



to dismiss a prisoner complaint that is: (1) “frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted”; or (2) “seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief.”

A claim is frivolous when it appears from the face of the complaint that the factual allegations are “clearly baseless” or that the legal theories are “indisputably meritless.” *Carroll v. Gross*, 984 F.2d 392, 393 (11th Cir. 1993). A complaint fails to state a claim when it does not include “enough factual matter (taken as true)” to “give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests[.]” *Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly*, 550 U.S. 544, 555-56 (2007) (noting that “[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level,” and that the complaint “must contain something more . . . than . . . a statement of facts that merely creates a suspicion [of] a legally cognizable right of action”) (internal quotations and citations omitted); *see also Ashcroft v. Iqbal*, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009) (explaining that “threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice”).

In making the above determinations, all factual allegations in the complaint must be viewed as true. *Brown v. Johnson*, 387 F.3d 1344, 1347 (11th Cir. 2004). Moreover, “[p]ro se pleadings are held to a less stringent standard than pleadings drafted by attorneys and will, therefore, be liberally construed.” *Tannenbaum v. United States*, 148 F.3d 1262, 1263 (11th Cir. 1998).

In order to state a claim for relief under section 1983, a plaintiff must allege that: (1) an act or omission deprived him of a right, privilege, or immunity secured by the

Constitution or a statute of the United States; and (2) the act or omission was committed by a person acting under color of state law. *Hale v. Tallapoosa County*, 50 F.3d 1579, 1581 (11th Cir. 1995). If a litigant cannot satisfy these requirements, or fails to provide factual allegations in support of his claim or claims, then the complaint is subject to dismissal. *See Chappell v. Rich*, 340 F.3d 1279, 1282-84 (11th Cir. 2003) (affirming the district court's dismissal of a section 1983 complaint because the plaintiffs factual allegations were insufficient to support the alleged constitutional violation). *See also* 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b) (dictating that a complaint, or any portion thereof, that does not pass the standard in section 1915A "shall" be dismissed on preliminary review).

## **II. BACKGROUND**

Plaintiff brings this action asserting equal protection and eighth amendment violations in connection with the denial of his request to attend his mother's January 17, 2013, funeral. In support of his claim that he received disparate treatment due to his race, Plaintiff alleges that WSP officials allowed a white inmate to visit his dying mother on two occasions in late 2012. The white inmate is a sex offender with "special movement" restrictions. Plaintiff, on the other hand, was convicted of misdemeanor criminal damage to property and trespass. He is allegedly a "State Wide Trustee," who apparently can work outside the prison.

Plaintiff sues Warden Donald Barrow, who denied Plaintiff's request to attend his mother's funeral, and Deputy Warden Sue Mickens, who failed to "communicate her finding of time and place funeral in reasonable timing to her superior." Plaintiff also sues

Shevondah Fields, Manager of Inmate Affairs for the Georgia Department of Corrections, who determined via a grievance appeal that Barrow had not violated policy in denying Plaintiff's request to attend his mother's funeral. He seeks damages and immediate release from prison.<sup>1</sup>

### ***III. DISCUSSION***

#### ***A. Dismissed Claim***

Plaintiff patently has not alleged that he received cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment. Accordingly, it is **RECOMMENDED** that Plaintiff's Eighth Amendment claim be **DISMISSED**.

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), the Plaintiff may file written objections to this recommendation with the United States District Judge to whom this case is assigned **WITHIN FOURTEEN (14) DAYS** after being served with a copy hereof.

#### ***B. Dismissed Defendants***

Plaintiff's only allegation against Deputy Warden Mickens is that she failed to timely inform Warden Barrow of the time and place of Plaintiff's mother's funeral. Thus, Plaintiff alleges, at most, negligence on the part of Mickens. Mere allegations of negligence, as opposed to deliberate indifference, will not support a constitutional claim. *See e.g., Richardson v. Johnson*, 598 F.3d 734, 737 (11<sup>th</sup> Cir. 2010). It is therefore **RECOMMENDED** that Mickens be **DISMISSED** as a Defendant herein.

---

<sup>1</sup> Release from prison is not available in a section 1983 action, but only in a habeas corpus proceeding, after exhaustion of state remedies.

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), the Plaintiff may file written objections to this recommendation with the United States District Judge to whom this case is assigned **WITHIN FOURTEEN (14) DAYS** after being served with a copy hereof.

As to Defendant Shevondah Fields, her approval of Warden Barrow's action in connection with an after-the-fact grievance appeal is insufficient to state a section 1983 claim. Plaintiff makes no suggestion that Fields was party to the alleged discrimination against Plaintiff. *See Lee v. Michigan Parole Bd*, 104 F. App'x 490, 493 (6<sup>th</sup> Cir. 2004) ("Section 1983 liability may not be imposed simply because a defendant denied an administrative grievance or failed to act based upon information contained in a grievance."). In light of the foregoing, it is hereby **RECOMMENDED** that Fields be **DISMISSED** as a Defendant herein.

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), the Plaintiff may file written objections to this recommendation with the United States District Judge to whom this case is assigned **WITHIN FOURTEEN (14) DAYS** after being served with a copy hereof.

***C. Remaining Defendant***

To state a claim for violation of the Equal Protection Clause, an inmate must allege that other similarly situated inmates received more favorable treatment and that the discriminatory treatment was based on some constitutionally protected interest, such as race. *Jones v. Ray*, 279 F.3d 944, 946-47 (11th Cir. 2001). Although it is by no means clear that Plaintiff will ultimately prevail against Warden Donald Barrow, the Court will allow Plaintiff's equal protection claim to proceed against Barrow.

It is hereby **ORDERED** that service be made on Defendant Warden Donald Barrow and that he file an Answer or such other response as may be appropriate under Rule 12 of the FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, U.S.C. § 1915, and the *Prison Litigation Reform Act*. Defendant is reminded of the duty to avoid unnecessary service expenses, and of the possible imposition of expenses for failure to waive service pursuant to Rule 4(d).

**DUTY TO ADVISE OF ADDRESS CHANGE**

During the pendency of this action, all parties shall at all times keep the clerk of this court and all opposing attorneys and/or parties advised of their current address. Failure to promptly advise the Clerk of any change of address may result in the dismissal of a party's pleadings filed herein.

**DUTY TO PROSECUTE ACTION**

Plaintiff is advised that he must diligently prosecute his complaint or face the possibility that it will be dismissed under Rule 41(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for failure to prosecute. Defendants are advised that they are expected to diligently defend all allegations made against them and to file timely dispositive motions as hereinafter directed. This matter will be set down for trial when the Court determines that discovery has been completed and that all motions have been disposed of or the time for filing dispositive motions has passed.

**FILING AND SERVICE OF MOTIONS, PLEADINGS, DISCOVERY AND**

**CORRESPONDENCE**

It is the responsibility of each party to file original motions, pleadings, and correspondence with the Clerk of Court. A party need not serve the opposing party by mail if the opposing party is represented by counsel. In such cases, any motions, pleadings, or correspondence shall be served electronically at the time of filing with the Court. If any party is not represented by counsel, however, it is the responsibility of each opposing party to serve copies of all motions, pleadings, and correspondence upon the unrepresented party and to attach to said original motions, pleadings, and correspondence filed with the Clerk of Court a certificate of service indicating who has been served and where (i.e., at what address), when service was made, and how service was accomplished (i.e., by U.S. Mail, by personal service, etc.).

### **DISCOVERY**

Plaintiff shall not commence discovery until an answer or dispositive motion has been filed on behalf of the defendants from whom discovery is sought by the plaintiff. The Defendants shall not commence discovery until such time as an answer or dispositive motion has been filed. Once an answer or dispositive motion has been filed, the parties are authorized to seek discovery from one another as provided in the FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE. The deposition of the Plaintiff, a state/county prisoner, may be taken at any time during the time period hereinafter set out provided prior arrangements are made with his custodian. **Plaintiff is hereby advised that failure to submit to a deposition may result in the dismissal of his lawsuit under Rule 37 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.**

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that discovery (including depositions and interrogatories) shall be completed within 90 days of the date of filing of an answer or dispositive motion by the defendant (whichever comes first) unless an extension is otherwise granted by the court upon a showing of good cause therefor or a protective order is sought by the defendants and granted by the court. This 90-day period shall run separately as to Plaintiff and each Defendant beginning on the date of filing of each Defendant's answer or dispositive motion (whichever comes first). The scheduling of a trial may be advanced upon notification from the parties that no further discovery is contemplated or that discovery has been completed prior to the deadline.

Discovery materials shall not be filed with the Clerk of Court. No party shall be required to respond to any discovery not directed to him/her or served upon him/her by the opposing counsel/party. The undersigned incorporates herein those parts of the **Local Rules** imposing the following limitations on discovery: except with written permission of the court first obtained, **INTERROGATORIES** may not exceed TWENTY-FIVE (25) to each party, **REQUESTS FOR PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS AND THINGS** under Rule 34 of the FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE may not exceed TEN (10) requests to each party, and **REQUESTS FOR ADMISSIONS** under Rule 36 of the FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE may not exceed FIFTEEN (15) requests to each party. No party shall be required to respond to any such requests which exceed these limitations.

**REQUESTS FOR DISMISSAL AND/OR JUDGMENT**

The Court shall not consider requests for dismissal of or judgment in this action, absent the filing of a motion therefor accompanied by a brief/memorandum of law citing supporting authorities. Dispositive motions should be filed at the earliest time possible, but in any event no later than thirty (30) days after the close of discovery unless otherwise directed by the court.

**DIRECTIONS TO CUSTODIAN OF PLAINTIFF**

In accordance with the *Prison Litigation Reform Act*, Plaintiff's custodian is hereby directed to remit to the Clerk of this Court each month twenty percent (20%) of the preceding month's income credited to Plaintiff's inmate account until the \$350.00 filing fee has been paid in full, provided the amount in the account exceeds \$10.00. Transfers from Plaintiff's account shall continue until the entire filing fee has been collected, notwithstanding the earlier dismissal of Plaintiff's lawsuit.

**PLAINTIFF'S OBLIGATION TO PAY FILING FEE**

If Plaintiff is hereafter released from custody, he shall remain obligated to pay any remaining balance due of the above filing fee; Plaintiff shall continue to remit monthly payments as required by the *Prison Litigation Reform Act*. Collection from Plaintiff of any balance due by any means permitted by law is hereby authorized in the event Plaintiff fails to remit payments.

**SO ORDERED AND RECOMMENDED**, this 28th day of May, 2013.

S/ STEPHEN HYLES  
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE