[Constitution, Jefferson's Manual, and the Rules of the House of Representatives, 108th Congress]
[108th Congress]
[House Document 107-284]
[Jeffersons Manual of ParliamentaryPractice]
[Pages 172-194]
[From the U.S. Government Printing Office, www.gpo.gov]
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When the Speaker is seated in his chair, every member is to sit in his
place. Scob., 6; Grey, 403.
sec. xvii--order in debate
[[Page 173]]
In the House the decorum of Members is regulated by the various
provisions of rule XVII; and this provision of the parliamentary law is
practically obsolete.
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Sec. 354. Procedure of the Member in seeking
recognition. |
When any Member means to speak, he is to stand up in his
place, uncovered, and to address himself, not to the House, or any
particular Member, but to the Speaker, who calls him by his name, that
the House may take notice who it is that speaks. Scob., 6; D'Ewes, 487,
col. 1; 2 Hats., 77; 4 Grey, 66; 8 Grey, 108. But Members who are
indisposed may be indulged to speak sitting. 2 Hats., 75, 77; 1 Grey,
143.
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<> When a Member stands up to
speak, no question is to be put, but he is to be heard unless the House
overrule him. 4 Grey, 390; 5 Grey, 6, 143.
In the House a Member seeking recognition is governed by clause 1 of
rule XVII, which differs materially from this provision of the
parliamentary law. The Speaker, moreover, calls the Member, not by name,
but as ``the gentleman (or gentlewoman) from ------,'' naming the State.
As long ago as 1832, at least, a Member was not required to rise from
his own particular seat since seats are no longer assigned (V, 4979,
footnote).
In the House no question is put as to the right of a Member to the
floor, unless he be called to order and dealt with by the House under
clause 4 of rule XVII.
[[Page 174]]
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Sec. 356. The parliamentary law as to recognition by the
Speaker. |
If two or more rise to speak nearly together, the Speaker
determines who was first up, and calls him by name, whereupon he
proceeds, unless he voluntarily sits down and gives way to the other.
But sometimes the House does not acquiesce in the Speaker's decision, in
which case the question is put, ``which Member was first up?'' 2 Hats.,
76; Scob., 7; D'Ewes, 434, col. 1, 2.
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In the Senate of the United States the President's decision is without
appeal.
In the House recognition by the Chair is governed by clause 2 of rule
XVII and the practice thereunder. There has been no appeal from a
decision by the Speaker on a question of recognition since 1881, on
which occasion Speaker Randall stated that the power of recognition is
``just as absolute in the Chair as the judgment of the Supreme Court of
the United States is absolute as to the interpretation of the law'' (II,
1425-1428), and in the later practice no appeal is permitted (VIII,
2429, 2646, 2762).
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Sec. 357. Right of the Member to be heard a second
time. |
No man may speak more than once on the same bill on the same day;
or even on another day, if the debate be adjourned. But if it be read
more than once in the same day, he may speak once at every reading. Co.,
12, 115; Hakew., 148; Scob., 58; 2 Hats., 75. Even a change of opinion
does not give a right to be heard a second time. Smyth's Comw. L., 2, c.
3; Arcan, Parl., 17.
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But he may be permitted to speak again to clear a matter of fact, 3
Grey, 357, 416; or merely to explain himself, 2 Hats., 73, in some
material part of his speech, Ib., 75; or to the manner or words of the
question, keeping himself to that only, and not traveling into the
merits of it, Memorials in Hakew., 29; or to the orders of the House, if
they be transgressed, keeping within that line, and not falling into the
matter itself. Mem. Hakew., 30, 31.
[[Page 175]]
The House has modified the parliamentary law as to a Member's right to
speak a second time by clause 3 of rule XVII and by permitting a Member
controlling time in debate to yield to another more than once (Apr. 5,
2000, p. ----). In ordinary practice rule XVII is not rigidly enforced,
and Members find little difficulty in making such explanations as are
contemplated by the parliamentary law.
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Sec. 358. Participation of the Speaker in debate. |
But if the
Speaker rise to speak, the Member standing up ought to sit down, that he
may be first heard. Town., col. 205; Hale Parl., 133; Mem. in Hakew.,
30, 31. Nevertheless, though the Speaker may of right speak to matters
of order, and be first heard, he is restrained from speaking on any
other subject, except where the House have occasion for facts within his
knowledge; then he may, with their leave, state the matter of fact. 3
Grey, 38.
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This provision is usually observed in the practice of the House only
with regard to the conduct of the Speaker when he is in the chair. In
several instances the Speaker has been permitted by the House to make a
statement from the chair, as in a case wherein his past conduct had been
criticized (II, 1369), and in a case wherein there had been unusual
occurrences in the joint session to count the electoral vote (II, 1372),
and in a matter relating to a contest for the seat of the Speaker as a
Member (II, 1360). In rare instances the Speaker has made brief
explanations from the chair without asking the assent of the House (II,
1373, 1374). Speakers have called others to the chair and participated
in debate, usually without asking consent of the House (II, 1360, 1367,
footnote, 1368, 1371; III, 1950), and in one case a Speaker on the floor
debated a point of order which the Speaker pro tempore was to decide (V,
6097). In rare instances Speakers have left the chair to make motions on
the floor (II, 1367, footnote). Speakers may participate in debate in
Committee of the Whole, although the privilege was rarely exercised in
early practice (II, 1367, footnote).
During the House's consideration of several measures relating to the
use of military force in the Persian Gulf, the Speaker took the floor
not only to debate the pending question but also to commend the House on
the quality of its recent debates on matters of war and peace and to
explain his decision to vote on measures relating thereto even though
not required to do so (Jan. 12, 1991, p. 1085).
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Sec. 359. Impertinent, superfluous, or tedious
speaking. |
No one is to speak impertinently or beside the question,
superfluous, or tediously. Scob., 31, 33; 2 Hats., 166, 168; Hale Parl.,
133.
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[[Page 176]]
tice has the House suppressed superfluous or tedious speaking, its hour
rule (clause 2 of rule XVII) being a sufficient safeguard in this
respect.
The House, by clause 1 of rule XVII, provides that the Member shall
address himself to the question under debate, but neither by rule nor
prac
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Sec. 360. Language reflecting on the House. |
No person is to
use indecent language against the proceedings of the House; no prior
determination of which is to be reflected on by any Member, unless he
means to conclude with a motion to rescind it. 2 Hats., 169, 170;
Rushw., p. 3, v. 1, fol. 42. But while a proposition under consideration
is still in fieri, though it has even been reported by a committee,
reflections on it are no reflections on the House. 9 Grey, 508.
