Nothing contained in any antitrust law shall render unlawful the inclusion and enforcement in any trademark licensing contract or agreement, pursuant to which the licensee engages in the manufacture (including manufacture by a sublicensee, agent, or subcontractor), distribution, and sale of a trademarked soft drink product, of provisions granting the licensee the sole and exclusive right to manufacture, distribute, and sell such product in a defined geographic area or limiting the licensee, directly or indirectly, to the manufacture, distribution, and sale of such product only for ultimate resale to consumers within a defined geographic area: Provided, That such product is in substantial and effective competition with other products of the same general class in the relevant market or markets.
(Pub. L. 96–308, §2, July 9, 1980, 94 Stat. 939.)
Section 1 of Pub. L. 96–308 provided that: “This Act [enacting this chapter] may be cited as the ‘Soft Drink Interbrand Competition Act’.”
Section 4 of Pub. L. 96–308 provided that: “In the case of any proceeding instituted by the United States described in subsection (i) of section 5 of the Clayton Act (relating to suspension of the statute of limitations on the institution of proceedings by the United States) (15 U.S.C. 16(i)) which is pending on the date of the enactment of this Act [July 9, 1980], that subsection shall not apply with respect to any right of action referred to in that subsection based in whole or in part on any matter complained of in that proceeding consisting of the existence or enforcement of any provision described in section 2 of this Act [this section] in any trademark licensing contract or agreement described in that section.”
Nothing in this chapter shall be construed to legalize the enforcement of provisions described in section 3501 of this title in trademark licensing contracts or agreements described in that section by means of price fixing agreements, horizontal restraints of trade, or group boycotts, if such agreements, restraints, or boycotts would otherwise be unlawful.
(Pub. L. 96–308, §3, July 9, 1980, 94 Stat. 939.)
As used in this chapter, the term “antitrust law” means the Sherman Act (15 U.S.C. 1 et seq.), the Clayton Act (15 U.S.C. 12 et seq.), and the Federal Trade Commission Act (15 U.S.C. 41 et seq.).
(Pub. L. 96–308, §5, July 9, 1980, 94 Stat. 939.)
The Sherman Act (15 U.S.C. 1 et seq.), referred to in text, is act July 2, 1890, ch. 647, 26 Stat. 209, which is classified to sections 1 to 7 of this title. For complete classification of this Act to the Code, see Short Title note set out under section 1 of this title and Tables.
The Clayton Act (15 U.S.C. 12 et seq.), referred to in text, is act Oct. 15, 1914, ch. 323, 38 Stat. 730, which is classified generally to sections 12, 13, 14 to 19, 21, and 22 to 27 of this title, and sections 52 and 53 of Title 29, Labor. For further details and complete classification of this Act to the Code, see References in Text note set out under section 12 of this title and Tables.
The Federal Trade Commission Act (15 U.S.C. 41 et seq.), referred to in text, is act Sept. 26, 1914, ch. 311, 38 Stat. 717, which is classified generally to subchapter I (§41 et seq.) of chapter 2 of this title. For complete classification of this Act to the Code, see section 58 of this title and Tables.