

EXTENSIONS OF REMARKS

SADDAM HUSSEIN: A HEAVY HITTER IN THE TERRORIST BIG LEAGUES

HON. WM. S. BROOMFIELD

OF MICHIGAN

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Saturday, January 12, 1991

Mr. BROOMFIELD. Mr. Speaker, our Government recently announced that it has evidence that terrorists supported by Iraq are planning attacks against United States interests around the world should the coalition use the military option to liberate Iraq.

I commend the administration for having taken seriously Saddam Hussein's initial threats to use terrorism against the United States, both here in this country, as well as overseas. I urge the President to continue to upgrade our Nation's antiterrorism capabilities. While I am unaware of any Iraqi-backed terrorist operations here in the United States, we should be well prepared for possible terrorist activities here. Iraq's past and present involvement in terrorism around the world, however, is well documented and reveals yet another facet of that dictator's strategy for intimidating our country.

In the past, Saddam Hussein has employed, supported, and trained international terrorist groups to include elements within the Palestine Liberation Organization [PLO], and other groups which advocated armed struggle against Israel and the West. The Hussein government has maintained ties with the radical Abu Nidal Organization, and its chief, Sabri Al-Banna, who is responsible for the Rome and Vienna airport massacres and a bloody attack on an Istanbul synagogue. The Iraqi Government also supported the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-Special Command, and the 15 May Organization which was responsible for the bombing of a Pan Am flight in 1982.

Iraq reduced its terrorist activities during the 1980 to 1988 Iran-Iraq war, as part of an effort to improve relations with the West, but quickly returned to supporting terrorist activities in 1990. Prior to the August 2 invasion of Kuwait, the Iraqi leader invited various terrorist groups to return to Iraq. Elements of the Abu Nidal Organization, and the PLO, headed by Abul Abbas, are located in Baghdad. The Abbas organization seized the cruise ship *Achille Lauro*, and recently raided Israel's coast. Abul Abbas recently announced: "If America attacks Iraq, we will fight with our Iraqi brothers in our own way." Another infamous terrorist, Abu Ibrahim, is a recognized Palestinian explosives expert who lives in Baghdad. In addition, the notorious international terrorist, Carlos, known as "The Jackal", is reportedly back on Saddam Hussein's payroll. Saddam Hussein is back in the terrorist big leagues and has assembled a formidable lineup of heavy hitters for his team.

Given Saddam Hussein's part and current support of international terrorism, I am not surprised that our Government has detected the movements of Iraqi-backed terrorists. I am confident that the administration is doing everything possible to enhance security both in the United States and at our diplomatic missions overseas. Should the Iraqi leader unleash his legions of terrorists, he will pay a high price and should not forget what happened in Tripoli, Libya, in April 1986.

I want to share with my colleagues more background information from the Department of State concerning Saddam Hussein's support for international terrorism.

[From the U.S. Department of State Dispatch, Nov. 5, 1990]

IRAQ'S SUPPORT FOR TERRORISTS

Saddam Hussein has called for a *jihād* or "holy war" against those who support the UN condemnation of Iraq. On September 13, in response to President Bush's statement that he would hold Iraq responsible for terrorist attacks against the United States, the Iraqi Foreign Ministry warned that the US military presence in the Persian Gulf would "draw a natural reaction from the Arab and Islamic masses." Earlier, Iraqi Foreign Minister Tariq Aziz had said that Baghdad is under no moral obligation to refrain from terrorism if threatened by the French, British, or US governments.

Iraq has a worldwide network available to support terrorist operations. In the past, Baghdad has used civilian and military intelligence officers, diplomatic facilities, Iraqi Airways offices, and Iraqi cultural centers to support its own operations, as well as those of non-Iraqi groups, primarily against its regional rivals, Iran and Syria, and Iraqi dissident targets. Baghdad also offers its support to Palestinian terrorist groups. Many of these groups say they are willing to support Iraq by mounting terrorist attacks against Western, Israeli, and moderate Arab facilities and personnel.

Several hundred civilians—mostly from the United States, Western Europe, and Japan—have been dispersed to strategic locations throughout Iraq, and thousands of other civilians have been denied permission to leave the country. Some of those who have left Kuwait and Iraq report that they were forcibly removed from their homes and separated from their families.

STATE SPONSORED TERRORISM

Iraq's record shows that it regards terrorism as a legitimate means of striking its enemies, both foreign and domestic. During the 1970s, Baghdad gave logistical support to elements within the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) as well as to other groups which advocated armed struggle against Israel and the West. Baghdad has hosted elements of the PLO's security organization (Fatah), including Abdullah al-Hamid Labib (Colonel Hawari) who was linked to a wave of bomb attacks throughout Europe in the 1980s. In 1988, he was convicted *in absentia* by a French court for his part in assembling an arms cache in Paris.

Saddam Hussein has for years used acts of terrorism against political opponents of his

regime. Baghdad sponsored three assassinations of exiled Iraqi dissidents, in the UK, Sudan, and Norway.

Iraq hosts dissident organizations which use terrorism against the governments of Syria and Iran, using these ties to increase pressure on his rivals during periods of increased tension. In late 1980, six Syrian dissident organizations operating out of Iraq formed the Syrian National Salvation Front which advocates the use of armed struggle against the Assad regime. The most prominent group within the Syrian National Salvation Front is the militant Muslim Brotherhood, which maintains armed cells inside Syria and reportedly attacked its diplomats overseas in 1989 and again in Brussels in early 1990. Iraq openly supports the Mojahedin-e Khalq, the Iranian dissident group most closely associated with terrorism, and supplies its national liberation army with weapons.

Iraq has historical ties to radical Palestinian groups, including the Abu Nidal Organization (ANO), and splinter factions of George Habbash's Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), such as the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-Special Command (PLFP-SC) and the 15 May Organization led by master bombmaker Abu Ibrahim. The 15 May group was responsible for a number of attacks, including the bombing of a Pan Am flight over Honolulu in 1982, several Israeli embassies and El Al offices, and of department stores in London, Paris, and Brussels. In 1979, the United States designated Iraq a state sponsor of terrorism under Section 6(j) of the Export Administration Act.

Iraq's interest in terrorism against Western targets waned during the 1980-88 war with Iran. In the early 1980s, Baghdad moved closer to the policies of its moderate Arab neighbors by reducing its support for non-Palestinian terrorists and placing restrictions on many Palestinian groups. Consequently, Iraq was removed from the US list of state sponsors of terrorism in 1982. As a further example of its changed policy, Iraq expelled the Abu Nidal Organization in 1983.

Saddam Hussein resumed pursuit of his wider ambitions in the Arab world once the fighting with Iran ended. In Lebanon, Baghdad increased aid to anti-Syrian groups (Lebanese militias and Syrian dissidents) as well as to Palestinian terrorist groups with historical ties to Iraq—the Palestine Liberation Front (PLF), and Colonel Hawari. In early August 1990, Iraq intensified contacts with several Palestinian terrorist groups; some have publicly threatened terrorist attacks against Baghdad's opponents. On September 1, 1990, in response to Iraq's renewed support for terrorist groups and its detention of foreign nationals, the US government returned Iraq to the list of state sponsors of terrorism.

PALESTINIAN TERRORIST GROUPS PLEDGE SUPPORT FOR IRAQ

Iraq has tried to justify its support for Palestinian groups, including those engaged in terrorism, as being consistent with its public policy of aiding the struggle for a Palestinian homeland. Iraq also views its assistance as a means of enhancing its regional prestige

• This "bullet" symbol identifies statements or insertions which are not spoken by a Member of the Senate on the floor.

Matter set in this typeface indicates words inserted or appended, rather than spoken, by a Member of the House on the floor.

and, most importantly, preventing Syria from gaining control of the Palestinian movement. Over the years, most Palestinian factions reciprocated by offering Iraq political support in its war with Iran; some have helped Iraq oppose Syria.

In recent weeks, leaders of several Palestinian terrorist groups have paid tribute to Saddam Hussein and threatened operations against a wide variety of targets in the event of military action against Baghdad. Iraq's belligerence and promise of support have attracted those groups long favoring the use of force to solve the Arab-Israeli conflict.

Palestinian groups, including members of the PLO, have pledged to use "every means available" to remove US and other forces from Saudi Arabia. Palestine Liberation Front (PLF) leader Abu Abbas has been outspoken in his support for the Iraqis. Within days of Baghdad's invasion of Kuwait, he called for his men to "open fire on the American enemy everywhere. Quake the earth under the feet of the American and NATO invaders and the collaborators." On October 1, Abu Abbas threatened to down a US airliner if an Iraqi plane was downed as part of the UN-ordered air blockade. (The Abu Abbas-led faction of the PLF is the group which carried out the 1985 hijacking of the Italian cruise ship, *Achille Lauro*, and the unsuccessful May 1990 seaborne attack against civilians on Israeli beaches. Abu Abbas's claim of responsibility for that attack was broadcast from an Iraqi radio station.)

Some Syrian-based Palestinian groups have expressed their willingness to support Saddam Hussein in a conflict with the United States. Their reasons may have more to do with rallying enthusiasm within their own organizations than with support for Baghdad's regional ambitions. George Habbash, leader of the PFLP, has said publicly that he is opening an office in Iraq in support of Saddam Hussein. He has pledged that his organization will carry out attacks against the United States and others opposed to Iraq in the event of a military clash. In the 1970s and early 1980s, the PFLP killed civilians in attacks on airlines and buses in the Middle East and Europe.

Ahmed Jabril's staunchly pro-Syrian Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command (PFLP-GC) and the Abu Musa organization recently have pledged support for Saddam. In late September, Saddam Hussein received Shaikh Al-Tamimi, leader of the Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) movement, who declared his support for Iraq. The PIJ claimed responsibility for a February 1990 Egyptian bus attack which left 9 killed and 16 wounded.

THE ANO COMES FULL CIRCLE

The US believes the Abu Nidal organization—one of the most dangerous terrorist groups—is moving elements of its organization back to Baghdad from Libya. Since the ANO was founded in Iraq in 1974, its members have killed or wounded more than 900 people on 3 continents. Over the years, in return for safehaven, logistical support, and financial assistance, the organization conducted operations with the support of three state sponsors—Iraq, Syria, and Libya. In recent months, ANO leaders have killed scores of members in internecine struggles.

Sabri al-Banna, the leader of the ANO, was the PLO representative in Baghdad until 1974 when he and others broke from Fatah, denouncing the PLO leadership for its diplomatic efforts to resolve the Arab-Israeli conflict. During the 1970s, the ANO carried out attacks from its base of operations in Iraq—mostly against PLO, Syrian, and Jordanian

targets. In 1980, Iraqi and ANO interests began to diverge. The ANO launched a series of vicious attacks against synagogues in Europe that became a trademark of the organization. These attacks interfered with Baghdad's attempts to attract European support for its war with Iran. Probably because of pressure from the United States and Europe, Baghdad insisted the ANO move its base of operations out of Iraq.

Syria allowed Sabri al-Banna's group—sometimes with the helping hand of Syrian intelligence officers—to expand its operations in Europe and the Middle East. In the mid-1980's, the ANO carried out attacks in the Rome and Vienna airports, continued the bombings and machine guns attacks on synagogues in Europe and Turkey, and conducted over a dozen attacks against Jordanian targets, including diplomats in Ankara and Bucharest and Jordanian airline offices in Europe.

Following public revelations of Syrian involvement in terrorist operations in Europe, the cost of Syria of its support for terrorism began to outweigh the benefits. The British prosecution of Nezar Hindawi—the man who attempted to place a bomb on an El Al flight—implicated Syrian Air Force Intelligence officials, the Syrian national airline, and Syrian Embassy personnel. In response the UK broke diplomatic relations with Syria, the United States and the Federal Republic of Germany recalled their ambassadors, and the European Community agreed to various political and economic sanctions against Syria. Under pressure from the United States, European, and friendly Arab nations, the Syrians had ANO move its headquarters to Libya in June 1987. However, Syria continued to allow ANO gunmen to operate in the Syrian controlled Bekaa Valley in Lebanon.

The ANO, which receives substantial Libyan financial and logistical support (including weapons and travel documents) conducted an attack in July 1988 against the Greek cruise liner, *City of Poros*, in which 9 civilians were killed and 98 wounded. The ANO also killed 8 and wounded 21 in its attack on the Acropole Hotel and the British Sudan Club in Khartoum, Sudan in May 1988.

The ANO now has assets in Iraq, Lebanon, Libya, North Africa, and Europe, which could be used to conduct operations against those opposed to Iraq's invasion of Kuwait. There are credible reports that ANO operatives are heading for Europe and the Middle East where authorities are taking steps to prevent terrorist attacks.

AN INTERNATIONAL RESPONSE TO TERRORISM

President Bush and Secretary of State Baker have responded directly to Baghdad's aggression and threats to use terrorism against Americans and others. The US government also is working in cooperation with the international community to dissuade Iraq and the groups its supports from holding hostages and attacking civilians. That cooperation also includes requests through diplomatic channels that those who have influence with Baghdad and the Palestinian terrorist groups use that influence to assure that there is no outbreak of international terrorist violence.

The threat of terrorist attack is taken seriously. Both the Government of Iraq and the groups its supports have carried out operations in the past. They have the resources and infrastructure in place to do so again. The US government has issued travel warnings and threat advisories alerting the American public and others, including foreign governments, to the threat. In response,

the international community is working to enhance counter-terrorism cooperation at the operational level—from information-sharing to tightening security to protect against terrorist attack.

The United States has made it clear that it holds Iraq responsible for terrorist attacks it carries out, as well as attacks carried out by those who act on its behalf. There can be no moral defense of terrorism. The United States will continue to work with other nations to exert legal, economic, and other pressure on Baghdad to abandon its holding of civilian hostages and to end its support for terrorist groups who threaten civilians with bombings, assassination, and other violence.

A PEACE TO END ALL WARS

HON. ANDREW JACOBS, JR.

OF INDIANA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Saturday, January 12, 1991

Mr. JACOBS. Mr. Speaker, two decades ago this appeared in the Washington Post. What is that quotation? "Déjà vu all over again."

Every war to end all wars just ends up on the list of all wars.

[From the Washington Post, May 28, 1971]

AN EX-MARINE SUGGESTS A PEACE TO END ALL WARS

[From a statement before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee yesterday by Rep. Andrew Jacobs, Jr. who served as a PFC in the First Marine Division in Korea.]

One hears it said that a continuation of intervention will mean a generation of peace—it will teach the Communists a lesson. Yet in the very midst of our mammoth effort in Southeast Asia did the Russians even so much as hesitate to invade Czechoslovakia?

Who would ever believe that the underdeveloped tip of the Asian tail could wag the world?

A generation of peace? A war to end all wars?

I was 13 when World War II ended all wars. And I knew that sort of thing was only for my father's generation. I would be spared. And so at 18 I was sent into hell with an M-1 rifle to help bring back a generation of peace.

My little sister's boyfriends would be spared—long enough to serve in another crusade this time with M-14 rifles and another promise of peace.

And next month my little sister's little boy will be 16.

A generation of peace? A war to end all wars? How about a peace to end all wars?

Mr. Chairman, if our country ever goes to war again it should be because we have to, not just because we have a chance to.

And we don't have to borrow the trouble of a war to protect freedom where there is no freedom to protect.

The only way to avoid future Vietnams is to recognize our error in becoming involved in this one.

And that recognition—that realization will not result from official government declarations that Vietnam has been "our finest hour."

THE GENUINE SUCCESS FOR U.S.
FOREIGN POLICY

HON. ROBERT J. LAGOMARSINO

OF CALIFORNIA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Saturday, January 12, 1991

Mr. LAGOMARSINO. Mr. Speaker, I believe most of us understood how former Secretary of State Shultz felt when he lamented that nothing is ever really over in this town. Consequently, when something really is over, and it represents a genuine success for United States foreign policy, we should stop and take note.

