Constitution, Jefferson's Manual, and the Rules of the House of Representatives, 104th Congress-Section XVII.Order in Debate

[Constitution, Jefferson's Manual, and the Rules of the House of Representatives, 104th Congress]
[104th Congress]
[House Document 103-342]
[Jeffersons Manual of ParliamentaryPractice]
[Pages 163-181]
[From the U.S. Government Printing Office, www.gpo.gov]

<>
When the Speaker is seated in his chair, every member is to sit in his
place. Scob., 6; Grey, 403.

SEC. XVII.--ORDER IN DEBATE.

[[Page 164]]

In the House of Representatives the decorum of Members is regulated by
the various provisions of rule XIV; and this provision of the
parliamentary law is practically obsolete.

Sec. 354. Procedure of the Member in seeking recognition.

When any Member means to speak, he is to stand up in his place, uncovered,
and to address himself, not to the House, or any particular Member, but
to the Speaker, who calls him by his name, that the House may take
notice who it is that speaks. Scob., 6; D'Ewes, 487, col. 1; 2 Hats.,
77; 4 Grey, 66; 8 Grey, 108. But Members who are indisposed may be
indulged to speak sitting. 2 Hats., 75, 77; 1 Grey, 143.

<> When a Member stands up to
speak, no question is to be put, but he is to be heard unless the House
overrule him. 4 Grey, 390; 5 Grey, 6, 143.

In the House of Representatives the Member, in seeking recognition is
governed by clause 1 of rule XIV, which differs materially from this
provision of the parliamentary law. The Speaker, moreover, calls the
Member, not by name, but as ``the gentleman (or gentlewoman) from ------
,'' naming the State. As long ago as 1832, at least, a Member was not
required to rise from his own seat (V, 4979, footnote).

In the House of Representatives no question is put as to the right of
a Member to the floor, unless he be called to order and dealt with by
the House under clauses 4 and 5 of rule XIV.

[[Page 165]]

Sec. 356. The parliamentary law as to recognition by the
Speaker.

If two or more rise to speak nearly together, the Speaker
determines who was first up, and calls him by name, whereupon he
proceeds, unless he voluntarily sits down and gives way to the other.
But sometimes the House does not acquiesce in the Speaker's decision, in
which case the question is put, ``which Member was first up?'' 2 Hats.,
76; Scob., 7; D'Ewes, 434, col. 1, 2.

In the Senate of the United States the President's decision is without
appeal.

In the House of Representatives recognition by the Chair is governed
by clause 2 of rule XIV and the practice thereunder. There has been no
appeal from a decision by the Speaker on a question of recognition since
1881, on which occasion Speaker Randall stated that the power of
recognition is ``just as absolute in the Chair as the judgment of the
Supreme Court of the United States is absolute as to the interpretation
of the law'' (II, 1425-1428), and in the later practice no appeal is
permitted (VIII, 2429, 2646, 2762).

Sec. 357. Right of the Member to be heard a second
time.

No man may speak more than once on the same bill on the same day;
or even on another day, if the debate be adjourned. But if it be read
more than once in the same day, he may speak once at every reading. Co.,
12, 115; Hakew., 148; Scob., 58; 2 Hats., 75. Even a change of opinion
does not give a right to be heard a second time. Smyth's Comw. L., 2, c.
3; Arcan, Parl., 17.

But he may be permitted to speak again to clear a matter of fact, 3
Grey, 357, 416; or merely to explain himself, 2 Hats., 73, in some
material part of his speech, Ib., 75; or to the manner or words of the
question, keeping himself to that only, and not traveling into the
merits of it, Memorials in Hakew., 29; or to the orders of the House, if
they be transgressed, keeping within that line, and not falling into the
matter itself. Mem. Hakew., 30, 31.

[[Page 166]]

The House of Representatives has modified the parliamentary law as to
a Member's right to speak a second time by clauses 3 and 6 of rule XIV
and by permitting a Member controlling time in debate to yield to
another more than once. In ordinary practice rule XIV is not rigidly
enforced, and Members find little difficulty in making such explanations
as are contemplated by the parliamentary law.

Sec. 358. Participation of the Speaker in debate.

But if
the Speaker rise to speak, the Member standing up ought to sit down,
that he may be first heard. Town., col. 205; Hale Parl., 133; Mem. in
Hakew., 30, 31. Nevertheless, though the Speaker may of right speak to
matters of order, and be first heard, he is restrained from speaking on
any other subject, except where the House have occasion for facts within
his knowledge; then he may, with their leave, state the matter of fact.
3 Grey, 38.

This provision is usually observed in the practice of the House, so
far as the conduct of the Speaker in the chair is concerned. In several
instances the Speaker has been permitted by the House to make a
statement from the chair, as in a case wherein his past conduct had been
criticised (II, 1369), and in a case wherein there had been unusual
occurrences in the joint meeting to count the electoral vote (II, 1372),
and in a matter relating to a contest for the seat of the Speaker as a
Member (II, 1360). In rare instances the Speaker has made brief
explanations from the chair without asking the assent of the House (II,
1373, 1374). Speakers have called others to the chair and participated
in debate, usually without asking consent of the House (II, 1360, 1367,
footnote, 1368, 1371; III, 1950), and in one case a Speaker on the floor
debated a point of order which the Speaker pro tempore was to decide (V,
6097). In rare instances Speakers have left the chair to make motions on
the floor (II, 1367, footnote). Speakers may participate in debate in
Committee of the Whole, although at certain periods in the history of
the House the privilege was rarely exercised (II, 1367, footnote).

During the House's consideration of several measures relating to the
use of military force in the Persian Gulf, the Speaker took the floor
not only to debate the pending question but also to commend the House on
the quality of its recent debates on matters of war and peace and to
explain his decision to vote on measures relating thereto even though
not required to do so under clause 6 of rule I (Jan. 12, 1991, p. ----).

Sec. 359. Impertinent, superfluous, or tedious
speaking.

No one is to speak impertinently or beside the question,
superfluous, or tediously. Scob., 31, 33; 2 Hats., 166, 168; Hale Parl.,
133.

[[Page 167]]
tice has the House ever suppressed superfluous or tedious speaking, its
hour rule (clause 2 of rule XIV) being a sufficient safeguard in this
respect.

The House, by clause 1 of rule XIV, provides that the Member shall
address himself to the question under debate, but neither by rule nor
prac

Sec. 360. Language reflecting on the House.

No person is to
use indecent language against the proceedings of the House; no prior
determination of which is to be reflected on by any Member, unless he
means to conclude with a motion to rescind it. 2 Hats., 169, 170;
Rushw., p. 3, v. 1, fol. 42. But while a proposition under consideration
is still in fieri, though it has even been reported by a committee,
reflections on it are no reflections on the House. 9 Grey, 508.

In the practice of the House of Representatives it has been held out
of order in debate to cast reflections on either the House or its
membership or its decisions, whether present or past (V, 5132-5138). A
Member who had used offensive words against the character of the House,
and who declined to explain, was censured (II, 1247). Words impeaching
the loyalty of a portion of the membership have also been ruled out (V,
5139). Where a Member reiterated on the floor certain published charges
against the House, action was taken, although other business had
intervened, the question being considered one of privilege (III, 2637).
It has been held inappropriate and not in order in debate to refer to
the proceedings of a committee except such as have been formally
reported to the House (V, 5080-5083; VIII, 2269, 2485-2493; June 24,
1958, pp. 12120, 12122), but this rule does not apply to the proceedings
of a committee of a previous Congress (Chairman Hay, Feb. 2, 1914, p.
2782), and the rationale for this limitation on debate is in part
obsolete under the modern practice of the House insofar as the doctrine
is applied to open committee meetings and hearings.

[[Page 168]]
or unmannerly words against a particular Member. Smyth's Comw., L. 2,
c. 3. * * *

Sec. 361. Personalities in debate forbidden.

No person, in
speaking, is to mention a Member then present by his name, but to
describe him by his seat in the House, or who spoke last, or on the
other side of the question, &c., Mem. in Hakew., 3; Smyth's Comw., L. 2,
c. 3; nor to digress from the matter to fall upon the person, Scob., 31;
Hale Parl., 133; 2 Hats., 166, by speaking reviling, nipping,

[[Page 169]]
to the motivations of Members who file complaints before the Committee
on Standards of Official Conduct (Speaker pro tempore Foley, June 15,
1988, p. 14623; July 6, 1988, p. 16630; Mar. 22, 1989, p. 5130; May 2,
1989, p. 7735; Nov. 3, 1989, p. ----); and that they should refrain from
critical personal references to members of the Committee on Standards of
Official Conduct (Mar. 3, 1995, p. ----). Although debate on a
privileged resolution recommending disciplinary action against a Member
may include comparisons with other such actions taken by or reported to
the House for purposes of measuring severity of punishment, it is not in
order to discuss the conduct of another Member not the subject of a
committee report (Dec. 18, 1987, p. 36271).
In the practice of the House a Member is not permitted to refer to
another by name (V, 5144; VIII, 2526, 2529, 2536), or to address him in
the second person (V, 5140-5143; VI, 600; VIII, 2529). The proper
reference to a colleague is ``the gentleman (or gentlewoman) from ------
,'' naming the State (June 14, 1978, p. 17615; July 21, 1982, pp. 17314-
15). By rule of the House (clause 1 of rule XIV), as well as by the
parliamentary law, personalities are forbidden (V, 4979, 5145, 5163,
5169), whether against the Member in his capacity as Representative or
otherwise (V, 5152, 5153). But a distinction has been drawn between
charges made by one Member against another in a newspaper and the same
made in debate on the floor (III, 2691). A Member may not read in debate
extraneous material, critical of Members, which would be improper if
spoken in the Member's own words (May 25, 1995, p. ----); thus words in
a telegram read in debate which repudiated the ``lies and half-truths''
of a House committee report were taken down and ruled out of order as
reflecting on the integrity of committee members (June 16, 1947, p.
7065). Questions have arisen sometimes involving a distinction between
general language and personalities (V, 5153, 5163, 5169). A denunciation
of the spirit in which a Member had spoken was held out of order as a
personality (V, 6981). The House has censured a Member for gross
personalities (II, 1251). References in debate to an identifiable group
of sitting Members as having committed a crime (e.g., ``stealing'' an
election) are proscribed by clause 1 of rule XIV (Feb. 27, 1985, p.
3898; Speaker Wright, Mar. 21, 1989, p. 5016). That rule prohibits
references in debate to newspaper accounts used in support of a Member's
personal criticism of a sitting Member in a way which would be
unparliamentary if uttered as the Member's own words (Feb. 25, 1985, p.
3346). It is not in order in debate to refer in a personally critical
manner to the political tactics of the Speaker or other Members (June
25, 1981, p. 14056), by charging dishonesty or disregard of the rules
(July 11, 1985, p. 18550), to reflect on his patriotism (``kowtowing''
to persons who would desecrate the flag, June 20, 1990, p. 14877), or to
refer to a particular Member of the House in a derogatory fashion, and
the Chair will intervene to prevent improper references where it is
evident that a particular Member is being described (Oct. 28, 1981, p.
25681; Nov. 3, 1989, p. ----). Although remarks in debate may not
include personal attacks against a Member or an identifiable group of
Members, they may address political motivations for legislative
positions (Jan. 24, 1995, p. ----; Mar. 8, 1995, p. ----). The Speaker
has reminded and advised Members that they should refrain from
references in debate to the official conduct of other Members where such
conduct is not the subject then pending before the House by way of
either a report of the Committee on Standards of Official Conduct or
another question of the privileges of the House (July 24, 1990, p. ----;
Mar. 19, 1992, p. ----); that they should refrain from references in
debate

Sec. 362. Criticism of the Speaker.

Complaint of the conduct
of the Speaker should be presented directly for the action of the House
and not by way of debate on other matters (V, 5188). In a case wherein a
Member used words insulting to the Speaker the House on a subsequent
day, and after other business had intervened, censured the offender (II,
1248). In such a case the Speaker would ordinarily leave the chair while
action should be taken by the House (II, 1366; V, 5188; VI, 565). In the
104th Congress the Chair reaffirmed that it is not in order to speak
disrespectfully of the Speaker, and that under the precedents the
sanctions for such violations transcend the ordinary requirements for
timeliness of challenges (II, 1248; Jan. 4, 1995, p. ----; Jan. 19,
1995, p. ----). It is not in order to arraign the personal conduct of
the Speaker (Jan. 18, 1995, p. ----; Jan. 19, 1995, p. ----).

Sec. 363. Motives of Members not to be arraigned.

* * * The
consequences of a measure may be reprobated in strong terms; but to
arraign the motives of those who propose to advocate it is a
personality, and against order. Qui digreditur a materia ad personam,
Mr. Speaker ought to suppress. Ord. Com., 1604, Apr. 19.

[[Page 170]]
as impugning the motives of the Member offering the amendment (Dec. 3,
1973, pp. 41270, 41271). While in debate the assertion of one Member may
be declared untrue by another, yet in so doing an intentional
misrepresentation must not be implied (V, 5157-5160), and if stated or
implied is censurable (II, 1305) and presents a question of privilege
(III, 2717; VI, 607). A Member in debate having declared the words of
another ``a base lie,'' censure was inflicted by the House on the
offender (II, 1249).

The arraignment of the motives of Members is not permitted (V, 5147-
51; Dec. 13, 1973, p. 41270), and the Speakers have intervened to
prevent it, in the earlier practice preventing even mildest imputations
(V, 5161, 5162). However, remarks in debate may address political, but
not personal, motivations for legislative positions (Jan. 24, 1995, p.
----; Mar. 8, 1995, p. ----) or for committee membership (July 10, 1995,
p. ----). Accusing another Member of hypocrisy has been held not in
order (July 24, 1979, p. 20380; Mar. 29, 1995, p. ----), and
characterizing the motivation of a Member in offering an amendment as
deceptive and hypocritical was ruled out of order (June 12, 1979, p.
11461). A statement in debate that an amendment could only be demagogic
or racist because only demagoguery or racism impelled such an amendment
was ruled out of order

Sec. 364. Disorder and interruptions during debate.