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In the practice of the House it has been held out of order in debate
to cast reflections on either the House or its membership or its
decisions, whether present or past (V, 5132-5138). A Member who had used
offensive words against the character of the House, and who declined to
explain, was censured (II, 1247). Words impeaching the loyalty of a
portion of the membership have also been ruled out (V, 5139). Where a
Member reiterated on the floor certain published charges against the
House, action was taken, although other business had intervened, the
question being considered one of privilege (III, 2637). It has been held
inappropriate and not in order in debate to refer to the proceedings of
a committee except such as have been formally reported to the House (V,
5080-5083; VIII, 2269, 2485-2493; June 24, 1958, pp. 12120, 12122), but
this rule does not apply to the proceedings of a committee of a previous
Congress (Feb. 2, 1914, p. 2782), and the rationale for this limitation
on debate is in part obsolete under the modern practice of the House
insofar as the doctrine is applied to open committee meetings and
hearings.
[[Page 177]]
or unmannerly words against a particular Member. Smyth's Comw., L. 2, c.
3. * * *
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Sec. 361. Personalities in debate forbidden. |
No person, in
speaking, is to mention a Member then present by his name, but to
describe him by his seat in the House, or who spoke last, or on the
other side of the question, &c., Mem. in Hakew., 3; Smyth's Comw., L. 2,
c. 3; nor to digress from the matter to fall upon the person, Scob., 31;
Hale Parl., 133; 2 Hats., 166, by speaking reviling, nipping,
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In the practice of the House, a Member is not permitted to refer to
another Member by name (V, 5144; VIII, 2526, 2529, 2536), or to address
him in the second person (V, 5140-5143; VI, 600; VIII, 2529). The proper
reference to another Member is ``the gentleman (or gentlewoman) from --
----,'' naming the Member's State (June 14, 1978, p. 17615; July 21,
1982, p. 17314). A mere reference to a Member's voting record
does not form a basis for a point of order against those remarks (June
13, 2002, p. ----, p. ----).
By rule of the House (clause 1 of rule XVII), as well as by
parliamentary law, personalities are forbidden (V, 4979, 5145, 5163,
5169), whether against the Member in the Member's capacity as
Representative or otherwise (V, 5152, 5153), even if the references may
be relevant to the pending question (Sept. 28, 1996, p. 25778). The
House has censured a Member for gross personalities (II, 1251). The
Chair may intervene to prevent improper references where it is evident
that a particular Member is being described (Nov. 3, 1989, p. 27077).
The Chair does not rule on the veracity of a statement made by a
Member in debate (Apr. 9, 1997, p. ----). Although
accusing another Member of deceit engages in personality, merely
accusing another Member of making a mistake does not (Oct. 26, 2000, p.
----).
Clause 1 of rule XVII has been held to proscribe: (1) referring to an
identifiable group of sitting Members as having committed a crime (e.g.,
``stealing'' an election or obstructing justice) (Feb. 27, 1985, p.
3898; Speaker Wright, Mar. 21, 1989, p. 5016; May 19, 1998, p. ----);
(2) referring in a personally critical manner to the political tactics
of the Speaker or other Members (June 25, 1981, p. 14056); (3) referring
to a particular Member of the House in a derogatory fashion (Nov. 3,
1989, p. 27077); (4) characterizing a Member as ``the most impolite
Member'' (June 27, 1996, p. 15915); (5) questioning the integrity of a
Member (July 25, 1996, p. 19170); (6) denunciating the spirit in which a
Member had spoken (V, 6981); and (7) using a Member's surname as
though an adjective for a word of ridicule (June 13, 2002, p. ----
).
[[Page 178]]
acter of the measure's proponent (Nov. 9, 1995, p. 31413). The Chair has
also held in order a general reference that ``big donors'' receive
``access to leadership power and decisions'' because the reference did
not identify a specific Member as engaging in an improper quid pro quo
(Apr. 9, 1997, p. ----). A general statement that seemed to
invoke racial stereotypes, but not in a context so inflammatory as to
constitute a breach of decorum, was held not unparliamentary (Apr. 9,
2003, p. ----).
A distinction has been drawn between general language, which
characterizes a measure or the political motivations behind a measure,
and personalities (V, 5153, 5163, 5169). Although remarks in debate may
not include personal attacks against a Member or an identifiable group
of Members, they may address political motivations for legislative
positions (Jan. 24, 1995, p. 2214; Mar. 8, 1995, pp. 7307, 7308; Nov.
17, 1995, p. 33832; June 13, 1996, p. 14043). For example, references to
``down-in-the-dirt gutter politics'' and ``you people are going to pay''
were held not to be personal references (Nov. 14, 1995, p. 32388).
Similarly, characterizing a pending measure as a ``patently petty
political terrorist tactic'' was held in order as a reference to the
pending measure rather than to the motive or char
A Member should refrain from references in debate to the official
conduct of a Member where such conduct is not the subject then pending
before the House by way of either a report of the Committee on Standards
of Official Conduct or another question of the privileges of the House
(see, e.g., July 24, 1990, p. 18917; Mar. 19, 1992, p. 6078; May 25,
1995, pp. 14434-37; Sept. 19, 1995, pp. 25454, 25455). This stricture
also precludes a Member from reciting news articles discussing a
Member's conduct (Sept. 24, 1996, p. 24318), reciting the content of a
previously tabled resolution raising a question of the privileges of the
House (Nov. 17, 1995, p. 33853; Sept. 19, 1996, p. 23855), or even
referring to a Member's conduct by mere insinuation (Sept. 12, 1996, p.
22899). Notice of an intention to offer a resolution as a question of
the privileges of the House under rule IX does not render a resolution
``pending'' and thereby permit references to conduct of a Member
proposed to be addressed therein (Sept. 19, 1996, p. 23811).
The stricture against references to a Member's conduct not then
pending before the House applies to the conduct of all sitting Members
(Apr. 1, 1992, p. 7899), including conduct that has previously been
resolved by the Committee on Standards of Official Conduct or the House
(Sept. 20, 1995, pp. 25825, 25826; Sept. 24, 1996, pp. 24483, 24485;
Apr. 17, 1997, p. ----). This stricture does not apply to the conduct of
a former Member, provided the reference is not made in an attempt to
compare the conduct of a former Member with the conduct of a sitting
Member (Sept. 12, 1996, pp. 22900, 22901).
Debate on a pending privileged resolution recommending disciplinary
action against a Member may necessarily involve personalities. However,
clause 1 of rule XVII still prohibits the use of language that is
personally abusive (see, e.g., July 31, 1979, p. 21584; Jan.
21, 1997, p. 393) and the Chair may
take the initiative to prevent violations of the rule (July 24, 2002, p.
----). Furthermore, during the actual pendency of such a
resolution, a Member may discuss a prior case reported to the House by
the Committee on Standards of Official Conduct for the purpose of
comparing the severity of the sanction recommended in that case with the
severity of the sanction recommended in the pending case, provided that
the Member does not identify, or discuss the details of the past conduct
of, a sitting Member (Dec. 18, 1987, p. 36271).
[[Page 179]]
ards of Official Conduct (June 15, 1988, p. 14623; July 6, 1988, p.
16630; Mar. 22, 1989, p. 5130; May 2, 1989, p. 7735; Nov. 3, 1989, p.
27077); (2) to personal criticism of a member of the Committee on
Standards of Official Conduct (Apr. 1, 1992, p. 7899; Mar. 3, 1995, p.
6715; Sept. 19, 1996, p. 23812; Sept. 24, 1996, p. 24317); and (3) to an
investigation undertaken by the Committee on Standards of Official
Conduct, including suggestion of a course of action (Mar. 3, 1995, p.
6715; Sept. 24, 1996, p. 24317; Sept. 28, 1996, p. 25778) or advocacy of
an interim status report by the Committee (Sept. 12, 1996, p. 22900;
Sept. 28, 1996, p. 25778).
In addition to the prohibition against addressing a Member's conduct
when it is not actually pending before the House, the Speaker has
advised that Members should refrain from references in debate (1) to the
motivations of a Member who filed a complaint before the Committee on
Stand
A Member may not read in debate extraneous material critical of
another Member, which would be improper if spoken in the Member's own
words (May 25, 1995, pp. 14436, 14437; Sept. 12, 1996, p. 22898). Thus,
words in a telegram read in debate which repudiated the ``lies and half-
truths'' of a House committee report were ruled out of order as
reflecting on the integrity of committee members (June 16, 1947, p.
7065), and unparliamentary references in debate to newspaper accounts
used in support of a Member's personal criticism of another Member were
similarly ruled out of order (Feb. 25, 1985, p. 3346).
[[Page 180]]
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Sec. 362. Criticism of the Speaker. |
Complaint of the conduct
of the Speaker should be presented directly for the action of the House
and not by way of debate on other matters (V, 5188). In a case wherein a
Member used words insulting to the Speaker the House on a subsequent
day, and after other business had intervened, censured the offender (II,
1248). In such a case the Speaker would ordinarily leave the chair while
action should be taken by the House (II, 1366; V, 5188; VI, 565). In the
104th Congress the Chair reaffirmed that it is not in order to speak
disrespectfully of the Speaker, and that under the precedents the
sanctions for such violations transcend the ordinary requirements for
timeliness of challenges (II, 1248; Jan. 4, 1995, p. 552; Jan. 19, 1995,
p. 1599). It is not in order to arraign the personal conduct of the
Speaker (Jan. 18, 1995, p. 1441; Jan. 19, 1995, p. 1601). For example,
it is not in order to charge dishonesty or disregard of the rules (July
11, 1985, p. 18550), to reflect on his patriotism by accusing him of
``kowtowing'' to persons who would desecrate the flag (June 20, 1990, p.
14877), to refer to him as a ``crybaby'' (Nov. 16, 1995, p. 33394), or
to refer to official conduct of the Speaker that has previously been
resolved by the Committee on Standards of Official Conduct or the House
(Apr. 17, 1997, p. ----). The Chair may take the initiative to admonish
Members for references in debate that disparage the Speaker (June 25,
1981, p. 14056; Mar. 22, 1996, p. 6077). Debate on a resolution
authorizing the Speaker to entertain motions to suspend the rules may
not engage in personality by discussing the official conduct of the
Speaker, even if possibly relevant to the question of empowerment of the
Speaker (Sept. 24, 1996, p. 24485).
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Sec. 363. Motives of Members not to be arraigned. |
* * * The
consequences of a measure may be reprobated in strong terms; but to
arraign the motives of those who propose to advocate it is a
personality, and against order. Qui digreditur a materia ad personam,
Mr. Speaker ought to suppress. Ord. Com., 1604, Apr. 19.
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The arraignment of the motives of Members is not permitted (V, 5147-
51; Dec. 13, 1973, p. 41270), and the Speakers have intervened to
prevent it, in the earlier practice preventing even mildest imputations
(V, 5161, 5162). However, remarks in debate may address political, but
not personal, motivations for legislative positions (Jan. 24, 1995, p.
2214; Mar. 8, 1995, pp. 7307, 7308; Nov. 17, 1995, p. 33832; June 13,
1996, p. 14043) or for committee membership (July 10, 1995, pp. 18257-
59). Accusing another Member of hypocrisy has been held not in order
(July 24, 1979, p. 20380; Mar. 29, 1995, p. 9675), and characterizing
the motivation of a Member in offering an amendment as deceptive and
hypocritical was ruled out of order (June 12, 1979, p. 11461). A
statement in debate that an amendment could only be demagogic or racist
because only demagoguery or racism impelled such an amendment was ruled
out of order as impugning the motives of the Member offering the
amendment (Dec. 3, 1973, pp. 41270, 41271). However, debate
characterizing a pending measure as a ``patently petty political
terrorist tactic'' was held in order as directed at the pending measure
rather than the motive or the character of its proponent (Nov. 9, 1995,
p. 31413). While in debate the assertion of one Member may be declared
untrue by another, yet in so doing an intentional misrepresentation must
not be implied (V, 5157-5160), and if stated or implied is censurable
(II, 1305) and presents a question of privilege (III, 2717; VI, 607). A
Member in debate having declared the words of another ``a base lie,''
censure was inflicted by the House on the offender (II, 1249).
[[Page 181]]
to take books or papers from the table, or write there, 2 Hats., 171, p.
170.