The State Department led an exceptional U.S. Government effort under Mr. Shultz's leadership to end a classic political and bureaucratic struggle that had outlasted every Secretary of State for the past two decades. That effort has been continued by, and now has yielded success for, Secretary Baker and the Bush administration. I am referring to the action of the U.N. Security Council on December 22, 1990, recognizing that the 1947 U.S. administered trusteeship ended for the peoples of the Marshall Islands, Micronesia and the Northern Mariana Islands on the basis of events which occurred in 1986.

On November 3, 1986, President Reagan signed Proclamation 5564, declaring that the United States had fulfilled its obligations under the 1947 trusteeship for the Pacific islands, and that the trusteeship agreement no longer applied to the islands. This action brought into full effect political status agreements which the Reagan administration, represented by Ambassador Fred M. Zeder II, had concluded with the democratically established constitutional governments of Micronesia and the Marshall Islands. The agreement with the Northern Mariana Islands was negotiated by Ambassador F. Haydn Williams on behalf of the Ford administration. Congress approved these agreements in two comprehensive pieces of legislation, Public Law 94-241 and Public Law 99-239.

These agreements, and the constitutions of the island governments, were approved by the peoples concerned in U.N. observed plebiscites, and the U.N. Trusteeship Council adopted resolutions—most notably Resolution 2183 of May 28, 1986—confirming that the islanders had freely expressed their wishes regarding self-government in valid acts of self-determination. U.N.T.C. Resolution 2183 specifically stated that the United States had satisfactorily discharged its obligations under the trusteeship.

Under its Covenant of Political Union with the United States, the Mariana Islands just north of Guam became the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands [CNMI] under the sovereignty of the United States. The Covenant extends United States citizenship to the people of the CNMI and partially applies the U.S. Constitution while bringing the islands of that chain into the U.S. for most legal and political purposes.

Under the unprecedented Compact of Free Association, the Federated States of Micronesia [FSM] and the Republic of the Marshall Islands [RMI] became sovereign, self-governing nations with separate and distinct citizenship.

The RMI and FSM have full internal self-government and conduct their own foreign affairs and treaty relations. This includes control of all land and ocean resources in accordance with the international law of nations.

Under the Compact the U.S. retains authority and responsibility to provide for defense of the islands, a commitment which other micro-states may come to envy as they pursue economic prosperity and political stability in the post-1989 world order which is now evolving. The Compact of Free Association can be terminated by the islanders in favor of independence at any time, or in favor of another status involving the U.S. if mutually agreed. Thus, the duration of free association may be indefinite, although the current Compact has a term of 15 years, or it may result in transition to another form of self-government, depending on the wishes of the people concerned. This is a very creative arrangement, and other major powers may want to model relations with autonomous areas after the U.S. approach to free association.

The RMI and FSM already exchange ambassadors with Washington, as well as with the numerous other nations which recognized that self-determination, not the timing of Security Council action, was the controlling legal and political criteria under Article 76 of the U.N. Charter for achieving self-government. The Security Council's action on December 22 eliminates any pretext for impeding further the universal acceptance of the new status of the RMI and FSM, as well as the CNMI.

The language of Security Council Resolution 683 of December 22, 1990, is significant because it states that the applicability of the trusteeship has terminated based upon entry into force of the status agreements in 1986. In other words, it constitutes a determination by the Security Council that the process which took place in 1986 had the effect of satisfying the objectives of the trusteeship with respect to the peoples concerned. This confirms the position taken by the U.S. in numerous lawsuits and policy debates on the question of trusteeship termination.

It is also important to note what the resolution does not say. For example, it does not state in the present tense that the trusteeship is "hereby" terminated, or anything to that effect. This is noteworthy because during the process for approval and implementation of the Compact there were those who asserted categorically that the U.S. could not implement the agreements until the Security Council adopted a resolution approving U.S. actions and expressly terminating the trusteeship. While those who write law review articles and editorials critical of U.S. policy in the trust territory found that view irresistible, the U.S. quite properly insisted that interpretation and implementation of the U.N. Charter provisions relating to termination were matters to be determined through political, legal and moral persuasion between the member states. That is what diplomacy and the U.N. are supposed to be all about.

The theory that the United States and the governments of the trust territory could not implement the forms of self-government chosen by the people without first jumping through hoops in the Security Council to get a resolution would have given any permanent member

of the Security Council the ability, by veto, to prevent the U.S. and the people concerned from bringing an end to the anachronistic trusteeship regime even though the people had spoken. In essence, it would have made realization of self-determination by the island peoples an entirely discretionary matter in the hands of any member of the Security Council with the veto under Article 27 of the Charter. Since the islanders, unlike the concerned member states of the U.N., never consented to be subject to the trusteeship, the notion of self-government being held hostage to U.N. formalities was perceived in the islands as a form of "international colonialism" being imposed by the United Nations. In this case, it could have led to abuse of the trusteeship system to frustrate rather than facilitate the form of self-government chosen by the people.

The proposition that a permanent member of the Security Council could veto implementation of acts of self-determination recognized by the Trusteeship Council and the international community as valid and consistent with the U.N. Charter simply was not acceptable to the United States. Indeed, in 1947, when he took the floor in the House of Representatives to argue in support of President Truman's proposed bill approving the trusteeship agreement, Representative Mike Mansfield from Montana explained to his colleagues that the very reason the Pacific islands trusteeship was being designated as "strategic" under Article 82 of the U.N. Charter was to prevent the U.N. from having a veto over U.S. actions. In fact, Mansfield cited the U.S. veto power as assurance that the U.S. could prevent the U.N. from, in his words, " * * * asserting effective control * * * over administration of the islands. It was Mansfield's view that the onus of contending with the Security Council veto threat would be on any member state which might seek to prevent the U.S. from implementing a particular course of action or policy with respect to the trust territory. A member country opposed to U.S. activities would have to raise the issue in the Security Council and propose a resolution of disapproval.

Mansfield's analysis, while never popular at U.N. cocktail parties, was prophetic. Forty years of intervening U.N. practice may make his views unfashionable today, but until very recently it was a virtual certainty that the Soviet Union would have vetoed a resolution approving termination of the trusteeship regardless of the merit of the U.S. position. As to the U.N. itself, only in the last decade has the U.N. bureaucracy realized that it was making itself irrelevant by providing nothing more than a forum for propaganda and verbal violence against the United States. In recent years the members of that body, including the Soviet Union, began to recognize that the U.N. never could realize its potential to promote peace and prosperity in the world if it did not begin to address itself to the substance as well as politics on its agenda. It was only very recently that it became possible for the issue of trusteeship termination to be taken up in a rational and fair environment within the Security Council.

Those special interest groups here in the U.S., and those in our Government, who sought, for their own reasons, to prevent full and final implementation of the CNMI Cov-

enant and the Compact of Free Association, after they exhausted all other means of pursuing their goal, were left with only one hope—that the U.S. could not implement the status agreements because it could not obtain a resolution of approval in the U.N. Security Council. Their principal ally in that hope was the Soviet Union at a time when its representatives gladly would have frustrated the democratically expressed aspirations of the Pacific island peoples in order to challenge U.S. leadership in the cause of self-determination. Everyone from career technocrats in matters Micronesian to special interest groups seeking to exploit problems in the islands to promote their own agendas joined in the chorus of those who urged delay.

It is to the everlasting credit of the Reagan Administration that it determined in 1986 that it would not be morally, politically or legally correct for the U.S. to withhold any longer its full recognition of the self-determination process in the CNMI, RMI and FSM in order merely to appease those critical of imperfections in the process. Overall, the Compact and the Covenant provided a sound framework for the peoples concerned to take control of their own destinies, and to address both those social problems inherent in island culture and those associated with their emergence from a century of foreign rule. The situation in Palau today demonstrates that the RMI, FSM and U.S. were correct in their calculation that the costs of delay were much greater than the benefits.

Thus, President Reagan's 1986 proclamation ending the trusteeship as a matter of U.S. law and policy was a bold stroke of foreign policy leadership. The people of the United States and their government will always be grateful to the other governments around the world which extended early recognition to these emerging democratic governments once both the elected leaders in the islands and the U.S. President took a firm stand in favor of self-government without delay.

