In the Matter of            )
the Appeal of               )
Program D381-S              )
Purchase Order 60004        )

For the Appellant: Midwest Bank Note Company, Plymouth, Michigan,
by Frederic G. Antoun, Jr., Attorney at Law, Chambersburg,

For the Government: Thomas Kelly, Esq., Assistant General
Counsel, U.S. Government Printing Office.

Before BERGER, Ad Hoc Chairman.


Midwest Bank Note Company (Appellant), 46001 Five Mile Road,
Plymouth, Michigan, appeals two final decisions of Contracting
Officer Richard Weiss of the U.S. Government Printing  Office
(Respondent or GPO) denying the Appellant's claims for additional
compensation in connection with its contract under Program D381-S
calling for the production of Social Security cards.  For the
reasons which follow, one of the Contracting Officer's final
decisions is MODIFIED  and the appeal is ALLOWED to the extent
indicated in this decision.  The other final decision is AFFIRMED
and the appeal of that decision is DENIED.


1.   On April 24, 1992 the Appellant was awarded the Program
D381-S contract, Purchase Order No. 92708, for the period April
24, 1992 to January 31, 1994.  Rule 4 File, Tab 4.1  On October
8, 1993, Print Order No. 60004 was issued for a quantity of 15
million cards, at an estimated cost of $1,265,000, broken down by
various quantities and shipping dates.  This Print Order
contained a copy change, as well as a notation indicating that
another copy change would occur in December 1993.  Rule 4 File,
Tab 5.
2.   On December 7, 1993 the contract administrator notified the
Appellant that a change was forthcoming and that new Government
Furnished Material (GFM) would be provided.  (The parties
contemplated that the changes would be made after completion of
the first batch of 5 million forms.) App. Exh. No. 4.2  Shortly
thereafter the Appellant received new negatives for the front and
back of the form.  The Appellant found that it could not use the
negative for the back of the form because of a change in the
vertical image size, and so notified the Respondent.  On or about
December 15, the Appellant was furnished with a new negative with
a resized vertical image, and the Appellant proceeded with

3.   On January 27 and again on February 3, 1994, the Appellant-
pursuant to a contract requirement that it furnish to GPO for
testing and approval samples of the paper to be used-submitted
samples from two mill orders.  These samples were rejected on
February 9, and the Appellant ceased production.  On February 17
the Appellant submitted new samples from the same orders.  These
were found to be acceptable and the Appellant was so advised on
February 28.  Production resumed on March 1.
4.   The Appellant filed several requests for additional
compensation in connection with Print Order 60004 which resulted
in final decisions of the Contracting Officer.  Rule 4 File, Tabs
14, 23, 25, 26, 31, and 32.  The Contracting Officer's responses
to two of those claims are the subject of this appeal . The first
of those claims was for $5,105 for additional makeready and other
costs incurred as a result of the December 1993 copy change; the
second was for another $5,105 for makeready and other costs
incurred as a result of the delay in obtaining GPO approval of
the paper samples.  The Contracting Officer, in final decisions
dated October 31, 1994, determined that the Appellant was
entitled to $1,052 for the first claim and nothing at all for the
second.  Rule 4 File, Tabs 31 and 32.  This appeal followed, with
the Appellant in its Complaint seeking $5,646 for the first claim
and $42,509.22 for the second.


   A. Copy Change Claim

The contract contains a specific "makeready" price, and the
parties apparently agree that the makeready effort for which this
price is to be paid encompasses any product changes that occur at
the outset of a print order.  The Appellant  asserts that it is
also entitled to be reimbursed for makeready efforts that are
necessitated by product changes occurring during  performance of
a  print order and states that the December 1993 change required
such an effort.  The Appellant, in its claim for this extra
reimbursement filed with the Contracting Officer, stated:

Every operation of this change-over had to be re-engineered in
order to produce the new form.  This not only involved what had
previously been discussed but also offset printing, intaglio make
ready and test printing and numbering/slitting.  We had to do
considerable work to keep the intaglio plate blue plate tinge
from appearing on the white part of the card.  Previously this
was hidden by the litho tint.  We actually had to do a pilot run
in order to work out the bugs.

Rule 4 File, Tab 28.  The Contracting Officer did not agree that
this work "is chargeable as a new makeready," but determined that
the Appellant was entitled to some compensation for making the
litho plate changes required by the copy change.  He further
determined that $1,052, but not the claimed $5,105,  was a fair
and reasonable amount.  He based this on another claim filed by
the Appellant, which the Respondent had agreed to pay, for a June
1992 change required by GPO.  The Appellant's breakdown of
charges for that claim included amounts for typesetting/proofing,
making film layout for plate, platemaking, and makeready, and
totaled $526.  Rule 4 File, Tab 29.  The Contracting Officer
decided that the changes involved in the current claim were "the
same" as those required in  1992 and that $526 per side, or
$1052, was therefore the appropriate reimbursement amount.
In its Complaint the Appellant abandoned its claim for $5,105 and
focused not on the fact of the December 1993 copy change but on
the alleged defect in the GFM it was furnished.  It stated that
the film furnished was defective because it "had images running
into the margins" and that as a result it incurred the following
--   3.5 hours trying to determine if the defect could be
corrected         $ 257