No one
is to disturb another in his speech by hissing, coughing, spitting, 6
Grey, 322; Scob., 8; D'Ewes, 332, col. 1, 640, col. 2, speaking or
whispering to another, Scob., 6; D'Ewes, 487, col. 1; nor stand up to
interrupt him, Town, col. 205; Mem. in Hakew., 31; nor to pass between
the Speaker and the speaking Member, nor to go across the House, Scob.,
6, or to walk up and down it, or to take books or papers from the table,
or write there, 2 Hats., 171, p. 170.

[[Page 171]]

The House of Representatives has by clause 7 of rule XIV prescribed
certain rules of decorum differing somewhat from this provision of the
parliamentary law, but supplemental to it rather than antagonistic. In
one respect, however, the practice of the House differs from the
apparent intent of the parliamentary law. In the House a Member may
interrupt by addressing the Chair for permission of the Member speaking
(V, 5006; VIII, 2465); but it is entirely within the discretion of the
Member occupying the floor to determine when and by whom he shall be
interrupted (V, 5007, 5008; VIII, 2463, 2465). There is no rule of the
House requiring a Member having the floor to yield to another Member to
whom he has referred during debate (Aug. 2, 1984, p. 22241). The Chair
may take the initiative in preserving order when a Member declining to
yield in debate continues to be interrupted by another Member, may order
that the interrupting Member's remarks not appear in the Record (July
26, 1984, p. 21247), and may admonish Members not to converse with a
Member attempting to address the House (Feb. 21, 1984, p. 2758). On the
opening day of the 103d Congress, during the customary announcement of
policies with respect to particular aspects of the legislative process,
the Chair elaborated on the rules of order in debate with a general
statement concerning decorum in the House of Representatives (Jan. 5,
1993, p. ----).

Sec. 365. Parliamentary method of silencing a
tedious Member.

Nevertheless, if a Member finds that it is not the inclination of
the House to hear him, and that by conversation or any other noise they
endeavor to drown his voice, it is his most prudent way to submit to the
pleasure of the House, and sit down; for it scarcely ever happens that
they are guilty of this piece of ill manners without sufficient reason,
or inattention to a Member who says anything worth their hearing. 2
Hats., 77, 78.

In the House of Representatives, where the previous question and hour
rule of debate have been used for many years, the parliamentary method
of suppressing a tedious Member has never been imported into the
practice (V, 5445).

Sec. 366. The parliamentary law as to naming a disorderly
Member.

If repeated calls do not produce order, the Speaker may call by
his name any Member obstinately persisting in irregularity; whereupon
the House may require the Member to withdraw. He is then to be heard in
exculpation, and to withdraw. Then the Speaker states the offense
committed; and the House considers the degree of punishment they will
inflict. 2 Hats., 167, 7, 8, 172.

The House of Representatives, in clauses 4 and 5 of rule XIV, has made
a provision which supersedes this provision of the parliamentary law.

[[Page 172]]
Members, the House, for the protection of their Members, requires them
to declare in their places not to prosecute any quarrel, 3 Grey, 128,
293; 5 Grey, 280; or orders them to attend the Speaker, who is to
accommodate their differences, and report to the House, 3 Grey, 419; and
they are put under restraint if they refuse, or until they do. 9 Grey,
234, 312.

Sec. 367. Proceedings in cases of assaults and
affrays.

For instances of assaults and affrays in the House of Commons,
and the proceedings thereon, see 1 Pet. Misc., 82; 3 Grey, 128; 4 Grey,
328; 5 Grey, 382; 6 Grey, 254; 10 Grey, 8. Whenever warm words or an
assault have passed between

In several instances assaults and affrays have occurred on the floor
of the House of Representatives. Sometimes the House has allowed these
affairs to pass without notice, the Members concerned making apologies
either personally or through other Members (II, 1658-1662). In other
cases the House has exacted apologies (II, 1646-1651, 1657), or required
the offending Members to pledge themselves before the House to keep the
peace (II, 1643). In case of an aggravated assault by one Member on
another on the portico of the Capitol for words spoken in debate, the
House censured the assailant and three other Members who had been
present, armed, to prevent interference (II, 1655, 1656). Assaults or
affrays in the Committee of the Whole are dealt with by the House (II,
1648-1651).

[[Page 173]]
in which he used them, or apologize. If the House is satisfied, no
further proceeding is necessary. But if two Members still insist to take
the sense of the House, the Member must withdraw before that question is
stated, and then the sense of the House is to be taken. 2 Hats., 199; 4
Grey, 170; 6 Grey, 59. When any Member has spoken, or other business
intervened, after offensive words spoken, they can not be taken notice
of for censure. And this is for the common security of all, and to
prevent mistakes which must happen if words are not taken down
immediately. Formerly they might be taken down at any time the same day.
2 Hats., 196; Mem. in Hakew., 71; 3 Grey, 48; 9 Grey, 514.

Sec. 368. Parliamentary law as to taking down
disorderly words.

Disorderly words are not to be noticed till the Member has
finished his speech. 5 Grey, 356; 6 Grey, 60. Then the person objecting
to them, and desiring them to be taken down by the Clerk at the table,
must repeat them. The Speaker then may direct the Clerk to take them
down in his minutes; but if he thinks them not disorderly, he delays the
direction. If the call becomes pretty general, he orders the Clerk to
take them down, as stated by the objecting Member. They are then a part
of his minutes, and when read to the offending Member, he may deny they
were his words, and the House must then decide by a question whether
they are his words or not. Then the Member may justify them, or explain
the sense

The House of Representatives has, by clauses 4 and 5 of rule XIV,
provided a method of procedure in cases of disorderly words. The House
permits and requires them to be noticed as soon as uttered, and has not
insisted that the offending Member withdraw while the House is deciding
as to its course of action.

Sec. 369. Disorderly words taken down and reported
from Committee of the Whole.

Disorderly words spoken in a committee must be
written down as in the House; but the committee can only report them to
the House for animadversion. 6 Grey, 46.

This provision of the parliamentary law has been applied to the
Committee of the Whole rather than to select or standing committees. The
House has censured a Member for disorderly words spoken in Committee of
the Whole and reported therefrom (II, 1259).

Sec. 370. References in debate to the
Executive.

In Parliament, to speak irreverently or seditiously against
the King is against order. Smyth's Comw., L. 2, c. 3; 2 Hats., 170.

[[Page 174]]
debate to refer to the President of the United States or his opinions,
either with approval or criticism, provided that such reference be
relevant to the subject under discussion and otherwise conformable to
the rules of the House (V, 5087-5091; VIII, 2500). Also a reference to
the probable action of the President was held in order (V, 5092).
Although wide latitude is permitted in debate on a proposition to
impeach the President (V, 5093), Members must abstain from language
personally offensive (V, 5094), such as calling the President a ``liar''
(June 26, 1985, p. 17394; Sept. 24, 1992, p. ----), attributing to him
``hypocrisy'' (Sept. 25, 1992, p. ----), or accusing him of giving aid
and comfort to the enemy (Jan. 25, 1995, p. ----). Furthermore, personal
abuse, innuendo, or ridicule of the President is not permitted (VIII,
2497; Aug. 12, 1986, p. 21078; Oct. 21, 1987, p. 8857; Sept. 21, 1994,
p. ----), such as describing an action as ``cowardly'' (Oct. 25, 1989,
p. 25817), or charging that the President has with intent been
intellectually dishonest (May 9, 1990, p. 9828). A Member may not read
in debate extraneous material personally abusive of the President, which
would be improper if spoken in the Member's own words, such as calling
the President a liar (Mar. 3, 1993, p. ----). The Chair has advised that
the protections afforded by Jefferson's Manual and the precedents
against unparliamentary references to the President himself do not
necessarily obtain for members of his family (July 12, 1990, p. ----).
In the 102d Congress, the Speaker enunciated a minimal standard of
propriety for all debate concerning candidates for the Presidency, based
on the traditional proscription against personally offensive references
to the President even in his capacity as a candidate (Speaker Foley,
Sept. 24, 1992, p. ----). In the 103d Congress, in response to frequent
remarks alluding to alleged sexual misconduct by the President, the
Speaker reminded Members that the rules of comity prohibit such
discussions of the President's personal character (May 10, 1994, p. ----
).
This provision of the parliamentary law is manifestly inapplicable to
the House of Representatives (V, 5086); and it has been held in order in

For discussion of the stricture against addressing remarks in debate
to the President, as in the second person, see Sec. 749, infra.

On January 27, 1909 (VIII, 2497), the House adopted a report of a
committee appointed to investigate the question, which report in part
stated:

``The freedom of speech in debate in the House of Representatives
should never be denied or abridged, but freedom of speech in debate does
not mean license to indulge in personal abuses or ridicule. The right of
Members of the two Houses of Congress to criticise the official acts of
the President and other executive officers is beyond question, but this
right is subject to proper rules requiring decorum in debate. Such right
of criticism in inherent upon legislative authority. The right to
legislate involves the right to consider conditions as they are and to
contrast present conditions with those of the past or those desired in
the future. The right to correct abuses by legislation carries the right
to consider and discuss abuses which exist or which are feared.

[[Page 175]]
to conduct its business in an orderly manner and without unnecessarily
and unduly exciting animosity among its Members or antagonism from those
other branches of the Government with which the House is correlated.''

``It is, however, the duty of the House to require its Members in
speech or debate to preserve that proper restraint which will permit the
House

Sec. 371. Debate and proceedings in the other House not to
be noticed in debate.

It is a breach of order in debate to notice what
has been said on the same subject in the other House, or the particular
votes or majorities on it there; because the opinion of each House
should be left to its own independency, not to be influenced by the
proceedings of the other; and the quoting them might beget reflections
leading to a misunderstanding between the two Houses. 8 Grey, 22.

[[Page 176]]
ings for the purpose of making legislative history), to refer to a
Senator or his vote on a proposition (Procedure, ch. 29, sec. 14.2;
Sept. 29, 1983, pp. 26515-16), or to publish the telephone number of a
Senator in an attempt to influence his future vote (Oct. 25, 1990, p. --
--).
Until clause 1 of rule XIV, was amended by adoption of the rules in
the 100th Congress (H. Res. 5, Jan. 6, 1987, p. 6) and again in the
101st Congress (H. Res. 5, Jan. 3, 1989, p. 72), this principle of
comity and the parliamentary law as described by Jefferson governed
debate in the House of Representatives to the full extent of its
provisions (see generally, V, 5095-5130; VIII, 2501-21; July 31, 1984,
p. 21670; Procedure, ch. 29, sec. 14). Clause 1 of rule XIV, now
provides that ``debate may include references to actions taken by the
Senate or by committees thereof which are a matter of public record,
references to the pendency or sponsorship in the Senate of bills,
resolutions, and amendments, factual descriptions relating to Senate
action or inaction concerning a measure then under debate in the House,
and quotations from Senate proceedings on a measure then under debate in
the House and which are relevant to the making of legislative history
establishing the meaning of that measure, but may not include
characterizations of Senate action or inaction, other references to
individual Members of the Senate, or other quotations from Senate
proceedings,''and such prohibited references to Senators include
references to Senators although not identified by name (Feb. 23, 1994,
p. ----; June 30, 1995, p. ----). A Member may not read or quote from
the record of speeches or proceedings in the Senate, or insert such
material in the Record (V, 5107-5111; VIII, 2501-2506; June 25, 1986, p.
15576; Procedure, ch. 29, sec. 14.3) except to make legislative history
on a measure then under debate, and the prohibition extends to quoting
accounts of Senate debates printed elsewhere, such as in reprints or in
the press (VIII, 2053). It has even been held out of order to criticize
words spoken in the Senate by one not a Member of that body in the
course of an impeachment trial (V, 5106). It is not in order in debate
to mention the name of a Senator (except as the sponsor of a measure or
in quotations from Senate proceed

Except as permitted in clause 1 of rule XIV, it is equally out of
order to characterize the position of the Senate, or of Senators
designated by name or position, on legislative issues (Oct. 5, 1984, pp.
30326-27; Oct. 11, 1984, p. 32153; Nov. 2, 1989, p. ----; July 12, 1990,
p. ----), or to speculate as to the intent of Senators or of the Senate
on legislation (Oct. 11, 1984, pp. 32221-23), or to characterize Senate
action or inaction (Apr. 29, 1986, p. 8856; July 31, 1986, p. 18253;
Aug. 4, 1987, p. 22288; Oct. 28, 1993, p. ----); or to question the
courage or resolve of its Members (Aug. 4, 1989, p. 19315). Nor is it in
order in debate to specifically urge that the Senate take certain
action; thus a Member may not refer to confirmation proceedings in the
Senate by advocating that it take a certain action with respect to a
Presidential nominee (Feb. 7, 1984, p. 1979; Oct. 8, 1991, p. ----; May
24, 1995, p. ----), or by characterizing the action of a Senate
committee on a judicial nominee (July 9, 1992, p. ----), or suggest that
the President urge Senate conferees to meet with House conferees on
specific legislation (Aug. 2, 1984, p. 22270).

On one occasion before the rule was changed in the 101st Congress to
permit certain quotations from Senate proceedings for the purpose of
making legislative history, the Speaker entertained a unanimous consent
request that a Member be permitted to refer in debate to Senate
proceedings (to quote a statement by the Senate Majority Leader as to
probable Senate action on the measure then pending in the House), but
the Speaker first ascertained in what manner the reference would be
made, in order to assure that remarks critical of the Senate, its
Members or proceedings would not be made (Speaker O'Neill, June 4, 1980,
p. 13212). But the Chair will not entertain such a request where the
references would necessarily imply criticism of the Senate, such as to
respond to remarks in the Senate which were critical of Members of the
House (VIII, 2519).