It is also to the everlasting credit of the Bush administration that this matter now has been resolved to the satisfaction of at least the responsible stakeholders in the process—including our allies and all of the member nations of the Security Council except Cuba. Given Soviet support for the resolution, one only can wonder who was feeding the Cubans their lines and acting in cahoots with Castro's U.N. team.

With the support of Congress in the form of timely authorizing legislation, the Administration kept faith with our commitment to assist the RMI and FSM in achieving international recognition of their new status by, among other things, exchanging ambassadors and opening embassies. Now our State Department has acted effectively to take advantage of the first real opportunity to achieve closure on the procedural matter of the Security Council's formal acceptance of the fact that the purpose of trusteeship had been fulfilled in 1986 when the new status agreements took effect. This demonstration of the administration's credibility and skill in sensitive diplomatic transactions underscores the importance of continuity and competence in U.S. foreign policy.

The interests of the island peoples and the United States, as well as the cause of self-determination, were significantly advanced because the Bush administration comprehended and acted in a manner consistent with the historical sweep of U.S. policy running all the way back to the Nixon administration when the initiative to conduct political status negotiations began. The principal purposes of the trusteeship were to promote strategic stability and self-government for the peoples of the islands. That duality of purpose is embodied in Articles 82 and 83 of the U.N. Charter and Article 5 of the Trusteeship Agreement. The Ford, Reagan and Bush administrations delivered on both strategic goals and self-government, while their critics apologized for legitimate U.S. strategic policy and sought to delay self-government so that paternalistic welfare programs could be introduced into the island cultures.

It can be acknowledged that some of the arguments in favor of delaying implementation of the new status agreements in 1986 were plausible—if misguided. The U.S. record on administration of the trusteeship was not even close to perfect, the CNMI, RMI, and FSM are not island paradises free of social and economic problems, and the benefits of both the U.S. military presence and social welfare programs must be balanced against the associated social costs. For example, along with our defense activities came both prosperity and overcrowding in areas adjacent to our bases as islanders migrated in search of employment. The development of missile technology in the region was vital to the nuclear deterrence policy that prevented nuclear war for forty years and set the stage for disarmament, but we are still living with the legacy of injuries caused to four island communities by the nuclear testing program. Similarly, along with our educational and health care programs came welfare dependency and disincentives to the private sector economic development which would have given the islanders economic power and autonomy.

It is fair to say that for both responsible people concerned about the legitimate interests of the United States and the peoples of the islands, and among the "blame America first" malcontents, there were real problems which could be cited in arguing for delay. However, the Compact addresses those problems more effectively than pre-Compact policies and does so in the context of a form of government consented to by the governed.

On the issue of trusteeship termination, it also can be said that the U.N. Charter and Trusteeship Agreement created ambiguity by not precisely prescribing the procedure for termination. The word "termination" is only used once, in Article 15 of the Trusteeship Agreement, which states only that the agreement cannot be terminated without consent of the United States as the administering power. While that provision tends to reinforce the Mansfield theory of U.S. authority, over the years the enablement of the Security Council under Article 83 of the Charter to approve "alteration or amendment" of the agreement has been interpreted in the U.N. subculture to include termination. When weighed against the core objectives of the U.N. Charter and Article 6 of the Trusteeship Agreement relating to self-determination, these matters of procedure

and legal interpretation became both quite critical and controversial. Despite recent uncharitable comments of the acting French Consul General in Hawaii, we are particularly grateful to the governments of France and Great Britain for their patience and understanding as we worked through this difficult process.

Again, it is a tribute to the administration that it did not allow transient issues, including the inability of Palau to implement the will of the voters there, to paralyze our foreign policy. We acted in a manner which was as effective and final as circumstances allowed, but which also was not prejudicial to the position of our allies, and we preserved our ability to augment the process in the Security Council if the opportunity arose. It was masterful diplomacy based on a good faith belief that the U.N. system would ultimately respect the self-determination process.

The United States has not always acted with such clarity of purpose on trust territory political status matters. The Carter administration announced with considerable fanfare that it would seek to terminate the trusteeship by 1981. Unfortunately, that schedule was thrown off for the entire trust territory primarily because Carter's chief negotiator reacted to controversial provisions of Palau's proposed constitution by insisting that the constitution would have to be revised to be compatible with the Compact. Nothing could have done more to lock the Palauans into an inflexible position, and to make matters worse the U.S. position effectively created linkage between Compact approval in Palau and trusteeship termination.

While two-thirds of Palau's people have approved the Compact on several occasions, the constitution has been interpreted by the local courts to require 75 percent approval. The voters then satisfied the constitutional requirement to amend the constitution, but the courts threw that vote out because of defects in the legislature's procedure for calling the election. In my view, without blaming anyone or being angry about it, we need to recognize that the inability of Palau's elected leaders to take the legal and political measures required to approve the Compact or amend the constitution is a sort of negative act of self-determination. The will of the vast majority of the people is clear, but if the elected leaders do not feel compelled by popular sentiment to get the job done and put the Compact into effect, then maybe we need to reconsider our policy.

In both Palau and Washington it is time for some new thinking. The Compact would endow Palau's community of 15,000 people with 450 million dollars, most of the funding to be transferred to Palau's ownership and control in the first five years. But no amount of economic assistance can purchase the basic sense of shared values and common goals that made it possible for the FSM, RMI, CNMI and U.S. to put our differences into a broader perspective and get on with the business of establishing our partnerships.

In Palau, the U.S. responsibility under the Compact to defend the islands, and our contingency base rights, are viewed by some as a prize this nation covets, but which Palau opposes and will tolerate only if we pay more under the Compact for the privilege of protecting the islands. Even though U.S. exercise of military contingency options in Palau has al-

ways been unlikely, the Palauans were convinced by outside special interest groups to squander their bargaining leverage seeking increased payments for hypothetical bases. In reality, the Palauans benefitted from the contingency base rights because the Compact contains more funds for Palau than could be justified without the options. Given the remote chance the U.S. would ever deploy in Palau, the U.S. negotiators were being generous, but the Palauan leaders chose to trust those who told them otherwise.

There also appears to be some sentiment that 450 million dollars is not enough because U.S. military authority, along with defense responsibility, extends for fifty years. Well, we may have a misunderstanding because we never assumed the Palauans would depend exclusively on U.S. assistance, but that this huge grant would be the baseline for private sector economic development, and that foreign assistance from other friendly nations might augment the U.S. grant. I fear we have forgotten that the basic question is whether or not the free association relationship would be a sound framework within which Palau and the United States can make the transition from trusteeship to friendly relations in a post-trusteeship context.

The Bush Administration adopted precisely the correct approach by finally ending the vestiges of linkage between trusteeship termination for the FSM, RMI, CNMI and Palau's status process. That linkage actually was broken in 1986, but the U.N. action of December 22 makes that fact clear for those who did not get the message.

The Administration also kept its eye on the ball when elected leaders in the CNMI voiced opposition to termination. In the U.N. context, such communications properly were respected but understood by most as relating to an internal political and legal issue within a member country. On the issue of trusteeship termination, the controlling consideration was approval of the Commonwealth Covenant by 78 percent of the voters in a U.N. observed plebiscite in 1975. Questions of interpretation of the agreement are now within the cognizance of the CNMI and U.S. legal and political systems, including the courts. I would only add that I look forward to working with the Administration and the Governor of the CNMI to ensure that reasonable understandings are reached on interpretation of the Covenant.

Faced with somewhat vexatious issues such as Palau's status and the CNMI policy debate, the United States could have repeated the errors of those who allowed U.S. policy to become ensnared in the past. Instead, we have achieved an unqualified success for U.S. foreign policy and the sustained vision of those in the Administration and Congress who conceived and carried it out. I understand that the President personally discussed this matter with FSM and RMI leaders at the Pacific Islands Summit last October, and it is no coincidence that the issue was elevated to a priority matter in New York a few weeks later.

We have seen recently that the U.N. can be a powerful force for law and order in the international community. The Security Council's action ending the trusteeship is one more demonstration that respect for self-determination and the peaceful resolution of disputes is

the duty, and must be the destiny, of civilized people. As the international community prepares to force one international outlaw to give up the fruits of aggression, with military action if he makes that necessary, we are reminded that the trusteeship system grew out of the concept embodied in the Atlantic Charter that nations should not be allowed to achieve territorial aggrandizement through aggression. Thus, termination of the trusteeship is the realization of the U.N. Charter objective that the status of disputed and non-self-governing areas be determined peacefully. As we ponder the great questions of war and peace in today's world the success of our policy in ending the trusteeship is a timely reminder that competent and sustained foreign policy can and does prevail on its merits.

A PROPOSAL TO PROVIDE ADDITIONAL LIFE INSURANCE FOR MEMBERS OF THE ARMED FORCES SERVING IN OPERATION DESERT SHIELD

HON. EDWARD R. ROYBAL

OF CALIFORNIA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Saturday, January 12, 1991

Mr. ROYBAL. Mr. Speaker, the practice of insuring the lives of members of the Armed Forces is of relatively recent origin. During the early wars to which the United States was a party, the fact that life insurance was not used to provide financial protection for the families of members of the Armed Forces was not looked upon as unusual. By the time the United States became involved in World War I, however, the situation had changed, and it was generally recognized that some means was needed to provide such protection for the families of members of the Armed Forces fighting for their country. Commercial insurance companies were not used for this purpose. To fill the gap, the War Risk Insurance Act of 1917 created a program of "U.S. Government Life Insurance" [USGLI] that permitted service members to buy yearly renewable term life insurance. In 1940, and again in 1951, this program of insurance coverage was updated and limits were raised in accordance with financial realities of the day. A new insurance program, the "Servicemen's Group Life Insurance" [SGLI], was introduced in 1965. The SGLI Program has been modified several times since its inception, mostly raising coverage limits, while the majority of its fundamentals have remained intact. Reserve members were also included in coverage. Prior to this proposal, the last changes to the program were made by the Veterans' Administration Health-Care Amendments of 1985, with coverage limits set up to \$50,000. All premium, enrollment requirements and general guidelines of coverage for this proposal are based on the same criteria as the Veterans' Administration Health-Care Amendments of 1985.

This proposed legislation seeks to amend current law, which presently offers \$50,000 in life insurance to qualifying members of the Armed Forces of the United States, to include the ability for an additional \$50,000 per person to become available automatically.

Qualified personnel are to include all members of the Armed Forces on active duty in the Persian Gulf region in connection with Operation Desert Shield.

Automatic coverage was chosen to avoid excessive paperwork and procedures in the course of military preparations. It was assumed that a majority of qualifying personnel would opt for this coverage, so if any inconvenience was to occur, it should be for the small number who might want to decline or limit this additional coverage.

Personnel choosing to decline this additional insurance must submit this request in writing, within such a time period as the Secretary of Veterans Affairs may require. They must also submit a request in writing to accept an amount of additional coverage less than the \$50,000 offered, the amount being evenly divisible by \$10,000.

If death, illness or injury relating to service in Operation Desert Shield does not occur, this policy shall terminate on the date which the member no longer is assigned to duty in the Persian Gulf region in connection with Operation Desert Shield.

If the member is suffering from an illness or injury incurred during the aforementioned duty, this insurance shall continue after that date to insure against death resulting from the same illness or injury until the earlier of the following: First, 1 year after the date on which the member no longer is assigned to duty in the Persian Gulf region in connection with Operation Desert Shield; or second, the date on which the member ceases to suffer from the illness or injury with service in the Persian Gulf region with Operation Desert Shield.

The effective date of this proposal shall occur on the date of enactment.

Application of this additional insurance shall apply to qualifying members with respect to periods of duty served after August 2, 1990, in the Persian Gulf region in connection with Operation Desert Shield.

IN SUPPORT OF THE PRESIDENT

HON. MICHAEL BILIRAKIS

OF FLORIDA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Saturday, January 12, 1991

Mr. BILIRAKIS. Mr. Speaker, Mr. Bob Radcliff, a good friend of mine who lives in Tampa, FL, sent a letter to me yesterday, and I only wish I had received it in time to include it in my floor statement on the Persian Gulf earlier in the day.

His son, Roger, is an Air Force colonel who flies A-10 ground attack planes and is currently in Saudi Arabia with operation Desert Shield. I would like to share with my colleagues Roger's comments that were included in that letter:

The machine that has been assembled here since August is unbelievable. No other nation in history could have pulled this off. You can't begin to appreciate the size of this effort unless you're here. Having said that, it will be one hell of a mess if this is allowed to drag on. We are not geared to sustain this effort over the long term. Even a draft won't get the people with the right training fast enough.

In the meantime, urge our Congress to support the President. Let's get this over with when the time is right.

Then Roger's father added his own admonition:

Mike, I, too, urge Congress to quit sidestepping, waffling and cowering, and get on with it. Our country, our Armed Forces and our President need the support of the Congress.

Today, Mr. Speaker, we have the opportunity to do just that and we should.

THE FUTURE OF THE COMMON PEOPLE

HON. BYRON L. DORGAN

OF NORTH DAKOTA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Saturday, January 12, 1991

Mr. DORGAN of North Dakota. Mr. Speaker, a cowboy poet from North Dakota named Rodney Nelson captured in poetry the struggle of the family farmers and livestock producers in the Northern Great Plains.

Rodney Nelson, in addition to being a wonderful poet, is a farmer near Almont, ND. I want to share with my colleagues his work entitled, "The Future of the Common People." It is reprinted below:

THE FUTURE OF THE COMMON PEOPLE

We often sit complaining that ranching's such a bitch
 Money's often short out here and few folks made it rich.
 Cattle markets often low, there's years it seldom rained . . .
 Seems like there's always some catastrophe, that wipes out what we've gained!
 But there is hope out on the prairie, the future's looking bright—
 Those eastern dudes have made some plans that might just turn out right!
 See, we've often been exploited, or abused to say the least . . .
 And the profit from our labor has been siphoned by the East!
 But now the tide is turning, the money will flow West—
 The Great Wild Buffalo Commons will make our lives the best!
 See, they're gonna take our land away and restore it like it was
 I, for one—a native son—think it's a worthy cause.
 We'll no longer have to struggle with the cattle and the wheat . . .
 'Cause change brings opportunity and we'll be in the driver's seat!
 There will be no angry exodus folks will laugh and jest—
 It will be just milk and honey for the folks who live out West!
 The compensations they'll allow us will lighten up our hearts . . .
 'Cause we know what they pay for toilet seats and all those airplane parts!
 Yes, the government will buy us out for lots and lots of dollars
 They'll educate the ignorant and make them Eastern scholars.
 Now, it won't happen overnight there's lots of work to do—
 Unemployment won't be heard of as we start our lives anew.

We'll tear down all the fences and seed the farms to grass . . .
 We'll have to seal up all those wells that produce the oil and gas!
 Power plants will have to go. Pocketbooks will soon be fat from the wages we'll be earning as we bulldoze cities flat!
 Bridges, dams, and highways will crumble from our hands
 'Cause we must remove these blemishes as we restore the lands.
 And when the project is complete that's when I'll make my mark.
 As a GS5 or maybe higher in the greatest national park.
 The government will employ me, and I will be among the rangers or technicians who maybe sample buffalo dung!
 There will be no complaints of winter or blizzards from my mouth . . .
 Cause I'll migrate with the buffalo, and spend my winters South!
 Yes, I'll be living mighty high or good to say the least—
 But my heart will sure be heavy for the folks who live out East.
 The Poppers will be "eating crow", for they will have deduced, that a hungry nation sure has missed the products we produced!
 They just might have to swallow hard and admit it would be great, to turn up their thermostat, or have protein on their plate!
 Then they will admit their errors, and they'll concede defeat—
 The Buffalo Common will be no treasure for folks who cannot eat!
 And someday some great scholar will be acclaimed in modern theses that they need the Western produce, or they'll be an endangered species!
 I think I'll still be young enough to see the nation's pains and I'll be among the settlers who re-populate the plains!
 Yes, the future does look bright for us, for we will stand the test . . . and Eastern dudes will finally see the value of the West!!!

WAR WOULD CARRY HIGH PRICE

HON. ANDREW JACOBS, JR.

OF INDIANA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Saturday, January 12, 1991

Mr. JACOBS. Mr. Speaker, as can be seen in the following, Kevin Drawbaugh, the business editor of the Indianapolis News does what all business people should do: He thinks things through:

WAR WOULD CARRY HIGH PRICE—NO ONE WINS IF UNITED STATES TAKES ON IRAQ TO KEEP OIL FLOWING

If bombs and bullets start to fly next week in Kuwait, the price of oil soon will seem insignificant next to the price of American blood.

Unless we're ready to concede that the former is more important to us than the latter, we should stay out of war with Iraq.

If that means backing down and leaving the Middle East to its own violent devices, so be it.

If Saddam Hussein ran roughshod over the Middle East, oil prices would skyrocket and the economies of the industrialized world

would suffer. But in the end, we'd be better off if it weaned us from oil dependency.

Let the Arabs tear themselves apart. They were at each other's throats centuries before anyone ever heard of the United States, and they'll still be at it when we're just a memory.

The bottom line is this: oil and temporary Arab stability are not worth the price of thousands of American lives.

Besides that, it's far from certain that U.S. and allied forces could defeat Iraq on the battlefield. It's an unpleasant thought. But what if we lost?

There's a lot of confusion about the situation in Iraq. War and edging toward it are always complicated. Abstractions become involved: national pride, combating aggression, protecting allies, upholding principles, setting an example.

In the case of Iraq, these are all sideshows that only distract from the main event. George Bush and Saddam Hussein are faced off across the line in the sand for one reason above all others: oil.

Almost 50 percent of the world's known oil reserves are in Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Iraq. In the Age of Oil, that's a remarkably tight geographic concentration of economic power.

Saddam is a petty dictator. Like most of his kind, he is interested mightily in power and money. For this reason, he'd like to control Iraq, Kuwait, and probably Saudi Arabia, too.

Saddam's ambitions conflict with those of the industrialized world, whose self-appointed enforcer is the United States. The rich nations depend on the oil of the Arab states and would like to continue acquiring it on more or less favorable terms.

The flow of relatively cheap Mideast oil would be disrupted if Saddam were to gain control over enough reserves to manipulate the world market. The United States is in Saudi Arabia to try to prevent that.

Is this a cause worth fighting for? The answer is no.

First, the United States should not depend on Arab oil. The Middle East is a historically unstable region. We learned that in the 1970s, after the OPEC oil embargo. Why go to war to perpetuate a situation we know will only blow up again?

Second, we learned in the 1970s that we can easily reduce our dependence on Arab oil. Energy policies adopted after the OPEC oil shock decreased our annual Arab oil needs from 15 percent of total consumption in 1980 to only 3 percent in 1985. That figure today, thanks to the abandonment of national energy policy, is up to 14 percent. But with determination, it could be lowered. Why not declare war on Arab oil dependency, instead of on Iraq?

Third, Saddam Hussein is neither immortal nor invulnerable. Left to pursue his megalomaniacal course, he would inevitably self-destruct. Why not wait him out?

Finally, even if we did go to war, even if we did crush Saddam, what would come next?

Which nation would fill the resulting Mideast power vacuum? Syria? Iran? Saudi Arabia? Enlightened societies these are not in time, each could produce another Saddam, another crisis, another line in the sand.

IRAQ WAR POWERS RESOLUTION

HON. JOHN M. SPRATT, JR.

OF SOUTH CAROLINA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Saturday, January 12, 1991

Mr. SPRATT. Mr. Speaker, when I learned that we were to debate and decide the President's war powers in the Persian Gulf, I drafted a resolution I could support, and I want to submit it for the RECORD.

This resolution would have affirmed our support for Resolution 678, but it would have urged the President to keep applying sanctions and to use the power given him to back up our threats while we step up our diplomatic efforts.

Although this resolution would have given the President the power to use "all necessary means," including military force, it would have urged him to wage war only as our final resort, and if he came to that resort, it would have enjoined him to come back to Congress for a resolution of war powers:

H.J. RES. —

(To demonstrate the resolve of the United States to free Kuwait from occupation by Iraq, to authorize the deployment of the Armed Forces of the United States in a theater where hostilities may be imminent, to approve actions of the President and of the United Nations Security Council, and for other related purposes.)

Whereas, on August 2, 1990, the Government of Iraq invaded the State of Kuwait in flagrant violation of the United Nations Charter and fundamental principles of international law;

Whereas the President and Congress have condemned Iraq's aggression and brutality, and the United Nations Security Council has imposed upon Iraq an air and maritime embargo and other economic sanctions to compel Iraq to withdraw from Kuwait;

Whereas, the President, in response to requests from governments in the region and in accordance with the rights of individual and collective self-defense as specified in the Charter of the United Nations, has deployed the Armed Forces of the United States within and around the Arabian Peninsula as part of a multinational force;

Whereas such action has deterred Iraq from initiating hostilities against other states in the region, but thus far has not caused Iraq to withdraw from Kuwait;

Whereas the Security Council of the United Nations has authorized the use of military force against Iraq if Iraq does not withdraw from Kuwait on or before January 15, 1991, and hostilities may be imminent should Iraq fail to withdraw: Now, therefore, be it

Resolved by the Senate and the House of Representatives of the United States of America in the Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

This resolution may be referred to as the "Iraq War Powers Resolution."

SEC. 2. DECLARATION OF OBJECTIVES.

The objectives of the United States in the Persian Gulf, as stated by the President, are hereby affirmed by the Congress as follows—

(a) the immediate, complete, and unconditional withdrawal of all Iraqi forces from Kuwait;

(b) the restoration of the government of Kuwait;

(c) the promotion of a new order in the Persian Gulf region and the world in general,

in which nations are secure from the threat of aggression.

SEC. 3. WAR POWERS FINDINGS.

The Congress finds that—

(a) the Security Council of the United Nations on November 29, 1990, adopted Resolution 678, which authorized member states cooperating with the Government of Kuwait to use all necessary means to achieve Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait unless Iraq, on or before January 15, 1991, withdraws from Kuwait;

(b) Iraqi forces have not withdrawn from Kuwait;

(c) If Iraqi forces have not withdrawn from Kuwait by January 15, 1991, then as of January 16, 1991, the United States forces deployed in the theatre will be in a situation where imminent involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated by the circumstances, as defined in section 4(a)1 of the War Powers Resolution of 1973;

SEC. 4. AUTHORIZATION OF MILITARY ACTION.

The Congress hereby approves and affirms its support for—

(a) Resolution 678 as adopted by the Security Council of the United Nations.

(b) Deployment of the armed forces of the United States to the Persian Gulf theater under section 5(b)(1) of the War Powers Resolution of 1973, for such time as is necessary to achieve their mission, which is to compel withdrawal of all Iraqi forces from Kuwait.

(c) Use of the armed forces of the United States to enforce the resolutions of the Security Council; to repel attack, to counter-attack, and to defend other nations in the region against aggression by Iraq; and to preempt imminent acts of aggression against the armed forces of the United States, allied forces, and other nations in the region.

SEC. 5. USE OF SANCTIONS AND DIPLOMACY TO ACHIEVE WITHDRAWAL OF IRAQ FROM KUWAIT.

The Congress commends the President for his diplomacy in developing international consensus and cooperation in response to Iraq's invasion of Kuwait. The Congress urges the President to continue his diplomatic efforts and the application of sanctions to achieve the objectives of the United States, and to make war upon Iraq as a final resort only if other means fail.

SEC. 6. CONSULTATION WITH CONGRESS.

To ensure the support of the Congress and of the people of the United States, the Congress calls upon the President before making war upon Iraq—

(a) to consult with and seek consensus among the leadership of Congress, including the Speaker of the House of Representatives, the President Pro Tempore of the Senate, and the Majority and Minority leaders of the Senate and House of Representatives, and

(b) to request the adoption by Congress of a resolution approving a military offensive or declaration of war against Iraq.

SEC. 7. EXPEDITED CONSIDERATION.

The Congress shall vote on the President's request for approval of a military offensive or for a declaration of war against Iraq within three days after the President submits his request.

TRIBUTE TO BECKY L. ROBERTS

HON. HOWARD L. BERMAN

OF CALIFORNIA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Saturday, January 12, 1991

Mr. BERMAN. Mr. Speaker, I rise today to pay tribute to an exceptional individual. Becky Roberts, who has served as a dynamic force in the development of the San Fernando Valley, was honored by her peers recently as she completed her term as president of the San Fernando Valley Board of Realtors. During Becky's presidency, the board, one of the largest in the Nation, took major steps in expanding its commitment to the community. She was instrumental in the formation of a charitable foundation and a driving force in raising more than \$30,000 for the valley's homeless. Becky's initiative and leadership as well as her never ending quest for excellence introduced new levels of professionalism to the real estate industry in southern California.

It was through Becky's encouragement and participation that more than 200 colleagues serving on 16 standing committees and several ad hoc committees researched, developed and implemented scores of programs and activities benefiting board members and the communities they serve. Becky instituted unique monthly training sessions for her executive committee, reviving skills long ignored. She upgraded the board's computerized MLS system to ensure that the highest level of service is available to the people of the San Fernando Valley. All of these innovations and improvements were made in the spirit of cooperation and goodwill, thanks to Becky's abilities to effectively work with and for people. Becky has been a popular and effective spokesperson for the board through its weekly president's columns in the local print and electronic media.

It is my distinct honor and pleasure to ask my colleagues to join me in saluting Becky L. Roberts, an invaluable member of my community.

END REPRESSION IN LITHUANIA

HON. JOHN EDWARD PORTER

OF ILLINOIS

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Saturday, January 12, 1991

Mr. PORTER. Mr. Speaker, the grave matter before us, the crisis in the Persian Gulf, has understandably commanded the attention of the Members of the House since the beginning of the 102d Congress. As this matter has dominated our energies, however, another crisis—less reported, but no less important—has developed in the tiny Republic of Lithuania.

Through timing too convenient to be an accident, the Soviet Union has stepped up its military domination of the Baltic States by sending paratroopers and tanks to repress the people of Lithuania while the eyes of the world are focused elsewhere.

Yesterday, Soviet troops using live ammunition stormed the Lithuanian Press Center and other official buildings. This oppressive action comes less than a day after Mikhail Gorbachev

chev warned the Lithuanian Parliament that it must reaffirm the primacy of the Soviet constitution or accept the consequences.

So far seven Lithuanians have been injured in the crackdown, including a man who was crushed by a tank and a member of Lithuania's fledgling national guard named Tomas Luksis who was shot in the face while defending the Lithuanian Publishing House from being taken by Soviet troops.

In an effort to protect public buildings, especially the Lithuanian Parliament, a force of 2,500 Lithuanians have banded together to form a Lithuanian national guard to face the 95,000 Soviet troops currently stationed in Lithuania. "We have enough ammunition to make a symbolic resistance" said one man. "The point is not to defend the building against—Soviet—paratroopers. We know we can not do that. The point is to make some token resistance in order to show the world that we are not surrendering voluntarily."

As the violence escalated yesterday, Lithuanian President Vytautas Landsbergis placed an urgent call to President Gorbachev to ask him to issue a Presidential order to "stop the bloodshed." Landsbergis was told that President Gorbachev was busy having lunch and could not speak with him. Clearly, the military actions and violence are condoned and directed by Mr. Gorbachev, a man who only last year was awarded the Nobel Prize for peace.

The Soviet claim of sovereignty over Lithuania has always been without foundation. The freedom of the Lithuanian people was taken from them in 1940 when Lithuania was annexed into the Soviet Union as part of a secret deal between Hitler and Stalin. A puppet government in Vilnius, the Lithuanian capital, rendered up the country to the Soviets without a shred of popular support from the people of Lithuania.

The United States has never recognized this illegal annexation and has stood by the fiercely proud Lithuanian people through the more than 50 years of repression at the hands of the Soviets. In March 1990 Lithuania took responsibility for its own destiny and declared independence from the Soviet Union. Moscow responded aggressively by implementing economic sanctions on Lithuania last summer and threatening the use of force, a threat which it is apparently prepared to carry out.

Mr. Speaker, it is unconscionable that, while democracy and freedom make dramatic strides in Eastern and Central Europe, the Soviet Union should regress and use military force to impose an unpopular regime on a peaceful people. This is the action of another time—a time when a cold war raged and an Iron Curtain snuffed out the light of freedom and self-determination in much of the world. This is not the action of a man or a nation dedicated to freedom and it draws into question the sincerity of Mr. Gorbachev's human rights reforms.

Members of Congress must make their voices heard on this issue and send a strong message to Mr. Gorbachev and the Soviet Union that military repression of the Baltics will not go unnoticed regardless of when it occurs and that actions like those in Lithuania will not be tolerated. The people of Lithuania, like those of the rest of the world, should and must have the right of self-determination and free-

dom from fear and domination. Mr. Gorbachev, pull out your troops, end the repression and let the Lithuanian people follow their consciences to a new era of freedom in the Baltics.

COST OF ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION MAKES THE UNITED STATES MORE DEPENDENT ON FOREIGN ENERGY SOURCES

HON. WILLIAM E. DANNEMEYER

OF CALIFORNIA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Saturday, January 12, 1991

Mr. DANNEMEYER. Mr. Speaker, I have attached a short news story from the January 7, 1991 issue of the Oil Daily, which describes an upcoming study from the Department of Energy on the relationship between environmental regulation and domestic energy production. The authors of the study estimate that four environmental statutes—the Clean Air Act, the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, the Clean Water Act, and the Safe Drinking Water Act—will cost the domestic oil industry between \$2 and \$7 billion annually and reduce the amount of recoverable oil by up to 43 percent.

This study represents the first time the Department of Energy has examined the cumulative impact of environmental laws on domestic production and goes a long way toward explaining why this Nation is so dependent on foreign sources of oil and natural gas. As we prepare to sacrifice the lives of our young men and women in the Persian Gulf to guarantee the unimpeded flow of oil to growing Western economies, we should consider the relationship between Operation Desert Shield and our energy policy here in America. An aggressive and coordinated policy to explore and develop domestic sources of oil and natural gas, coupled with nuclear licensing reform, would enable the United States to tolerate future instability in the Middle East without resorting to the use of force.

I commend the following article to my colleagues' attention:

ENVIRONMENTAL LAWS COULD COST OIL INDUSTRY \$79 BILLION

(By Lynn Garner)

WASHINGTON.—Compliance with new and revised environmental statutes will cost the oil industry anywhere from \$15 billion to \$79 billion—depending on the price of oil—in additional exploration and production costs, a new Department of Energy study concludes.

The study also predicts that environmental legislation under consideration by Congress could accelerate the abandonment of the nation's remaining domestic oil reservoirs by as much as 10 years.

The DOE study has just been completed and is being distributed to Congress, state officials and the industry.

CUMULATIVE IMPACT

The two-volume report is unique in that it is the first time that DOE has looked at the cumulative effect of environmental legislation on future domestic oil production, rather than the effect of individual laws.

DOE studied the impact of four major environmental statutes that it says will cost the industry from \$2 billion to \$7 billion per year

just to stay in compliance, after the initial compliance costs.

"These costs could reduce the amount of oil that can be recovered using advanced recovery technologies by 3 to 43 percent (at \$20 per barrel)," said Robert H. Gentile, DOE assistant secretary for fossil energy.

The cost estimates vary so widely because DOE studied the impact at different oil price scenarios, from \$16 per barrel to \$34 per barrel.

"These and other estimates presented in the report are conservative," he added.

The four environmental statutes analyzed in the report include the Clean Air Act, the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act that governs hazardous waste, the Clean Water Act and the Safe Drinking Water Act.

SIGNIFICANT EFFECTS

"This report demonstrates the need to consider the cumulative impacts of new regulatory requirements in conjunction with other existing, proposed or contemplated regulatory requirements affecting oil supply," Gentile said.

"The environmental decisions we make in the coming months will have very significant impacts on this nation's domestic oil production," added Michael R. McElwrath, principal deputy assistant secretary for fossil energy.

Proposed changes in RCRA, the hazardous waste law, could cut Lower 48 oil production by nearly 20 percent by the year 2000, he said.

The addition of just \$500 per well of new compliance costs, from whichever environmental law, could shut down virtually all oil production coming from Appalachia, McElwrath said.

The DOE study, "Potential Cumulative Impacts of Environmental Regulatory Initiatives," was prepared under contract by ICF Resources Inc. of Fairfax, Va., for DOE's Office of Fossil Energy.

The DOE study looks at future production from conventional production in the Lower 48 states; future infill drilling and waterflood projects in the Lower 48; future enhanced oil recovery projects in the Lower 48; and onshore and offshore crude oil fields remaining to be discovered in the Lower 48 and Alaska.

DOE estimates that after currently proved reserves are produced by conventional recovery methods, nearly two-thirds of the known U.S. oil resource (more than 300 million barrels) will remain untouched.

But the department has concluded that the United States will continue to face a rapid pace of abandonment of oil reservoirs.

SALUTING ENVIRONMENTAL REPORTER HAROLD SCARLETT

HON. JACK FIELDS

OF TEXAS

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Saturday, January 12, 1991

Mr. FIELDS. Mr. Speaker, Houstonians long ago became accustomed to living and working in close proximity to the world's largest petrochemical industrial complex. We recognize the advantages of the many refineries and petrochemical plants along, or near, the Houston Ship Channel. Those advantages include good, high-paying jobs and financially significant additions to our local tax base.

But we also recognize that those industrial facilities are not without their risks. They pose potential threats to our local environment and to the communities in which we live and work.

For the last 20 years, Houstonians have benefited for the solid journalistic efforts of Harold Scarlett, the Houston Post's veteran environmental reporter who made it his business to keep Houstonians informed of issues affecting their environment. Harold Scarlett retired on January 1 after a long and distinguished career at the Post, and his dedication to providing Houstonians with understandable analyses of environmental issues will be sorely missed.

Harold Scarlett began his work at the Houston Post in 1952, but left 3 years later to join the editorial staff of the European edition of Stars and Stripes. He returned to the Houston Post in 1958, where he remained until his retirement. It was in 1970 that Texas Lieutenant Governor Bill Hobby, then the editor of the Post, assigned Harold to the newly formed environmental beat.

In my 10 years in Congress, I have had many opportunities to talk with Harold on a wide variety of environmental matters. During those conversations, it was evident that for him, the environment was more than just a beat to be covered. For Harold, the environment was more than just an issue. It was a passion about which he was personally concerned and about which he was extraordinarily well informed.

The rise of the environmental movement in the 1970's, congressional passage of the landmark 1970 Clean Air Act, enactment of the historic Clean Water Act in 1972, and subsequent Federal environmental laws provided Harold with the opportunity to explain the Nation's deepening environmental crisis to men and women in the Houston area. Similarly, several local issues—including a clean lakes demonstration program in Lake Houston, the proposed Wallisville Reservoir, the water quality of Galveston Bay, the widening and deepening of the Houston Ship Channel—provided Harold with ample opportunities to better educate Houstonians about the environment. While we have not always seen eye to eye on every story he covered, Harold's fairness and integrity was evident in every story for which he interviewed me.

In a news article announcing Harold's retirement, the journalist advised men and women concerned about the quality of the air we breathe, the water we drink, and the land on which we walk to "keep informed, keep alert. Don't get hysterical and don't ever feel one person can't make a difference."

Houstonians have taken that advice to heart. We have become far more knowledgeable about threats to our environment, and we have grown less tolerant of those who spoil our environment. Much of the credit for expanding our knowledge and deepening our concern can be traced to one man in the newsroom of the Houston Post: Harold

Scarlett. His knowledge and expertise, his dedication and commitment, motivated thousands of Houstonians to consider more seriously what too many of us had taken for granted.

Mr. Speaker, I know you join with me in saluting the many accomplishments of this outstanding journalist, and wishing him well in all his future endeavors.

THE CHANCE FOR PEACE NOW UP TO SADDAM HUSSEIN

HON. DOUG BEREUTER

OF NEBRASKA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Saturday, January 12, 1991

Mr. BEREUTER. Mr. Speaker, as we prepare for bilateral votes on the Persian Gulf crisis today I urge my colleagues to consider the following very cogent editorial of January 9, 1991 in the Tremont, NE, Tribune:

HUSSEIN BLINDLY IGNORES INEVITABLE

It is painfully clear that changes of a peaceful end to the Persian Gulf crisis rest heavily on Saddam Hussein's shoulders.

Americans praying for a non-violent end to the standoff must consider with cautious optimism developments that indicate the United States' hard-line stance is working. Hussein has at no time shown himself to be any more than a ruthless dictator without sense to know when the world is against him and his defeat is inevitable.

A week before the United Nation's Jan. 15 deadline for Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait, the United States, Britain and NATO are rightfully focused in demanding without compromise that Hussein withdraw completely from Kuwait or be driven out.

Clearly, Hussein has lost control of his sinister and criminal plan of conquest. Iraqis' support for this tyranny obviously is not as strong as he would have the United States and the rest of the world believe.

Much can happen during the next seven days, but one thing seems clear—the United States, with U.N. support, will hold true to its threat of force if necessary.

As Secretary of State James Baker III admitted Monday, the only chance for a peaceful conclusion to the Gulf crisis is if Hussein realizes—although belatedly—that the U.N. deadline is real and unchangeable.

Hussein reacts to the U.N. stance by calling the U.S.-led multinational force opposing him the aggressors and by claiming his goal is to liberate Palestine.

It's difficult to understand how an invasion of Kuwait brings Palestine any closer to liberation. Surely, if Hussein had his plans in order, he could have found a better way to achieve this only recently stated goal, seen by many as no more than a negotiation tool.

The United Nation's and Bush administration should be applauded for their no-deals approach to a situation in which bargaining

only increases the chances that more, less desirable concessions will be sought by Hussein later.

Hussein, with his people starting to fall in behind the rest of the world, is in no position for compromise. He must realize one country cannot "trample and wipe out" another, then use the acquired nation-state as a bargaining chip.

IN SUPPORT OF THE PRESIDENT

HON. JOHN J. DUNCAN, JR.

OF TENNESSEE

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Saturday, January 12, 1991

Mr. DUNCAN. Mr. Speaker, I am not enthusiastic about this predicament which our Nation finds itself today in the Middle East. I do not want war. My constituents in east Tennessee do not want war. No American wants war in the Persian Gulf.

However, we as a nation, have the awesome responsibility to help ensure stability in far-off regions of the world. Worldwide steadiness is vital to U.S. interests. This is why we are in the Middle East. If we do not stand up to Hussein's brutal and unprovoked aggression then what will be our response to other aggressors in the future.

History has proven that aggression unchecked inevitably expands. Like it or not, the United States is the only superpower in the world, and with this status comes responsibilities.

I believe that the bipartisan Michel-Solaz amendment is our last best hope for a peaceful resolution to the crisis in the gulf. The President has made repeated attempts at negotiation with Iraq. He has the unprecedented backing of the United Nations, as well as the majority of the American people. We must stand behind him. We must give creditability to the President's policies if we are to exercise any control over future world events. A serious threat to Hussein could certainly lead him to consider a peaceful and positive resolution to the crisis in the gulf.

The President does not want war. He wants to negotiate peace through a position of strength. And it is our duty and responsibility, from a moral standpoint, to give President Bush the support needed to stop the tyranny and oppression that Hussein has forced upon not only Kuwait, but his own people as well.

The question of war lies in the hands of Saddam Hussein. I can only hope and pray that he will choose a peaceful settlement. Let us not repeat our mistakes of the past. Let us stand united, shoulder to shoulder with the President, so that we can signal Hussein that his immorality will not go unchecked.