ping shipments of proliferation concern. By sharing information through diplomatic and other channels, we and our AG partners have been successful in interdicting various shipments destined to CBW programs.

MISSILES FOR WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION DELIVERY

During the reporting period, the United States carefully controlled exports that could contribute to unmanned delivery systems for weapons of mass destruction and closely monitored activities of potential missile proliferation concern. We also continued to implement U.S. missile sanctions law, in cases where sanctionable activity was determined to have occurred. In August 1997, we imposed sanctions against two North Korean entities determined to have engaged in missile proliferation activities. Similar sanctions imposed in May 1996 remain in effect against two entities in Iran and one entity in North Korea for transfers involving Category II Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) Annex items.

During this reporting period, MTCR Partners continued to share information about proliferation problems with each other and with other potential supplier, consumer, and transshipment states. Partners also emphasized the need for implementing effective export control systems. This cooperation has resulted in the interdiction of missile-related materials intended for use in missile programs of concern.

The United States was an active participant in the MTCR's June 1997 Reinforced Point of Contact Meeting (RPOC). At the RPOC, MTCR Partners engaged in useful discussions of regional missile proliferators' concerns, as well as steps the Partners could take to increase transparency and outreach to nonmembers.

In July 1997, the United States also played a leading role at the Swiss-hosted MTCR workshop on the licensing and enforcement aspects of transshipment. The workshop was successful in focusing attention on the enforcement problems raised by proliferators' misuse of transshipment and fostered a productive exchange of ideas on how countries can better address such activity.

The United States worked unilaterally and in coordination with its MTCR Partners to combat missile proliferation and to encourage nonmembers to export responsibly and to adhere to the MTCR Guidelines. Since the last report, we have continued our missile nonproliferation dialogue with China, the Republic of Korea (ROK), North Korea (DPRK), and Ukraine. In the course of normal diplomatic relations, we also have pursued such discussions with other countries in Central Europe, the Middle East, and Asia.

In June 1997, the United States and the DPRK held a second round of missile talks, aimed at freezing the DPRK's indigenous missile development program and curtailing its missile-related export activities. The DPRK appeared willing to consider limits on its missile-related exports, in return for sanctions-easing measures, but did not engage in discussion of limits on its missile development program. We intend to pursue further missile talks with the DPRK.

In July 1997, we held another round of nonproliferation talks with the ROK. These talks were productive and made progress toward facilitating ROK membership in the MTCR.

In response to reports that Iran had acquired sensitive items from Russian entities for use in Iran's missile development program, the United States intensified its high-level dialogue with Russia on this issue. We held a number of productive discussions with senior Russian officials aimed at finding ways the United States and Russia can work together to prevent Iran's ballistic missile development program from acquiring Russian technology and equipment. This process is continuing.

NUCLEAR WEAPONS

In a truly historic landmark in our efforts to curb the spread of nuclear weapons, the 50th U.N. General Assembly on September 10, 1996, adopted and called for signature of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), negotiated over the previous 2½ years in the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva. The overwhelming passage of this U.N. resolution (158–3–5) demonstrates the CTBT's strong international support and marks a major success for United States foreign policy. On September 24, 1996, I and other international leaders signed the CTBT in New York.

During 1997, CTBT signatories have conducted numerous meetings of the Preparatory Commission in Vienna, seeking to promote rapid completion of the International Monitoring System established by the Treaty. On September 23, I transmitted the CTBT to the Senate, requesting prompt advice and consent to ratification.

The CTBT will serve several United States national security interests in banning all nuclear explosions. It will constrain the development and qualitative improvement of nuclear weapons; end the development of advanced new types; contribute to the prevention of nuclear proliferation and the process of nuclear disarmament; and strengthen international peace and security. The CTBT marks an historic milestone in our drive to reduce the nuclear threat and to build a safer world.

Formal preparations for the year 2000 Review Conference for the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) began in 1997 with the first of three annual Preparatory Committee meetings of the Parties to the Treaty. The United States is committed to working to ensure that the 2000 NPT review Conference will further strengthen the NPT and reinforce global nuclear nonproliferation objectives. Since the 1995 NPT Conference, eight additional states have joined the NPT, leaving only five states worldwide currently outside the NPT regime. The NPT Exporters (Zangger) Committee added China to its membership in 1997.

The Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) continued its efforts to upgrade control lists and export control procedures. NSG members confirmed their agreement to clarifications to the nuclear trigger list to accord with trigger list changes agreed to by the members of the NPT Exporters (Zangger) Committee, and the International Atomic Energy Agency published these understandings on September 16, 1997. The NSG also is actively pursuing steps to enhance the transparency of the export regime in accordance with the call in Principles 16 and 17 of the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference.

The NSG held an export control seminar in Vienna on October 8 and 9, 1997, which described and explained the role of the NSG (and the Zangger Committee) in preventing nuclear proliferation. The NSG also continued efforts to enhance information sharing among members regarding the nuclear programs of proliferant countries by (1) ''officially'' linking the NSG members through a dedicated computer network allowing for real-time distribution of license denial information, and by (2) creating a separate session for exchange of information on the margins of the NSG plenary meeting.

NSG membership will increase to 35 with the acceptance of Latvia. The ultimate goal of the NSG is to obtain the agreement of all suppliers, including nations not members of the regime, to control nuclear and nuclear-related exports in accordance with the NSG guidelines.

EXPENSES

Pursuant to section 401(c) of the National Emergencies Act (50 U.S.C. 1641(c)), I report that there were no expenses directly attributable to the exercise of authorities conferred by the declaration of the national emergency in Executive Order 12938 during the semiannual reporting period.

WILLIAM J. CLINTON.

THE WHITE HOUSE, *November 12, 1997.*

By unanimous consent, the message, together with the accompanying papers, was referred to the Committee on International Relations and ordered to be printed (H. Doc. 105–169).

¶131.11 RECESS—1:14 P.M.

The SPEAKER pro tempore, Mr. PETRI, pursuant to clause 12 of rule I, declared the House in recess at 1 o'clock and 14 minutes p.m., until approximately 5 p.m.

¶131.12 AFTER RECESS—5:05 P.M.

The SPEAKER pro tempore, Mr. SUNUNU, called the House to order.

¶131.13 RESIGNATION AS MEMBER OF HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

The SPEAKER pro tempore, Mr. SUNUNU, laid before the House the following communication, which was read as follows: