

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
AT KNOXVILLE

ROBERT ANTOINE TRUSS,)
)
 Petitioner,)
)
 v.) Nos. 3:05-CR-146-TWP-CCS-1
) 3:16-CV-416-TWP
 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,)
)
 Respondent.)

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Before the Court is Petitioner’s pro se motion to vacate, set aside, or correct his sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 [Doc. 171]. He bases his request for relief on *Johnson v. United States*, 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015), in which the Supreme Court held that the residual clause of the Armed Career Criminal Act (“ACCA”) was unconstitutionally vague [*Id.*]. The United States responded in opposition on July 27, 2016 [Doc. 172]. Petitioner did not reply and the time for doing so has now passed. E.D. Tenn. L.R. 7.1, 7.2. For reasons that follow, Petitioner’s § 2255 motion [Doc. 171] will be **DENIED** and **DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE**.

I. BACKGROUND

On August 22, 2006, Petitioner pled guilty to, and was subsequently convicted of, conspiring to manufacture, distribute, and possess with intent to distribute cocaine base, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 846 and 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(A), and possessing a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)(i) [Docs. 110, 112, 125]. The parties stipulated, under Rule 11(c)(1)(C), that the statutory minimum of 180 months’ imprisonment—consecutive terms of 120 months for the drug offense and 60 months for the

firearms offense—would be appropriate [Doc. 111; Presentence Investigation Report (“PSR”) ¶¶ 62–65]. The Court agreed, imposed an 180-month term of incarceration [Doc. 125].

No appeal was taken and the conviction became final on December 11, 2006, at the expiration of time to appeal. *See Sanchez-Castellano v. United States*, 358 F.3d 424, 428 (6th Cir. 2004) (explaining an unappealed judgment of conviction becomes final when the time for filing a direct appeal has elapsed); Fed. R. App. Proc. 4(b)(1)(A)(i) (“In a criminal case, a defendant’s notice of appeal must be filed in the district court within 14 days after . . . the entry of . . . judgment.”). Nearly nine-and-a-half years later—on June 27, 2016—Petitioner filed the instant petition for collateral relief seeking correction of his sentence in light of *Johnson* [Doc. 171]. The United States responded in opposition to relief [Doc. 172].

II. ANALYSIS

Petitioner appears to argue that the *Johnson* decision invalidated the residual clause in § 924(c)(3)(B)’s definition of crime of violence and that the absence of that provision requires vacatur of his conviction under § 924(c)(1)(A) [Doc. 171]. The argument fails for two reasons.

First, binding Sixth Circuit precedent holds that while *Johnson* invalidated the residual provision of the ACCA and identically worded clause in Section 4B1.2 of the United States Sentencing Guidelines, § 924(c)(3)(B)’s definition of crime of violence remains unaffected.¹ *See*

¹ The ACCA mandates a 15-year sentence for any felon who unlawfully possesses a firearm after having sustained three prior convictions “for a violent felony or a serious drug offense, or both, committed on occasions different from one another.” 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1). The statute defines “violent felony” as “any crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year” that (1) “has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person of another” (the “use-of-physical-force clause”); (2) “is burglary, arson, or extortion, involves the use of explosives” (the “enumerated-offense clause”); or (3) “otherwise involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another” (the “residual clause”). 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B). It was this third clause—the residual clause—that the Supreme Court deemed unconstitutional in *Johnson*. 135 S. Ct. at 2563.

United States v. Pawlak, 822 F.3d 902, 911 (6th Cir. 2016) (concluding “rationale of *Johnson* applies equally” to the Guidelines’ definition of crime of violence); *United States v. Taylor*, 814 F.3d 340, 376–79 (6th Cir. 2016) (recognizing at least four “significant differences” between the residual clause in § 924(c)(3)(B) and the ACCA’s residual clause and noting “the argument that *Johnson* effectively invalidated [the former] is . . . without merit”).

Second, even if *Johnson*’s reasoning could be used to invalidate § 924(c)(3)(B)’s residual clause, Petitioner’s conviction under § 924(c)(1)(A) did not rely on that provision. To the contrary, Petitioner was convicted of possessing a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime, not crime of violence [Docs. 110, 112, 125]. The statute defines “drug trafficking crime” as “any felony punishable under the Controlled Substances Act, 21 U.S.C. §§ 801, et seq., [or] the Controlled Substances Import and Export Act, 21 U.S.C. §§ 951, et seq.” 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(2). *Johnson* has no bearing whatsoever on the scope of that definition. Accord *United States v. Jenkins*, 613 F. App’x 754, 755 (10th Cir. 2015) (deeming *Johnson* irrelevant to drug offenses).

Section 4B1.1 enhances a defendant’s offense level if he or she qualifies as a “career offender,” i.e., adult defendant whose offense of conviction is a “crime of violence or controlled substance offense” and who has “at least two prior felony convictions of either a crime of violence or a controlled substance offense.” U.S. Sentencing Manual § 4B1.1(a). “Crime of violence” under the Guidelines is defined in an almost identical manner as “violent felony” under the ACCA. See U.S. Sentencing Manual § 4B1.2(a) (adopting identical use-of-force and residual clauses as well as a nearly identical enumerated-offense clause).

Section 924(c)(1)(A) makes it a crime for an individual, “in relation to any crime of violence or drug trafficking crime . . . for which the person may be prosecuted in a court of the United States, [to] use[,] carr[y] [or possess] a firearm . . . in furtherance of . . . such crime.” 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A). Section 924(c)(3) goes on to define “crime of violence” as any “felony” that “has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person or property of another” (use-of-physical-force clause); or “by its nature, involves a substantial risk that physical force against the person or property of another may be used in the course of committing the offense” (“residual clause”).

Because the drug offense underlying Petitioner's § 924(a)(1)(A)(i) conviction involved violation of the Controlled Substances Act, the Court finds that Petitioner has failed to demonstrate that the same was imposed in contravention of the laws of the United States.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the reasons discussed, Petitioner's § 2255 motion [Doc. 171] will be **DENIED** and **DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE**. The Court will **CERTIFY** any appeal from this action would not be taken in good faith and would be totally frivolous. Therefore, this Court will **DENY** Petitioner leave to proceed *in forma pauperis* on appeal. See Rule 24 of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure. Petitioner having failed to make a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right, a certificate of appealability **SHALL NOT ISSUE**. 28 U.S.C. § 2253; Rule 22(b) of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure.

AN APPROPRIATE ORDER WILL ENTER.

s/ Thomas W. Phillips
SENIOR UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE