

*President Clinton.* Well, my experience in these things, which is mounting up now, indicates that the public placement of blame is not very productive if what you really want to do is get the parties to talk again.

Let me tell you what the facts are. Fifteen months ago we were asked by Prime Minister Netanyahu to explore whether or not there was some way we could facilitate, if you will, an acceleration of the Oslo process, which was embodied in the peace signing in September of '93 in Washington, to move, more or less, immediately to final status talks between the Palestinians and the Israelis.

He pointed out that a lot of these issues were highly contentious, especially for his government, and it would be better to make—to put them all together in one big package and try to make—have as few votes as possible to ratify the process. And I, frankly, thought he had a good idea. I thought it then, and I think it now.

And for a year and some odd months, we have worked very hard to try to find a formula which will enable the parties to take one more step in the process started at Oslo, and then go to final status talks. In other words, we haven't tried to find a formula to resolve all the issues; we've tried to find a formula to get them over the hurdle to get into final status talks. We came up with a set of ideas. In principle, but not in all the details, but in principle, Mr. Arafat accepted them. Mr. Netanyahu was not in a position to do so. He went home to Israel; he asked Mr. Ross, my Middle East Ambassador, to go out there and talk to him. He did. He's coming back now; he's on his way,

or he may already be in the United States. Secretary Albright has stayed behind. They will talk some more.

I'm hoping that we can find an agreement based on the ideas we've presented which will enable these two parties to get together and go into final status talks.

I think, frankly, there is still some mistrust between them. And I think, frankly, there is still some difference of calculation among some of the actors in the Middle East drama about whether they are or are not benefited by a delay, by a stall. I can only tell you that I have seen a lot of doors open and close in the last 5½ years, and my view is that it is neither in Israel's nor the Palestinian Authority's interest to promote delay; that far more bad things are likely to happen than good things by a deliberate strategy of delay.

So I'm hoping that we'll be able to unlock this problem and worry about responsibility in the future and get results now.

NOTE: The President spoke at approximately 3:48 p.m. on the terrace of Sans Souci Gardens. In his remarks, he referred to President Boris Yeltsin of Russia; Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif of Pakistan; President Slobodan Milosevic of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro); Ibrahim Rugova, leader, Democratic League of Kosovo; Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu of Israel; and Chairman Yasser Arafat of the Palestinian Authority. Chancellor Kohl spoke in German, and his remarks were translated by an interpreter. A portion of these remarks could not be verified because the tape was incomplete.

## Statement on the Situation in Kosovo *May 13, 1998*

I welcome the news that President Milosevic and Dr. Ibrahim Rugova will meet on May 15 in Belgrade to initiate a dialog without preconditions.

As Ambassadors Holbrooke and Gelbard announced earlier today, the parties have also agreed to continue this dialog in a series of talks in Pristina.

This is a sober first step towards resolving a very dangerous conflict that clearly has the potential to spill over into neighboring countries and destabilize the region.

There is a great deal more to be done, however, before all the peoples of Kosovo enjoy the peace, security, and human rights they deserve. The parties face a complex challenge, but success is up to them. We expect each to make

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good their commitment to serious and productive dialog.

We should be mindful of the difficult road ahead, but we are encouraged to see this process underway.

## Message to the Congress Reporting the Detonation of a Nuclear Device by India

May 13, 1998

*To the Congress of the United States:*

Pursuant to section 102(b)(1) of the Arms Export Control Act, I am hereby reporting that, in accordance with that section, I have determined that India, a non-nuclear-weapon state, detonated a nuclear explosive device on May 11, 1998. I have further directed the relevant agencies and instrumentalities of the United States Government to take the necessary actions

to impose the sanctions described in section 102(b)(2) of that Act.

WILLIAM J. CLINTON

The White House,  
May 13, 1998.

NOTE: The memorandum on sanctions against India is listed in Appendix D at the end of this volume.

## Message to the Congress Reporting on the National Emergency With Respect to Iran

May 13, 1998

*To the Congress of the United States:*

I hereby report to the Congress on developments since the last Presidential report of November 25, 1997, concerning the national emergency with respect to Iran that was declared in Executive Order 12170 of November 14, 1979. This report is submitted pursuant to section 204(c) of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA), 50 U.S.C. 1703(c). This report covers events through March 31, 1998. My last report, dated November 25, 1997, covered events through September 30, 1997.

1. There have been no amendments to the Iranian Assets Control Regulations, 31 CFR Part 535 (the "IACR"), since my last report.

2. The Iran-United States Claims Tribunal (the "Tribunal"), established at The Hague pursuant to the Algiers Accords, continues to make progress in arbitrating the claims before it. Since the period covered in my last report, the Tribunal has rendered one award. This brings the total number of awards rendered by the Tribunal to 585, the majority of which have been in favor of U.S. claimants. As of March 31,

1998, the value of awards to successful U.S. claimants paid from the Security Account held by the NV Settlement Bank was \$2,480,897,381.53.

Since my last report, Iran has failed to replenish the Security Account established by the Algiers Accords to ensure payment of awards to successful U.S. claimants. Thus, since November 5, 1992, the Security Account has continuously remained below the \$500 million balance required by the Algiers Accords. As of March 31, 1998, the total amount in the Security Account was \$125,888,588.35, and the total amount in the Interest Account was \$21,716,836.85. Therefore, the United States continues to pursue Case No. A/28, filed in September 1993, to require Iran to meet its obligation under the Algiers Accords to replenish the Security Account.

The United States also continues to pursue Case No. A/29 to require Iran to meet its obligation of timely payment of its equal share of advances for Tribunal expenses when directed to do so by the Tribunal. Iran filed its Rejoinder in this case on February 9, 1998.