[Deschler's Precedents, Volume 2, Chapters 7 - 9]
[Chapter 9. Election Contests]
[L. Disposition of Contests; Resolutions]
[§ 45. Costs and Expenses; Compensation and Allowances]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office, www.gpo.gov]
[Page 1096-1099]
CHAPTER 9
Election Contests
L. DISPOSITION OF CONTESTS; RESOLUTIONS
Sec. 45. Costs and Expenses; Compensation and Allowances
A witness whose deposition is taken under the Federal Contested
Elections Act is entitled to receive the same fees and travel allowance
paid to witnesses subpenaed to appear before the House of
Representatives or its committees.(1)
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1. 2 USC Sec. 389(b).
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The Committee on House Administration may allow to any party
reimbursement, from the contingent fund of the House, for his
reasonable expenses of the case, including reasonable attorney's fees.
An application for such reimbursement should be accompanied by a
detailed account of such expenses, together with supporting vouchers
and receipts.(2)
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2. 2 USC Sec. 396.
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Under the former Contested Elections Act, 2 USC Sec. 226, no
contestant or contestee was to be paid more than $2,000 for expenses in
election contests. Payment of any sum under the former statute was
subject to several conditions and obligations. No such limit, other
than the term ``reasonable expenses'' is contained in the present
statute, 2 USC Sec. 396. -------------------
Payments From Contingent Fund
Sec. 45.1 Where authorized by the House, the Committee on House
Administration may
[[Page 1097]]
make payments, even after the House adjourns, from the House
contingent fund for its expenses incurred in its investigation of
an election contest.
In Wilson v Granger (Sec. 54.5, infra), a 1948 Illinois contest,
following numerous extensions of time granted by the Committee on House
Administration to the parties in an election contest, the House agreed
to a resolution providing for payments, after adjournment, by the
committee of a limited amount from the contingent fund, to cover the
costs of employment of investigators, attorneys, and clerical,
stenographic, and other assistants involved in the investigation.
Sec. 45.2 The House may agree to a resolution providing for payment of
expenses incurred by an elections committee, from the contingent
fund of the House.
In Roy v Jenks (Sec. 49.1, infra), a 1938 New Hampshire contest, a
committee on elections having been directed to conduct an additional
investigation in a contested election case, the House agreed to a
resolution called up by unanimous consent by a member of the committee
which provided for payment of its expenses from the contingent fund of
the House.
Payments From Treasury Authorized by Joint Resolution
Sec. 45.3 Congress may, by joint resolution, appropriate money from the
Treasury to pay expenses incurred by the parties in an election
contest.
In Lanzetta v Marcantonio (Sec. 48.1, infra), a 1936 New York
contest, on the final day of the second session of the 74th Congress, a
House joint resolution was introduced from the floor which made
appropriations for the payment of expenses incurred in an election
contest for a seat in the House from New York. Payment was authorized
to both contestant and contestee for expenses incurred, as audited and
recommended by the Committee on Elections. The joint resolution was
passed without debate and by voice vote.
Payments to Candidates Involved in Election Dispute Investigation
Sec. 45.4 In an investigation of the right of two candidates for a seat
in the House in a disputed election, the House has authorized by
resolution the reimbursement of both candidates for mileage and
expenses actually incurred
[[Page 1098]]
in connection with the investigation by the Committee on House
Administration.
In the 1961 Indiana investigation of the right of J. Edward Roush
or George O. Chambers to a seat in the House (Sec. 59.1, infra), the
committee report reasoned that ``had the investigation . . . been an
actual `election contest,' both the contestant and the contestee would
have been authorized reimbursement of those expenses actually incurred
in connection with the investigation conducted by the committee'';
hence the House resolved to reimburse both candidates.
Retroactive Payments
Sec. 45.5 When, in a disputed election, the right of a candidate to a
seat in the House has been determined, the Member-elect may be
retroactively given the compensation, mileage, allowances, and
other emoluments of a Member from the time he would otherwise have
been sworn, had not his right to the seat been investigated.
In the 1961 Indiana investigation of the question of the right of
J. Edward Roush or George O. Chambers to a seat (Sec. 59.1, infra), the
House ultimately resolved that Roush was entitled to the seat and
awarded him the compensation, mileage, and the like, of a Member from
the time that the Congress had convened (when he would otherwise have
taken the oath).
Reimbursement Request Where Contest Has Abated
Sec. 45.6 A request for reimbursement of legal expenses incurred in a
contested election was submitted to the Clerk even though the
contest had abated by reason of the contestant's failure to produce
evidence in support of his case within the time required by law.
In the 1937 Tennessee election contest of Rutherford v Taylor
(Sec. 49.2, infra), the contestee claimed that he was entitled to
reimbursement for legal expenses as permitted by 2 USC
Sec. 226.(3)~ Eventually the Clerk transmitted a letter to
the Speaker notifying him that the contest had abated, but not before
the contestant had served notice of the contest upon the contestee, who
answered the notice. Also, some testimony was taken before the case
abated. The
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3. Now 2 USC Sec. 396.
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[[Page 1099]]
Committee on Elections never issued a final report on the case.
Payments Conditioned on Good Faith in Filing the Contest
Sec. 45.7 A contestant's petition for expenses may be denied by an
elections committee on the ground that contestant did not display
good faith in filing the contest and made no showing of probable
cause for relief.
In McEvoy v Peterson (Sec. 52.2, infra), a 1944 Georgia contest, an
elections committee concluded that contestant had not filed the contest
in good faith, and denied his petition for reimbursement of expenses,
it appearing that he had not been a member of any registered political
party in the state, his name had not been on any ballots' and he had
not received any votes.