

PHILLIP A. TALBERT  
United States Attorney  
LAUREL J. MONTOYA  
Assistant United States Attorney  
Robert E. Coyle Federal Courthouse  
2500 Tulare Street  
Fresno, CA 93721

(559) 497-4000

Attorneys for Plaintiff  
United States of America

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT  
EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,  
  
Plaintiff,  
  
v.  
  
RAY WILLIAM URIBE,  
  
Defendant.

CASE NO. 1:17-CR-00240-DAD-BAM  
1:22-MJ-00062-EPG

STIPULATION REGARDING EXCLUDABLE  
TIME PERIODS UNDER SPEEDY TRIAL ACT;  
ORDER

DATE: May 2, 2022  
TIME: 2 p.m.  
COURT: Hon. Sheila K. Oberto

On May 13, 2020, this Court issued General Order 618, which suspends all jury trials in the Eastern District of California until further notice. This General Order was entered to address public health concerns related to COVID-19. Further, pursuant to General Order 614, 620, 624, 628, and 630 and the CARES Act, this Court's declaration of judicial emergency under 18 U.S.C. § 3174, and the Ninth Circuit Judicial Council's Order of April 16, 2020, continuing this Court's judicial emergency, this Court has allowed district judges to continue all criminal matters to a date after May 1, 2020.<sup>1</sup>

Although the General Order addresses the district-wide health concern, the Supreme Court has emphasized that the Speedy Trial Act's end-of-justice provision "counteract[s] substantive openendedness with procedural strictness," "demand[ing] on-the-record findings" in a particular case. *Zedner v. United States*, 547 U.S. 489, 509 (2006). "[W]ithout on-the-record findings, there can be no

<sup>1</sup> A judge "may order case-by-case exceptions" at the discretion of that judge "or upon the request of counsel, after consultation with counsel and the Clerk of the Court to the extent such an order will impact court staff and operations." General Order 618, ¶ 7 (E.D. Cal. May 13, 2020).

1 exclusion under” § 3161(h)(7)(A). *Id.* at 507. And moreover, any such failure cannot be harmless. *Id.*  
 2 at 509; *see also United States v. Ramirez-Cortez*, 213 F.3d 1149, 1153 (9th Cir. 2000) (explaining that a  
 3 judge ordering and ends-of-justice continuance must set forth explicit findings on the record “either  
 4 orally or in writing”).

5 Based on the plain text of the Speedy Trial Act—which *Zedner* emphasizes as both mandatory  
 6 and inexcusable—General Orders 611, 612, 617, 618, and 620 and the subsequent declaration of judicial  
 7 emergency require specific supplementation. Ends-of-justice continuances are excludable only if “the  
 8 judge granted such continuance on the basis of his findings that the ends of justice served by taking such  
 9 action outweigh the best interest of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial.” 18 U.S.C. §  
 10 3161(h)(7)(A). Moreover, no such period is excludable unless “the court sets forth, in the record of the  
 11 case, either orally or in writing, its reason or finding that the ends of justice served by the granting of  
 12 such continuance outweigh the best interests of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial.” *Id.*

13 The General Orders and declaration of judicial emergency exclude delay in the “ends of justice.”  
 14 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7) (Local Code T4). Although the Speedy Trial Act does not directly address  
 15 continuances stemming from pandemics, natural disasters, or other emergencies, this Court has  
 16 discretion to order a continuance in such circumstances. For example, the Ninth Circuit affirmed a two-  
 17 week ends-of-justice continuance following Mt. St. Helens’ eruption. *Furlow v. United States*, 644 F.2d  
 18 764 (9th Cir. 1981). The court recognized that the eruption made it impossible for the trial to proceed.  
 19 *Id.* at 767-68; *see also United States v. Correa*, 182 F. Supp. 326, 329 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (citing *Furlow* to  
 20 exclude time following the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks and the resultant public emergency).  
 21 The coronavirus is posing a similar, albeit more enduring, barrier to the prompt proceedings mandated  
 22 by the statutory rules.

23 In light of the societal context created by the foregoing, this Court should consider the following  
 24 case-specific facts in finding excludable delay appropriate in this particular case under the ends-of-  
 25 justice exception, § 3161(h)(7) (Local Code T4).<sup>2</sup> If continued, this Court should designate a new date  
 26

27 <sup>2</sup> The parties note that General Order 612 acknowledges that a district judge may make  
 28 “additional findings to support the exclusion” at the judge’s discretion. General Order 612, ¶ 5 (E.D.  
 Cal. March 18, 2020).

1 for the status conference. *United States v. Lewis*, 611 F.3d 1172, 1176 (9th Cir. 2010) (noting any  
2 pretrial continuance must be “specifically limited in time”).

3 **STIPULATION**

4 Plaintiff United States of America, by and through its counsel of record, and defendant, by and  
5 through defendant’s counsel of record, hereby stipulate as follows:

6 1. By previous order, case no. 17-cr-240, a petition alleging a violation of supervised  
7 release, was set for preliminary hearing and status on May 2, 2022 at 2 p.m. on the duty calendar.

8 2. The government has filed a complaint alleging new charges in case no. 22-mj-62.  
9 Defendant has not had his initial appearance in that mater.

10 3. By this stipulation, defendant now moves to continue the preliminary hearing and status  
11 conference until May 10, 2022, and to exclude time between May 2, 2022, and May 10, 2022, under  
12 Local Code T4. The parties also agree that the initial appearance in case 22-mj-62 can be set for initial  
13 appearance on May 10, 2022, at 2 p.m.

14 4. The parties agree and stipulate, and request that the Court find the following:

15 a) Counsel for defendant needs additional time to determine if a preliminary hearing  
16 should be held in 17-cr-240. Counsel for defendant believes that failure to grant the above-  
17 requested continuance would deny him/her the reasonable time necessary for effective  
18 preparation, taking into account the exercise of due diligence.

19 b) In addition to the public health concerns cited by General Order 611 and  
20 presented by the evolving COVID-19 pandemic, an ends-of-justice delay is particularly apt in  
21 this case because Counsel or other relevant individuals have been encouraged to telework and  
22 minimize personal contact to the greatest extent possible. It will be difficult to avoid personal  
23 contact should the hearing proceed.

24 c) Based on the above-stated findings, the ends of justice served by continuing the  
25 case as requested outweigh the interest of the public and the defendant in a trial within the  
26 original date prescribed by the Speedy Trial Act.

27 d) For the purpose of computing time under the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161,  
28 et seq., within which trial must commence, the time period of May 2, 2022 to May 10, 2022,

1 inclusive, is deemed excludable pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7)(A), B(iv) [Local Code T4]  
2 because it results from a continuance granted by the Court at defendant's request on the basis of  
3 the Court's finding that the ends of justice served by taking such action outweigh the best interest  
4 of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial.

5 5. Nothing in this stipulation and order shall preclude a finding that other provisions of the  
6 Speedy Trial Act dictate that additional time periods are excludable from the period within which a trial  
7 must commence.

8 IT IS SO STIPULATED.

9  
10 Dated: April 28, 2022

PHILLIP A. TALBERT  
United States Attorney

11  
12 /s/ LAUREL J. MONTOYA  
LAUREL J. MONTOYA  
Assistant United States Attorney

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14  
15 Dated: April 28, 2022

/s/ ERIC V. KERSTEN  
ERIC V. KERSTEN  
Counsel for Defendant  
RAY WILLIAM URIBE,

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18  
19 **ORDER**

20 IT IS SO ORDERED.

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23  
24 DATED: 4/28/2022

/s/ Sheila K. Oberto  
THE HONORABLE SHEILA K. OBERTO  
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE