

**UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA**

JOHNNIE PARKER, *et al.*,

Plaintiffs,

v.

JOHN MORIARTY & ASSOCIATES,

Defendant/Third Party Plaintiff,

v.

STRITTMATTER METRO, LLC,

Third Party Defendant/Fourth Party
Plaintiff,

v.

ENVIRONMENTAL CONSULTANTS AND
CONTRACTORS, INC.,

Fourth Party Defendant.

Civil Action No. 15-1506 (CKK)

MEMORANDUM OPINION

(December 21, 2016)

On December 2, 2016, the Court issued an [62] Order and accompanying [63] Memorandum Opinion denying both the [46] *Motion to Intervene* and the [61] *Motion to Retain Right of Party to Intervene* filed by Deborah Khalil-Ambrozou (“Movant”), Plaintiff Johnnie Parker’s mother. Presently before the Court is Movant’s [68] *Motion to Reverse 62 Order Denying Ms. Khalil-Ambrozou’s 46 Motion to Intervene and Ms. Khalil-Ambrozou’s 61 Motion to Retain Right of Party to Intervene and Redress*, which the Court shall construe as a motion for reconsideration of its Order denying Movant’s request to intervene in the instant action pursuant

to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b).¹ The Court has carefully considered Movant's motion and concludes that Movant has provided no basis for the Court to alter or amend its decision to deny her request to intervene.²

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b) provides that "any order . . . that adjudicates fewer than all the claims or the rights and liabilities of fewer than all the parties . . . may be revised at any time before the entry of a judgment adjudicating all the claims and all the parties' rights and liabilities." Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 54(b). "The Court has broad discretion to hear a motion for reconsideration brought under Rule 54(b)." *Flythe v. D.C.*, 4 F. Supp. 3d 216, 218 (D.D.C. 2014) (quoting *Isse v. Am. Univ.*, 544 F. Supp. 2d 25, 29 (D.D.C. 2008)). "[T]his jurisdiction has established that reconsideration is appropriate 'as justice requires.'" *Lyles v. District of Columbia*, 65 F. Supp. 3d 181, 188 (D.D.C. 2014) (quoting *Cobell v. Norton*, 355 F. Supp. 2d 531, 539 (D.D.C. 2005)). In general, "a court will grant a motion for reconsideration of an interlocutory order only when the movant demonstrates: (1) an intervening change in the law; (2) the discovery of new evidence not previously available; or (3) a clear error in the first order." *Stewart v. Panetta*, 826 F. Supp. 2d 176, 177 (D.D.C. 2011) (quoting *Zeigler v. Potter*, 555 F. Supp. 2d 126, 129 (D.D.C. 2008)).

As the Court explained in its earlier opinion, "Movant's asserted injury aris[es] out of the altercation at her house and the court-ordered evaluation in 2016, and Plaintiff Parker's claims aris[e] out of an alleged injury that he incurred while working as subcontractor on a construction

¹ While Movant does not set forth the authority under which she seeks for the Court to reconsider its ruling, the Court is mindful of its "obligation to construe *pro se* filings liberally." *Toolasprashad v. Bur. of Prisons*, 286 F.3d 576, 583 (D.C. Cir. 2002). Here, the Court construes this as a motion brought pursuant to Rule 54(b) because the Court has not yet entered a final judgment on all pending claims in this action.

² In an exercise of its discretion, the Court finds that holding oral argument would not be of assistance in rendering its decision. See LCvR 7(f).

