are great psychological and actual advantages over other nations.

But the one thing that strikes fear into the hearts of ruthless enemies is our large supply of atomic bombs and the heavy bombers we have in being to deposit them in strategic places if an attack should be made on this Nation.

Thus it appears entirely clear to me that the building of a stronger Air Force is imperative for adequate national defense. Air power is essential to the safety and prestige of our position in the world. Air power is the one field in which because of our scientific research and technological skills we have a decisive natural advantage. Air power is a peculiarly American specialty in which it would be relatively easy for us to achieve and maintain superiority and dominance over those who might be disposed to assail us. We can and must have the best Air Force in the world.

I am not impressed with the argument made here that we can have just as effective an Air Force under the bill as we could under the amendment providing \$1,100,000,000 more. There is no argument for economy, however sincere and well motivated, that should be allowed to jeopardize the national security or leave the Nation without that kind of aerial striking power that will continue to deter ruthlessness and aggression and protect the Nation.

One billion dollars is a lot of money. But measured in terms of defense and total budget it is a small price indeed to pay for greater security. We cannot insure absolute immunity for the Nation against attack. But we can insure that potential enemies may know of our preparedness and that if a wanton attack should be made, it can and will be answered promptly and effectively by mighty, cosmic, atomic blows from the skies carried out by the most modern, speediest, best heavy bombers raining widespread devastation and destruction upon the enemy.

I would express the hope and heartfelt prayer that this will be the last great

defense appropriation that we of the House shall have to vote for. I hope and pray that the great and all-powerful Prince of Peace, the arbiter of every destiny, may infuse all nations, including the Soviet, with emotions of brotherhood and friendship and human cooperation in order that universal disarmament may come to pass, that hating, conspiracy, and aggression may cease, that war may be abolished and replaced by institutions of justice, that the world may live, work, and progress in amity and universal peace.

Feeling as strongly as I do on the question of American preparedness, until that time comes, I propose as a matter of security and statesmanship to support and strive for the maintenance of a strong, invulnerable, impregnable national defense.

Mr. PATTERSON. Mr. Chairman, some consolidation of facts is necessary to sift through the welter of charges and counter charges having to do with the recommended appropriations for the Air Force.

The amount requested in the Eisenhower budget is sufficient to maintain our air strength to a point adequate for our foreseeable need. All talk of increased appropriations giving the Nation more air power for our immediate need is misleading to the extreme.

Should Congress follow the lead of the strongest air advocates and vote greatly increased funds—not one additional plane would be made available in 1954. The Air Force has at present large sums of both obligated and unspent and unobligated moneys. The productive facilities of the Nation could not build additional planes without full mobilization. Money appropriated above the budget request would not increase our 1954 air strength one iota.

The President is supremely qualified to pass on the military needs, and he has made it evident on many occasions that he approves of the reductions which have been suggested.

Lest my position be misunderstood, let me note that in the 80th Congress I strongly supported the successful effort to build our air strength to 70 groups. I am still an advocate of air power, particularly in a strategic sense. Under the amount suggested by the Department of Defense, and concurred in by the Appropriations Committee, this Nation will retain air supremacy so essential to our defense.

An insolvent nation is a weak nation, whatever its strength in materiel and manpower may be. This is not to place economy before strength, but to be realistic in our planning. Should we over-expend we sap our economic strength and weaken our position of world leadership. No insolvent nation ever won a war or survived full military action. We must reach for the middle ground which will assure military strength and keep our citizens solvent in their financial affairs.

Sound planning will give America more defense strength for fewer dollars, just as any efficient enterprise can give the consumer more value per dollar than an inefficient and wasteful one.

Mr. Chairman, I desire to take this opportunity to commend the House Appropriations Committee for the consideration which it gave to the continuance of the program for the promotion of rifle practice.

I was particularly pleased to note that it was the sense of the committee, as expressed in the report, "that the National Board should spare no effort in attempting to make available .22 caliber ammunition to the junior rifle clubs, and should, in fact, do its utmost to encourage the junior clubs."

I hope that the National Board will be able somehow to obtain sufficient .22 caliber ammunition for these young men, although its task is made the more difficult—if not impossible—by the lack of funds to purchase such ammunition. This is made most evident by the fact that \$100,000, the amount recommended by the committee, is the Army's estimate of the administrative expenses of the Director of Civilian Marksmanship during the next fiscal year.

As evidence of the importance of adequate appropriations for this program, I am inserting as part of these remarks, a newspaper clipping from the New York Times of October 19, 1952. The clipping is datelined Berlin, and recites an ordinance proposed by the East German Ministry of Education for compulsory rifle and pistol training for children of both sexes from the age of 12 years upward. Both 12- and 14-year-old children would receive 1 hour per day in small-bore rifle practice. Children over 14 years receive training in the service rifle.

We should all be thankful that this program for the promotion of rifle practice accomplishes a vital objective in the traditionally American volunteer basis.

The American Legion at its last national convention recognized the importance of this program by the adoption of a resolution as follows:

"Resolved by the American Legion in national convention assembled, That the national legislative commission of the American Legion be authorized and directed to urge the 83d Congress to increase the appropriation for the National Board for the Promotion of Rifle Practice so that it might more effectively carry out the objectives of that program."

Adopted by the 34th annual convention, the American Legion, August 25-28, 1952, New York, N. Y.

The reference in the House committee report to the senior rifle clubs requires some comment in order that the Members not misunderstand this very important phase of the program for the promotion of rifle practice.

The House report states:

The senior rifle clubs, deprived of a partial potential membership by the Selective Service Act, are more and more composed of the hobby shooters.

It must be recognized that the Selective Service Act takes many young men who have the advantage of earlier training and qualification in the junior clubs. It must be emphasized, however, that the Selective Service Act instead of tapping the potential membership of the senior clubs actually acts as a pipeline for the senior clubs; as these young men re-

turning to civilian life seek affiliation in these clubs to maintain or improve proficiency in the service rifle.

The description of hobby shooters for the men in the senior clubs ought not to be misunderstood. The statutory objectives of this program—a program which has held its own over the space of half a century—is to promote proficiency in rifle marksmanship as a necessary adjunct of national defense. If in the pursuit of that objective the hobby shooter participates in this program, then indeed we ought to hope that thousands more of these hobby shooters join up. The trained shooter is a man who believes in his weapon. When the time comes when he must rise to the defense of the Nation, he, the hobby shooter, will be well prepared and, after all, that in essence is the object of this program. It is analogous to the Civil Air Patrol, another valuable adjunct to national security. Without the hobby flyer it would take untold billions for more pilots and aircraft to do the job of the CAP.

Again, I wish to commend the committee for its consideration of the program for the promotion of rifle practice, and trust that it will heed these comments as to the importance of supplying ammunition for the junior clubs, and maintaining the senior clubs as a valuable asset to the trained reserve of the country.

[From the New York Times of October 19, 1952]

REDS WILL TEACH CHILDREN TO SHOOT— ALSO, GERMAN YOUNGSTERS AT 15 MUST LEARN COMMANDO TYPE STREET FIGHTING

BERLIN.—East Germany's plans for building a national service army of 500,000 men are moving ahead and are beginning to affect all sections of the Soviet-zone population. Hardly a single age-group is untouched.

A new ordinance proposed by the East German Ministry of Education provides for compulsory rifle and revolver training for children of both sexes from the age of 12 upward. One hour a day is to be devoted to teaching the 12-to-14-year-olds to fire a small-bore rifle.

The instructors are the members of the Communist "people's police." Over the age of 14, training is to be in the use of Wehrmacht-type army rifles and revolvers. Proficiency in marksmanship and regular attendance at these classes will be made a condition of a good school report.

In addition, all German children at the age of 15 are to receive special training for 2 hours a week in commando-type hand-to-hand and street fighting.

Steps also are being taken to call up 88,000 former Wehrmacht officers and 16,000 ex-S. S. officers now living in the Soviet Zone. They are to get 8 training courses of 14 weeks each. The best of them (the figure of 12 percent is estimated for "passes" at these courses) are to be drafted into the new East German "national" army at once. The second-bests are to be placed on reserve.

To encourage the ex-officers not to flee to the West, it is emphasized that a Nazi background will not affect chances of promotion in the new East Germany army. A warning also is given that an attempt to avoid call-up will be treated as desertion and punished with death by shooting.

To discourage any stirrings of pacifism and resistance to the new "national army," East German political police have been carrying out a thorough purge of known pacifists. In a secret report by the East German Ministry of State Security which has fallen into

Western hands, it is claimed that in the month up to June 15, 1952, 3,896 East Germans had been arrested for "defeatist and pacifist remarks and activities."

The report says that most resistance to the new army comes from the industrial areas. A much more "friendly atmosphere" exists in the country areas.

To increase production of weapons the Soviet authorities have handed back to the East Germans a vast underground armaments factory built by the Nazis near Torgau and employing many thousands.

The plant is turning out aerial torpedoes and shells for heavy guns. Several penal camps will be moved into the neighborhood to provide additional cheap labor.

Mr. JUDD. Mr. Chairman, it is with reluctance that I have come to the conviction I must vote for the Mahon amendment, when most of the members of the committee and of my party are voting the other way. The situation is similar to that on August 4, 1950, when we were debating whether to impose price and other controls on our economy. It was just after the outbreak of war in Korea. I said:

"Mr. Chairman, probably most of the Members of this body will vote on an issue like this in terms of their analysis of the present world situation. In my view it is sufficiently serious that it will take almost a miracle to get us through it without requiring controls on our economy. Therefore, if there is to be error, I would rather err on the side of doing too much too soon than on the side of too little too late, which has been our procedure too often in the past. If we do the former and it does not prove necessary, we can and will promptly take the controls off. But if we do not take action now that events prove necessary, then we will have been derelict in our duty to the point of endangering the very survival of our country."

Mr. Chairman, my vote today must be dictated by my estimate of the world situation now. As a result of our lack of will, not lack of power, to win the war in Korea when we could have done so in 1951 and 1952, I think our position is more serious today than it was then, because the net position of the Communists in Korea and in Asia is stronger. That means the danger of war is greater.

Appeasement of the Communists has always been presented as the way to prevent extension of the war. I have always opposed appeasement or weakness because I believed they would make more likely a larger war, not prevent it.

The difficulties with which we are struggling today were foreseen and warned against on every possible occasion. It is now too late for any good, easy way out, no matter how skillful our present administration. When we refused to defeat the Communists last year and the year before, "because it would cost too much in lives and money," we were choosing a course that I felt sure would lead to even greater costs in lives and money—unless a miracle occurred and the Kremlin's conspiracy weakened from within earlier than we had a right to expect.

The revolts in East Germany, Czechoslovakia, and Poland are of the greatest significance. I believe they foreshadow the beginning of the end—if we exploit the Communist weaknesses to

the full. But while we hope and pray the end will be soon, it is folly to count on that. The best way to hasten the desired end is to redouble, not reduce our efforts, in order to hearten our friends everywhere and give pause to our enemies.

The statements made here by Members for whom I have the greatest respect make me doubt that the Air Force can use all these additional funds to good advantage in the next fiscal year. I realize too that none of the additional amount, if provided, will produce any additional air strength in the next year. But until the cracks in the Kremlin are much wider, we must make large provision for 2 and 3 and 4 years from now. Probably the committee bill provides enough, and now earnestly we all desire to cut down appropriations. But right at this critical juncture when the situation is so fluid and uncertain, and when the additional amount if voted keeps the total still less than that requested in the Eisenhower budget, I have been unable to get the consent of my conscience to deny this additional appropriation, hoping it will not have to be used. If the new study under the new Chiefs of Staff indicates by next January that the smaller figure is adequate or all that can be expended effectively, no one will be happier than I to rescind part of the appropriation or to have unobligated balances recovered into the Treasury. If I am to err, I must err on the side of more rather than less.

The CHAIRMAN. Under the rule, the Committee rises.

Accordingly the Committee rose; and the Speaker, having resumed the chair, Mr. ALLEN of Illinois, Chairman of the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union, reported that that Committee, having had under consideration the bill (H. R. 5969) making appropriations for the Department of Defense and related independent agencies for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1954, and for other purposes, pursuant to House Resolution 310, he reported the bill back to the House with sundry amendments adopted by the Committee of the Whole.

The SPEAKER. Under the rule, the previous question is ordered.

Is a separate vote demanded on any amendment? If not, the Chair will put them en gros.

The question is on the amendments.

The amendments were agreed to.

The SPEAKER. The question is on the engrossment and third reading of the bill.

The bill was ordered to be engrossed and read a third time and was read the third time.

The SPEAKER. The question is on the passage of the bill.

Mr. MAHON. Mr. Speaker, I offer a motion to recommit, which is at the Clerk's desk.

The SPEAKER. Is the gentleman opposed to the bill?

Mr. MAHON. I am in its present form.

The SPEAKER. Is there any other Member who is unqualifiedly opposed to the bill? If not, the gentleman qualifies.

The Clerk will report the motion to recommit.

The Clerk read as follows:

Mr. MAHON moves to recommit the bill H. R. 5969 to the Committee on Appropriations with instructions to report it back forthwith with the following amendment:

Aircraft and related procurement: Page 27, line 13, strike out "\$3,495,000,000" and insert in lieu thereof the following: "\$3,848,000,000."

Major procurement other than aircraft: On page 27, line 18, strike out "\$600,000,000" and insert in lieu thereof "\$650,000,000."

Maintenance and operation: Page 29, line 8, strike out "\$3,050,000,000" and insert in lieu thereof "\$3,650,000,000."

Military personnel requirements: Page 31, line 10, strike out "\$3,270,000,000" and insert in lieu thereof "\$3,442,000,000."

Mr. SCRIVNER. Mr. Speaker, I move the previous question on the motion to recommit.

The previous question was ordered.

The SPEAKER. The question is on the motion to recommit.

Mr. MAHON. Mr. Speaker, on that I demand the yeas and nays.

The yeas and nays were ordered.

The question was taken; and there were—yeas 161, nays 230, not voting 39, as follows:

[Roll No. 75]

YEAS—161

Abernethy	Friedel	O'Brien, N. Y.
Addonizio	Garmatz	O'Hara, Ill.
Albert	Gordon	O'Neill
Andrews	Granahan	Passman
Balley	Grant	Patman
Barrett	Green	Patten
Battle	Gregory	Perkins
Bennett, Fla.	Hagen, Calif.	Pfost
Bentsen	Hardy	Philbin
Blatnik	Harris	Pilcher
Boggs	Hays, Ark.	Poage
Boland	Hays, Ohio	Polk
Bolling	Hinsshaw	Preston
Boykin	Hollfield	Price
Brooks, Tex.	Holtzman	Priest
Brown, Ga.	Howell	Rabaut
Buchanan	Ikard	Rains
Buckley	Jones, Ala.	Rhodes, Pa.
Burleson	Jones, Mo.	Riley
Byrd	Judd	Roberts
Byrne, Pa.	Karsten, Mo.	Rodino
Camp	Kee	Rogers, Colo.
Cannon	Kelley, Pa.	Rogers, Mass.
Carnahan	Kelly, N. Y.	Rogers, Tex.
Celler	Keogh	Rooney
Chelf	Kilday	Roosevelt
Chudoff	King, Calif.	Secret
Cooley	Kirwan	Selden
Cooper	Klein	Shelley
Crosser	Kluczynski	Sheppard
Crumacker	Landrum	Sikes
Davis, Ga.	Lanham	Smith, Miss.
Davis, Tenn.	Lesinski	Spence
Deane	Long	Staggers
Delaney	Lyle	Steed
Dingell	McCarthy	Sullivan
Dodd	McCormack	Sutton
Dollinger	Machrowicz	Thompson, La.
Donohue	Madden	Thompson, Tex.
Dorn, S. C.	Magnuson	Thornberry
Dowdy	Mahon	Trimble
Doyle	Matthews	Vinson
Eberharter	Metcaif	Wheeler
Edmondson	Miller, Calif.	Whitten
Elliott	Mills	Wickersham
Evins	Mollohan	Wier
Fallon	Morgan	Williams, Miss.
Felghan	Moss	Willis
Fine	Moulder	Wilson, Tex.
Fisher	Multer	Winstead
Forand	Murray	Yates
Forrester	Nelson	Yorty
Fountain	Norrell	Zablocki
Frazier	O'Brien, Mich.	

NAYS—230

Abbott	Andresen,	Ayres
Adair	August H.	Baker
Alexander	Angell	Barden
Allen, Calif.	Arends	Bates
Allen, Ill.	Ashmore	Beamer
Andersen,	Aspinall	Becker
H. Carl	Auchincloss	Belcher

Bender
 Bennett, Mich.
 Berry
 Betts
 Bishop
 Bolton,
 Frances P.
 Bolton,
 Oliver P.
 Bonin
 Bosch
 Bow
 Bramblett
 Bray
 Brown, Ohio
 Brownson
 Broyhill
 Budge
 Burdick
 Busbey
 Bush
 Byrnes, Wis.
 Campbell
 Canfield
 Carlyle
 Carrigg
 Case
 Cederberg
 Chatham
 Chenoweth
 Chipperfield
 Church
 Clardy
 Clevenger
 Cole, Mo.
 Cole, N. Y.
 Coon
 Corbett
 Cotton
 Coudert
 Cretella
 Cunningham
 Curtis, Mo.
 Curtis, Nebr.
 Dague
 Davis, Wis.
 Dawson, Utah
 Dempsey
 Derounian
 Devereux
 D'Ewart
 Dondero
 Donovan
 Dorn, N. Y.
 Fenton
 Fernandez
 Fino
 Ford
 Frelinghuysen
 Fulton
 Gamble
 Gary
 Gavin
 Gentry
 George
 Golden
 Goodwin
 Graham
 Gross
 Gubser
 Gwinn
 Hagen, Minn.

NOT VOTING—39

Bentley
 Bonner
 Brooks, La.
 Colmer
 Condon
 Curtis, Mass.
 Dawson, Ill.
 Dies
 Dolliver
 Durham
 Ellsworth
 Engle
 Fogarty

So the motion to recommit was rejected.

The Clerk announced the following pairs:

On this vote:
 Mr. Rayburn for, with Mr. Wolcott against.
 Mr. Dies for, with Mr. Ellsworth against.
 Mr. Heller for, with Mr. Hillelson against.
 Mr. Teague for, with Mr. McVey against.
 Mr. Morrison for, with Mr. Reed of Illinois against.
 Mr. O'Brien of Illinois for, with Mr. Kearney against.
 Mr. Lane for, with Mr. Richards against.

Mr. Brooks of Louisiana for, with Mr. Colmer against.
 Mr. Gathings for, with Mr. Rivers against.
 Mr. Hart for, with Mr. Shafer against.
 Mr. Fogarty for, with Mr. Curtis of Massachusetts against.
 Mr. Engel for, with Mr. Wigglesworth against.
 Mr. Durham for, with Mr. Hand against.
 Mr. Condon for, with Mr. Bonner against.
 Mr. Mack of Illinois for, with Mr. Sheehan against.
 Mr. Dawson for, with Mr. James against.

Until further notice:
 Mr. Hoffman of Michigan with Mr. Lucas.
 Mr. Dolliver with Mr. Regan.

Mr. HINSHAW changed his vote from "nay" to "yea."

Mr. SHELLEY changed his vote from "nay" to "yea."

The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.

The SPEAKER. The question is on the passage of the bill.

Mr. SCRIVNER. Mr. Speaker, on that I demand the yeas and nays.

The yeas and nays were ordered.

The question was taken; and there were—yeas 386, nays 0, not voting 44, as follows:

[Roll No. 76]
 YEAS—386

Abbt
 Abernethy
 Adair
 Addonizio
 Albert
 Alexander
 Allen, Calif.
 Allen, Ill.
 Andersen,
 H. Carl
 Andresen,
 August H.
 Andrews
 Angell
 Arends
 Ashmore
 Aspinall
 Auchincloss
 Ayres
 Bailey
 Baker
 Barden
 Barrett
 Bates
 Battle
 Beamer
 Becker
 Belcher
 Bender
 Bennett, Fla.
 Bennett, Mich.
 Bentsen
 Berry
 Betts
 Bishop
 Biatnik
 Boggs
 Boland
 Bolling
 Bolton,
 Frances P.
 Bolton,
 Oliver P.
 Bonin
 Bosch
 Bow
 Boykin
 Bramblett
 Bray
 Brooks, Tex.
 Brown, Ga.
 Brown, Ohio
 Brownson
 Broyhill
 Buchanan
 Buckley
 Budge
 Burdick
 Burleson
 Busbey
 Bush
 Byrd
 Byrne, Pa.

Johnson
 Jonas, Ill.
 Jonas, N. C.
 Jones, Ala.
 Jones, Mo.
 Jones, N. C.
 Judd
 Karsten, Mo.
 Kean
 Kearns
 Keating
 Kee
 Kelley, Pa.
 Kelly, N. Y.
 Keogh
 Kersten, Wis.
 Kilburn
 Kilday
 King, Calif.
 King, Pa.
 Kirwan
 Klein
 Kluczynski
 Knox
 Krueger
 Laird
 Landrum
 Lanham
 Lantaff
 Latham
 LeCompte
 Lesinski
 Long
 Lovre
 Lyle
 McCarthy
 McConnell
 McCormack
 McCulloch
 McDonough
 McDougough
 McIntire
 McMillan
 Machrowicz
 Mack, Wash.
 Madden
 Magnuson
 Mahon
 Mailliard
 Marshall
 Robson, Ky.
 Martin, Iowa
 Mason
 Matthews
 Meador
 Merrill
 Merrow
 Metcalf
 Miller, Calif.
 Miller, Kans.
 Miller, Md.
 Miller, Nebr.
 Miller, N. Y.
 Mills
 Mollohan
 Morano
 Morgan
 Moss
 Moulder

NOT VOTING—44

Bentley
 Bonner
 Brooks, La.
 Colmer
 Condon
 Curtis, Mass.
 Dawson, Ill.
 Deane
 Dies
 Dolliver
 Durham
 Ellsworth
 Engle
 Evins
 Fogarty

So the bill was passed.
 The Clerk announced the following pairs:

Mr. Wolcott with Mr. Rayburn.
 Mr. Wigglesworth with Mr. Dies.
 Mr. Bentley with Mr. Morrison.
 Mr. Reed of Illinois with Mr. Heller.
 Mr. Smith of Kansas with Mr. Gathings.
 Mr. Hand with Mr. O'Brien of Illinois.
 Mr. Sheehan with Mr. Teague.
 Mr. Shafer with Mr. Engle.
 Mr. James with Mr. Evins.
 Mr. Kearney with Mr. Lane.
 Mr. McVey with Mr. Lucas.
 Mr. Ellsworth with Mr. Regan.

Mr. Curtis of Massachusetts with Mr. Brooks of Louisiana.
 Mr. Dolliver with Mr. Bonner,
 Mr. Hale with Mr. Colmer.
 Mr. Hillelson with Mr. Condon.
 Mr. Horan with Mr. Fogarty.
 Mr. Hoffman of Michigan with Mr. Hart.
 Mr. Hope with Mr. Durham.
 Mr. Reams with Mr. Richards.

The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.

A motion to reconsider was laid on the table.

COMMITTEE ON EDUCATION AND LABOR

Mr. McCONNELL. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that the Committee on Education and Labor may have until midnight Friday, July 3, to file reports on the bills H. R. 5691, H. R. 6049, and H. R. 6078, and that additional views may be filed by the gentleman from New York [Mr. POWELL], to accompany the reports on the bills H. R. 6049 and H. R. 6078.

The SPEAKER. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Pennsylvania?

There was no objection.

MUTUAL SECURITY ACT OF 1953

Mr. ARENDS. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent to take from the Speaker's desk the bill (H. R. 5710) to amend further the Mutual Security Act of 1951, as amended, and for other purposes, with Senate amendment thereto, disagree to the Senate amendment and agree to the conference asked by the Senate.

The SPEAKER. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Illinois? [After a pause.] The Chair hears none and appoints the following conferees: MESSRS. CHIPERFIELD, VORYS, JUDD, RICHARDS, and BATTLE.

OAK RIDGE

Mr. BAKER. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent to address the House for 1 minute and to revise and extend my remarks, and include extraneous matter.

The SPEAKER. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Tennessee?

There was no objection.

Mr. BAKER. Mr. Speaker, I rise to call the attention of the House to the difficulties in securing application of its will to the problems created by the extensive operations made necessary under the atomic-energy program. One aspect of the Manhattan project which resulted from the need for security was the establishment of large communities behind an iron curtain. These communities were owned and controlled by the Federal Government.

Since the end of World War II the residents of these communities have earnestly sought elimination of Federal ownership and the creation of as normal community relations as possible under normal community developments practiced elsewhere in this country.

In the last Congress I introduced H. R. 4901 for this purpose. All elements

affected have sought to bring about this result. There are complex questions which must be resolved, and extensive efforts have been made to work out this whole question of private participation in the atomic-energy program, in the use of atomic energy as well as in the ownership of the communities in which these developments are now located.

For example, the Atomic Energy Commission appointed a panel on community operations on Oak Ridge and Richland, which issued a report known as the Scurry report, which is pending before the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy. The Town Council of Oak Ridge and similar bodies in Hanford and Richland have participated in the discussion of pending proposals and have sought early action regarding my bill and similar bills which have been introduced before the Congress.

I am advised that the Atomic Energy Commission itself has prepared proposed legislation which the Bureau of the Budget is currently considering.

It was pending action on these proposals for private ownership of the community properties, particularly the housing, which resulted in a request of the Town Council of Oak Ridge for continuation of Federal rent control and designation of the Oak Ridge area as a critical area under Public Law 96.

The Critical Area Advisory Committee did designate the area under terms of Public Law 139, which had the identical criteria as under Public Law 96, except for the requirement that a substantial immigration of workers shall have occurred. Now in this community it was not possible to meet this criteria because the total community is a controlled community. Each house is allocated in effect by a Federal agent, and though Oak Ridge is currently faced with a tremendous expansion program unlike problems created in other communities where immigration could be shown statistically, the methods used by the Government agencies did not provide for the kind of situation which this community faced.

In order to meet this problem, Mr. Speaker, after consultation with the members of the House Banking and Currency Committee, I introduced an amendment which the committee and the House accepted and which is currently part of Public Law 23, which reads as follows:

Amendment offered by Mr. BAKER: On page 4, line 4, immediately before the colon insert the following: "(except that clause (2) of this sentence shall not apply in any area in which is located an Atomic Energy Commission installation and the housing accommodations in such area are owned by the Federal Government. However, maximum rents under this title shall not apply to any such housing accommodations when sold by the Federal Government.)"

During the course of the discussion, Chairman WOLCOTT, of the House Banking and Currency Committee, said, and I quote from page 3698 of the RECORD:

There is some question under this criteria whether, because there has been such immigration in Oak Ridge which would justify the continuance of rent control under the criteria. But all of the housing in Oak Ridge is owned by the Federal Government

and is under control, and will continue to be under control as Government-owned property. An amendment will be offered which has been worked out to exempt Oak Ridge from the provisions of this criteria because we think—in fact, we have thought all along—that all of the atomic-energy installations could qualify under this new criteria. If it is found that Oak Ridge cannot qualify inasmuch as it is all Government-owned property, then I think an amendment will be offered which should be reasonably satisfactory which would keep Oak Ridge under control so long as the houses are owned by the Federal Government. But when the Federal Government sells any houses to private owners then those houses—because otherwise the area could not qualify—will be decontrolled.

I call the attention of the House, that the chairman of the committee in charge of drafting this legislation when the act was initially passed in 1947, and the leader of the minority in the subsequent revisions said in the above quote:

We have thought all along that all of the atomic energy installations could qualify under this new criteria.

Now, Mr. Speaker, what are the agencies doing with this expression of congressional intention?

Mr. Speaker, apparently the Congress is being ignored. I wrote to the Chairman of the Critical Areas Advisory Committee, Mr. Glenwood Sherrard, urging that he take action in accordance with the legislative history of this law and designate Oak Ridge and the other atomic energy communities involved as critical areas in accordance with the terms of the act.

Mr. Speaker, Public Law 23 was approved on April 30, 1953. In view of the fact that no action had been taken I wrote to the Chairman on June 18. Now, instead of complying with the intentions of the act, I find Mr. Sherrard, who is familiar with hotel problems in large cities, as an official of the Parker House chain in Boston, proceeding to decontrol not only virtually all critical areas in the country, but particularly communities covered by this amendment, including the atomic energy installations throughout the United States.

Mr. Speaker, it seems we have here a question of conformance by the downtown agencies with the will of the Congress. Mr. Speaker, this problem is one which has had broad consideration and wide attention. Under unanimous consent, I include herewith the full text of two press stories indicating the interest of the chamber of commerce and of the CIO, both of which have had committees studying this problem, and also a press release by the Office of Defense Mobilization showing decontrol of two major AEC communities:

[From the Oak Ridger, Oak Ridge, Tenn., of June 24, 1953]

CHAMBER OF COMMERCE ACTING TO HALT REMOVAL OF HOUSES HERE

The chamber of commerce Tuesday acted to halt the removal of houses from Oak Ridge and to speed up the property disposal program.

On the removal of houses, Tom Lane moved that the chamber go on record as opposing the removal of any more houses until there is a surplus in Oak Ridge. The motion was passed. A committee was appointed to bring the motion to the attention of AEC.

The committee members will be Lane, Frank Wilson, and Don McKay. The AEC is now in the process of removing flat-tops and TDU's.

The land-sale committee of the chamber was directed to write a strong letter to Joseph Dodge, Director of the Bureau of the Budget, expressing concern over the failure of the Bureau to complete its review of the property-disposal program.

The Bureau has been reviewing legislation prior to submitting it to Congress for more than 2 months.

The chamber is to express the concern of residents that Congress may adjourn before any action is taken this year. Copies of the letter are to be sent to Senators ESTES KEFAUVER and ALBERT GORE and Representative HOWARD BAKER, including a request that each of these congressional representatives also write to the Budget Bureau.

CIO URGES NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION ON ATOMIC ENERGY HOUSING AND COMMUNITY POLICY

A proposal that a national advisory commission be appointed to make a comprehensive study of housing and community policy in atomic energy centers was advanced by CIO President Walter P. Reuther in a letter to President Eisenhower, dated February 14 and made public today.

The suggestion was based on a recommendation by Harold Sandbank, a housing consultant, who surveyed the problem for the CIO National Housing Committee and the CIO Gas, Coke and Chemical Workers, which has a substantial membership in Atomic Energy Commission centers.

Mr. Reuther pointed out to the President that serious housing and community problems have developed for the workers in each atomic energy production center.

"No consistent program has been established under which workers in these atomic energy centers might solve their housing problems," he wrote. "In one place subsidized trailers have been used at great expense to the Federal Government. In another, the Government has undertaken construction of the total housing needed in the community.

"Serious problems have developed as a result for which the varying program of the Atomic Energy Commission has prevented community solution. . . .

"The CIO believes this problem deserves your serious attention. We can better win the world struggle for the hearts and minds of men if in the achievement of such significant developments as atomic energy we do not ignore the most fundamental problem of the workers employed in this industry."

Mr. Sandbank was formerly associated with the John B. Pearce Foundation in development of the initial housing proposals for the AEC community at Oak Ridge, Tenn.

A copy of his report was sent the President. It shows the need for a national policy on atomic energy center housing and community problems by reference to the present chaos. It also discusses in detail the situation at Oak Ridge, where disposal of Government-owned housing and other property is being considered.

**EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT,
OFFICE OF DEFENSE MOBILIZATION,
Washington, D. C., June 29, 1953.**

Two areas now under Federal rent control will lose the designation of "critical defense housing area" after July 31, 1953, the Defense Areas Advisory Committee of the Office of Defense Mobilization announced today.

The two areas are: The Savannah River area, South Carolina-Georgia, and Arco-Blackfoot-Idaho Falls, Idaho.

An area must meet all of the following three requirements to be continued after

July 31 as a critical defense housing area for rent control purposes:

1. There must be new, reactivated or substantially expanded plants or installations of the Department of Defense or Atomic Energy Commission in operation in the area;

2. There must be a substantial immigration of defense workers or military personnel for these activities; and

3. A substantial shortage of housing must exist resulting in excessive rent increases which impede or threaten to impede the activities at the plants or installations.

The committee has reviewed the two areas on the basis of the criteria and other provisions of the law and the reports of the Housing and Home Finance Agency, Department of Labor, Atomic Energy Commission, and Department of Defense.

The committee found that in the Savannah River area the peak of construction is past and outmigration of construction workers is occurring; that there is no longer a substantial housing shortage, and additional defense housing is becoming available so that excessive rent increases should not occur.

Although there will be a seasonal increase in the number of construction workers and an increase in the number of operating employees in the Arco-Blackfoot-Idaho Falls area, a defense housing program is under way there which, with existing vacancies, should provide sufficient housing for the area, the committee said.

The actions taken today affect only rent control and do not relate to critical areas designed under the Defense Housing and Community Facilities and Services Act.

Meanwhile each of the critical defense housing areas now under rent control must be reviewed before July 31. The committee has reviewed 73 areas to date which will not be recommended for continued rent control after July 31. Announcements on the remaining areas will be made as the committee completes its review.

The localities embraced in the two areas follow:

Area: Savannah River area, South Carolina-Georgia.

Geographic definition: In South Carolina counties of Aiken, Allendale, Bamberg, Barnwell, and most of Orangeburg; and, in Georgia counties of Richmond, Columbia, McDuffie, and District 81-Wrens in Jefferson County.

Area: Arco-Blackfoot-Idaho Falls, Idaho.

Geographical definition: Butte County, Bingham County except the precincts of Sterling, Aberdeen 1 and 2; Bonneville County except precincts of Poplar, Antelope, Ozone, Palisades, Grays, Blowout, and Jack-knife.

There are serious problems here. I do not intend to stand idly by while the folks living in these controlled communities are ignored in direct violation of the will expressed by this House. Mr. Speaker, this problem is one which we have just established a Commission to explore. This House has enacted H. R. 4406 establishing a Commission on Governmental Functions and Fiscal Resources. This Commission, I am sure, will make recommendations regarding the problem we are facing here.

Meanwhile, the Critical Areas Committee is obligated and required by the statute to designate this community a critical area for the continuance of Federal rent control.

Mr. SPENCE. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. BAKER. I yield to the gentleman from Kentucky.

Mr. SPENCE. Let me say to the gentleman that one of the impelling rea-

sons for giving the President power to declare areas critical for the purpose of continuing rent control was the necessity for that control in atomic-energy areas. I am astonished under the circumstances that those controls are being lifted after we have just given the President the power to continue them.

Mr. BAKER. I thank the gentleman.

VETERANS' ADMINISTRATION

Mrs. ROGERS of Massachusetts. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent to address the House for 1 minute to include a letter.

The SPEAKER. Is there objection to the request of the gentlewoman from Massachusetts?

There was no objection.

Mrs. ROGERS of Massachusetts. Mr. Speaker, this morning I received a letter from the Acting Administrator of Veterans' Affairs, Mr. H. V. Stirling, in which he advised of a general plan of reorganization of the Veterans' Administration.

The plan, which is similar to the one developed by the former Administrator, General Gray, was approved this morning at a staff meeting of officials of the Veterans' Administration, and will be put in effect immediately. It establishes a Department of Veterans' Benefits and a Department of Insurance, in addition to the now-existing Department of Medicine and Surgery.

This reorganization plan has been under study for some time, and it is hoped that when it is in full operation it will eliminate much of the redtape and duplication of administrative details that have precluded efficient operations in the past.

Every Member of Congress is interested in this subject, and I attach hereto the letter which outlines the reorganization plan:

**VETERANS' ADMINISTRATION,
Washington, D. C., July 2, 1953.**

HON. EDITH NOURSE ROGERS,
Chairman, Committee on Veterans' Affairs, House of Representatives,
Washington, D. C.

DEAR MRS. ROGERS: The general plan of organization of the Veterans' Administration involving the establishment of three major operating units within the Veterans' Administration as proposed by Maj. Gen. Carl R. Gray, Jr., our former Administrator, has been approved. The concept and implications involved in the establishment of a Department of Veterans' Benefits and a Department of Insurance which together with the Department of Medicine and Surgery will operate the more than 200 field stations of the Veterans' Administration was made public November 26, 1952, and amplified and developed January 12, 1953.

I have been directed to commence the reorganization immediately. While lines of authority and communication between field stations and central office will be clarified and strengthened, the reorganization itself will take place primarily in our Washington office. In Washington there will be fewer officials reporting directly to the Administrator; staff and operating responsibilities will be clearly separated at all levels and there will be increased delegations of authority to the field.

An approved amendment to the proposed plan requires a reduction in the number of Washington subordinates reporting to the Administrator. This has resulted in estab-

lishing an Assistant Administrator for Administration who will have staff responsibility for personnel, purchasing, administrative services, and the security program. Thus the staff activities reporting to the Administrator will include the Board of Veterans Appeals, Information Service, Investigation Service, Controller, General Counsel, Assistant Administrator for Administration, Assistant Administrator for Legislation, and Assistant Administrator for Construction.

Existing lines of authority and communication will continue in full force and effect until further orders, which will be so timed as to effect the reorganization as quickly as possible consistent with maintaining service to veterans.

You are being provided under separate cover with a chart of the new form of organization. Your particular attention is invited to the fact that the internal organization of the three operating departments is subject to change as indicated on page 49 of Reorganization of Veterans' Administration—Background and Solution, which brochure was furnished January 12, 1953.

Sincerely yours,

H. V. STIRLING,
Acting Administrator.

SCHEDULE OF HEARINGS ON HOSPITALIZATION ENTITLEMENT

Mrs. ROGERS of Massachusetts. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent to address the House for 1 minute.

The SPEAKER. Is there objection to the request of the gentlewoman from Massachusetts?

There was no objection.

Mrs. ROGERS of Massachusetts. Mr. Speaker, I have been asked by the chairman of the Subcommittee on Hospitals, the Honorable B. W. KEARNEY, to announce the following schedule for the hearings on hospitalization entitlement which will begin before that subcommittee next Wednesday morning at 10 a. m., in room 356, Old House Office Building.

For the first 3 days we will receive testimony from the four veterans' organizations, with the Veterans of Foreign Wars testifying first on Wednesday, July 8, to be followed by the Disabled American Veterans and AMVETS, and a representative of the American Legion who desires to be heard on Friday, July 10.

It is planned then to adjourn the hearings until the following Monday, July 13, at which time we will proceed to hear the following organizations in the order indicated:

The American Medical Association, National Medical Veterans Association, American Dental Association, American Hospital Association, Accident and Health Insurance Council, Commission on Chronic Illness.

At the end of the testimony from the associations and groups indicated in the paragraph above, the subcommittee will then proceed to hear representatives of the following Government agencies:

Veterans' Administration, General Accounting Office, Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, Department of Justice, Bureau of the Budget.

It is planned, I believe, for the hearings to be held on Monday, Tuesday, Thursday, and Friday of each week until completed, with Wednesday held open for action of the full committee.

I wish to commend the Subcommittee on Hospitals for the manner in which

they are approaching this problem so vital to every veteran in the Nation, and Members can readily see that this question is going to receive the careful consideration which it merits.

AUTHORIZATION TO SIGN ENROLLED BILLS

Mr. ARENDS. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that notwithstanding the adjournment of the House until Monday next the Clerk be authorized to receive messages from the Senate and that the Speaker be authorized to sign any enrolled bills and joint resolutions passed by the two Houses and found truly enrolled.

The SPEAKER. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Illinois?

There was no objection.

ADJOURNMENT OVER

Mr. ARENDS. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that when the House adjourns today it adjourn to meet on Monday next.

The SPEAKER. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Illinois?

There was no objection.

GRAIN STORAGE PROBLEM

Mr. CURTIS of Nebraska. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent to extend my remarks at this point in the RECORD.

The SPEAKER. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Nebraska?

There was no objection.

Mr. CURTIS of Nebraska. Mr. Speaker, the problem of grain storage has become extremely acute. In 1948 the Democrat Party made grain storage an issue. The facts that they gave the country at that time could hardly be supported by the record. Nevertheless, they prevailed, and the grain storage situation has constantly grown worse. It is one of the inherited problems with which we must deal now.

The support-loan price on wheat at Lincoln, Nebr., is approximately \$2.33½ per bushel. However, no farmer can get that. There is no storage available. The elevators a day or two ago were paying but \$1.79 a bushel. In other words, the support-loan program is not effective because of the lack of storage space.

It may be that the failure to solve the problem of grain storage will play into the hands of the speculators and those who may hold some available storage space. Some farmers may be compelled to sell the grain at low prices now, and that grain may be stored by someone else and held until the support loan price is actually effective in the market place.

Government-owned storage facilities have not been a satisfactory answer. Too often this Government-owned storage is not of the modern type where the grain can be efficiently handled and where there is machinery to clean, aerate, condition, and dry the grain.

The answer to this problem is privately owned grain storage facilities everywhere—on the farm, at the local ele-

vator, the farm cooperative elevator, the private grain-elevator company, both locally and in the terminal markets.

How can we get these storage facilities constructed by private enterprise to meet this national problem? We can do it the same way we have met national problems in our defense program when we have needed additional plants and facilities. We have successfully secured additional facilities by granting a more rapid tax amortization of the cost of constructing such facilities.

For 4 or 5 years or more, I have had a bill pending in Congress to do that very thing. My colleague the gentleman from Iowa [Mr. MARTIN] has likewise sponsored such legislation throughout the years. The previous administration opposed our suggested solution of this problem. Consequently, it has been delayed through the years. We now face a problem that is very acute. The farmer is being penalized for our failure to meet this problem.

The Martin-Curtis proposal is a simple one. Anyone wishing to build grain storage can do so and charge the cost off as depreciation over a period of 5 years. The real benefit from such a program will go to the farmers and producers, especially those who are unable to provide storage for themselves, because, when storage is available, the farmer can place his grain in that storage, take the warehouse receipt, and secure the Government support loan on it. He then is not forced to sell his grain on a depressed market.

Whether this storage is provided by the individual farmer himself on his farm, or by a farm cooperative, or by the private grain trade near the farm or at the terminal elevator, the benefits go directly to the producer.

At the present time the lack of storage is costing many wheat farmers the loss of 60 or 70 cents a bushel. This loss materially reduces the farmers net income for Federal income-tax purposes. Consequently, the Federal Treasury has a stake in this problem. By providing storage we not only do justice to the farmer and prevent him from being gouged and forced to sell at far below the support price, but we cause millions and millions of dollars to flow into the Treasury in the form of Federal income taxes from the farmers.

I am convinced that if the cost of providing grain storage space can be written off from taxable income over a period of 5 years, many individual farmers, farm cooperatives, and grain companies will immediately start to build. I am reliably informed that experienced men in the grain trade are ready and anxious to proceed with such a program. Some of the large, modern elevators can build additional space adjacent to their existing elevator at a cost of approximately 35 to 60 cents per bushel. This means the providing of most modern storage that can handle the grain and prevent it from deteriorating. Better storage is one answer to the troublesome problem of the inspection of grain in interstate commerce and to the charge that some of the grain is unfit for human consumption.

Mr. Speaker, I am happy to report that the Department of Agriculture, under the leadership of the new administration, is

interested in advancing the objectives of the Martin-Curtis proposal. I have reason to believe that the Treasury Department will, likewise, support this proposal. It will provide a sound solution to a most distressing problem. Time is of the essence. I hope that this bill can be advanced without delay.

PERSONAL ANNOUNCEMENT

Mr. REAMS. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent to address the House for 1 minute.

The SPEAKER. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Ohio?

There was no objection.

Mr. REAMS. Mr. Speaker, on the final rollcall on the appropriation bill under consideration today, I was not present in the Chamber. I was in the radio-recording studio and was not able to get here for the final rollcall vote on the bill. If I had been here, I would have voted for the bill on final passage.

DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR

Mr. BAILEY. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent to address the House for 1 minute.

The SPEAKER. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from West Virginia?

There was no objection.

Mr. BAILEY. Mr. Speaker, I have asked for this time in order to join my colleague, the gentleman from the Fourth District of West Virginia [Mr. NEAL], in his protest against the practice of the Procurement Division of the Department of the Interior in awarding a contract to a Japanese firm in competition with a firm doing business in his district. In this particular instance it was a manufacturer of porcelain material, and the bid was on insulators for high-tension wires. The Japanese firm underbid the American firm by \$30,000. I protest the continuation of that practice.

AIDING AND ASSISTING SMALL BUSINESS?

Mr. ZABLOCKI. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent to address the House for 3 minutes.

The SPEAKER. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Wisconsin?

There was no objection.

Mr. ZABLOCKI. Mr. Speaker, I was deeply disturbed to learn from press releases that the Department of Commerce—allegedly because of inadequate appropriations—is closing 11 of its 42 field offices this month. Additional field offices are supposed to be closed in the near future.

One of the offices which are being closed on July 31 is located in Milwaukee, Wis. The Milwaukee field office has been of tremendous help to small business in our city, and in our entire State. It has assisted small business with such problems as Government procurement, import and export licenses, material allocations, management aids, and by furnishing various statistical data.

I am very distressed that these services will no longer be rendered by the Department of Commerce in Milwaukee. The Department informs me, of course, that they have made some arrangements with the Milwaukee Chamber of Commerce, whereby that organization will take over some of the functions exercised by the Commerce field office. The Milwaukee Chamber of Commerce will now become a cooperative office, and disseminate information about imports, exports, licenses, statistics, and so on.

But the Department officials admit that the Milwaukee Chamber of Commerce will be unable to render all of the services expected from the Department of Commerce by small business. So, in many cases, small-business men in Wisconsin will now have to seek such assistance from the Department's central office in Washington, or from a field office located in some other State. This means expense and delays.

Is this the kind of help and treatment that small business can expect from the present administration? Are the services to be rendered by the new cooperative office in Milwaukee going to be as adequate and as impartial as those rendered by the Department of Commerce field office? Or will they tend to cater to prominence rather than to need?

Time will tell how this proposed change will affect the small establishments which have come to look up to the Department of Commerce for cooperation and assistance in solving the many complex problems that they have to face. It appears to me, however, that the closing of the Milwaukee field office is not very consistent with the generous promises made to small business during the last election campaign by the Republicans who are presently in power.

For those who may have forgotten, this is what the Republican platform promised to small business:

We will aid small business in every practicable way. . . . We will maintain special committees in Congress whose chief function will be to study and review continuously the problems of small business and recommend legislation for their relief. We shall always be mindful of the importance of keeping open the channels of opportunity for young men and women.

We will follow principles of equal enforcement of antimonopoly and unfair competition statutes and will simplify their administration to assist the businessman who in good faith seeks to remain in compliance. At the same time, we shall relentlessly protect our free-enterprise system against monopolistic and unfair trade practices.

That is a part of what the Republican platform promised to small business. It seems to me that the curtailment of vital services and the closing of important field information and assistance centers is certainly not the way to help small business.

POLICY OF MASSACHUSETTS COOPERATIVE BANK LEAGUE OF BOSTON, MASS., TO MAKE HOME LOANS TO VETERANS

Mr. McCORMACK. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent to address the House for 2 minutes and to revise and extend my remarks.

The SPEAKER. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Massachusetts?

There was no objection.

Mr. McCORMACK. Mr. Speaker, I received a very fine letter recently from Warner M. Allen, executive secretary of the Massachusetts Cooperative Bank League, of Boston, Mass., which reads as follows:

By direction of the executive committee of the league, I write to inform you that the cooperative banks in Massachusetts have made great numbers of loans to veterans, in the amount of many millions of dollars.

They stand ready to continue to do so, and want it to be known that in Massachusetts there will be no lack of service to the veterans who may be referred, without hesitation, to any of our 173 cooperative banks, most of whom will find themselves in position to help the veteran to become the homeowner that we want him to be.

In localities where the demand for money has seriously shortened the supply veterans can and will find, as you, yourself, are well aware, cooperative banks in nearby communities which will welcome their inquiries.

It is the committee's desire that this be generally known.

I am very happy to receive this letter from Mr. Allen and in accordance with his desire and the desire of the member banks of his league, to give the contents of his letter as wide publicity as possible so the veterans of Massachusetts might know of the fine spirit of cooperation with them entertained by the 173 cooperative banks in Massachusetts that constitutes the Massachusetts Cooperative Bank League, showing the recognition and assumption by the member banks of the league of their responsibilities. In other States, if this same policy has not been adopted, and is not being followed, the policy and action of the members of the Massachusetts Cooperative Bank League constitutes a pace and a leadership for them to follow.

DISPENSING WITH CALENDAR WEDNESDAY BUSINESS

Mr. ARENDS. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that the business in order on Calendar Wednesday next be dispensed with.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Illinois?

There was no objection.

LEAVE OF ABSENCE

By unanimous consent, leave of absence was granted to:

MESSRS. CUNNINGHAM, BATES, NELSON, WILSON of California, HARDY, HEBERT, FISHER, RIVERS, and HESS, from July 6 to July 11, on account of official business.

Mr. SCHERER, for July 6, 7, and 8, 1953, on account of hearings of the Committee on Un-American Activities in New York City on said dates.

EXTENSION OF REMARKS

By unanimous consent, permission to extend remarks in the Appendix of the RECORD, or to revise and extend remarks, was granted to:

Mr. SMITH of Wisconsin in two instances and to include extraneous matter.

Mr. ALEXANDER and to include extraneous matter.

Mr. JONES of Alabama in three instances and to include editorials.

Mr. O'HARA of Illinois in three instances.

Mr. MASON and to include an article by Ruth Montgomery.

Mr. WOLVERTON in three instances and to include extraneous matter.

Mr. LAIRD in two instances and to include extraneous matter.

Mr. REES of Kansas and to include a sermon.

Mr. CRETELLA and to include an editorial.

Mr. MCGREGOR and to include an article.

Mr. YATES to revise and extend his remarks in the Committee of the Whole and to attach thereto letters and miscellaneous material.

Mr. SHUFORD and to include an editorial.

Mr. RHODES of Pennsylvania in three instances and to include extraneous matter.

Mr. WICKERSHAM and to include extraneous matter.

Mr. MORGAN and to include extraneous matter.

Mr. MULTER and to include extraneous matter.

Mr. ADAIR and to include an article.

Mr. MAHON, also to revise and extend his remarks in the Committee of the Whole today and include extraneous matter.

Mr. FINO and to include an article.

Mr. DAWSON of Utah and to include extraneous matter.

Mr. DAVIS of Wisconsin (at the request of Mr. ARENDS) to extend his remarks immediately following the remarks of Mr. BARTLETT and to include extraneous matter.

Mr. HALLECK (at the request of Mr. ARENDS) and to include a resolution.

Mr. BECKER (at the request of Mr. ARENDS) and to include an editorial.

Mr. JUDD in three instances and to include extraneous matter.

Mr. CURTIS of Nebraska and to include a speech delivered by him.

Mr. GROSS to include in his remarks in the Committee of the Whole certain extraneous matter.

Mr. WIDNALL and to include an editorial.

Mr. YOUNGER and to include two tables.

Mr. JARMAN and to include extraneous matter.

Mr. BARTLETT to revise and extend his remarks in the Committee of the Whole and include extraneous matter.

Mr. MADDEN and to include an editorial.

Mr. RODINO (at the request of Mr. ZABLOCKI) and to include extraneous matter.

Mr. HAGEN of Minnesota in three instances and to include extraneous matter.

Mr. GAVIN in two instances and to include extraneous matter.

ADJOURNMENT

Mr. ARENDS. Mr. Speaker, I move that the House do now adjourn.
The motion was agreed to; accordingly (at 5 o'clock and 13 minutes p. m.),

under its previous order, the House adjourned until Monday, July 6, 1953, at 12 o'clock noon.

EXECUTIVE COMMUNICATIONS, ETC.

Under clause 2 of rule XXIV, executive communications were taken from the Speaker's table and referred as follows:

818. A letter from the Secretary of Agriculture, transmitting a draft of a bill entitled "A bill to amend section 8 (e) of the Soil Conservation and Domestic Allotment Act"; to the Committee on Agriculture.

819. A letter from the Commissioner, Immigration and Naturalization, United States Department of Justice, transmitting copies of orders suspending deportation, as well as a list of the persons involved, pursuant to the act approved July 1, 1948 (Public Law 863), amending subsection (c) of section 19 of the Immigration Act of February 5, 1917, as amended (8 U. S. C. 155 (c)); to the Committee on the Judiciary.

REPORTS OF COMMITTEES ON PUBLIC BILLS AND RESOLUTIONS

Under clause 2 of rule XIII, reports of committees were delivered to the Clerk for printing and reference to the proper calendar, as follows:

Mr. HOPE: Committee on Agriculture. H. R. 4353. A bill to increase farmer participation in ownership and control of the Federal Farm Credit System; to create a Federal Farm Credit Board; to abolish certain offices; to impose a franchise tax upon certain farm credit institutions; and for other purposes; with amendment (Rept. No. 701). Referred to the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union.

PUBLIC BILLS AND RESOLUTIONS

Under clause 4 of rule XXII, public bills and resolutions were introduced and severally referred as follows:

By Mr. HESELTON:
H. R. 6071. A bill to create a National Petroleum Commission, and for other purposes; to the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce.

By Mr. HOLIFIELD:
H. R. 6072. A bill to extend and improve the old-age and survivors insurance system, to provide permanent and total disability insurance and rehabilitation benefits, and for other purposes; to the Committee on Ways and Means.

By Mr. HYDE:
H. R. 6073. A bill to provide that the Uniform Simultaneous Death Act shall apply in the District of Columbia; to the Committee on District of Columbia.

By Mr. KILDAY:
H. R. 6074. A bill to amend the act of July 15, 1940, pertaining to emergency officers' retirement benefits; to the Committee on Armed Services.

By Mr. SMITH of Mississippi:
H. R. 6075. A bill to amend the Internal Revenue Code to provide that State welfare agencies may be furnished with information regarding the income-tax exemptions claimed by individuals receiving or applying for certain public-assistance benefits; to the Committee on Ways and Means.

By Mr. WINSTEAD:
H. R. 6076. A bill to repeal those provisions of law which exclude from the Federal old-age and survivors insurance system service performed by an individual in the employ of his son, daughter, or spouse, and service performed by a child in the employ of his father or mother; to the Committee on Ways and Means.

By Mr. YOUNGER:
H. R. 6077. A bill to permit the State of California to fix, charge, and collect tolls for the use of bridges and similar crossings of San Francisco Bay; to the Committee on Public Works.

By Mr. KEARNS:
H. R. 6078. A bill to amend Public Law 874 of the 81st Congress so as to make improvements in its provisions and extend its duration for a 2-year period, and for other purposes; to the Committee on Education and Labor.

By Mr. BOLAND:
H. R. 6079. A bill to provide for loans to enable needy and scholastically qualified students to continue post-high-school education; to the Committee on Education and Labor.

By Mr. FALLON:
H. R. 6080. A bill to authorize the appropriation of funds for the construction of certain highway-railroad grade separations made necessary by the Federal highway system, and for other purposes; to the Committee on Public Works.

By Mr. METCALF:
H. R. 6081. A bill to amend the act of June 28, 1934 (48 Stat. 1269), commonly known as the Taylor Grazing Act, as amended June 26, 1936 (49 Stat. 1976), July 14, 1939 (53 Stat. 1002), July 30, 1947 (61 Stat. 630), August 6, 1947 (61 Stat. 790), and June 19, 1948 (62 Stat. 533), in order to provide for the maximum beneficial use of the public lands by authorizing the Secretary of the Interior to appoint more representative district advisory boards and permitting the Secretary of the Interior to exercise his discretion and authority in order to improve the administration of the public lands involved in the above-enumerated statutes by operation and utilization of such lands and range resources under a multiple-use program that will adequately protect both the private values and public interest in such lands; to the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs.

By Mr. POAGE:
H. R. 6082. A bill to authorize the Secretary of Agriculture to guarantee loans to farmers and livestock producers under certain circumstances; to the Committee on Agriculture.

By Mr. ROBSION of Kentucky:
H. R. 6083. A bill to incorporate the National Woman's Relief Corps, Auxiliary to the Grand Army of the Republic; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

By Mr. WILSON of Texas:
H. R. 6084. A bill to relieve the acute shortage in the municipal water supply of the cities of Grand Prairie, Tex., and Irving, Tex.; to the Committee on Public Works.

By Mr. HARRISON of Nebraska:
H. J. Res. 289. Joint resolution proposing an amendment to the Constitution of the United States; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

By Mr. O'BRIEN of New York:
H. J. Res. 290. Joint resolution creating a committee to assist in the celebration of the 200th anniversary of the Congress of 1754, held at Albany, N. Y., on June 24 of that year; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

By Mr. SHORT:
H. J. Res. 291. Joint resolution to determine the number of members of the Ready Reserve of the Armed Forces of the United States necessary for the national security to be ordered to active duty involuntarily during the fiscal year 1954, to authorize such number of members and retired members of the Regular components to be ordered to active duty, and for other purposes; to the Committee on Armed Services.

By Mr. CHIPERFIELD:
H. Con. Res. 126. Concurrent resolution expressing the sense of the Congress that the Chinese Communists should not be recognized to represent China in the United Nations; to the Committee on Foreign Affairs.

By Mrs. CHURCH:

H. Con. Res. 127. Concurrent resolution opposing the admission of Communist China to membership in the United Nations; to the Committee on Foreign Affairs.

By Mr. BATTLE:

H. Con. Res. 128. Concurrent resolution opposing the admission of Communist China to membership in the United Nations; to the Committee on Foreign Affairs.

By Mr. CHIPERFIELD:

H. Con. Res. 129. Concurrent resolution expressing the sense of the Congress that the Chinese Communists are not entitled to and should not be recognized to represent China in the United Nations; to the Committee on Foreign Affairs.

By Mr. DEWART:

H. Res. 315. Resolution requesting the Secretary of the Interior to negotiate a fair and just settlement with the Crow Tribe of Indians for use of tribal property in construction of the Hardin project; to the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs.

MEMORIALS

Under clause 3 of rule XXII, memorials were presented and referred as follows:

By Mr. LANTAFF: Memorial of the State of Florida urging discontinuance of encroachment and usurpation of legal and traditional rights of the State to control and supervise the education of its people; to the Committee on Veterans Affairs.

By the SPEAKER: Memorial of the Legislature of the State of New Jersey relative to a compact with the State of New York for the reduction of criminal and corrupt practices in the handling of waterborne freight within the port of New York district and the regularization of the employment of waterfront labor, etc.; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

PRIVATE BILLS AND RESOLUTIONS

Under clause 1 of rule XXII, private bills and resolutions were introduced and severally referred as follows:

By Mr. FERNANDEZ:

H. R. 6085. A bill for the relief of Alma S. Wittlin-Frischauer; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

By Mr. HAYS of Arkansas:

H. R. 6086. A bill for the relief of the estate of Preston Leon Stubblefield; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

By Mr. HESS:

H. R. 6087. A bill to provide relief for Cloday Corp.; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

By Mr. HRUSKA:

H. R. 6088. A bill for the relief of Vaclav Majer, Irma Majer, and Vaclav Majer, Jr.; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

By Mr. JAVITS:

H. R. 6089. A bill for the relief of Valentin M. Sara; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

By Mr. KING of Pennsylvania:

H. R. 6090. A bill for the relief of Frank (Franz) Homolka, Olga Homolka (nee Mandel), Adolf Homolka, Helga Maria Homolka, and Frieda Homolka; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

By Mr. LANE:

H. R. 6091. A bill for the relief of Jacob Vandenberg; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

By Mr. MAILLIARD (by request):

H. R. 6092. A bill for the relief of Miss Elsa Huni; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

By Mr. MORGAN:

H. R. 6093. A bill for the relief of Ornello Cerilli; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

By Mr. ROOSEVELT:

H. R. 6094. A bill for the relief of Aron Gluck, Hela Gluck, and Moses Leon Joseph Gluck; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

H. R. 6095. A bill for the relief of Milton Szamet; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

By Mr. WINSTEAD (by request):

H. R. 6096. A bill for the relief of Sachiko Fujikawa; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

By Mr. WOLVERTON:

H. R. 6097. A bill for the relief of Toni Rotkopf; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

PETITIONS, ETC.

Under clause 1 of rule XXII, petitions and papers were laid on the Clerk's desk and referred as follows:

382. By Mr. GOODWIN: Petition of the City Council, City of Malden, Mass., relative to their opposition of cutback and layoffs at Boston Naval Shipyard; to the Committee on Armed Services.

383. By the SPEAKER: Petition of Grass Roots Cattlemen, Vega, Tex., relative to the drought and the decline in the cattle market, and requesting the Government to assist in the present problem which threatens our national welfare; to the Committee on Agriculture.

SENATE

MONDAY, JULY 6, 1953

The Chaplain, Rev. Frederick Brown Harris, D. L., offered the following prayer:

Our Father God, we come conscious that the regal fact of Thy fatherhood ties us to every son and daughter of Thine under the spreading canopy of Thy universal love and care. May the great causes that concern Thy human family, the selfless ministries that heal the world and rebuild it, the attitudes that create good will and make abiding peace possible at last, gain the utter allegiance of our labor and our love. As leaders of the Nation in these tempestuous days grant to Thy servants, who here deliberate, clear thought, kind hearts, and quiet faith. And among ourselves, in this dear land of the free, and in our dealing with all the peoples of the world, in nations great and small, may we be so transparently just and fair that falsehood and expediency and every evil that shuns the light may be banished by the truth which makes men free. In the dear Redeemer's name we ask it. Amen.

THE JOURNAL

On request of Mr. KNOWLAND, and by unanimous consent, the reading of the Journal of the proceedings of Thursday, July 2, 1953, was dispensed with.

MESSAGE FROM THE HOUSE RECEIVED DURING ADJOURNMENT

Under authority of the order of the Senate of July 2, 1953,

The Secretary of the Senate received, on July 3, 1953, the following message from the House of Representatives:

That the House had passed a bill (H. R. 5969) making appropriations for the Department of Defense and related independent agencies for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1954, and for other purposes, in which it requested the concurrence of the Senate.

HOUSE BILL REFERRED DURING ADJOURNMENT

Under authority of the order of the Senate of July 2, 1953,

The bill (H. R. 5969) making appropriations for the Department of Defense and related independent agencies for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1954, and for other purposes, was read twice by its title, on July 3, 1953, and referred to the Committee on Appropriations.

EXECUTIVE REPORTS OF A COMMITTEE SUBMITTED DURING ADJOURNMENT

Under authority of the order of the Senate of July 2, 1953,

Mr. WILEY, from the Committee on Foreign Relations, submitted, on July 3, 1953, the following executive reports:

Executive D (83d Cong., 1st sess.), an agreement on German external debts, signed at London on February 27, 1953, by the Federal Republic of Germany, and by the United States and 17 other creditor countries (Ex. Rept. No. 3);

Executive E (83d Cong., 1st sess.), an agreement between the United States and the Federal Republic of Germany, regarding the settlement of the claims of the United States for postwar economic assistance (other than surplus property) to Germany, signed at London on February 27, 1953 (Ex. Rept. No. 3);

Executive F (83d Cong., 1st sess.), an agreement between the United States and the Federal Republic of Germany, relating to the indebtedness of Germany for awards made by the Mixed Claims Commission, United States and Germany, signed at London on February 27, 1953 (Ex. Rept. No. 3); and

Executive G (83d Cong., 1st sess.), an agreement between the United States and the Federal Republic of Germany, concerning the validation of German dollar bonds, signed at Bonn on April 1, 1953 (Ex. Rept. No. 3).

MESSAGES FROM THE PRESIDENT

Messages in writing from the President of the United States were communicated to the Senate by Mr. Miller, one of his secretaries.

MESSAGE FROM THE HOUSE—ENROLLED JOINT RESOLUTION SIGNED

A message from the House of Representatives, by Mr. Bartlett, one of its clerks, announced that the Speaker had affixed his signature to the enrolled joint resolution (H. J. Res. 234) authorizing an appropriation to defray expenses of the annual meeting of the Interparliamentary Union for the year 1953, to be held in Washington, D. C., and it was signed by the Vice President.

LEAVES OF ABSENCE

On request of Mr. JOHNSON of Texas, and by unanimous consent, Mr. DANIEL was excused from attendance on the sessions of the Senate during this week.

On request of Mr. JOHNSON of Texas, and by unanimous consent, Mr. HUNT was excused from attendance on the sessions of the Senate for the next several days.