

the account “Operation and Maintenance, Defense Agencies” for fiscal year 1993 a sum not to exceed the amount appropriated pursuant to the authorization in subsection (a) of this section to—

(1) other accounts of the Department of Defense for the purpose of providing assistance to the independent states of the former Soviet Union; or

(2) appropriations available to the Department of State and other agencies of the United States Government for the purpose of providing assistance to the independent states of the former Soviet Union for programs that the President determines will increase the national security of the United States.

(c) Administrative provisions

(1) Amounts transferred under subsection (b) of this section shall be available subject to the same terms and conditions as the appropriations to which transferred.

(2) The authority to make transfers pursuant to this section is in addition to any other transfer authority of the Department of Defense.

(d) Coordination of programs

The President shall coordinate the programs described in subsection (b) of this section with those authorized in the other provisions of this chapter and in the provisions of the Freedom for Russia and Emerging Eurasian Democracies and Open Markets Support Act of 1992 (Public Law 102-511) so as to optimize the contribution such programs make to the national interests of the United States.

(Pub. L. 103-160, div. A, title XII, § 1209, Nov. 30, 1993, 107 Stat. 1782.)

REFERENCES IN TEXT

The Freedom for Russia and Emerging Eurasian Democracies and Open Markets Support Act of 1992, referred to in subsec. (d), is Pub. L. 102-511, Oct. 24, 1992, 106 Stat. 3320. For complete classification of this Act to the Code, see Short Title note set out under section 5801 of this title and Tables.

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CHAPTER REFERRED TO IN OTHER SECTIONS

This chapter is referred to in sections 6021, 6023, 6032 of this title.

§ 6001. Findings

The Congress makes the following findings:

(1) The government of Fidel Castro has demonstrated consistent disregard for internationally accepted standards of human rights and for democratic values. It restricts the Cuban people’s exercise of freedom of speech, press, assembly, and other rights recognized by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations on December 10, 1948. It has refused to admit into Cuba the representative of the United Nations Human Rights Commission appointed to investigate human rights violations on the island.

(2) The Cuban people have demonstrated their yearning for freedom and their increasing opposition to the Castro government by risking their lives in organizing independent, democratic activities on the island and by undertaking hazardous flights for freedom to the United States and other countries.

(3) The Castro government maintains a military-dominated economy that has decreased the well-being of the Cuban people in order to enable the government to engage in military interventions and subversive activities throughout the world and, especially, in the Western Hemisphere. These have included involvement in narcotics trafficking and support for the FMLN guerrillas in El Salvador.

(4) There is no sign that the Castro regime is prepared to make any significant concessions to democracy or to undertake any form of democratic opening. Efforts to suppress dissent through intimidation, imprisonment, and exile have accelerated since the political changes that have occurred in the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe.

(5) Events in the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe have dramatically reduced Cuba’s external support and threaten Cuba’s food and oil supplies.

(6) The fall of communism in the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, the now universal recognition in Latin America and the Caribbean that Cuba provides a failed model of government and development, and the evident inability of Cuba’s economy to survive current trends, provide the United States and the international democratic community with an unprecedented opportunity to promote a peaceful transition to democracy in Cuba.