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Sec. 364. Disorder and interruptions during debate. |
No one
is to disturb another in his speech by hissing, coughing, spitting, 6
Grey, 322; Scob., 8; D'Ewes, 332, col. 1, 640, col. 2, speaking or
whispering to another, Scob., 6; D'Ewes, 487, col. 1; nor stand up to
interrupt him, Town, col. 205; Mem. in Hakew., 31; nor to pass between
the Speaker and the speaking Member, nor to go across the House, Scob.,
6, or to walk up and down it, or
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The House has, by clause 5 of rule XVII, prescribed certain rules of
decorum differing somewhat from this provision of the parliamentary law,
but supplemental to it rather than antagonistic. In one respect,
however, the practice of the House differs from the apparent intent of
the parliamentary law. In the House a Member may interrupt by addressing
the Chair for permission of the Member speaking (V, 5006; VIII, 2465);
but it is entirely within the discretion of the Member occupying the
floor to determine when and by whom he shall be interrupted (V, 5007,
5008; VIII, 2463, 2465). There is no rule of the House requiring a
Member having the floor to yield to another Member to whom he has
referred during debate (Aug. 2, 1984, p. 22241). A Member may ask
another to yield from any microphone in the Chamber, including those in
the well, so long as not crossing between the Member having the floor
and the Chair (June 5, 1998, p. ----). The Chair may take the initiative
in preserving order when a Member declining to yield in debate continues
to be interrupted by another Member, may order that the interrupting
Member's remarks not appear in the Record (July 26, 1984, p. 21247), and
may admonish Members not to converse with a Member attempting to address
the House (Feb. 21, 1984, p. 2758), as it is not in order to engage in
disruption while another is delivering remarks in debate (June 27, 1996,
p. 15915). On the opening day of the 103d Congress, during the customary
announcement of policies with respect to particular aspects of the
legislative process, the Chair elaborated on the rules of order in
debate with a general statement concerning decorum in the House (Jan. 5,
1993, p. 105). Under this provision, the Chair may require a line of
Members waiting to sign a discharge petition to proceed to the rostrum
from the far right-hand aisle and require the line not to stand between
the Chair and Members engaging in debate (Oct. 24, 1997, p. ----).
Hissing and jeering is not proper decorum in the House (May 21, 1998, p.
----). For further discussion of interruptions in debate, see Sec. 946,
infra.
[[Page 182]]
says anything worth their hearing. 2 Hats., 77, 78.
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Sec. 365. Parliamentary method of silencing a
tedious Member. |
Nevertheless, if a Member finds that it is not the inclination of
the House to hear him, and that by conversation or any other noise they
endeavor to drown his voice, it is his most prudent way to submit to the
pleasure of the House, and sit down; for it scarcely ever happens that
they are guilty of this piece of ill manners without sufficient reason,
or inattention to a Member who
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In the House, where the previous question and hour rule of debate have
been used for many years, the parliamentary method of suppressing a
tedious Member has never been imported into the practice (V, 5445).
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Sec. 366. The parliamentary law as to naming a disorderly
Member. |
If repeated calls do not produce order, the Speaker may call by
his name any Member obstinately persisting in irregularity; whereupon
the House may require the Member to withdraw. He is then to be heard in
exculpation, and to withdraw. Then the Speaker states the offense
committed; and the House considers the degree of punishment they will
inflict. 2 Hats., 167, 7, 8, 172.
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This provision of parliamentary law should be in conjunction with
clause 4 of rule XVII, Sec. Sec. 960-961, infra, particularly as this
provision relates to the ultimate authority of the House to determine
whether a Member ignoring repeated calls to order should be permitted to
proceed in order.
[[Page 183]]
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Sec. 367. Proceedings in cases of assaults and
affrays. |
For instances of assaults and affrays in the House of Commons,
and the proceedings thereon, see 1 Pet. Misc., 82; 3 Grey, 128; 4 Grey,
328; 5 Grey, 382; 6 Grey, 254; 10 Grey, 8. Whenever warm words or an
assault have passed between Members, the House, for the protection of
their Members, requires them to declare in their places not to prosecute
any quarrel, 3 Grey, 128, 293; 5 Grey, 280; or orders them to attend the
Speaker, who is to accommodate their differences, and report to the
House, 3 Grey, 419; and they are put under restraint if they refuse, or
until they do. 9 Grey, 234, 312.
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In several instances assaults and affrays have occurred on the floor
of the House. Sometimes the House has allowed these affairs to pass
without notice, the Members concerned making apologies either personally
or through other Members (II, 1658-1662). In other cases the House has
exacted apologies (II, 1646-1651, 1657), or required the offending
Members to pledge themselves before the House to keep the peace (II,
1643). In case of an aggravated assault by one Member on another on the
portico of the Capitol for words spoken in debate, the House censured
the assailant and three other Members who had been present, armed, to
prevent interference (II, 1655, 1656). Assaults or affrays in the
Committee of the Whole are dealt with by the House (II, 1648-1651).
[[Page 184]]
of for censure. And this is for the common security of all, and to
prevent mistakes which must happen if words are not taken down
immediately. Formerly they might be taken down at any time the same day.
2 Hats., 196; Mem. in Hakew., 71; 3 Grey, 48; 9 Grey, 514.
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Sec. 368. Parliamentary law as to taking down
disorderly words. |
Disorderly words are not to be noticed till the Member has
finished his speech. 5 Grey, 356; 6 Grey, 60. Then the person objecting
to them, and desiring them to be taken down by the Clerk at the table,
must repeat them. The Speaker then may direct the Clerk to take them
down in his minutes; but if he thinks them not disorderly, he delays the
direction. If the call becomes pretty general, he orders the Clerk to
take them down, as stated by the objecting Member. They are then a part
of his minutes, and when read to the offending Member, he may deny they
were his words, and the House must then decide by a question whether
they are his words or not. Then the Member may justify them, or explain
the sense in which he used them, or apologize. If the House is
satisfied, no further proceeding is necessary. But if two Members still
insist to take the sense of the House, the Member must withdraw before
that question is stated, and then the sense of the House is to be taken.
2 Hats., 199; 4 Grey, 170; 6 Grey, 59. When any Member has spoken, or
other business intervened, after offensive words spoken, they can not be
taken notice
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The House has, by clause 4 of rule XVII, provided a method of
procedure in cases of disorderly words. The House permits and requires
them to be noticed as soon as uttered, and has not insisted that the
offending Member withdraw while the House is deciding as to its course
of action.
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Sec. 369. Disorderly words taken down and reported
from Committee of the Whole. |
Disorderly words spoken in a committee must be
written down as in the House; but the committee can only report them to
the House for animadversion. 6 Grey, 46.
|
This provision of the parliamentary law has been applied to the
Committee of the Whole, rather than to select or standing committees,
which are separately empowered to enforce rules of decorum (clause 1(a)
of rule XI, which incorporates the provisions of rule XVII where
applicable). The House has censured a Member for disorderly words spoken
in Committee of the Whole and reported therefrom (II, 1259).
|
Sec. 370. References in debate to the
Executive. |
In Parliament, to speak irreverently or seditiously against
the King is against order. Smyth's Comw., L. 2, c. 3; 2 Hats., 170.
|
This provision of the parliamentary law is manifestly inapplicable to
the House (V, 5086); and it has been held in order in debate to refer to
the President of the United States or his opinions, either with approval
or criticism, provided that such reference be relevant to the subject
under discussion and otherwise conformable to the Rules of the House (V,
5087-5091; VIII, 2500). Under this standard the following references are
in order: (1) a reference to the probable action of the President (V,
5092); (2) an adjuration to the President to keep his word (although an
improper form of address) (Dec. 19, 1995, p. 37601); and (3) an
accusation that the President ``frivolously vetoed'' a bill (Nov. 8,
1995, p. 31785).
[[Page 185]]
stain from comparisons to the personal conduct of sitting Members of the
House or Senate (Dec. 18, 1998, p. ----). Furthermore,
Members may not refer to evidence of alleged impeachable offenses by the
President contained in a communication from an independent counsel
pending before a House committee (Sept. 14, 1998, p. ----; Sept. 17,
1998, p. ----), although they may refer to the communication, itself,
within the confines of proper decorum in debate (Oct. 6, 1998, p. ----).
Although wide latitude is permitted in debate on a proposition
to impeach the President (V, 5093), Members must abstain from language
personally offensive (V, 5094; Dec. 18, 1998, p. ----); and Members must
ab
Personal abuse, innuendo, or ridicule of the President is not
permitted (VIII, 2497; Aug. 12, 1986, p. 21078; Oct. 21, 1987, p. 8857;
Sept. 21, 1994, p. 25147). Under this standard the following references
are not in order: (1) calling the President a ``liar'' or accusing him
of ``lying'' (June 26, 1985, p. 17394; Sept. 24, 1992, pp. 27345, 27346;
Nov. 15, 1995, p. 32587; June 6, 1996, pp. 13228, 13229; Mar. 18, 1998,
p. ----; Nov. 14, 2002, p. ----; July 15, 2003, p. ----),
or suggesting mendacity (such as suggesting the President misrepresented
the truth, attempted to obstruct justice, and encouraged others to
perjure themselves (Feb. 25, 1998, p. ----), charging him with intent to
be intellectually dishonest (May 9, 1990, p. 9828), stating that many
were convinced he had ``not been honest'' (Mar. 5, 1998, p. ----); (2)
attributing to him ``hypocrisy'' (Sept. 25, 1992, p. 27674); (3)
accusing him of giving ``aid and comfort to the enemy'' (Jan. 25, 1995,
p. 2352); (4) accusing him of ``demagoguery'' (Jan. 23, 1996, p. 1144;
Jan. 24, 1996, pp. 1220, 1221; May 30, 1996, pp. 12646, 12647); (5)
calling him a ``draft-dodger'' or accusing him of ``raping the truth''
(Apr. 24, 1996, pp. 8807, 8808; Sept. 30, 1996, p. 26603);
(6) describing his action as ``cowardly'' (Oct. 25, 1989, p. 25817); (7)
referring to him as ``a little bugger'' (Nov. 18, 1995, p. 33974); (8)
alluding to alleged sexual misconduct on his part (May 10, 1994, p.
9697; Feb. 25, 1998, p. ----; Mar. 5, 1998, p. ----; May 18, 1998, p. --
--); (9) alluding to unethical behavior on his part (June 20, 1996, p.
14829; July 9, 2002, p. ----); (10) discussing ``charges''
leveled at the President or under investigation (Mar. 19, 1998, p. ----;
June 11, 1998, p. ----), including alluding to ``fund-raising abuses''
(Mar. 14, 2000, p. ----) or speculating that the Vice President might
someday pardon the President for certain charges (Apr. 12, 2000, p. ----
); or discussing alleged criminal conduct (Sept. 10, 1998, p. ----);
(11) discussing personal conduct even as a point of reference or
comparison (July 16, 1998, p. ----; Sept. 9, 1998, p. ----); and
(12) implying a cause-and-effect relationship between political
contributions and his actions as President (May 22, 2001, p. ----
). The Chair may admonish Members transgressing this stricture
even after other debate has intervened (Jan. 23, 1996, p. 1144).
[[Page 186]]
President made off the floor (even if recited as a rebuttal to such
criticism) (Dec. 17, 1998, p. ----).
A Member may not read in debate extraneous material personally abusive
of the President, which would be improper if spoken in the Member's own
words (July 12, 1996, pp. 17109, 17110; July 26, 1996, p. 19458; Feb.
26, 1998, p. ----; Mar. 3, 1993, p. 3958; Nov. 15, 1995, p. 32587; May
2, 1996, p. 10010; Mar. 17, 1998, p. ----; July 15, 2003, p. ----
). This prohibition includes the recitation of another Member's
criticism of the
The Chair has advised that the protections afforded by Jefferson's
Manual and the precedents against unparliamentary references to the
President, himself, do not necessarily obtain for members of his family
(July 12, 1990, p. 17206). In the 102d Congress, the Speaker enunciated
a minimal standard of propriety for all debate concerning nominated
candidates for the Presidency, based on the traditional proscription
against personally offensive references to the President even in his
capacity as a candidate (Speaker Foley, Sept. 24, 1992, p. 27344).
For discussion of the stricture against addressing remarks in debate
to the President, as in the second person, see Sec. 945, infra.
On January 27, 1909 (VIII, 2497), the House adopted a report of a
committee appointed to investigate the question, which report in part
stated:
``The freedom of speech in debate in the House should never be denied
or abridged, but freedom of speech in debate does not mean license to
indulge in personal abuses or ridicule. The right of Members of the two
Houses of Congress to criticize the official acts of the President and
other executive officers is beyond question, but this right is subject
to proper rules requiring decorum in debate. Such right of criticism is
inherent upon legislative authority. The right to legislate involves the
right to consider conditions as they are and to contrast present
conditions with those of the past or those desired in the future. The
right to correct abuses by legislation carries the right to consider and
discuss abuses which exist or which are feared.
``It is, however, the duty of the House to require its Members in
speech or debate to preserve that proper restraint which will permit the
House to conduct its business in an orderly manner and without
unnecessarily and unduly exciting animosity among its Members or
antagonism from those other branches of the Government with which the
House is correlated.''
