[Deschler's Precedents, Volume 2, Chapters 7 - 9]
[Chapter 9. Election Contests]
[L. Disposition of Contests; Resolutions]
[§ 43. Committee Reports]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office, www.gpo.gov]
[Page 1090-1095]
CHAPTER 9
Election Contests
L. DISPOSITION OF CONTESTS; RESOLUTIONS
Sec. 43. Committee Reports
Under the House rules, until the 94th Congress, the Committee on
House Administration was required to make a final report to the House
in each contested election case.(16)
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16. Rule XI clause 25, House Rules and Manual Sec. 733 (1973).
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This report was to be made at such time ``as the committee
considers practicable in that Congress to which the contestee is
elected.'' (17) Prior to the adoption of this language, the
rule required submission of final reports not later than six months
from the first day of the first regular session of the Congress. Such
rules have been construed as directory rather than
mandatory.(18)
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17. Id.
18. Id. (notes).
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[[Page 1091]]
In General; Form of Report
Sec. 43.1 The committee report may be summary in form, and may provide
for the disposition of more than one contest in the same report.
In Woodward v O'Brien (Sec. 54.6, infra), a 1947 Illinois contest,
the Committee on House Administration disposed of the contest in a
summary report which also provided for the disposition of two other
cases. The report recited that no testimony in behalf of the contestant
had been taken during the required period, and recommended that notices
of intention to contest the elections be dismissed.
Sec. 43.2 An elections committee report may summarily recommend that a
contest be dismissed as lacking in merit.
In Mankin v Davis (Sec. 54.2, infra), a 1947 Georgia election
contest in which the contestant disputed the method by which the
contestee had been nominated in the primary election, the committee
report indicated that the committee had held full hearings in the
contest, and had given consideration to the contestee's brief, which
had been filed more than 30 days after reception of a copy of the
contestant's brief, and the committee summarily recommended that the
contest be dismissed ``as lacking in merit.'' Accordingly, the contest
was dismissed.
Sec. 43.3 The Committee on House Administration has submitted a final
report on an election contest brought by a defeated primary
candidate although there was no record of transmittal of the
contest to the committee.
In the 1951 Georgia contested election of Lowe v Davis (Sec. 56.3,
infra), there was no record of transmittal of the contest to the
Committee on House Administration, nor did the House adopt a resolution
referring the contest to the committee, but the committee nevertheless
submitted a unanimous report indicating that the contestant, who had
not been a candidate in the general election, had been defeated by the
contestee in the primary election and that ``the contestee had not been
guilty of any acts in connection with that primary which would
disqualify him for office.''
Resolution Accompanying Report
Sec. 43.4 A member of an elections committee may submit
[[Page 1092]]
a report on an election contest from the floor for printing in the
Record, and then immediately call up an accompanying privileged
resolution relating to the contest by unanimous consent.
In the 1943 Illinois election contest of Moreland v Schuetz
(Sec. 52.3, infra), after submitting the election committee report that
the contestant had not introduced sufficient evidence to warrant a
complete recount, which he had requested, a Member on the election
committee then by unanimous consent called up on the same day the
resolution disposing of the contest.
The House agreed to the resolution.(19)
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19. This procedure has been followed in almost every election contest.
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Timeliness of Report
Sec. 43.5 The rule that required the Committee on House Elections to
submit their final reports within six months from the first day of
the first regular session to which the contestee was elected was
construed to be directory and not mandatory, so as not to prevent
the consideration of an election contest reported after the six
months had expired.
In Roy v Jenks (Sec. 49.1, infra), a 1938 New Hampshire contest, a
point of order was made against acceptance of a final report on an
election contest by the House in that it was not timely, being in
violation of former section 47 of Rule XI, which required the
submission of such reports not later than six months from the first day
of the first regular session of the Congress to which the contestee was
elected. The Speaker overruled the point of order challenging the
report, noting that a mandatory construction of that rule would be
inconsistent with the constitutional right of the House to judge the
election of its Members, and inconsistent with the statutory right of
parties to collect testimony for a longer period.
Sec. 43.6 The Speaker ruled that a point of order could not be directed
against reception by the House of an elections committee report
that was not presented to the House until after the period required
for its submission had expired.
As noted above, in Roy v Jenks (Sec. 49.1, infra), a 1938 New
Hampshire contest, Speaker William B. Bankhead, of Alabama, overruled a
point of order directed against
[[Page 1093]]
the late filing of an elections committee report; an appeal from this
decision was laid on the table by a roll call vote.
Minority Reports
Sec. 43.7 By unanimous consent, the minority views of an elections
committee may be filed subsequent to the filing of the majority
final report.
In Roy v Jenks (Sec. 49.1, infra), a 1938 New Hampshire contest,
the minority of the Committee on Elections was granted one week, by
unanimous consent, to file its views.
Sec. 43.8 The minority views of an election committee, though filed
subsequent to the views of the majority, were by unanimous consent
printed to accompany the views of the majority.
In the 1932 Illinois election contest of Kunz v Granata (Sec. 46.2,
infra), the report from the majority on the Committee of Elections No.
3 was submitted on Mar. 11, 1932, and the following day a member of the
committee minority was given unanimous consent by the House to print
the minority views to accompany the majority report.
Sec. 43.9 Dissenting members of a subcommittee on elections have
presented minority views and recommendations, together with a
chronological chart of events, the rules of the Committee on
Elections, and the laws governing contested elections.
In the 1949 Michigan contested election of Stevens v Blackney
(Sec. 55.3, infra), the minority report took strong exception to the
actions of the subcommittee and filed a minority report citing
precedents of the House, court decisions and federal statutes.
Effect of Contestant's Withdrawal or Abandonment of Contest
Sec. 43.10 The report of an elections committee may recite the fact
that contestant had withdrawn his notice of contest, and may
include a resolution recommending that contestee be held entitled
to his seat.
In Smith v Polk (Sec. 50.3, infra), a 1939 Ohio contest, a
unanimous report of the Committee on Elections recited the fact that
contestant had withdrawn the contest and recommended the following
resolution:
Resolved, That the Honorable James G. Polk was duly elected as
Representative from the Sixth Congressional
[[Page 1094]]
District of the State of Ohio to the Seventy-sixth Congress and is
entitled to his seat.
Sec. 43.11 There have been instances in which an elections committee
has failed to submit a final report, particularly in those cases
where the House has been informed that the contestant has abandoned
his contest.
In the 1937 Tennessee contested election case of Rutherford v
Taylor (Sec. 49.2, infra), the Clerk transmitted a letter to the
Speaker advising that the contestant had initiated an election contest
on Dec. 4, 1936, by serving notice on the contestee, a returned Member,
and had taken testimony on Jan. 27, 29, and again on Apr. 27, 1937, but
that no further testimony had been adduced. The Clerk advised in the
letter that the contest had abated. The Speaker referred the letter,
along with copies of the notice and answer, to the Committee on
Elections No. 1 and ordered the materials printed as a House
document.(20)
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20. See also LaGuardia v Lanzetta (Sec. 47.10, infra), a 1934 New York
election contest.
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Sec. 43.12 A report of a committee on elections, containing its
recommendations as to the disposition of the contest, may include a
transcript of contestant's letter of withdrawal.
In the 1934 Mississippi election contest of Reese v Ellzey
(Sec. 47.13, infra), the Committee on Elections report contained a
letter from the contestant withdrawing from the contest, stating in
part that ``while so many matters of vital importance require the
attention of the Congress, it would be unpatriotic on my part to
attempt to occupy the time of Congress about a matter of such trivial
importance to the welfare of our country.''
Failure of Committee to Submit Report
Sec. 43.13 There have been instances in which an elections committee
did not submit a report and the House did not dispose of a contest
in which testimony had been taken by the parties and forwarded
pursuant to statute.
In the 1934 Pennsylvania election contest of Felix v Muldowney
(Sec. 47.7, infra), the Speaker laid before the House a letter from the
Clerk transmitting the contest instituted by the contestant. That
communication, containing also original testimony taken by the parties
and other accompanying
[[Page 1095]]
papers, was referred to the Committee on Elections and ordered printed.
The committee, however, did not submit a report relating to this
election contest during the 73d Congress, and the House took no other
action with respect to the contest.
Sec. 43.14 There have been instances in which the report of the
Subcommittee on Elections has been printed and adopted by the full
Committee on House Administration, but no further action taken on
the election contest.
In the 1963 Minnesota election contest of Odegard v Olson
(Sec. 60.1, infra), neither a resolution dismissing the contest or
declaring the contestee entitled to his seat nor the report of the
Subcommittee on Elections, was submitted by the Committee on House
Administration to the House, although the full committee had adopted
the subcommittee report finding that time for taking testimony had
expired.