

diately, and when we *will* come home. Although the report answers those questions in detail, I want to repeat concisely my answers:

- We went to Somalia because without us a million people would have died. We, uniquely, were in a position to save them, and other nations were ready to share the burden after our initial action.
- What the United States is doing there is providing, for a limited period of time, logistics support and security so that the humanitarian and political efforts of the United Nations, relief organizations, and others can have a reasonable chance of success. The United Nations, in turn, has a longer term political, security, and relief mission designed to minimize the likelihood that famine and anarchy will return when the United Nations leaves. The U.S. military mission is not now nor was it ever one of "nation building."
- We cannot leave immediately because the United Nations has not had an adequate chance to replace us, nor have the Somalis had a reasonable opportunity to end their strife. We want other nations to assume more of the burden of international peace. To have them do so, they must think that they can rely on our commitments when we make them. Moreover, having been brutally attacked, were American forces to leave now we would send a message to terrorists and other potential adversaries around the world that they can change our policies by killing our people. It would be open season on Americans.
- We will, however, leave no later than March 31, 1994, except for a few hundred support troops. That amount of time will permit the Somali people to make progress toward political reconciliation and allow the United States to fulfill our obligations properly, including the return of any Americans being detained. We went there for the right reasons and we will finish the job in the right way.

While U.S. forces are there, they will be fully protected with appropriate American military capability.

Any Americans detained will be the subject of the most complete and thorough efforts of which this Government is capable, with the unrelenting goal of returning them home and returning them to health.

I want to thank all those who have expressed their support for this approach during the last week. At difficult times such as these, when we face international challenges, bipartisan unity among our two branches of government is vital.

**William J. Clinton**

The White House,  
October 13, 1993.

### **Message to the Congress Transmitting Budget Deferrals**

*October 13, 1993*

*To the Congress of the United States:*

In accordance with the Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974, I herewith report eight deferrals of budget authority, totaling \$1.2 billion.

These deferrals affect International Security Assistance programs as well as programs of the Agency for International Development and the Departments of Agriculture, Defense, Health and Human Services, and State. The details of these deferrals are contained in the attached report.

**William J. Clinton**

The White House,  
October 13, 1993.

### **Letter to Congressional Leaders on Bosnia-Herzegovina**

*October 13, 1993*

*Dear Mr. Speaker: (Dear Mr. President:)*

Six months ago I provided you with my initial report on the deployment of U.S. combat-equipped aircraft to support NATO's enforcement of the no-fly zone in Bosnia-Herzegovina. I am now providing this follow-up report, consistent with the War Powers