[[Page 177]]
in their capacity as candidates for the Presidency or other office are
not prohibited, and where a Senator is a candidate for President or Vice
President his official policies, actions, and opinions as a candidate
may be criticized in terms not personally offensive (Speaker Wright,
Sept. 29, 1988, p. 26683), but references attacking the character or
integrity of a Senator even in that context are not in order (Oct. 30,
1979, p. 30150).
In one case, the personal views of a Senator, not uttered in the
Senate, were allowed to be quoted in the House (V, 5112), but the weight
of recent precedent and the purposes of the rule prohibit references to
speeches or statements of Senators occurring outside the Senate Chamber
(VIII, 2515; June 26, 1935, pp. 10189-90; May 2, 1941, pp. 3566-67;
Procedure, ch. 29, sec. 14.3; May 21, 1984, p. 13024). With respect to
references to members of the Senate acting in another capacity,
references to former Members of the House who are presently Senators are
only permissible if they merely address prior House service and are not
implicitly critical of Senate service (May 8, 1984, p. 11428). A Member
of the House has been permitted to refer to a speech made in the Senate
by one no longer a Member of that body (V, 5112), although references to
Senate proceedings on legislation in the current Congress other than
those expressly permitted to establish legislative history should be
avoided. References to Members of the Senate

Even prior to the 100th Congress (as indicated in Procedure, ch. 29,
sec. 14.1) it was permissible to refer to proceedings in the other
House, provided the reference does not contravene the principles stated
by Jefferson. A Member must be permitted to refer to the existence of
the Senate and its functions in a general and neutral way. For example,
a Member may oppose a sine die adjournment resolution on the grounds
that Congress should stay in session to complete action on specified
legislation then pending in the Senate (V, 5115). It is appropriate to
state whether or not the Senate has acted on House-passed legislation as
long as criticism is neither stated nor implied (Oct. 4, 1984, p.
30047). If references to the Senate are appropriate, the Member
delivering them is not required to use the term ``the other body,'' and
the use of the term ``Senate'' is not a per se violation of the rule of
comity (Oct. 4, 1984, p. 30047). It is in order in debate, while
discussing a question involving conference committee procedure, to state
what actually occurred in a conference committee session, without
referring to or criticizing a named member of the Senate (July 29, 1935,
p. 12011).

[[Page 178]]

Sec. 372. The other House and its Members not to be
criticized in debate.

While the Senate may be referred to properly in
debate, it is not in order to criticize its acts (V, 5114-5120; Dec. 10,
1980, p. 33205; Apr. 27, 1993, p. ----); refer to a Senator in terms of
personal criticism (V, 5121, 5122; VIII, 2518, 2521; July 10, 1990, p.
----); even anonymously (VIII, 2512); for purpose of complimenting
(VIII, 2509; Apr. 21, 1993, p. ----), or read a paper making such
criticism (V, 5127); and the inhibition extends to references to the
remarks or actions of a Senator outside the Senate (VIII, 2515; Speaker
Albert, Oct. 7, 1975, p. 32055). The prohibition extends to references
to another person's criticism of a Member of the Senate (Aug. 4, 1983,
p. 23145). After examination by a committee a speech reflecting on the
character of the Senate was ordered to be stricken from the Record, on
the ground that it tended to create ``unfriendly conditions between the
two bodies * * * obstructive of wise legislation and little short of a
public calamity'' (V, 5129). But where a Member has been assailed in the
Senate, he has been permitted to explain his own conduct and motives,
without bringing the whole controversy into discussion or assailing the
Senator (V, 5123-5126). Propositions relating to breaches of these
principles have been entertained as of privilege (V, 5129, 6980).

Sec. 373. Complaint by one House of conduct of a
Member of the other.

Neither House can exercise any authority over a Member
or officer of the other, but should complain to the House of which he
is, and leave the punishment to them.

In a notable instance, wherein a Member of the House had assaulted a
Senator in the Senate Chamber for words spoken in debate, the Senate
examined the breach of privilege and transmitted its report to the
House, which punished the Member (II, 1622). A Senator having assailed a
House Member in debate, the House messaged to the Senate a resolution
declaring the language a breach of privilege and requested the Senate to
take appropriate action (Sept. 27, 1951, p. 12270). The Senator
subsequently asked unanimous consent to correct his remarks in the
permanent Congressional Record, but objection was raised (Sept. 28,
1951, p. 12383). But where certain Members of the House, in a published
letter, sought to influence the vote of a Senator in an impeachment
trial, the House declined to consider the matter as a breach of
privilege (III, 2657). While on one occasion it was held that a
resolution offered in the House requesting the Senate to expunge from
the Record statements in criticism of a Member of the House did not
constitute a question of privilege, being in violation of the rule
prohibiting references to the Senate in debate (VIII, 2519), a properly
drafted resolution referring to language published in the record on a
designated page of Senate proceedings as constituting a breach of
privilege and requesting the Senate to take appropriate action
concerning the subject has been held to present a question of the
privileges of the House (VIII, 2516).

[[Page 179]]
tween the two Houses, which can hardly be terminated without difficulty
and disorder. 3 Hats., 51.

Sec. 374. Duty of the Speaker to prevent expressions
offensive to the other House.

* * * Where the complaint is of words
disrespectfully spoken by a Member of another House, it is difficult to
obtain punishment, because of the rules supposed necessary to be
observed (as to the immediate noting down of words) for the security of
Members. Therefore it is the duty of the House, and more particularly of
the Speaker, to interfere immediately, and not to permit expressions to
go unnoticed which may give a ground of complaint to the other House,
and introduce proceedings and mutual accusations be

In the House of Representatives this rule of the parliamentary law is
considered as binding on the Chair (V, 5130; VIII, 2465), and it is the
duty of the Speaker to call to order a Member who criticizes the actions
of the Senate, its Members or committees in debate or through an
insertion in the Record (Speaker Albert, Apr. 17, 1975, p. 10458; Oct.
7, 1975, pp. 32055-56). Pending consideration of a measure relating to
the Senate, the Speaker announced his intention to strictly enforce this
provision of Jefferson's Manual prohibiting improper references to the
Senate, and to deny recognition to Members violating the prohibition,
subject to permission of the House to proceed in order (Speaker O'Neill,
June 16, 1982, p. 13843). While the Chair should take the initiative to
prevent improper references to the Senate in debate, the Chair will not
respond to hypothetical questions as to the propriety of possible
characterizations of Senate actions prior to their use in debate (Oct.
24, 1985, p. 28819).

Sec. 375. Course of the Member when business concerning
himself is debating.

No Member may be present when a bill or any business
concerning himself is debating; nor is any Member to speak to the merits
of it till he withdraws. 2 Hats., 219. The rule is that if a charge
against a Member arise out of a report of a committee, or examination of
witnesses in the House, as the Member knows from that to what points he
is to direct his exculpation, he may be heard to those points before any
question is moved or stated against him. He is then to be heard, and
withdraw before any question is moved. But if the question itself is the
charge, as for breach of order or matter arising in the debate, then the
charge must be stated (that is, the question must be moved), himself
heard, and then to withdraw. 2 Hats., 121, 122.

[[Page 180]]
In other cases, after the proposition for censure or expulsion has been
proposed, Members have been heard in debate, either as a matter of right
(II, 1286), as a matter of course (II, 1246, 1253), by express provision
(II, 1273), and in writing (II, 1273), or by unanimous consent (II,
1275). A Member against whom a resolution of censure was pending was
asked by the Speaker if he desired to be heard (VI, 236). But a Member
was not permitted to depute another Member to speak in his behalf (II,
1273). In modern practice the Member has been permitted to speak in his
own behalf, both in censure (June 10, 1980, pp. 13802-11) and expulsion
proceedings (Oct. 2, 1980, pp. 28953-78). A Member-elect has been
permitted to participate in debate on a resolution relating to his right
to take the oath (Jan. 10, 1967, p. 23).

In 1832, during proceedings for the censure of a Member, the Speaker
informed the Member that he should retire (II, 1366); but this seems to
be an exceptional instance of the enforcement of the law of Parliament.

Sec. 376. Disqualifying personal interest of a
Member.

Where the private interests of a Member are concerned in a bill or
question he is to withdraw. And where such an interest has appeared, his
voice has been disallowed, even after a division. In a case so contrary,
not only to the laws of decency, but to the fundamental principle of the
social compact, which denies to any man to be a judge in his own cause,
it is for the honor of the House that this rule of immemorial observance
should be strictly adhered to. 2 Hats., 119, 121; 6 Grey, 368.

In the House of Representatives it has not been usual for the Member
to withdraw when his private interests are concerned in a pending
measure, but the House has provided by clause 1 of rule VIII that the
Member shall not vote in such a contingency. In one instance the Senate
disallowed a vote given by a Senator on a question relating to his own
right to a seat; but the House has never had occasion to proceed so far
(V, 5959).

[[Page 181]]

Sec. 377. Wearing of hats by Members.

No Member is to come
into the House with his head covered, nor to remove from one place to
another with his hat on, nor is to put on his hat in coming in or
removing, until he be set down in his place. Scob., 6.

Sec. 378. Adjournment of questions of order.

Until 1837 the parliamentary practice of wearing hats during the
session continued in the House; but in that year it was abolished by
clause 7 of rule XIV.
A question of
order may be adjourned to give time to look into precedents. 2 Hats.,
118.

<> In
Parliament, all decisions of the Speaker may be controlled by the House.
3 Grey, 319.

The Speaker has declined, on a difficult question of order, to rule
until he had taken time for examination (III, 2725; VI, 432; VII, 2106;
VIII, 2174, 2396, 3475), and may take a parliamentary inquiry under
advisement, especially where not related to the pending proceedings
(VIII, 2174; Apr. 7, 1992, p. ----), but it is conceivable that a case
might arise wherein this privilege of the Chair would require approval
of the majority of the House, to prevent arbitrary obstruction of the
pending business by the Chair. On occasion, the Chair has reversed as
erroneous a decision previously made (VI, 639; VII, 849; VIII, 2794,
3435). The law of Parliament evidently contemplates that the adjournment
of a question of order shall be controlled by the House.

The Speaker's decision on a decision of order is subject to appeal by
any Member (clause 4 of rule I).