--   upon receipt of "new corrected film," redoing flats and
offset plates       1139

--   10 hours of "press on hold" representing the time between
the Appellant "would have gone on press" and when it received
proof approval based on the corrected film                1750

--   "labor waiting" during the 10-hour delay

--   performing an additional litho press makeready after receipt
of the
corrected film                            2000

The Appellant stated that none of these costs would have been
incurred "but for the error in
 government furnished materials which necessitated a change by
 the government.  Complaint at 2.
Subsequently, the Appellant resurrected its argument that it is
entitled to an equitable adjustment because of the copy change
and twice more changed the amount it is claiming.  In responding
to interrogatories, the Appellant stated that the amount listed
in the Complaint was erroneous because it omitted the cost of
10.5 hours worth of film work on the replacement negative
furnished on December 15, and that the $1,139 figure should be
$1,811.20, which would increase the total to $6,318.20.
Appellant's Responses To Respondent's First Set Of
Interrogatories and Request For Production Of Documents
(hereafter Responses To Interrogatories)  12.  In its post-
hearing submission, the Appellant referenced the hearing
testimony of its Chairman, see HT 28, to claim reimbursement for
an additional 1.2 hours for making ready one backplate,
Appellant's Brief (App.Brf.) at 3, which, at the Appellant's
claimed rate of $64 per hour,  would add another $76.80, for a
total of $6,395.  The Appellant also again argued that the
December 1993 copy change, regardless of whether the GFM was
defective, entitled it to an equitable adjustment because of the
additional costs it incurred as a result of the change.  App.Brf.
at 8.
The Respondent's position, tersely set forth in its brief, is
that:  (1) the Appellant has not met its burden of proving that
the GFM was defective; and (2) even if the GFM was defective the
Appellant is entitled to no more than the $1,052 offered by the
Contracting Officer because:  (a) new plates are routinely
installed during production runs without any contractor
entitlement to makeready charges, and (b) the Appellant cannot be
reimbursed for the claimed labor and equipment downtime

because the Appellant was not otherwise ready at that time to
begin production.  Respondent's Brief (Resp.Brf.) at 3-4.
The Appellant correctly states that, pursuant to the "Changes"
clause of the contract, GPO Contract Terms, Solicitation
Provisions, Supplemental Specifications, and Contract Clauses,
GPO Pub. 310.2, effective December 1, 1987 (Rev. 9-88) (hereafter
GPO Contract Terms), Contract Clauses,  4,  "the reasonable cost
of performing changes is compensable."  App.Brf. at 9.  Costs
incurred by contractors because of defective GFM or delayed
receipt of GFM may also be reimbursable.  GPO Contract Terms,
Contract Clauses,  7; Commercial Products & Eng'g Co., Inc.,
ASBCA 40392, 96-2 BCA  28,411; Banta Company, GPOBCA 03-91
(November 15, 1993), slip op., 1993 WL 526843.3  Thus,
notwithstanding the Appellant's lack of clarity about the precise
basis for its claim, its entitlement to an equitable adjustment
must be considered in light of both the pure "changes" basis for
the claim and the defective GFM aspect of the claim.

The "Changes" clause permits the Contracting Officer to make
changes, within the general scope of the contract, to the
drawings, designs, and specifications and provides for an
equitable adjustment to the contract price if the changes
increase or decrease the cost of, or the time required for,
performance of the contract work.  The changes can be effected
through a formal change order or, when the procedures of the
"Changes" clause are not followed,  through a constructive
change.  See News Printing Co., Inc., GPOBCA 13-94 (February 20,
1998), slip op. at 7-8, 1998 WL 148999.  The basis for a
constructive change must be some action by the Contracting
Officer or someone authorized to act on his behalf, or a
ratification by the Contracting Officer of some action by an
official not authorized to change the contract.  Id. at 9.  Here,
although  the record contains no formal change order, the
Contracting Officer agrees that the contract was changed in
December 1993 and, as noted above, has agreed to reimburse the
Appellant the sum of $1,052 for that change.  Thus, regardless of
whether the December copy change was directed by someone with
authority to act for the Contracting Officer or was simply
ratified by the Contracting Officer's subsequent actions, see,
e.g., T.W. Cole, PSBCA 3076, 92-3 BCA  25,091 (acceptance of
work with knowledge of modification); Mil-Pak Co., GSBCA 5849,
83-1 BCA  16,482 (fixing amount of equitable adjustment), the
Board is satisfied that there was a change to the contract within
the meaning of the "Changes" clause.
The Appellant claims it is entitled to an equitable adjustment in
light of the change because the change increased its cost of
performance.  The burden of proof is on the party claiming an
equitable adjustment; thus, the Appellant must show, by a
preponderance of the evidence, the reasonableness of the costs
claimed and their causal connection to the change upon which the
equitable adjustment claim is based.  Universal Printing Co.,
GPOBCA 09-90 (June 22, 1994), slip op. at 40, 1994 WL 377586; see
John Cibinic, Jr. and Ralph C. Nash, Jr., Administration of
Government Contracts 698-99 (Third ed. 1995) (hereafter Cibinic &
Nash, Administration) and cases cited therein.
The Appellant's claim for the cost of additional work engendered
by the copy change, as explained in its response to
interrogatories and its brief, includes the following:
--   3.5 hours @$64 for prepress work, plus $33 for materials
    --   11.3 hours @$64 for prepress work, plus $416 for
    materials, plus           1811.20
another 10.5 hours @$64 for prepress work on the face side of the

--   1.2 hours @$64 for backplate makeready
--   litho press makeready                             2000
The Appellant explains that the $64 hourly rate had been
previously agreed to, and that the $2,000 makeready charge is a
very conservative amount representing the work required only for
the litho press makeready.4  HT 37.  The Appellant in its brief
and during the hearing described the prepress effort as stopping
the offset press, duplicating the Government-furnished negative
12 times (for each side of the card), positioning the 12 images
in the appropriate layout, and making a plate.  HT 30-32;
App.Brf. at 8. The ensuing press makeready involved removing the
old plates, washing and inking the press, installing the new
plates, and "get[ting] the 4 units of the press running in
appropriate synchronization with appropriate register," App.Brf.
at 8,  a process that often takes "half a day to a full day to
get it going, and you waste a lot of paper."  HT 32.
The Respondent does not take exception to any particular cost
element of the Appellant's claim.  The Contracting Officer
testified only that he considered the original claimed amount to
be "out of line" because in "the course of a 15 million run on
this press, plates are changed numerous, numerous times" (without
compensation to the contractor for an additional makeready) and
recent experience with the Appellant indicated that $526 per side
was a reasonable amount for making a new plate required by copy
changes.  HT 192, 208, 212.  He further stated he "made a
decision based on the facts that were in front of me" and that
"[n]obody ever came back to me and said there [were] extenuating
[circumstances.]" HT 216.

The Appellant sums up this record by stating that its "statement
of the cost of the change was not effectively challenged by the
GPO's testimony [so] there is no reason to disregard it."  HT 9.
It further states that the "$2,000.00 cost of the litho press
makeready is, according to uncontradicted testimony, reasonable"
and not challenged by GPO.  HT 9.
The problem with the Appellant's summation is that it is the
Appellant which has the affirmative burden of proving the amount
to which it is entitled.  The preferred method for establishing
the amount of an equitable adjustment is through the introduction
of actual cost data.  "As a rule, actual costs are proved through
the introduction of the contractor's accounting records, which
will be accepted if they have been audited by the Government and
are unrebutted," although in other cases costs may be established
on the basis of estimates that are supported by detailed,
substantiating data.  Universal Printing Co., supra, at 41.  In
addition, the Appellant must show what it reasonably cost to
perform the work as changed.  Id. at 42.
The Appellant's claimed amounts are not supported by accounting
records or by any other detailed, substantiating data.  The claim
for prepress hours is based on a letter dated April 29, 1994 from
the Appellant to the Contracting Officer listing hours worked,
App.Exh. No. 6, and a handwritten document stating that it
reflects manufacturing and daily time sheet records and showing
the times worked by employee Dan Ellis on December 15 through 18
for a total of 10.5 hours. App.Exh. No.7.  Although these
documents were referred to by the Appellant's chairman during his
testimony,  HT 28-29, neither the actual time sheets nor an
affidavit from the person compiling the data are a part of the
record.  Moreover, there is no meaningful explanation in the
record for the difference between what the Appellant now claims
for work engendered by the December copy change and the work
performed after the June 1992 change.  The Appellant's chairman
testified that the June change occurred at a press sheet
inspection, before the presses were running, while the change
here was made in the middle of a run.  HT 93.  That does not
explain, however, why  film layout and platemaking involved 4.3
hours for the June 1992 change but 10.5 and 11.3 hours for the
December 1993 changes.

Accordingly, the Board finds that the Appellant has not met its
burden of proof to show its actual prepress costs or the
reasonableness of those costs.  The Board therefore concludes
that the Appellant has not established its entitlement to more
than the $1,052 for litho plate changes offered by the
Contracting Officer.
With respect to the makeready operation, the Appellant has
furnished absolutely no cost data.  While it has explained why a
substantial makeready effort was required and how long such an
effort could conceivably take, it has provided no testimony or
written information concerning the actual hours devoted to the
makeready effort, the number of employees involved in that
effort, or the approximate amount of paper that was wasted during
the operation.  It relies solely on its extrapolation of an
arbitrary but "conservative" figure of $2,000 from its higher
contract makeready price as the basis for this aspect of its
claim.  While contract bid prices may be used to establish a
basis for an equitable adjustment where actual cost data are not
available, arbitrary figures, as opposed to actual costs or
estimates of actual costs supported by substantiating data, are
not acceptable bases for equitable adjustments.  Universal
Printing Co., supra, at 41 n.41, 48.  Thus, again the Board must
conclude that the amount claimed has not been shown to be
reasonable.  On the other hand, since the December 1993 changes
took place after commencement of the production run for Print
Order 60004 and the litho press had to be restarted with the new
plates, Responses To Interrogatories  12, the Board has no
difficulty in believing that the changes had a cost impact beyond
the $1,052 the Contracting Officer was willing to pay for making
new plates.  Thus, the Board also does not agree with the
Respondent that the Appellant should receive nothing for the
makeready operation.

Under the circumstances, the Board considers this element of the
claim to be appropriate for resolution through the "jury verdict"
approach, pursuant to which the Board may exercise its discretion
to arrive at a fair amount of compensation.  Universal Printing
Co., supra, at 50; Banta Co., supra, at 46.  One accepted jury
verdict technique is to split the difference.  Universal Printing
Co., supra, at 53.  The difference between the Respondent's offer
of zero and the Appellant's claim of $2,000 is $1,000.  Thus, the
Board holds that the Appellant is entitled to $1,000 for its
makeready expenses.
That leaves the claim for 10 hours of down time for labor and
press equipment, which is predicated on the assertion that the
GFM furnished to the Appellant on  December 13, 1993 was
defective.  The Appellant asserts that the negative was defective
because the size of the text image increased from 3 inches to 3
5/8 inches, which didn't allow it enough margin space to provide
for "plate gap" on its 24-inch press.  According to the
Appellant, neither it nor any other web press operator could
manufacture the card with that dimension.  HT 21; App.Brf. at 2.
The Respondent denies that the negative was defective, and
asserts that a replacement negative was furnished solely to
accommodate the Appellant's printing equipment.  Resp.Brf. at 3.

The Board is not convinced that the original negative was
defective.  Whether or not GFM is defective typically depends
upon its suitability for its intended use.  A & E Copy Center,
GPOBCA 38-92 (September 25, 1996), slip op. at 21-22, 1996 WL
812881; Printing Unlimited, GPOBCA 21-90 (November 30, 1993),
slip op. at 18-20, 1993 WL 516844.  The Board has held that in
the context of GPO printing contracts suitability means that the
image clarity of the GFM (negatives, mylar materials, camera
copy, etc.) must be clear enough so that the contractor, "with a
reasonable expenditure of effort," could use it to produce an
acceptable end product.  A & E Copy Center, supra, at 22;
Printing Unlimited, supra, at 20.  There is no suggestion here
that the negative in question did not provide sufficient clarity.
The Appellant's only objection to the negative concerns the size
of the text image which, because of  "plate gap,"  would not
permit it to "get six cards around the cylinder" of its 24-inch
press.  HT 21.  The Appellant does not explain, however, why the
only way it could do the job was with six cards around the
cylinder.  While that might be the most efficient production
method given the size of the card and the dimensions of the
Appellant's press, the Board sees nothing in the contract
requiring six card images on a plate.  Certainly, the Respondent
is not precluded from specifying legitimate requirements that
happen not to be compatible with a production process utilizing
six images per plate on a 24-inch press; if the Respondent has
such requirements, a contractor may utilize a different press if
one is available or have fewer than six images going around the
cylinder.  Accordingly, given the complete absence of testimony
or other evidence from the Appellant as to why it could not do
the job with fewer than six images per plate without unreasonable
delay or expense, the Board finds that the Appellant has not met
its burden of proof on this issue as well and therefore agrees
with the Respondent that here the problem involved not defective
GFM, but rather, as it did in A & E Copy Center, supra,  the
contractor's equipment and the contractor's approach to
performance.  Accordingly, the Board finds no basis for an
equitable adjustment for the claimed costs of labor and equipment
down time.
The Appellant is therefore entitled to a total of $2,052 ($1,052
for new plates, as offered by the Contracting Officer, and $1,000
for the makeready) for the copy change claim.

   B. Delay Claim

The delay claim arises primarily out of the production delay the
Appellant encountered when paper samples it submitted were not
approved.  The "Sampling and Testing" provision of the
specifications required the contractor to furnish 50 sheets of
the paper proposed to be used for the contract prior to starting
production.  That provision further stated that "[e]ach shipment
of paper from the manufacturer must be tested," that the
contractor will be notified of approval or disapproval within 5
workdays of receipt of the samples by GPO, and that "[i]f the
initial sample is disapproved, the contractor will be required to
furnish such additional samples as is deemed necessary by the
Contracting Officer ...."   Rule 4 File, Tab 1.  During the
course of the contract the Appellant received multiple shipments
of paper for use on this contract,  Complaint at 2, and on
January 27 and February 3, 1994, the Appellant submitted samples
from two of those shipments.  Testing was completed on February
9, and the Appellant was informed on that date that the samples
had failed.     The Appellant, by letter of February 10, advised
the Contracting Officer that "it would be in touch ... when we
determine when a new mill run of paper will arrive ... so that we
can submit samples for your testing."  Rule 4 File, Tab 12.  On
February 16, however, the Appellant advised that it had no plans
to order more paper.  Rule 4 File, Tab 15.  The Contracting
Officer then requested additional samples, which the Appellant
furnished on February 17 and which GPO received on February 18.
HT 195.  These samples were tested on the day of receipt and
found to conform with the specifications.  Rule 4 File, Tab 19.
Concerned about the inconsistent results, the Contracting Officer
on February 23 asked for an explanation of the inconsistency.
Rule 4 File, Tab 18.  The Appellant was notified that the samples
were acceptable on February 28.
The Appellant alleges that the rejection of its first samples on
February 9 was erroneous, that GPO took longer than the
contractually permitted time of five workdays to respond to the
second samples, and that as a result it incurred 75 hours of down
time for labor and equipment, had to do another makeready of both
the litho and intaglio presses, and incurred substantial overtime
expenses in order to ensure final delivery by the original
contract date.  The Appellant seeks $3,750 for idle labor,
$13,125 for idle press time, $5,105 for the makeready, and
$20,529.22 for overtime labor.

The Respondent's position again is a succinct one:  (1) the
Appellant cannot recover down time and makeready costs because
the Appellant commenced production with the paper before it was
approved and therefore bore the risk of the consequences of the
subsequent rejection of the paper, and (2) the Appellant cannot
recover the overtime costs because the Respondent did not require
adherence to the original final delivery date.
The failure of the paper samples involved chemical sensitivity
testing.  The contract specifications required the paper to "have
certain chemical sensitivities such that it shall provide a
visual reaction to attempted alteration" with various classes of
chemicals, including sodium bisulfite.  Rule 4 File, Tab 1.  The
Respondent tested the paper by applying drops of the chemicals
and then looking for a visual reaction-if a white spot appeared
after application of sodium bisulfite, the paper passed the test.
HT 266, 278.  The GPO testing official determined that there was
no visual reaction to the sodium bisulfite on the samples
furnished on January 27 and February 3.  The reaction was found
on the samples furnished on February 17.
GPO's chief of the Paper and Physical Testing Division testified
that the original samples were rejected because "there was no
appreciable reaction or there was no reaction to the ... sodium
bisulfite."  HT 269.  On cross-examination, she was asked, if she
looked "very, very hard," if she saw "any discoloration or
markings ... around the edge, even tiny," on the February 3 paper
sample.  She admitted that she did, but stated that the paper
failed because this was "a subjective test" and it was the
testing official's judgment "that it was not an obvious
reaction." HT 284.  She further testified that "there was no way"
the January 27 sample would be acceptable and that the February 3
sample was "questionable" but that "[a]nyone making a judgment
could say that was unacceptable."  HT 304.
The Appellant asserts that the rejection of the first samples was
erroneous because the same "subjective" testing that resulted in
the rejection resulted in approval of the same paper when
additional samples were furnished and tested.  The Appellant
further asserts that the testimony of the

Testing Division chief establishes that there was no difference
in the test results on the February 3 sample and the later sample
from the same mill order.

The Appellant's position is not convincing.  First, the testimony
does not establish that the test results on the first samples and
on the later samples were the same.  The testimony was to the
effect that the January 27 sample was in "no way" acceptable and
that the chemical reaction on the February 3 sample was
"questionable" and could be considered unacceptable, while the
results of the testing on the second set of samples indicated
compliance with the specifications.  HT 270, 304.  Second, while
the later testing was on paper from the same mill orders, the
samples were different, and the Testing Division chief  testified
that paper can vary within a mill run and even within a roll and
clearly did so here.  HT 270, 271-72, 289-90.  This indicates not
that the initial testing was erroneous, but that different test
results were possible from the same mill run.  In short, the
Appellant has not met its burden of establishing, as it alleges
in its brief,  that "the first tests were in error or that the
test standards were improperly and negligently applied."5
App.Brf. at 12.                                     Moreover, as
the Respondent states, the Appellant embarked on production with
the paper in question before obtaining GPO's approval of that
paper, App.Exh. No. 10,  despite the contract provision stating
that "[m]anufacture of the final production prior to approval of
the samples submitted is at the contractor's risk."  Rule 4 File,
Tab 1.  Just as it does in connection with a contractor's failure
to await an "OK to print" authorization before starting
production, this language places the financial consequences of
proceeding with production before the requisite approval is
obtained squarely on the shoulders of the Appellant. See IPI
Graphics, GPOBCA 04-96 (April 9, 1998), slip op. at 5-6, 1998 WL
______; Fry Communications, Inc., GPOBCA 30-94 (March 30, 1998)
slip op. at 9, 1998 WL ______;  The George Marr Co., GPOBCA 31-94
(April 23, 1996), slip op. at 51-52, 1996 WL 273662; McDonald &
Eudy Printers, Inc., GPOBCA 25-92 (April 11, 1994), slip op. at
22-23.6  Indeed, even "the Government's own initial error or
change of mind" will not insulate the contractor from the
consequences of proceeding without approval.  IPI Graphics,
supra, at 6.  Thus, if the Appellant had to stop production and
incur costs as a result of that stoppage because the paper
subsequently was not approved, it bore the risk of that
consequence and cannot look to the Government to reimburse it.

In addition, the Board notes that the situation in which the
Appellant found itself when the paper samples were rejected on
February 9-having to stop production, incur press and labor down
time, and engage in another makeready-would have occurred
regardless of how the testing came out.  In this respect, the
Appellant admits that it started to use the paper in question
before obtaining approval because it was "short of paper."
App.Exh. No. 10.  The Appellant's chairman testified that if he
had received back within five days  an approval for the paper
sample submitted on January 27, he would not have had to cease
production.  HT 324-25.  However, GPO did not perform the test on
the samples until February 9.  Govt.Exh. No. 4B.    Thus, had the
Appellant not started to print with the unapproved paper, it
would have run out of paper in early February while waiting for
GPO's test results and would have had to stop production, with
the resultant down time and the necessity for another makeready.
Although the contract required the Respondent to respond to the
paper sample submissions within five days of receipt, the
contract, pursuant to the "Notice of Compliance With Schedules"
clause, supra, n.3, provided only for a delivery date extension
in the event the Respondent took more than five days.  Thus, if
the samples had been approved rather than rejected, the Appellant
still would have experienced down time because of the
Respondent's delay in testing
the paper samples, and under the contract such a delay would have
entitled the Appellant to a delivery date extension, but not to
reimbursement for idle presses and labor.7
As for the claim for overtime labor, the Appellant asserts that
the overtime was necessary to meet the original final delivery
date of May 10 and that the overtime was necessitated by the
delay caused by the Respondent's improper and untimely testing.
Since the Board cannot find on this record that the testing was
improper, the Board is concerned only with the delay resulting
from the Respondent's failure to test the paper samples and
provide the outcome of that testing to the Appellant within the
contractually required five-day period.

As stated above, this type of delay is controlled by the "Notice
of Compliance With Schedules" clause of the contract, supra, n.3.
That clause provides that the "shipping/delivery schedule will be
extended automatically by the total number of workdays that the
work was delayed PLUS 1 workday [up to a total of 3] for each day
of delay ...."  (The clause also permits the contractor to
request additional time beyond the automatic extension date.)
Thus, the original  final  contract delivery deadline of May 10
was automatically extended by GPO's testing delays.8  See
Pennsylvania Printed Products Co., Inc., GPOBCA 29-87 (January
22, 1990), slip op. at 13, 1990 WL 454977 (termination for
default for failure to deliver improper where delivery date was
automatically extended by Government-caused delay).  The
Appellant argues, however, that the Respondent did not extend the
delivery schedule and made it plain that it expected final
delivery to be by the original May 10 date.  Under these
circumstances, the Appellant asserts, the Respondent "affected
[sic] a de facto acceleration of the schedule" entitling it to an
equitable adjustment.  App.Brf. at 10.

Where there are delays that entitle the contractor to delivery
schedule extensions, the Government's insistence, in the face of
those delays, that the contractor meet the original delivery
schedule is treated as a constructive change entitling the
contractor to an equitable adjustment9 under the "Changes" clause
of the contract, GPO Contract Terms, Contract Clauses,  4.  See
Cibinic & Nash, Administration 450-1.  The Government's
acceleration order may be express or implied; it may be implied
from expressions of urgency by the Government, particularly if
coupled with a threat of default or of an assessment of
liquidated damages. Fermont Div., Dynamics Corp. of America,
ASBCA 15806, 75-1 BCA  11,319, aff'd, 216 Ct. Cl. 448 (1978);
William Lagnion, ENGBCA 3778, 78-2 BCA  13,260; Pathman Constr.
Co., ASBCA 14285, 71-1 BCA  8905.  Constructive acceleration
does not arise, however, when the Government merely informs the
contractor of the Government's right to default, Donald R.
Stewart & Assocs., AGBCA 84-226-1, 92-1 BCA  24,705, or applies
"reasonable" pressure to complete work on schedule.  Fermont
Div., Dynamics Corp. of America, supra.
The Appellant's position that a constructive acceleration
occurred here is grounded in its "impression that no schedule
extensions would be granted."  App.Brf. at 7.  This impression,
the Appellant's chairman testified, came from various discussions
he had with the Contracting Officer and the contract
administrator, the "substance" of which was that, while interim
shipping dates were changed,  he would "be able to make that last
shipping date, you won't have any more time on that ... we have
got to have that," and which led him to conclude "that the final
shipping date was not going to be extended."  HT 66, 111.  The
Appellant argues that its chairman made that impression known to
the Contracting Officer in a letter dated February 10, 1994, Rule
4 File, Tab 13, and that the Contracting Officer never
contradicted that understanding.  The Appellant further argues
that because the Contracting Officer sent it a "Cure Notice" on
February 9 when the paper samples were rejected, threatening a
possible default because of "endangering future ship[ping]
dates," Rule 4 File, Tab 11, it "believed default and termination
... was a real possibility."  App.Brf. at 11.
GPO denies that there was a constructive acceleration.  It points
out that in a letter to the Contracting Officer dated January 13,
1994, the Appellant set forth its projected shipping schedule and
stated that "even allowing for unexpected contingencies, we
should be able to ship the last of this order by mid April ...
prior to the last scheduled shipment of May 10th."  Answer, Tab
K.    The Respondent further states that it did nothing to
accelerate the shipping schedule, and that the "Appellant
accelerated itself."  Resp.Brf. at 9.

The Board has little doubt that the Appellant believed GPO
desired final shipment by May 10; the Appellant's incurrence of
substantial overtime costs on this fixed price contract is not
otherwise readily explainable. Cf. Swanson Printing Co., GPOBCA
27-94 (November 18, 1996), slip op. at 43, 1996 WL 812958
(" do not, as a rule, voluntarily perform work not
called for by the contract.").  Notwithstanding that belief and
that desire, however, the Board finds no evidence that GPO
explicitly or implicitly directed the Appellant to ship by May 10
instead of by the later date to which the Appellant was
automatically entitled by virtue of its contract.  There is no
evidence that the Appellant ever informed the Contracting Officer
of its intention or desire to deliver by the extended date or any
date beyond May 10, and no evidence that the Respondent precluded
the Appellant from so doing by any direct exhortation of urgency
or of a firm need for a May 10 delivery.  In this regard, the
Contracting Officer testified that as a result of the paper
testing delays he informed the Appellant of its entitlement to an
automatic extension and that delivery schedule adjustments were
made for whatever the Appellant requested, with the result that
interim shipment dates were changed.  HT 200-201.  He further
testified that he never insisted on a May 10 final delivery date,
that it made sense to him that the Appellant would have wanted to
extend that date since it sought and received extensions of
interim dates, but that the Appellant indicated it could meet the
May 10 date.  HT 202.  Indeed, in a letter to the Contracting
Officer dated March 4, 1994, the Appellant, expressing its
understanding that "the agency is anxious to receive as many
cards as possible as soon as possible," proposed a shipment of
3,536,000 cards on March 30 which would "allow us to complete
final 4,000,000 cards for shipment May 10 as originally planned."
Gov't.Exh. No. 1.  There was no suggestion from the Appellant
that it considered this proposed schedule to be an accelerated
one for which it would expect extra compensation and no mention
of the use of overtime labor to effect the schedule.

The Appellant's reliance on its February 10 letter to the
Contracting Officer and the February 9 cure notice also is of no
avail.  The Appellant's statement in the letter about its
"impression ... that the shipping schedule ... must be
maintained" was by way of explanation for the Appellant's
decision in early February to utilize the paper that had not been
approved; this preceded GPO's testing delay and thus had nothing
to do with contract delivery dates that resulted automatically
from the testing delay.   The cure notice simply stated that
"your failure to submit paper samples equal to specifications ...
is endangering future ship dates ...."  The focus of the notice
was not on delivery dates, but on the paper failure, which
threatened whatever the delivery dates-as originally specified or
as automatically extended-happened to be.
In short, for there to be a constructive acceleration here there
must be something more than what the Appellant has identified.
Impressions, understandings, and desires are not the basis for a
constructive acceleration.  See, e.g., Guaranty Constr. Co.,
GSBCA 3109, 70-2 BCA  8483; Kingston Bituminous Prods. Co.,
ASBCA 9964, 67-2 BCA  6638 (urging completion of the work in
accordance with the original schedule is not an acceleration
order).  There must be something tantamount to a Government order
that deprives the contractor of the extended delivery date to
which it is entitled.  Nothing like that is evident from the
record before the Board.  Accordingly, the Board finds no basis
for an equitable adjustment to accommodate the claimed overtime


The Contracting Officer's final decision on the copy change claim
is MODIFIED and the matter is REMANDED to the Contracting Officer
with instructions to pay the Appellant, in accordance with this
decision,  the sum of $2,052.  The Contracting Officer's final
decision on the delay claim is AFFIRMED and the appeal of that
decision is DENIED.

It is so Ordered.

May 27, 1998                     Ronald Berger
Ad Hoc Chairman
Board of Contract Appeals


1 The Contracting Officer's appeal file, assembled pursuant to
Rule 4 of the Board's Rules of Practice and Procedure. was
delivered to the Board on March 9, 1995.  It is referred to as
the Rule 4 File,, with an appropriate Tab number also indicated.
The Rule 4 File consists of 34 tabs, numbered accordingly.
2 A hearing was held in this matter on September 20-21, 1995.
The transcript of the hearing will be referred to as HT with
appropriate page citations.  Exhibits introduced into evidence at
the hearing are identified as App. Exh. or Gov't Exh. followed by
the appropriate number.
3 In Banta Co. an equitable adjustment was allowed because of a
delay in furnishing GFM. However, unlike the comparable clause
used by Executive agencies, see Federal Acquisition Regulation 
52.245-4,  GPO's "Government Furnished Property" clause does not
provide for an equitable adjustment in the event of untimely
delivery of GFM.  Delays in furnishing GFM are instead dealt with
in GPO's "Notice of Compliance With Schedules" clause, GPO
Contract Terms, Contract Clauses,  12, which provides for an
extension of the delivery schedule when such delays occur.  It is
only when the contractor has undertaken performance, a change is
then made to the required performance, and the GFM related to
that change is delayed, that an equitable adjustment for costs
incurred (including down time) as a result of the delay may be
permitted under the "Changes" clause. See New South Press, GPOBCA
45-92 ( November 4, 1994), slip op., 1994 WL 837425,
distinguishing Banta Co., supra.
4 The Appellant's Chairman testified that this makeready charge
was less than the contract price for makeready because that price
encompassed makeready on all the presses.  HT 33, 37.
5 The Board recognizes that there is subjectivity involved in
evaluating the results of the chemical testing of the paper.
While Government agencies are required to establish objective
criteria for measuring the acceptability of a contractor's
deliverables and may not reject those deliverables on the basis
of some subjective determination of unacceptability or
noncompliance, The Standard Register Co., Inc., GPOBCA 25-94
(March 23, 1998), slip op. at 20, 1998 WL ______; Professional
Printing of Kansas, Inc., GPOBCA 02-93 (May 19, 1995), slip op.
at 69, 1995 WL 488488; A & E Copy Center, supra, at 19, in
certain circumstances some subjectivity in determining
acceptability pursuant to established criteria may be
unavoidable.  In the Board's view, such circumstances include
situations where only a "visual" examination is to be made, since
the results depend upon what the viewer believes he or she sees.
See Fry Communications, Inc., GPO 22-84 (February 20, 1986), slip
op. at 17-19, 1986 WL 181462
    6  While the cited cases all involve a contractor's failure
    to await an "OK to print" authorization after submission of
    proofs rather than an approval of paper samples, in at least
    one of the cases the ["m]anufacture ... at the contractor's
    risk" language was virtually the same as in this case, see
    McDonald & Eudy Printers, Inc., supra at 4; moreover, in the
    Board's view, the financial risk on the contractor of
    proceeding without the requisite approval, regardless of
    whether the approval is for a paper sample or a printed
    proof, is the same.
7 To the extent the Appellant is asserting that is was
financially damaged by the delay and is entitled to damages for
idle press time and labor, it is raising a pure breach of
contract claim, over which this Board has no jurisdiction.  The
Wessel Co., Inc., GPOBCA 8-90 (February 28, 1992), slip op., 1992
WL 487877; R.C. Swanson Printing and Typesetting Co., GPOBCA
15-90 (March 6, 1992), slip op., 1992 WL 382924.
    8  The Appellant asserts that it was entitled to a 12-workday
    extension based on a 3-day delay with the January 27 sample
    submission, a 1-day delay on the February 3 submission, and a
    2-day delay in connection with the allegedly defective GFM
    problem.  The Board has already concluded that the GFM was
    not defective.  The "Notice of Compliance With Schedules"
    clause also does not provide for unlimited one-for-one
    "grace" days-there is a limit of three.  The Board is also
    unaware of why the Appellant considers GPO's February 9
    response to the February 3 sample submission to be late-by
    the Board's calculations, the Respondent took only four
    workdays to respond to that sample.  On the other hand, the
    Respondent did take an extra workday (from February 18, the
    date of receipt, HT 196, to February 28) to respond to the
    second set of samples.  Thus, the Board considers that the
    Appellant was entitled to an extension of 3 days for the
    January 27 submission (the Appellant and the Contracting
    Officer agree that GPO received these samples on January 28,
    HT 43, 217) and 1 day for the February 17 submission, plus 3
    grace days, for a total of 7 workdays.
9  Additional costs incurred for accelerated delivery  authorized
by the Contracting Officer are limited to the "actual net
increase in manufacturing expense."  GPO Contract terms, Contract
Clauses,  26 ("Payment for Accelerated Delivery").  See Harry
Hoffman & Sons Printing, GPOBCA 7-86 (April 20, 1987), slip op.
at 3, n.1, 1987 WL 228969.