[[Page 187]]
|
Sec. 371. The other House and its Members not to be
criticized in debate. |
It is a breach of order in debate to notice what
has been said on the same subject in the other House, or the particular
votes or majorities on it there; because the opinion of each House
should be left to its own independency, not to be influenced by the
proceedings of the other; and the quoting them might beget reflections
leading to a misunderstanding between the two Houses. 8 Grey, 22.
|
Until former clause 1 of rule XIV (current clause 1 of rule XVII) was
amended by adoption of the rules in the 100th Congress (H. Res. 5, Jan.
6, 1987, p. 6) and again in the 101st Congress (H. Res. 5, Jan. 3, 1989,
p. 72), this principle of comity and the parliamentary law as described
by Jefferson governed debate in the House to the full extent of its
provisions (see generally, V, 5095-5130; VIII, 2501-21; July 31, 1984,
p. 21670; Deschler-Brown, ch. 29, Sec. 44). Clause 1 of rule XVII
governs debate concerning the Senate and permits some factual references
that are a matter of public record and that are relevant to the making
of legislative history on the pending measure. It is the duty of the
Speaker to call to order a Member who criticizes the actions of the
Senate (see Sec. 374, infra), and the Speaker may admonish a Member even
after intervening recognition (Oct. 12, 1999, p. ----; Nov. 15,
2001, p. ----). The House has, by unanimous consent, permitted
tributes to a retiring Senator (Sept. 18, 2000, p. ----).
It is not in order in debate to mention the name of a Senator (except
as the sponsor of a measure or in quotations from Senate proceedings for
the purpose of making legislative history). This rule has been applied
when a Member in debate: (1) either criticizes (V, 5121, 5122; VIII,
2518, 2521; July 10, 1990, p. 17205) or compliments (VIII, 2509; Apr.
21, 1993, p. 8013; Nov. 18, 1999, p. ----), including extending
thanks to named Senators (June 12, 2001, p.----); (2) refers to a
Senator's vote on a proposition (Deschler-Brown, ch. 29,
Sec. Sec. 44.38-44.44; (3) characterizes the position of a Senator on a
legislative issue (Deschler-Brown, ch. 29, Sec. Sec. 44.17, 44.19; Oct.
11, 1984, p. 32153; July 12, 1990, p. 17205); (4) publicizes the
telephone number of a Senator in an attempt to influence his future vote
(Oct. 25, 1990, p. 34083); or (5) speculates as to the intent or motives
of a Senator (Oct. 11, 1984, pp. 32221-23; Oct. 21, 1997, p. ----
; Nov. 6, 2001, p. ----; Apr. 11, 2003, p. ----). The
prohibition against such references to Senators includes a reference not
explicitly naming the Senator (VIII, 2512; Feb. 23, 1994, p. 2658; June
30, 1995, p. 18153; Feb. 27, 1997, pp. 2768, 2769), including a
recitation of a quote by ``a Member of the other body'' (Feb., 12, 2003,
p. ----). References to statements or actions of Senators
occurring outside the Senate Chamber also are not in order
(VIII, 2515; Deschler-Brown, ch. 29, Sec. Sec. 44.31-44.37; Apr.
11, 2000, p. ----). The prohibition also extends to the reading of a
paper making criticisms of a Senator (V, 5127) and references to another
person's criticism of a Senator (Aug. 4, 1983, p. 23145). Remarks in
debate during the pendency of an impeachment resolution may not include
comparisons to the personal conduct of sitting Members of the House or
Senate (Dec. 18, 1998, p. ----). /It also is not in order in
debate to refer to the presence of a Senator on the House floor (Apr.
17, 2002, p. ----; Apr. 30, 2002, p. ----).
[[Page 188]]
accounts of Senate debates printed elsewhere, such as in reprints or in
the press (VIII, 2053). After examination by a committee, a speech
reflecting on the character of the Senate was ordered to be stricken
from the Record, on the ground that it tended to create ``unfriendly
conditions between the two bodies * * * obstructive of wise legislation
and little short of a public calamity'' (V, 5129).
A Member may not read or quote from the record of speeches or
proceedings in the Senate, or insert such material in the Record (V,
5107-5111; VIII, 2501-2506; June 25, 1986, p. 15576; Deschler-Brown, ch.
29, Sec. Sec. 44.23-44.25; Apr. 11, 2000, p. ----) except to make
legislative history on a measure then under debate, and the prohibition
extends to quoting
On one occasion before the rule was changed in the 101st Congress to
permit certain quotations from Senate proceedings for the purpose of
making legislative history, the Speaker entertained a unanimous-consent
request that a Member be permitted to refer in debate to Senate
proceedings (to quote a statement by the Senate Majority Leader as to
probable Senate action on the measure then pending in the House), but
the Speaker first ascertained in what manner the reference would be
made, in order to assure that remarks critical of the Senate, its
Members, or its proceedings would not be made (Speaker O'Neill, June 4,
1980, p. 13212). However, the Chair will not entertain
such a request where the references would necessarily imply criticism of
the Senate, such as to respond to remarks in the Senate which were
critical of Members of the House (VIII, 2519).
With respect to references to Members of the Senate acting in another
capacity, references to former Members of the House who are presently
Senators are only permissible if they merely address prior House service
and are not implicitly critical of Senate service (May 8, 1984, p.
11428). A Member of the House has been permitted to refer to a speech
made in the Senate by one no longer a Member of that body (V, 5112),
although references to Senate proceedings on legislation in the current
Congress other than those expressly permitted to establish legislative
history should be avoided. In the 104th Congress the Chair held that the
precise standard in clause 1 of former rule XIV (current rule XVII) for
references to ``individual Members of the Senate'' does not apply to
references to former Senators or to the Vice President in his former
capacity as a Senator (Dec. 14, 1995, p. 36968). It has even been held
out of order to criticize words spoken in the Senate by one not a Member
of that body in the course of an impeachment trial (V, 5106).
[[Page 189]]
President contained in extraneous material read in debate are held to
the same standard as words spoken in debate (Sept. 19, 2000, p. ----).
References in debate to the Vice President (as President of the
Senate) are governed by the standards of reference permitted toward the
President rather than the more stringent prohibitions under clause 1 of
former rule XIV (current rule XVII) against references to sitting
Senators. Therefore, a Member may criticize in debate the policies, or
candidacy, of the Vice President but may not engage in personality (Dec.
14, 1995, p. 36968; July 14, 1998, p. ----; Sept. 20, 2000, p. ----). As
such, it is not in order to allude to ``wrongdoings [including] fund-
raising telephone calls by the Vice President'' (Mar. 14, 2000, p. ----
); to speculate that he might someday ``pardon'' the President (Apr. 12,
2000, p. ----); to accuse him of lying (Sept. 20, 2000, p. ----; Sept.
21, 2000, p. ----); or to suggest ``he has a problem with the truth''
(Oct. 5, 2000, p. ----). References to the Vice
References to Members of the Senate in their capacities as candidates
for the Presidency or other office are not prohibited; where a Senator
is a candidate for President or Vice President his official policies,
actions, and opinions as a candidate may be criticized in terms not
personally offensive (Speaker Wright, Sept. 29, 1988, p. 26683), but
references attacking the character or integrity of a Senator even in
that context are not in order (Oct. 30, 1979, p. 30150).
Although it is not in order to characterize the position
of the Senate (Oct. 5, 1984, p. 30326) or speculate as to the intent of
the Senate on legislation (Oct. 11, 1984, pp. 32221-23), it is
permissible under clause 1 of rule XVII to discuss the content of a
Senate-passed counterpart to a pending House bill (Nov. 1, 2001, p. ----
), to affirm that the Senate has or has not taken an action (Dec.
19, 2001, p. --; Mar. 5, 2003, p. ------), or to discuss Senate
procedures on a factual basis (Feb. 13, 2003, p. ----). For example,
although a Member may say that the Senate has, as a matter of fact,
``not acted'' on a specified measure, the Member may not say that the
Senate ``cannot act'' (Dec. 19, 2001, p. ----) or cite the Senate for
``failure to act'' (Sept. 26, 2002, p. ----) or to suggest Senate
inaction was the result of a ``filibuster'' (Mar. 5, 2003, p. ----
).
[[Page 190]]
Even prior to the 100th Congress, it has been
permissible to refer to proceedings in the other House, provided the
reference does not contravene the principles stated by Jefferson. A
Member must be permitted to refer to the existence of the Senate and its
functions in a general and neutral way. For example, a Member may oppose
a sine die adjournment resolution on the grounds that Congress should
stay in session to complete action on specified legislation then pending
in the Senate (V, 5115), or a Member may discuss the
constitutional prerogatives of the Senate on a factual basis, but may
not characterize Senate procedures with regard to a particular
confirmation proceeding (Feb. 13, 2003, p. ----). It is
appropriate to state whether or not the Senate has acted on House-passed
legislation as long as criticism is neither stated nor implied (Oct. 4,
1984, p. 30047; Mar. 5, 2003, p. ----). If references to the Senate are
appropriate, the Member delivering them is not required to use the term
``the other body,'' and the use of the term ``Senate'' is not a per se
violation of the rule of comity (Oct. 4, 1984, p. 30047).
Similarly, references to ``the other body'' will not cure
unparliamentary references directed to the Senate (Oct. 2, 2002, p. ----
). It is in order in debate, while discussing a question
involving conference committee procedure, to state what actually
occurred in a conference committee session, without referring to or
criticizing a named Member of the Senate (July 29, 1935, p. 12011).
Where a Member has been assailed in the Senate, he has been permitted to
explain his own conduct and motives, without bringing the whole
controversy into discussion or assailing the Senator (V, 5123-5126).
Propositions relating to breaches of these principles have been
entertained as of privilege (V, 5129, 6980).
Although the rule permits a factual statement about the Senate,
it prohibits any characterization of Senate action or
inaction (Apr. 29, 1986, p. 8856; July 31, 1986, p. 18253; Aug. 4, 1987,
p. 22288; Oct. 28, 1993, p. 26538; Jan. 3, 1996, p. 61). For example,
the rule prohibits: (1) characterization of the action of a
Senate committee on a Presidential nominee (July 9, 1992, p. 18342),
including advocating that it take a certain action with respect thereto
(Feb. 7, 1984, p. 1979; Oct. 8, 1991, p. 25754; May 24, 1995, p. 14304;
Oct. 30, 1997, p. ----; Feb. 12, 2003, p. ----); (2) any
criticism of Senate action (V, 5114-5120; Dec. 10, 1980, p. 33205; Apr.
27, 1993, p. 8271), including a characterization of Senate action as a
``further injustice'' (Oct. 6, 1999, p. ----), an allegation that
``the Senate has not passed legislation in a constructive way'' (Sept.
25, 2002, p. ----), an accusation that the Senate is governed by
``arcane budget rules'' (Oct. 2, 2002, p. ----), or an inference that
the Senate has failed to follow the law (Oct. 3, 2002, p. ----); (3) any
praise of Senate action, such as characterizing Senate action as
``responsible'' or ``bipartisan'' (Sept. 19, 2002, p. ----); (4)
questions with respect to the courage or resolve of its Members to take
an action (Aug. 4, 1989, p. 19315); (5) an accusation that
the Senate majority leadership failed to schedule a bill (Oct. 5, 1998,
p. ----) or that the Senate minority held a bill ``hostage'' (Oct. 5,
1999, p. ----); or (6) characterization of a Senate bill as
``hastily drafted'' (Nov. 1, 2001, p. ----). Furthermore, it is
not in order in debate to specifically urge that the Senate take certain
action, such as suggesting that the President urge Senate conferees to
meet with House conferees on specific legislation (Aug. 2, 1984, p.
22270), or urge Members of the House to ``lobby'' Senators on an issue
(Apr. 4, 2000, p. ----; Dec. 5, 2001, p. ----; Oct. 3, 2002, p.
----).
|
Sec. 373. Complaint by one House of conduct of a
Member of the other. |
Neither House can exercise any authority over a Member or
officer of the other, but should complain to the House of which he is,
and leave the punishment to them.
|
[[Page 191]]
to expunge from the Record statements in criticism of a Member of the
House did not constitute a question of privilege, being in violation of
the rule prohibiting references to the Senate in debate (VIII, 2519), a
properly drafted resolution referring to language published in the
record on a designated page of Senate proceedings as constituting a
breach of privilege and requesting the Senate to take appropriate action
concerning the subject has been held to present a question of the
privileges of the House (VIII, 2516).
In a notable instance, wherein a Member of the House had assaulted a
Senator in the Senate Chamber for words spoken in debate, the Senate
examined the breach of privilege and transmitted its report to the
House, which punished the Member (II, 1622). A Senator having assailed a
House Member in debate, the House messaged to the Senate a resolution
declaring the language a breach of privilege and requested the Senate to
take appropriate action (Sept. 27, 1951, p. 12270). The Senator
subsequently asked unanimous consent to correct his remarks in the
permanent Congressional Record, but objection was raised (Sept. 28,
1951, p. 12383). But where certain Members of the House, in a published
letter, sought to influence the vote of a Senator in an impeachment
trial, the House declined to consider the matter as a breach of
privilege (III, 2657). While on one occasion it was held that a
resolution offered in the House requesting the Senate
|
Sec. 374. Duty of the Speaker to prevent expressions
offensive to the other House. |
* * * Where the complaint is of words
disrespectfully spoken by a Member of another House, it is difficult to
obtain punishment, because of the rules supposed necessary to be
observed (as to the immediate noting down of words) for the security of
Members. Therefore it is the duty of the House, and more particularly of
the Speaker, to interfere immediately, and not to permit expressions to
go unnoticed which may give a ground of complaint to the other House,
and introduce proceedings and mutual accusations between the two Houses,
which can hardly be terminated without difficulty and disorder. 3 Hats.,
51.
|
[[Page 192]]
House to proceed in order (Speaker O'Neill, June 16, 1982, p. 13843).
While the Chair should take the initiative to prevent improper
references to the Senate in debate, the Chair will not respond to
hypothetical questions as to the propriety of possible characterizations
of Senate actions prior to their use in debate (Oct. 24, 1985, p.
28819). For a further discussion of the Speaker's duties regarding
unparliamentary debate, see Sec. Sec. 960-961, infra.
In the House this rule of parliamentary law is considered as binding
on the Chair (V, 5130; VIII, 2465), and it is the duty of the Speaker to
call to order a Member who criticizes the actions of the Senate, its
Members or committees in debate or through an insertion in the Record
(Speaker Albert, Apr. 17, 1975, p. 10458; Oct. 7, 1975, p. 32055). The
Chair has distinguished between engaging in personality toward another
Member of the House, as to which the Chair normally awaits a point of
order from the floor, and improper references to Members of the Senate,
which violate comity between the Houses whether or not engaging in
personality, as to which the Chair normally takes initiative (Feb. 27,
1997, pp. 2778, 2779). The Chair may admonish Members to
avoid unparliamentary references to the Senate even after intervening
recognition (Oct. 12, 1999, p. ----). Pending consideration of a measure
relating to the Senate, the Speaker announced his intention to strictly
enforce this provision of Jefferson's Manual prohibiting improper
references to the Senate, and to deny recognition to Members violating
the prohibition, subject to permission of the
|
Sec. 375. Course of the Member when business concerning
himself is debating. |
No Member may be present when a bill or any business
concerning himself is debating; nor is any Member to speak to the merits
of it till he withdraws. 2 Hats., 219. The rule is that if a charge
against a Member arise out of a report of a committee, or examination of
witnesses in the House, as the Member knows from that to what points he
is to direct his exculpation, he may be heard to those points before any
question is moved or stated against him. He is then to be heard, and
withdraw before any question is moved. But if the question itself is the
charge, as for breach of order or matter arising in the debate, then the
charge must be stated (that is, the question must be moved), himself
heard, and then to withdraw. 2 Hats., 121, 122.
|
[[Page 193]]
In 1832, during proceedings for the censure of a Member, the Speaker
informed the Member that he should retire (II, 1366); but this seems to
be an exceptional instance of the enforcement of the law of Parliament.
In other cases, after the proposition for censure or expulsion has been
proposed, Members have been heard in debate, either as a matter of right
(II, 1286), as a matter of course (II, 1246, 1253), by express provision
(II, 1273), and in writing (II, 1273), or by unanimous consent (II,
1275). A Member against whom a resolution of censure was pending was
asked by the Speaker if he desired to be heard (VI, 236). But a Member
was not permitted to depute another Member to speak in his behalf (II,
1273). In modern practice the Member has been permitted to speak in his
own behalf, both in censure (June 10, 1980, pp. 13802-11) and expulsion
proceedings (Oct. 2, 1980, pp. 28953-78). A Member-elect has been
permitted to participate in debate on a resolution relating to his right
to take the oath (Jan. 10, 1967, p. 23).
|
Sec. 376. Disqualifying personal interest of a
Member. |
Where the private interests of a Member are concerned in a bill or
question he is to withdraw. And where such an interest has appeared, his
voice has been disallowed, even after a division. In a case so contrary,
not only to the laws of decency, but to the fundamental principle of the
social compact, which denies to any man to be a judge in his own cause,
it is for the honor of the House that this rule of immemorial observance
should be strictly adhered to. 2 Hats., 119, 121; 6 Grey, 368.
|
In the House it has not been usual for the Member to withdraw when his
private interests are concerned in a pending measure, but the House has
provided by clause 1 of rule III that the Member shall not vote in such
a contingency. In one instance the Senate disallowed a vote given by a
Senator on a question relating to his own right to a seat; but the House
has never had occasion to proceed so far (V, 5959).
|
Sec. 377. Wearing of hats by Members. |
No Member is to come
into the House with his head covered, nor to remove from one place to
another with his hat on, nor is to put on his hat in coming in or
removing, until he be set down in his place. Scob., 6.
|
|
Sec. 378. Adjournment of questions of order. |
In 1837 the parliamentary practice of wearing hats during the session
was abolished by adoption of current clause 5 of rule XVII. See
Sec. 962, infra.
A question of
order may be adjourned to give time to look into precedents. 2 Hats.,
118.
|
[[Page 194]]
Chair. On occasion, the Chair has reversed as erroneous a decision
previously made (VI, 639; VII, 849; VIII, 2794, 3435). The law of
Parliament evidently contemplates that the adjournment of a question of
order shall be controlled by the House.
<> In
Parliament, all decisions of the Speaker may be controlled by the House.
3 Grey, 319.
The Speaker has declined, on a difficult question of order, to rule
until he had taken time for examination (III, 2725; VI, 432; VII, 2106;
VIII, 2174, 2396, 3475), and may take a parliamentary inquiry under
advisement, especially where not related to the pending proceedings
(VIII, 2174; Apr. 7, 1992, p. 8274), but it is conceivable that a case
might arise wherein this privilege of the Chair would require approval
of the majority of the House, to prevent arbitrary obstruction of the
pending business by the
The Speaker's decision on a decision of order is subject to appeal by
any Member (clause 5 of rule I).