[Cannon's Precedents, Volume 7]
[Chapter 215 - The Calendar of Motions to Discharge Committees]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office, www.gpo.gov]
Chapter CCXV.\1\
THE CALENDAR OF MOTIONS TO DISCHARGE COMMITTEES.
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1. The rule for discharging committees. Sections 1007-1015.
2. Privilege of the motion to discharge committees. Sections
1016-1018.
3. Presenting the motion. Section 1019.
4. Calling up the motion. Section 1019a, 1020.
5. Bills requiring consideration in Committee of the Whole.
Sections 1021, 1022.
6. Unfinished business. Section 1023.
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1007. Any Member may file with the Clerk a motion to discharge a
committee from the consideration of a public bill referred 30 days
prior.
A motion may also be filed to discharge the Committee on Rules from
the consideration of special orders referred to that committee seven
days prior.
When a majority of the membership of the House has signed a motion it
is entered on the Journal and referred to the Calendar of Motions to
discharge committees.
After the motion has been on the calendar seven days any signer may
call it up for consideration on second or fourth Mondays and the House
proceeds to its consideration; if agreed to, any Member may move the
immediate consideration of the bill which shall remain the unfinished
business until disposed of.
If a motion to discharge the Committee on Rules prevails the House
immediately votes on the adoption of the special order and if decided
in the affirmative proceeds at once to its execution.
After any perfected motion to discharge has been acted on, no motion
to discharge committees from the consideration of the same or any
similar measure shall be considered that session and any others which
may have been filed shall be stricken from the calendar.
Form and history of Section 4 of Rule XXVII.
Section 4 of Rule XXVII provides:
A Member may present to the Clerk a motion in writing to discharge a
committee from the consideration of a public bill or resolution which
has been referred to it 30 days prior thereto (but only one motion may
be presented for each bill or resolution). Under this rule it shall
also be in order for a Member to file a motion to discharge the
Committee on Rules from further consideration of any resolution
providing either a special order of business, or a special rule for the
consideration of any public bill or resolution favorably reported by a
standing committee, or a special rule for the consideration of a public
bill or resolution which has remained in a standing committee 30 or
more days without action: Provided, That said resolution from which it
is moved to discharge the Committee on Rules has been referred to that
committee at least seven days prior to the filing of the motion to
discharge. The motion shall be placed in the custody of the Clerk, who
shall arrange
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\1\ This chapter has no analogy with any previous chapter.
Sec. 1007
some convenient place for the signature of Members. A signature may be
withdrawn by a Member in writing at any time before the motion is
entered on the Journal. When a majority of the total membership of the
House shall have signed the motion, it shall be entered on the Journal,
printed with the signatures thereto in the Congressional Record, and
referred to the Calendar of Motions to Discharge Committees.
On the second and fourth Mondays of each month, except during the
last six days of any session of Congress, immediately after the
approval of the Journal, any Member who has signed a motion to
discharge which has been on the calendar at least seven days prior
thereto, and seeks recognition, shall be recognized for the purpose of
calling up the motion, and the House shall proceed to its consideration
in the manner herein provided without intervening motion except one
motion to adjourn. Recognition for the motions shall be in the order in
which they have been entered on the Journal.
When any motion under this rule shall be called up, the bill or
resolution shall be read by title only. After 20 minutes' debate, one-
half in favor of the proposition and one-half in opposition thereto,
the House shall proceed to vote on the motion to discharge. If the
motion prevails to discharge the Committee on Rules from any resolution
pending before the committee, the House shall immediately vote on the
adoption of said resolution, the Speaker not entertaining any dilatory
or other intervening motion except one motion to adjourn, and, if said
resolution is adopted, then the House shall immediately proceed to its
execution. If the motion prevails to discharge one of the standing
committees of the House from any public bill or resolution pending
before the committee, it shall then be in order for any Member who
signed the motion to move that the House proceed to the immediate
consideration of such bill or resolution (such motion not being
debatable), and such motion is hereby made of high privilege; and if it
shall be decided in the affirmative, the bill shall be immediately
considered under the general rules of the House, and if unfinished
before adjournment of the day on which it is called up it shall remain
the unfinished business until it is fully disposed of. Should the House
by vote decide against the immediate consideration of such bill or
resolution, it shall be referred to its proper calendar and be entitled
to the same rights and privileges that it would have had had the
committee to which it was referred duly reported same to the House for
its consideration: Provided, That when any perfected motion to
discharge a committee from the consideration of any public bill or
resolution has once been acted upon by the House it shall not be in
order to entertain during the same session of Congress any other motion
for the discharge from that committee of said measure, or from any
other committee of any other bill or resolution substantially the same,
relating in substance to or dealing with the same subject matter, or
from the Committee on Rules of a resolution providing a special order
of business for the consideration of any other such bill or resolution,
in order that such action by the House on a motion to discharge shall
be res adjudcata for the remainder of that session: Provided further,
That if before any one motion to discharge a committee has been acted
upon by the House there are on the Calendar of Motions to Discharge
Committees other motions to discharge committees from the consideration
of bills or resolutions substantially the same, relating in substance
to or dealing with the same subject matter, after the House shall have
acted on one motion to discharge, the remaining said motions shall be
stricken from the Calendar on Motions to Discharge Committees and not
acted on during the remainder of that session of Congress.
This rule was adopted in its present form on January 3, 1935.\1\
Originally all reports of committees were presented in the House on
motion of the chairman of the committee or any other Member, \2\ and
the motion to discharge a committee from consideration of a bill seems
to have been in frequent use in the practice of the House, as in the
Senate.\3\
However, at a very early date the use of the motion was discontinued
in the House, and as early as the Fortieth Congress \4\ was no longer
privileged in the order of business.
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\1\ First session Seventy-fourth Congress, Record, p. 20.
\2\ Jefferson's Manual, Sections XXVII, XLIII.
\3\ Standing Rules of the Senate, section 2, Rule XXVI.
\4\ Second session Fortieth Congress, Globe, p. 229.
Sec. 1007
The first record of an attempt to reestablish the privilege of the
motion appears in the Forty-eighth Congress,\1\ when a proposition to
make in order the motion to discharge a committee from the
consideration of a bill not reported within 30 days after reference,
was rejected, yeas 56, nays 115.
Discussion of the subject continued at varying intervals, and
resolutions embodying similar proposals were introduced from Congress
to Congress until, in 1910,\2\ the Committee on Rules reported, in lieu
of such resolutions referred to it, a rule which was adopted without
amendment as section 4 of Rule XXVIII.
The rule provided for filing with the Clerk motions to discharge
committees from consideration of bills at any time after reference.
Such motions were placed on a special calendar, to be called up on
suspension days after the call of the Calendar for Unanimous Consent,
and on being seconded by tellers, when called up, were placed on their
appropriate calendar as if reported by the committee having
jurisdiction.
The rule proved singularly ineffective, and in the revision of
1911,\3\ was amended by restricting the presentation of the motion to
not less than 15 days after reference and requiring the reading of the
bill by title only when the motion was called up to be seconded. It was
also transferred from Rule XXVIII, becoming section 4 of Rule XXVII.
The rule in this form was employed to such advantage in obstructive
tactics that in the second session of the Sixty-second Congress \4\ it
was further amended by making it the third order of business on
suspension days to follow the call of the Calendar for Unanimous
Consent and the disposition of motions to suspend the rules.
This change rendered the rule inoperative, and it remained
practically nugatory until the Sixty-eighth Congress,\5\ when the
Committee on Rules reported a substitute which was agreed to after five
days debate and under which a motion to discharge a committee when
signed by 150 Members was entered on a special calendar and after seven
days could be called up under privileged status. This rule was invoked
but once \6\ and while on that occasion the bill to which it was
applied failed to reach final consideration, so much time was consumed,
16 roll calls being had in one day \7\ during its consideration, that a
further revision of the rule was affected in the succeeding
Congress,\8\ making it still more difficult of operation. Under this
revision the requirement of 150 Members was increased to 218 Members, a
majority of the House, and further safeguards were included which
rendered the rule wholly unworkable. Only one attempt \9\ was made to
utilize it during the Sixty-ninth Congress and at the opening of the
Seventy-second Congress \10\ it was completely redrafted and adopted in
its present form with the exception that 145 signatures were sufficient
to secure
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\1\ First session Forty-eighth Congress, Record, p. 964.
\2\ Second session Sixty-first Congress, Record, p. 8439.
\3\ First session Sixty-second Congress, Record, pp. 18, 80.
\4\ Second session Sixty-second Congress, Record, p. 1685.
\5\ First session Sixty-eighth Congress, Record, p. 1143.
\6\ First session Sixty-eighth Congress, Record, p. 7874.
\7\ Record, p. 7885.
\8\ First session Sixty-ninth Congress, Record, p. 383.
\9\ Second session Sixty-ninth Congress, Record, p. 2160.
\10\ First session Seventy-second Congress, Record, pp. 10, 83.
Sec. 1008
reference to the Calendar. The amendment requiring a majority of the
membership of the House was incorporated in the resolution providing
for the adoption of the rules of the Seventy-fourth Congress.\1\
The problem of formulating a practical provision for the discharge of
committees is one of the oldest and most perplexing in the history of
the rules. From the drafting of the first form of the discharge rule in
the Sixty-first Congress until the adoption of the present form of the
rule, no measure passed the House under any of its various
modifications. In the 31 intervening sessions of the House no bill
reached the stage of practical consideration through discharge of a
committee under any of its provisions, until the Seventy-second
Congress when under the routine provided by the present form of the
rule, five measures were entered on the calendar, one \2\ of which
eventually passed the House. The discharge of a committee under the
rule for the first time in a quarter of a century of continuous
experiment indicates an approach to an effective form of this long-
considered rule.
1008. Motions to discharge committees are filed with the Clerk and
are not presented from the floor.
Members sign motions to discharge committees at the Clerk's desk
during the session of the House and not elsewhere.
Those filing motions to discharge committees may notify Members
either from the floor or by letter.
Signatures to a motion to discharge committees are not made public
until the requisite number have signed and the motion appears in the
Journal and Record.
On February 23, 1932,\3\ Mr. Robert S. Hall, of Mississippi,
announced the filing of a motion to discharge the Committee on Rules
from consideration of a resolution providing a special order for the
consideration of a bill relating to drainage and irrigation districts
reported by the Committee on Irrigation and Reclamation.
At the conclusion of his remarks, the Speaker \4\ said:
The Chair desires to make a statement to the House concerning
petitions of this type. It is not necessary to present such petitions
from the floor of the House of Representatives. Petitions of this
character should be placed in the hands of the Clerk, and any Member
desiring to sign such a petition must come to the Clerk's desk for the
purpose of putting his signature to the petition.
Any Member desiring to file such a petition may file it with the
Clerk and notify the Members as he may see proper, either from the
floor or by written communications. These signatures can not be made
public until the required number of Members have signed the petition.
1009. Motions to discharge committees are signed at the Clerk's desk
during the session of the House and not otherwise.
On February 26, 1932,\5\ Mr. John J. O'Connor, of New York, in
presenting a parliamentary inquiry, announced that a member of his
State delegation, Mr. Anthony J. Griffin, was confined in a hospital
and unable to attend the sessions of the
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\1\ First session Seventy-fourth Congress, Record, p. 20.
\2\ First session Seventy-second Congress, Record, p. 12042, 12853.
\3\ First session Seventy-second Congress, Record, p. 4513.
\4\ John N. Garner, of Texas, Speaker.
\5\ First session Seventy-second Congress, Record, p. 4783.
Sec. 1010
House, and asked that the Clerk or some other officer of the House be
delegated to carry to him for his signature the motion then pending at
the Clerk's desk to discharge the Committee on the Judiciary from the
consideration of the joint resolution relating to the repeal of the
eighteenth amendment to the Constitution.
The Speaker \1\ declined and said:
Undoubtedly the rule contemplates that petitions shall be filed at
the Clerk's desk and that Members shall sign the same at the desk. It
could not possibly be considered that it might be used as a sort of
round robin, to be sent from place to place for the purpose of securing
signatures of Members. The petition can only be signed while the House
is in session. Speaker Longworth so held in the first ruling made,
touching this particular matter.
It seems to the Chair that is a consistent and sensible
interpretation of the rule.
Mr. O'Connor pointed out that on a number of occasions the Speaker
had himself or through deputies administered the oath of office outside
the Hall of the House to Members detained by illness.
The Speaker explained:
That is when the House gives specific authority for that purpose. If
the House desired to give specific authority that this petition be
carried to the hospital for the purpose of securing a signature, of
course the House by vote can authorize that to be done; but the Chair
does not think he has authority, under the rules, to permit the
petition to leave the Clerk's desk, since it can only be signed while
the House is in session.
Mr. O'Connor inquired if the Speaker would recognize him to move that
the House authorize some one to submit the motion to Mr. Griffin for
his signature.
The Speaker said:
The Chair would rather not do that.
Mr. O'Connor then asked if he could be recognized to submit the
matter in the form of a request for unanimous consent.
The Speaker assented, and Mr. O'Connor asked unanimous consent that
the motion be placed in the hands of the Clerk at the close of the
day's session to be taken by him, or one of his deputies or a
designated Member of Congress, to the naval hospital in Washington to
be presented to Mr. Griffin for his signature and thereafter returned
to the office of the Clerk.
The Speaker said:
The Chair will state that when 145 signatures are attached to the
petition, under the rule, it is referred immediately to the calendar
and is printed in the Journal and the Record, and additional signatures
are not necessary. The Chair does not know that they could be included
in the petition.
Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from New York?
Objection being heard the request was denied.
1010. When called up under the rule a motion to discharge a committee
is of the highest privilege and the Speaker declines to recognize for
any matter not directly related to the proceedings.
Division of the time for debate under the rule is in accordance with
the attitude of Members on the pending motion and party lines are not
recognized.
Debate on the motion to discharge a committee is limited by the rule
and the Speaker is constrained to deny recognition for request to
extend the time.
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\1\ John N. Garner, of Texas, Speaker.
Sec. 1010a
On March 14, 1932,\1\ Mr. J. Charles Linthicum, of Maryland, called
up a motion \2\ to discharge the Committee on the Judiciary under
section 4 of Rule XXVII, from further consideration of the House joint
resolution proposing an amendment to the eighteenth amendment to the
Constitution.
Mr. Tilman B. Parks, of Arkansas, asked unanimous consent to extend
his remarks in the Record by inserting a telegram received from the
Young Men's Christian Association opposing the amendment.
The Speaker \3\ declined recognition for the purpose and said:
This rule is specific, and the Chair will not recognize any Member of
the House for any other proposition. The Clerk will report the
resolution by title.
The Clerk having reported the resolution by title, Mr. Bertrand H.
Snell, of New York, the minority leader, asked that the 10 minutes for
debate allowed those opposing the motion under the rule be divided and
one-half apportioned to the minority side of the House.
The Speaker said:
The rule is specific. The gentleman from Maryland making the motion
is entitled to 10 minutes, and if the chairman of the Committee on the
Judiciary is opposed to the motion, he would be entitled to 10 minutes.
If he is of the same opinion as the gentleman from Maryland on this
particular motion, the Chair would recognize some one on the committee
who desired to oppose it. Whether the gentleman from Texas, the
chairman of the Judiciary Committee, will yield is a question for the
gentleman from Texas.
Mr. Fiorello H. LaGuardia, of New York, then asked recognition to
prefer a request for unanimous consent to extend the time allowed under
the rule an additional 10 minutes.
The Speaker said:
It seems to the Chair that it is his duty to protect the rule. Being
a Member of the House, he will say himself that he would object to any
additional debate, taking as much responsibility as he can in the
premises.
Mr. Leonidas Dyer, of Missouri, the ranking minority member of the
committee, proposed to be discharged by the pending motion, inquired if
he was not entitled by virtue of his position on the committee, and his
opposition to the motion, to control half the time on one side or the
other.
The Speaker ruled in the negative and recognized Mr. Linthicum for 10
minutes under the rule.
Debate having been concluded and the vote being taken by yeas and
nays, the yeas were 187, the nays 227, and the motion to discharge the
Committee on the Judiciary from the consideration of the joint
resolution was not agreed to.
1010a. The proponents of a motion to discharge a committee are
entitled to open and close debate thereon.
On March 28,1932,\4\ the House was considering under the discharge
rule a motion to discharge the Committee on Rules from consideration of
a resolution providing a
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\1\ First session Seventy-second Congress, Record, p. 6000.
\2\ Record, p. 5058.
\3\ John N. Garner, of Texas, Speaker.
\4\ First session Seventy-second Congress, Record, p. 6947.
Sec. 1011
special order for the consideration of the bill (H. R. 4650), proposing
relief for drainage and irrigation districts.
In the course of the discussion, Mr. Robert S. Hall, of Mississippi,
who had opened the debate, inquired as to the status of the time.
The Speaker \1\ replied that of the 10 minutes allotted under the
rule, respectively, to Mr. Hall in support of the motion and Mr. Edward
W. Pou, of North Carolina, in opposition to the motion, each had 5
minutes remaining, and he would recognize Mr. Hall to consume the
remainder of his time.
Mr. Hall submitted that as the proponent of the pending motion he was
entitled to close the debate.
The Speaker acquiesced and recognized Mr. Pou for five minutes. At
the conclusion of Mr. Pou's remarks Mr. Hall consumed the remainder of
the time.
1011. On the second and fourth Mondays motions to discharge
committees conforming to the requirements of the rule are privileged
and take precedence of business merely privileged under the general
rules of the House.
On March 10, 1932,\2\ Mr. Charles R. Crisp, of Georgia, from the
Committee on Ways and Means, by direction of that committee, moved that
the House resolve itself into the Committee of the Whole House on the
state of the Union for the consideration of the bill (H. R. 10235), the
revenue bill. Pending the motion, Mr. Crisp asked unanimous consent
that general debate on the bill continue over Saturday, a period which
included the second Monday of the month.
Mr. John J. O'Connor, of New York, under reservation of the right to
object, inquired if agreement to the special order provided in the
request would interfere with the consideration of motions to discharge
committees in order under the rule on that day.
The Speaker \1\ replied:
The rule provides particularly that after the approval of the Journal
it shall be in order to call up such a motion. There is no discretion
in the hands of the House and the Chair so far as that rule is
concerned. It is made for the purpose of forcing the consideration of a
measure when the motion to discharge the committee has 145 signatures.
1012. A motion to discharge a committee having been agreed to, its
proponents are entitled to prior recognition in debate and for
allowable motions to expedite consideration.
Form of resolution providing for consideration of a bill taken from
the Committee on Rules under motion to discharge and providing for
consideration of a bill adversely reported by the committee to which it
was referred.
On June 13, 1932,\3\ Mr. Wright Patman, of Texas, one of the signers
of a motion to discharge the Committee on Rules from consideration of
the resolution (H. Res. 220) providing for the consideration of H. R.
7726, the adjusted service compensation bill, which had been duly
signed by 145 Members and which appeared in the
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\1\ John N. Garner, of Texas, Speaker.
\2\ First session Seventy-second Congress, Record, p. 5689.
\3\ First session Seventy-second Congress, Record, p. 12844.
Sec. 1012
Journal and Record for June 4, 1932,\1\ asked recognition to call up
the motion for consideration.
The Speaker pro tempore \2\ inquired:
Did the gentleman sign the petition?
Mr. Patman having answered in the affirmative, the Speaker pro
tempore directed the Clerk to report the resolution by title. The Clerk
read as follows:
House Resolution 220, a resolution to make the bill H. R. 7726, to
provide for the immediate payment to veterans of the face value of
their adjusted-service certificates, a special order of business.
Mr. Patman submitted that the resolution should be read in its
entirety.
The Speaker pro tempore ruled:
No; just the title, under the rule; and the title has been read.
In response to an inquiry from Mr. Patman, the Speaker pro tempore
explained:
With regard to the order of procedure, there will be 10 minutes
debate in favor of the motion to discharge the committee and 10 minutes
against it. A vote will then come on the motion to discharge the Rules
Committee; and if that is favorable, a vote will immediately be had on
the resolution from consideration of which the Rules Committee is
discharged.
Debate having been exhausted, the question was taken on the pending
motion. The yeas and nays were ordered, when the yeas were 226, the
nays 175, and the motion to discharge the Committee on Rules from
consideration of the resolution was agreed to.
The question recurring on the resolution, it was agreed to--yeas 225,
nays 170, in the following form: \3\
Resolved. That upon the day succeeding the adoption of this
resolution a special order be, and is hereby, created by the House of
Representatives for the consideration of H. R. 7726, notwithstanding
the adverse report on said bill. That on said day the Speaker shall
recognize the Representative from the first district of Texas, Wright
Patman, to call up H. R. 7726, a bill to provide for the immediate
payment to veterans of the face value of their adjusted-service
certificates, as a special order of business, and to move that the
House resolve itself into the Committee of the Whole House on the state
of the Union for the consideration of the said H. R. 7726. After
general debate, which shall be confined to the bill and shall continue
not to exceed four hours, to be equally divided and controlled by the
Member of the House requesting a rule for the considering of the said
H. R. 7726 and a member of the House who is opposed to the said H. R.
7726, to be designated by the Speaker, the bill shall be read for
amendment under the 5-minute rule. At the conclusion of the reading of
the bill for amendment the committee shall rise and report the bill to
the House with such amendments as may have been adopted, and the
previous question shall be considered as ordered on the bill and the
amendments thereto to final passage without intervening motion except
one motion to recommit. The special order shall be a continuing order
until the bill is finally disposed of.
On motion of Mr. Thomas L. Blanton, of Texas, a motion to reconsider
the vote by which the resolution was agreed to was laid on the table.
On Tuesday, June 14,\4\ the succeeding day, Mr. Charles R. Crisp, of
Georgia, from the Committee on Ways and Means, submitted a
parliamentary inquiry as
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\1\ Record, p. 10720.
\2\Henry T. Rainey, of Illinois, Speaker pro tempore.
\3\ For a shorter form consult the proceedings for May 10, 1932;
Record, p. 9924.
\4\ Record, p. 12911.
Sec. 1013
to whether the chairman of that committee, which had been discharged
from consideration of the bill, or proponents of the motion to
discharge the committee, were entitled to prior recognition in debate
and for motions to expedite the bill when it was taken up for
consideration in the House under the special order.
The Speaker pro tempore held that under the procedure of the House,
the proponents of the motion to discharge were entitled to prior
recognition in debate and in the management of the bill in the House
and in Committee of the Whole.
Thereupon, the Speaker pro tempore recognized Mr. Patman to move that
the House resolve itself into the Committee of the Whole House on the
state of the Union for the consideration of the bill.
Debate on the bill continued through June 14 and 15 \1\ when it was
passed by the House, yeas 211, nays 176.
1013. A bill to amend the Volstead Act by providing for the sale and
taxation of beer was held not to be a bill ``substantially the same''
within the purview of section 4 of Rule XXVII as a resolution proposing
the repeal of the eighteenth amendment.
On May 23, 1932,\2\ Mr. John J. O'Connor, of New York, proposed to
call up, under the discharge rule, a motion \3\ to discharge the
Committee on Ways and Means from consideration of the bill (H. R.
10017) proposing to amend the Volstead Act by authorizing the sale and
taxation of beer.
Mr. Thomas L. Blanton raised the question of order that the motion
was not admissible for the reason that the rule forbade consideration
of a motion to discharge a committee from consideration of a bill
``substantially the same'' as a bill previously considered under the
rule at the same session. Mr. Blanton took the position that this
provision was applicable as the bill referred to dealt with the same
subject matter and was substantially similar in substance with the
joint resolution (H. J. Res. 208) proposing the repeal of the
eighteenth amendment previously considered under the rule.
The Speaker \4\ overruled the point of order and said:
In case a motion to discharge a committee from considering a bill
authorizing 2 per cent beer was voted down, there could not be another
motion for the purpose of voting on the question of 4 per cent beer, or
even 1 per cent beer; but the question of amending the Constitution is
one question and the question of legalizing beer is another. The House
has passed on the question of a constitutional amendment but has not
passed on the question of whether or not the House would provide a
different definition of legalized beer.
The Chair overrules the point of order.
1014. The rule providing for motions to discharge committees does not
authorize signature of such motions by proxy.
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\1\ Record, p. 13054.
\2\ First session Seventy-second Congress, p. 10950.
\3\ Record, p. 10242.
\4\ John N. Garner, of Texas, Speaker.
Sec. 1015
There is no provision in the rules authorizing Members to vote by
proxy.
On March 5, 1930,\1\ Mr. Luther A. Johnson, of Texas, rising to a
parliamentary inquiry, referred to a motion in writing on the Clerk's
table, to discharge the Committee on Ways and Means from the
consideration of the bill (H. R. 7825) to amend the World War veterans'
act of 1924.
He explained that a colleague who was absent on account of illness
desired to sign the motion and inquired if it would be in order for
Members thus unavoidably absent to authorize the indorsement of their
signatures to the motion by proxy.
The Speaker \2\ replied:
Since the gentleman from Texas, Mr. Johnson, asked the Chair that
question informally yesterday, the Chair has examined the question and
feels very clear about how the rule should be construed.
Paragraph 4 of Rule XXVII relating to this subject reads as follows:
``A Member may present to the Clerk a motion in writing to instruct a
committee to report within 15 days a public bill or resolution which
has been referred to it 30 days prior thereto (but only one motion may
be presented for each bill or resolution). The motion shall be placed
in the custody of the Clerk, who shall arrange some convenient place
for the signature of Members. A signature may be withdrawn by a Member
in writing at any time before the motion is entered on the Journal.
When a majority of the membership of the House shall have signed the
motion it shall be entered on the Journal, printed with the signatures
thereto in the Congressional Record, and referred to the Calendar of
Motions to instruct committees.''
It will be observed that the word ``sign'' is used. No provision
whatever is made for any such thing as signing by proxy or by an agency
of any sort. While it is true that in some cans Members are authorized
to vote while absent, in committee proceedings, the Chair thinks that
is purely a matter of courtesy with the committee. It is not a question
of the rules of the House at all. There is no rule that the Chair knows
of in the House of Representatives for any sort of proxy. No man can
transfer his vote or permit another Member to vote for him, as I
believe is the rule in the French Chamber of Deputies. A Member must
vote in person.
There being no provision in the rule for anything else, the Chair is
very clear that no Member can delegate to another the right to sign
such a petition as this.
1015. A motion to discharge a committee from the consideration of a
bill applies to the bill as referred to the committee and not as it may
have been amended in the committee.
The House has no information relative to proceedings of a committee
not officially reported by direction of the committee.
On February 25, 1932,\3\ Mr. Carl G. Bachmann, of West Virginia,
rising to submit a parliamentary inquiry, called attention to a
motion,\4\ then pending in the custody of the Clerk, for the discharge
of the Committee on the Judiciary from further consideration of the
joint resolution (H. J. 208) proposing an amendment to the eighteenth
amendment to the Constitution. Mr. Bachmann explained that the
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\1\ Second session Seventy-first Congress, Record, p. 4829.
\2\ Nicholas Longworth, of Ohio, Speaker.
\3\ First session Seventy-second Congress, Record, p. 4705.
\4\ This motion with the required signatures appears at the close of
the proceedings in both the Record and Journal for March 1, 1932;
Record, p. 5058.
Sec. 1016
original resolution had been amended by the committee and in its
modified form had been laid on the table in the committee, and asked
which form of the resolution was affected by the motion to discharge
and whether the original resolution as referred to the committee or the
amended resolution as tabled by the committee would be taken up for
consideration in the House if the committee was discharged.
The Speaker \1\ ruled:
It is very plain under the rule that the motion to discharge, if
agreed to, would bring out the joint resolution as originally
introduced. The House has no knowledge of the statements made by the
gentleman from West Virginia as to what happened in the Committee on
the Judiciary. The only knowledge that the House has is that House
Joint Resolution 208 was introduced and referred to the Committee on
the Judiciary. Whatever petition is signed to bring the joint
resolution out under the rule would have to be a petition to bring out
the original resolution as sent to the Committee on the Judiciary.
1016. The House (overruling the Speaker) held the motion discharging
a committee from the consideration of a bill to be of higher privilege
on suspension day than the motion to resolve into Committee of the
Whole for the consideration of revenue or appropriation bills.
On Monday, January 16, 1911,\2\ a suspension day under the current
rule, Mr. John A. T. Hull, of Iowa, moved that the House resolve itself
into the Committee of the Whole House on the state of the Union for the
consideration of the Army appropriation bill.
Mr. John J. Fitzgerald, of New York, offered, as preferential, a
motion to discharge the Committee on Ways and Means from the further
consideration of the bill (H. R. 19784) to suspend the collection of
duties on meats.
The Speaker \3\ ruled that the motion to go into Committee of the
Whole to consider an appropriation bill took precedence of the motion
to discharge a committee.
On an appeal by Mr. Fitzgerald, the House, by a vote of yeas 126,
nays 146, declined to sustain the decision of the Chair.
1017. On December 18, 1922,\4\ it being a third Monday, Mr. Patrick
H. Kelley, of Michigan, moved that the House resolve into Committee of
the Whole House on the state of the Union to consider the naval
appropriation bill.
Pending which, Mr. Carl Hayden, of Arizona, asked recognition to call
up from the Calendar of Motions to Discharge Committees, then in
effect, a motion to discharge the Committee on Interstate and Foreign
Commerce from consideration of the bill (H. R. 263) amending the act to
regulate commerce.
Mr. William H. Stafford, of Wisconsin, made the point of order that
the motion to resolve into Committee of the Whole to consider
appropriation or revenue bills took precedence.
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\1\ John N. Garner, of Texas, Speaker.
\2\ Third session Sixty-first Congress, Record, p. 965.
\3\ Joseph G. Cannon, of Illinois, Speaker.
\4\ Fourth session Sixty-seventh Congress, Record, p. 641.
Sec. 1018
The Speaker \1\ held that, under the rule, the motion to discharge
took priority on suspension days, and recognized Mr. Hayden to call up
the motion.
1018. The motion to discharge a committee has been held to take
precedence of a motion to suspend the rules.
Recognition to call up motions from the Discharge Calendar is granted
in the order in which entered on the calendar.
On Monday, December 19, 1910,\2\ a day on which the calling up of
motions from the Discharge Calendar and motions to suspend the rules
were respectively in order in the rotation named, Mr. Charles E.
Fuller, of Illinois, by direction of the Committee on Invalid Pensions,
moved to suspend the rules and pass the bill (H. R. 29346) granting
pensions to Civil War veterans.
Pending this motion, Mr. John J. Fitzgerald, of New York, proposed to
call up from the Calendar of Motions to Discharge Committees a motion
to discharge the Committee on Ways and Means from consideration of the
bill (H. R. 19784) to suspend duties on meats, which motion was No. 19
on the calendar.
Thereupon Mr. James R. Mann, of Illinois, claimed the right to call
up from the Discharge Calendar the motion to discharge the Committee on
Post Offices and Post Roads from the further consideration of the bill
(H. R. 21321) to codify the postal laws of the United States, which
motion was No. 1 on the calendar.
The Speaker \3\ ruled:
This is a new rule. The gentleman from Illinois was recognized by the
Chair to suspend the rules, a motion which ordinarily would be in order
to-day over any other motion; but even after the bill referred to in
the motion to suspend has been read, it seems to the Chair a motion to
discharge the committee would take precedence under the terms of the
rule. So that at this stage, it seems to the Chair, in construing this
new rule, that the motion called up by the gentleman from New York
would be in order. He seems, however, to be superseded as to that
motion because the gentleman from Illinois calls up the first bill on
the calendar. And if he insists upon that, it will take precedence of
the motion of the gentleman from New York and also of the motion of the
gentleman from Illinois. The Clerk will report the bill called up by
the gentleman from Illinois.
1019. The time required after reference to calendar before motion to
discharge may be presented does not begin to run until committee is
appointed and organized.
On Monday, August 7, 1911,\4\ it being suspension day, Mr. Adolph J.
Sabath, of Illinois, proposed to call up from the Calendar of Motions
to Discharge Committees a motion to discharge the Committee on
Immigration and Naturalization from consideration of the bill (H. R.
1343) to amend the immigration act.
Mr. William F. Murray, of Massachusetts, made the point of order that
the bill had not been on the calendar the required number of days when
the motion was entered.
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\1\ Frederick H. Gillett, of Massachusetts, Speaker.
\2\ Third session Sixty-first Congress, Record, p. 498.
\3\ Joseph G. Cannon, of Illinois, Speaker.
\4\ First session Sixty-second Congress, Record, p. 3710.
Sec. 1019a
The Speaker \1\ said:
It is the opinion of the Chair that a bill must have been referred to
a committee for 15 days before it would be in order to move to
discharge said committee from consideration of said bill. The
committees were elected by the House on the 11th day of April, and 11
days plus 15 days, to wit, the 26th of April, would be the earliest day
on which said motion could be entered, for in computing the time you
can not include both days. This motion was placed on the calendar on
April 19. Speaker Cannon held--on May 3, 1909, Sixty-first Congress,
first session, page 1689--that until committees were appointed bills
and resolutions that had been introduced in the House were not before
these committees, and it was not privileged to move to discharge a
committee on a resolution of inquiry 7 days after the introduction of
such a resolution, as provided for by Rule XXII, clause 5. This
discharge rule provides that it shall be in order to move to discharge
a committee from further consideration of a bill referred to said
committee 15 days prior to the motion. The intention of the rule is to
allow the committee 15 days to consider the bill. This rule is a
stringent one, and to discharge a committee under it is a reflection on
the committee for tardiness of action. To say that the 15 days' notice
should begin to run before a committee is in existence would work gross
injustice upon such committee. This motion was placed on the Discharge
Calendar 8 days after the organization of the Committee on Immigration
and Naturalization, and, in the opinion of the Chair, was prematurely
placed thereon. Therefore, the Chair is compelled to sustain the point
of order.
1019a. Bills taken up for consideration from the discharge calendar
are not subject to the prohibition provided by section 2 of Rule XXI
interdicting consideration of appropriations not reported by the
Committee on Appropriations.
Bills called up under motions to discharge committees from their
further consideration are read by title only.
On March 12, 1934,\2\ Mr. Wright Patman, of Texas, under section 4 of
Rule XXVII, moved to discharge the Committee on Ways and Means from the
further consideration of the bill (H.R. 1) to provide for controlled
expansion of the currency and the immediate payment to veterans of the
face value of their adjusted-service certificates.
Pending the motion, Mr. Blanton demanded the reading of the bill in
full. The Speaker \3\ called attention to the provision of the rule
requiring that bills so called up be read by title only. Whereupon, on
motion of Mr. Blanton, by unanimous consent, the bill was ordered
printed in full in the Record.
The question being taken on the pending motion, it was decided in the
affirmative, yeas 313, nays 104, and the motion was agreed to. On
motion of Mr. Patman, the House resolved itself into the Committee of
the Whole House on the state of the Union for the consideration of the
bill.
In the reading of the bill the following section was reached:
Sec. 2. (a) Payment of the face value of adjusted-service
certificates under section 509 or 510 of the World War Adjusted
Compensation Act, as amended, shall be made in United States notes not
bearing interest. The Secretary of the Treasury is hereby authorized
and directed to issue such notes in such amount as may be required to
make such payment, and of the same wording, form, size, and
denominations as United States notes issued under existing law, except
that
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\1\ Champ Clark, of Missouri, Speaker.
\2\ Second Session Seventy-third Congress, Record p. 4379.
\3\ Henry T. Rainey, of Illinois, Speaker.
Sec. 1020
the wording thereon shall conform to the provisions of this act. The
Administrator of Veterans' Affairs and the Secretary of the Treasury
are hereby authorized and directed jointly to prescribe rules and
regulations for the delivery of such notes in payment under section 509
or 510 of the World War Adjusted Compensation Act, as amended.
(b) United States notes issued pursuant to the provisions of this act
shall be lawful money of the United States and shall be maintained at a
parity of value with the standard unit of value fixed by law. Such
notes shall be legal tender in payment of all debts and dues, public
and private, and shall be receivable for customs, taxes, and all public
dues, and when so received shall be reissued. Such notes, when held by
any national banking association or Federal Reserve bank, may be
counted as a part of its lawful reserve. The provisions of sections 1
and 2 of the act of March 14, 1900, as amended (U.S.C., title 31, secs.
314 and 408), and section 26 of the Federal Reserve Act, as amended
(U.S.C., title 31, sec. 409), are hereby made applicable to such notes
in the same manner and to the same extent as such provisions apply to
United States notes.
Mr. John Taber, of New York, made the point of order that the section
carried an appropriation, and the Committee on Ways and Means,
therefore, was without authority to report the bill.
The Chairman \1\ overruled the point of order and said:
The section of the rule to which the gentleman from New York refers,
and on which he relies to support his point of order, provides as
follows:
``No bill or joint resolution carrying appropriations shall be
reported by any committee not having jurisdiction to report
appropriations.''
Now, this bill had not been reported by the Committee on Ways and
Means, as the gentleman from New York suggests. It has not been
reported by any committee. The committee having jurisdiction has been
discharged from its further consideration, and it has been brought
before the House under the provisions of the discharge rule
specifically authorizing its consideration. The question as to whether
it carries an appropriation, or does not carry an appropriation, is
immaterial. The rule cited by the gentleman from New York does not
apply, and the point of order is overruled.
1020. A member calling up a bill from the Discharge Calendar is
precluded from making a point of order against it.
On August 7, 1911,\2\ a Monday on which the consideration of motions
on the Calendar of Motions to Discharge Committees was in order, Mr.
Adolph J. Sabath, of Illinois, called up from the calendar a motion to
discharge the Committee on Immigration and Naturalization from
consideration of the bill (H. R. 1343) to amend the immigration act.
Having been recognized by the Speaker for that purpose, Mr. Sabath
submitted the point of order that the bill had not been referred to the
Committee on Immigration and Naturalization a sufficient number of days
when the motion was filed.
Mr. Swagar Sherley, of Kentucky, made the point of order that, having
called up the motion, Mr. Sabath was precluded from raising a question
of order against it.
The Speaker \3\ sustained the point of order and said:
The Chair sustains the point of order that when a motion to discharge
a committee from the consideration of a bill is called up the Member
calling it up can not make a point of order against it.
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\1\ Clarence Cannon, of Missouri, Chairman.
\2\ First session Sixty-second Congress, Record, p. 3710.
\3\ Champ Clark, of Missouri, Speaker.
Sec. 1021
1021. The House having discharged a committee under the former rule,
it was held that the proper motion for consideration was, if a House
Calendar bill, that the House proceed to immediate consideration; if a
Union Calendar bill, that the House resolve into Committee of the Whole
to consider the bill.
The requirement that a bill be considered in Committee of the Whole
is not waived by the fact that the standing committee having
jurisdiction has been discharged from consideration, and the bill is
not on the calendar.
On Monday, May 5, 1924,\1\ the first Monday of the month, immediately
after the approval of the Journal, Mr. Alben W. Barkley, of Kentucky,
called up from the calendar the motion to discharge the Committee on
Interstate and Foreign Commerce for consideration of the bill (H. R.
7358) to provide for arbitration between carriers and their employees,
a bill placed on the calendar April 11.
The question on agreeing to the motion to discharge the committee
from further consideration of the bill, being taken, was decided in the
affirmative, yeas 194, nays 181.
Whereupon Mr. Barkley moved that the House proceed to the immediate
consideration of the bill. The motion was agreed to by a vote of yeas
197, nays 172.
Mr. Barkley then moved that the House resolve itself into the
Committee of the Whole House on the state of the Union to consider the
bill.
The Speaker announced that the noes seemed to have it, when Mr.
Barkley submitted that the House, having previously agreed to consider
the bill, the second motion was superfluous and the House should have
automatically resolved into the Committee of the Whole House on the
state of the Union.
The Speaker \2\ said:
This is the first time this rule has been interpreted, and the Chair
thinks it is quite important that we should settle it now carefully and
rightly. The rule under which we are proceeding provides that if the
motion to discharge prevails, it shall then be in order for any Member
who signed the motion to move that the House proceed to the immediate
consideration of the bill. While the rule provides that the House shall
proceed to the immediate consideration of the bill, yet in the case of
a bill which must be considered in Committee of the Whole House on the
state of the Union the Chair thinks that the proper motion would be not
to proceed to immediate consideration but that the House resolve itself
into the Committee of the Whole House on the state of the Union for the
consideration of the bill, because that is the procedure in other
similar situations. One can not raise the question of consideration in
the House on a bill that is on the Union Calendar, because it has been
held that the way to raise the question of consideration in that
situation is to move that the House resolve itself into the Committee
of the Whole House on the state of the Union for the consideration of
the bill. That motion raises the question of consideration. It seems to
the Chair that it would establish a good precedent if the House should
follow that analogy here and decide that when a bill from which the
committee has been discharged is on the House Calendar, the proper
motion is that the House proceed to its immediate consideration, but
that when it is a bill that must be considered in Committee of the
Whole, the motion would be to move that the House resolve itself into
the Committee of the Whole House on the state of the Union for the
consideration of the bill. It seems preposterous to say that we should
first move to consider the bill and then move to go into the Committee
of the Whole House on the state of the Union to consider it, which
raises the same issue. Why would it not be well to follow the
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\1\ First session Sixty-eighth Congress, Record, p. 7874.
\2\ Frederick H. Gillett, of Massachusetts, Speaker.
Sec. 1022
analogies of ordinary procedure and hold that with a bill that must be
considered in the Committee of the Whole House on the state of the
Union, the proper way to raise the question of consideration is to move
that the House resolve itself into the Committee of the Whole House on
the state of the Union? In that way the question of consideration is
raised immediately. When it is a bill which does not need consideration
in the Committee of the Whole then the proper motion is that the House
proceed to its immediate consideration.
The one question that it seems to the Chair as wise for us to have
settled now, with a view to the procedure in the future, is as to
whether, when a bill is one which requires to be considered in
Committee of the Whole, there shall be two votes on that, one to
consider the bill, and second, to go into Committee of the Whole; and
the Chair does not criticize the gentleman from Kentucky in moving
consideration. He followed the exact language of the rule, as was the
proper and safe course. But the Chair thinks we might well decide now
that for the future we might give the language a different
interpretation. There are two ways of raising the question of
consideration in the House--one by using that language and the other,
in the case of bills on the Union Calendar, by moving to go into the
Committee of the Whole for their consideration. Why should we not
follow that precedent here and, in case of bills which impose a charge
on the Treasury, move that the House proceed to its immediate
consideration by moving that the House resolve itself into the
Committee of the Whole House? Then we follow the spirit of the rule, if
not its exact language, and save one roll call, and the Chair would be
inclined, if it is a bill that requires the House to go into Committee
of the Whole, that that motion should be made immediately, and then it
would not be necessary to make the motion for immediate consideration.
1022. A motion to take up a bill, from the consideration of which a
committee has been discharged, under the former rule, being rejected,
the motion was held not to be again in order on the same Monday, but to
retain its privilege, and be admissible on a subsequent first or third
Monday.
Except in sessions ending by law, business admissible on the last six
days of a session is not in order until the concurrent resolution
providing for adjournment has passed both Houses.
On Monday, May 19, 1924,\1\ pending a motion by Mr. Alben W. Barkley,
of Kentucky, under the former rule, that the House resolve into the
Committee of the Whole House on the state of the Union to consider the
bill (H. R. 7358) to provide for arbitration between carriers and their
employees, Mr. Royal C. Johnson, of South Dakota, as a parliamentary
inquiry, asked what would be the status of this bill if the motion was
decided in the negative.
The Speaker \2\ said:
This may not be important at present, but it raises a question in the
construction of this rule which may some day be important, and the
Chair will state just how it lies in his mind.
The rule provides that when a bill is brought up the first day, if
the question of consideration is voted down--and the Chair stated two
weeks ago he thought that the question of consideration of a bill on
the Union Calendar like this could be raised by moving to go into
Committee of the Whole House on the state of the Union--if that was
voted down the rule provides that the bill goes onto the ordinary
calendar; but if it is not voted down it becomes a privileged question.
The Chair is inclined to think that after the day when a bill first
comes up, if the House has decided to consider it, after that when it
is called up, either as at present to go into the Committee of the
Whole of if the question of consideration should be raised in the case
of a bill that was not on the Union Calendar, the Chair is disposed to
think if that motion should be voted down that the bill would not lose
its privilege; that it has attained its privilege the first day by
consideration being given, and that instead of going to the calendar it
would still be privi-
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\1\ First session Sixty-eighth Congress, Record, p. 8894.
\2\ Frederick H. Gillett, of Massachusetts, Speaker.
Sec. 1023
leged business on the days provided in the rule--the first and third
Mondays; and reverting to the exact question to-day, if the motion to
go into committee should be voted down, then this bill would be in
order again two weeks from to-day, just as it is to-day, and would not
lose its privilege and go to the calendar.
Mr. Barkley asked if rejection of the motion would dispose of the
bill for that day.
The Speaker replied:
The Chair would think so, and that the suspension of the rules and
Consent Calendar would then come up.
Mr. Barkley further inquired when the motion would be precluded under
the clause prohibiting consideration of such business during the last
six days of the session.
The Speaker said:
The last six days of the session are never determined on in the long
session until near the close of the session. We never know when the
last six days are until the concurrent resolution is passed providing
for the adjournment. Unless that has been passed before two weeks from
to-day, the Chair thinks it would still be privileged.
1023. Prior to revision of the rule making bills called up the
continuing business until disposed of, bills remaining undisposed of at
adjournment on Monday, instead of coming up as unfinished business on
the following legislative day went over to the next Monday on which
that class of business was again in order.
The Speaker held that while the courts may not construe a law in the
light of debate attending its passage in the Legislature, the rules are
to be interpreted according to views of their purport expressed at the
time of adoption.
On Tuesday, May 6, 1924,\1\ Mr. Martin B. Madden, of Illinois, from
the Committee on Appropriations, moved that the House resolve itself
into the Committee of the Whole House on the state of the Union for the
consideration of the District appropriation bill.
Mr. Alben W. Barkley, of Kentucky, offered, as preferential, a motion
to resolve into the Committee of the Whole for the further
consideration of the bill (H. R. 7358) to provide for arbitration
between carriers and their employees, from which the Committee on
Interstate and Foreign Commerce had been discharged and which was under
consideration at adjournment on the preceding day.
The Speaker \2\ said:
The Chair appreciates that this is an important question, because it
is a precedent for the future conduct of the House under this rule. Let
us consider the exact parliamentary status. The Chair recognized the
chairman of the Committee on Appropriations to move to take up an
appropriation bill which was partly finished. As against that the
gentleman from Kentucky, who has charge of the bill considered
yesterday under the discharge rule, moved to take up the bill, claiming
it had a higher privilege. In order to recognize the gentleman from
Kentucky, it must be shown that it has a higher privilege than an
appropriation bill, because if they are of
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\1\ First session Sixty-eighth Congress, Record, p. 7960.
\2\ Frederick H. Gillett, of Massachusetts, Speaker.
Sec. 1023
equal privilege the Chair has the discretion in recognition, and that
is conclusive. Therefore it must be maintained that this bill from
which the committee was discharged has a higher privilege than an
appropriation bill. The clause of the rule which we must interpret
reads:
``If the motion prevails, it shall then be in order for any Member
who signed the motion to move that the House proceed to the immediate
consideration of such bill or resolution (such motion not being
debatable), and such motion is hereby made of high privilege; and if it
shall be decided in the affirmative, the bill shall be immediately
considered under the general rules of the House.''
It is to be observed that the bill itself is not made privileged.
Privilege is given only to the original motion to consider the bill;
and the question which has been debated and which is really in issue is
whether that applies simply to suspension days and so would not come up
again for two weeks, or whether it is a continuing privilege and
applies today.
It seemed to the Chair that the argument made by the gentleman from
Georgia, Mr. Crisp, who was the author of the rule and its main
advocate and proponent in the House when it was debated, very lucidly
and conclusively stated the meaning of that rule. Of course it could
be, by the mere phraseology of the rule, interpreted either way. It
could be held to be privileged every day or only Mondays. The fact that
it was made a clause of Rule XXVII, the suspension rule, would have
some weight.
Then also the well-established law that business which is in order on
a special day, if it is not finished, goes over to the next special
clay is a suggestive analogy. We have become accustomed to it on
Calendar Wednesdays and on suspension days and on the Private Calendar
days and it would seem to apply here. But what seems to the Chair
conclusive is that when the rule was under consideration in the House
the gentleman from Georgia, who was the author and chief advocate of
the bill, stated in language which has been quoted on the floor--stated
very explicitly--that the intention of the rule was that if a committee
was discharged and the bill was not finished on that day it would go
over until the next suspension day.
Now, that was stated more than once by him. It was in response to
inquiries from Members as to what the proper interpretation of the rule
was; and it seems to the Chair that it is very conclusive as to the
meaning which the House, when it adopted that rule, understood and
intended by it; that the House understood at the time that the business
under that rule, if it came up on one Monday, as yesterday, and was not
completed, went over for two weeks; and, while in the courts it may not
be allowed to ascertain the meaning of a law by examining the debate in
the Legislature, it seems to the Chair it is different here. The House
only at this session debated this question and adopted this rule. The
House was informed by the author of the rule what was intended. There
was no remonstrance or difference of opinion that the Chair has been
able to find at the time. The House apparently acquiesced in his
explanation. And so it seems to the Chair that he is carrying out the
purpose of the House in adopting this rule by deciding that the House
intended that this language, which might be given either
interpretation, was intended to mean that the business should go over
for two weeks. So the Chair sustains the point of order.